ISLA Journal Of International And Comparative Law by ISLA Journal Of Comparative Law

ILSA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW
NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
SHEPARD BROAD LAW CENTER
INTERNATIONAL AND PRACTITIONER'S NOTEBOOK EDITION
Volume 10 Spring 2004 Number 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
International And Transnational Justice Initiatives
Playing Hide and Seek with International Justice:
What Went Wrong in Indonesia and East Timor ........... Stefanie Frease 283
New Initiatives in Investment Law: Using Trade Agreements to
'Control' Capital Movement Restrictions
Introduction to the ILW Panel on "New Initiatives
In Investment Law: Using Trade Agreements to
'Control' Capital Movement Restrictions" ....... Cynthia Lichtenstein 293
Using Free Trade Agreements to Control Capital
Account Restrictions: Summary of Remarks on the
Relationship to the Mandate of the I.M.F .................... Deborah Siegel 297
African Countries at the Crossroads of Human Rights Development, the
Rule of Law, and Economic Priorities
Early American Conflicts and Modem African
Practices: A Comparative Commentary on
Constitutionalism ........................................ Gloria J. Browne-Marshall 305
Progress Toward a Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities
NGO Participation in Human Rights Law and Process: Latest
Developments in the Effort to Develop an International
Treaty on the Rights of People with Disabilities .............. Janet E. Lord 311
The Need for a Human Rights.Exception to the U.S.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
Litigating Human Rights Abuses in United States
Courts: Recent Developments ............................... Elizabeth F. Defeis 319
Preventing Genocide: The Role of the United Nations
Preventing Genocide: The Role of the United
Nations ................................................ Ambassador Stanislas Kamanzi 329
Recent Developments in Private International Law
Recent Developments in International Commercial
Arbitration ....................................................... Houston Putnam Lowry 335
A Global Convention on Choice of Court
Agreem ents ................................................................ Ronald A . Brand 345
Preemptive Self-Defense and the War on Iraq
Preemption in the 21 "t Century: What are the Legal
Parameters? ....... . .. . . . . Paul Williams, Scott R. Lyons, & Tali Neuwirth 353
International Whaling Commission: Present Challenges
and Future Prospects
The International Whaling Commission: Challenges
from Within and Without ................................... Howard S. Schiffman 367
Resolution of Claims to Self-Determination: The Expansion and
Creation of Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
Resolution of Claims to Self-Determination: The Expansion and
Creation of Dispute Settlement Mechanisms .................... Valerie Epps 377
Resolving Indigenous Claims to Self-
Determination ............................................................ Lorie M . Graham 385
The Right to Self-Determination and its
Enforcement .................................................... Johan D. van der Vyver 421
Earned Sovereignty: An Emerging Conflict Resolution
Approach ................ Paul R. Williams & Karen Heymann 437
New Challenges and Possible Remedies in Implementing the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in the Corporate Governance of Multiple Listed
Corporations
Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on Multiple Listed Corporations:
Conflicts in Comparative Corporate Laws and
Possible Remedies ......................................... Dr. Sabyasachi Ghoshray 447
Divergence Between the United States and the European
Union on Trade and Other Matters
International Law Association Panel Discussion on
"Divergence Between the United States and the European
Union on Trade and Other Matters" ................ Hunter R. Clark 459
U.S. - E.U. Trade Relations: Sources of Friction
And Prospects for Resolution .............................. Timothy C. Brightbill 467
Universal Criminal Jurisdiction
Address to the American International Law
A ssociation .......................................................................... Tal Becker 477
Women's Human Rights Violations and Sex Trafficking
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking
In Persons-A New Approach ................................. Elizabeth F. Defeis 485
NOTES & COMMENTS
U.N.'s Human Rights Norms for Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises:
An Imperfect Step in the Right Direction? .......................... Surya Deva 493
The Territoriality Inquiry Under the Act of State Doctrine:
Continuing the Search for an Appropriate Application
of Situs of Debt Rules in International Debt
D isputes ...................................................................... Ariel O scar D faz 525
PLAYING HIDE AND SEEK WITH
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: WHAT WENT
WRONG IN INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR
Stefanie Frease
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 283
II. BACKGROUND .......................................... 284
I. ESTABLISHING THE INDONESIAN AD HOC HUMAN RIGHTS COURT .. 286
IV. THE SPECIAL PANELS IN EAST TIMOR ........................ 289
V . CONCLUSION ........................................... 291
Presented at the panel discussion entitled, "Arresting Indicted War
Criminals and Other International Justice Issues at the International
Law Association's, International Law Weekend, Oct. 23, 2003.
I. INTRODUCTION
In discussing the justice processes used in Indonesia and East Timor to
hold individuals accountable for serious violations of international law com-
mitted in East Timor, it is important to emphasize that the problems are rooted
in politics not the rule of law. Political influence is what I'm going to focus on
because it goes to the core of the problems in Indonesia and East Timor and
provides a painful example of what can happen when a justice process becomes
deeply politicized.
Indonesia is a case study of what can go wrong when a country is pre-
maturely entrusted with the responsibility to try individuals for crimes it is
nowhere close to acknowledging. Indonesia also provides an important
example for the International Criminal Court and the principle of "complemen-
tarity," and the real problems that can be encountered when an offending state
is given first (and perhaps only) crack at prosecuting offenders it really wants
to protect, not prosecute.
And, I'm going to talk about East Timor-a case study of what can happen
when a legal system is created on a rickety foundation, in which genuine politi-
cal will and necessary resources are lacking and make the process vulnerable to
influence and manipulation for broader geo-political interests. East Timor is
also a place where cries for justice from the population are loud-they want
Indonesian leaders to be held accountable, and yet East Timor's political leaders
prefer to override these demands in favor of what they hope will become a
strong economic and political relationship with the country's former occupier.
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At the end of my talk, I would like to have persuaded some of you to
contact the United Nations Secretary-General and to ask him to establish a high-
level international review panel of between three and five judges and interna-
tional law experts to review not what happened in East Timor (the crimes are
well-documented), but to review what did not happen and to make recommen-
dations for redressing these omissions.'
II. BACKGROUND
East Timor occupies half an island; the other half, West Timor, is part of
Indonesia's vast archipelago. East Timor had been a Portuguese colony from
the 16th century but in July 1975, Portugal finally withdrew. Five months later,
on December 7, after months of fighting among various Timorese political
parties, Indonesia launched a full-fledged attack, which resulted in the terri-
tory's occupation by Indonesian forces for the next twenty-four years. East
Timor was and remains almost 95% Catholic and the population speaks a local
language, Tetum, and over thirty very distinct local dialects, but also relies
heavily on Bahasa Indonesian (learned during the occupation).2
During Indonesia's twenty-four-year occupation, as much as one quarter
of East Timor's population of about 800,000 was killed by security forces or
died as a result of starvation or abusive conditions. Torture, rape, disappear-
ances and other forms of degradation and domination were prevalent throughout
the period. The Timorese fought a guerilla war with an underground political
movement aimed at securing its independence.
In 1998, the political tides in Indonesia changed and its longtime authori-
tarian President Suharto resigned May 20, 1998, amid sustained popular and
violent protests. Vice President Habibie was sworn-in the same day and one
month later, he reopened the subject of East Timor by offering to grant it limited
autonomy. This offer quickly led to renewed negotiations between Indonesia
and Portugal (with East Timor's pro-independent movement represented by the
Portuguese delegation), and by late January 1999, President Habibie indicated
that Indonesia would withdraw from East Timor if the people voted against
increased autonomy, in favor of independence. Yet, as political agreements
were being negotiated, the Indonesian security services began to train and equip
local militias to intimidate and terrorize the population.
1. A fax can be sent to United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan at 212 963-4879. The
estimated cost for a three-person panel to operate with staff support and travel to the region over a nine-month
period is approximately $700,000.
2. Portuguese and Teturn were adopted as East Timor's official languages following its
independence but as a practical matter, Bahasa Indonesia is widely used. The issue of language has created
tension especially between the ruling elite, many of whom spent substantial time in Portugal or Mozambique
during the occupation and do not speak Bahasa, and the younger generation who do not speak Portuguese.
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On May 5, 1999, a series of three agreements were signed. The first agree-
ment outlined the terms of a popular referendum in which the people of East
Timor could vote for more autonomy within Indonesia, or reject the offer of
autonomy, placing East Timor on the path toward independence.3 A United
Nations presence was contemplated under either outcome to ensure a smooth
transition from the vote to implementation. The second agreement addressed
security concerns and gave Indonesian police sole responsibility for maintaining
law and order while calling on the armed forces and police to maintain
neutrality.4 The third agreement set forth modalities for conducting the vote,
including a referendum target date of August 8, 1999.'
These landmark agreements included a tight timeline for United Nations
action. On June 11, 1999, the Security Council established UNAMET (United
Nations Mission in East Timor) and rapidly deployed a small contingent of
personnel to register voters, ensure the popular referendum would be conducted
in a free and fair manner, and provide an objective assessment of the security
situation.
Security matters were a serious concern and hundreds of East Timorese
were killed as Indonesian security forces formed local militias to intimidate
citizens who favored independence. In 1999, there were two periods of
heightened violence instigated by Indonesian security forces and militias. The
first period began in late January 1999 and culminated in April 1999 before the
May 5 agreements. It was evidenced by murder, torture, rape and displacement.
The second period began right after the referendum vote on August 30 when
violence was at a low, but constant boil for five days. Then on September 4,
1999 when the referendum results were announced and more than 78% of the
population opted for independence, violence exploded. For the next two weeks,
the Indonesian military unleashed its security forces and home-grown East
Timorese militias in an impressively synchronized offensive that United Nations
employees described as nothing short of a "scorched earth" policy.6
3. Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the Question
of East Timor, May 5, 1999, Indon.-Port.-U.N., available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/agreementl
agreeFrame.Eng0l.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
4. East Timor Popular Consultation Agreement Regarding Security, May 5, 1999, Indon.-Port.-
U.N., available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/agreement/agreeFrameEngO4.html (last visited Jan.
21, 2004).
5. Agreement Regarding the Modalities for the Popular Consultation of the East Timorese through
a Direct Ballot, May 5, 1999, Indon.-Port.-U.N., available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/agreement/
agreeFrame-Eng03.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2004). Voter registration was set back by three weeks due to
security issues at the beginning of the process. This subsequently pushed back the date of the referendum to
Aug. 30, 1999.
6. Indonesia's Scorched Earth Policy Levels East Timor (Australian Broadcasting Corporation,
Sept. 27, 1999), available at http://www.abc.net.auf7.30/stories/s55114.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2004);
Associated Press, U.N. Official In E Timor Says World Community Miscalculated, Nov. 18, 1999, available
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By the time the 1999 violence ended, about 80% of the territory's infra-
structure was destroyed, hundreds of thousands of people were displaced
including nearly 200,000 who were pushed across the border into West Timor,
around 1,300 were dead, women had been raped and the entire population was
absolutely terrorized. I first went to East Timor one year later, in September
2000, and I was shocked by the near total destruction of not only the capital Dili
but also other towns and villages I visited. This easily compared to the worst
devastation I saw during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, Vukovar and the
frontline areas in Sarajevo and Mostar.
I. ESTABLISHING THE INDONESIAN AD HOC HUMAN RIGHTS COURT
As a result of this gratuitous violence and Indonesia's brutal and retaliatory
actions, there was hot discussion in capitals around the world and among human
rights advocates and lawyers as to how Indonesia could be held to account for
the serious violations of international law perpetrated by its forces and persons
acting under its authority. At that time, the focus was on crimes committed in
1999 when the violence was perceived as an enormous slap to the international
community after, against better judgment the Indonesian military had been
entrusted to do what it said it would do-provide security. At the time, many
talked about establishing another ad hoc international criminal tribunal similar
to those of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to try top-level Indonesian
offenders. However, there was little political appetite. Those Tribunals were
expensive, relatively slow moving, and politically cumbersome to negotiate.
Where, for example, would a Tribunal for East Timor be seated? What would
be its temporal jurisdiction? Would it go back to the time of occupation and
possibly, implicate the United States, or would it go back further to crimes
committed during East Timor's brief civil war and point to individuals now in
positions of power? It was also an election year in the United States and
pushing for an international ad hoc criminal tribunal to try Indonesian generals
would likely have created a political backlash from Indonesia's powerful United
States lobby.
Predictably, the idea of an ad hoc court was not popular with the Indo-
nesian military and political leaders. They said they would not send their
generals to a foreign court and that they could be trusted to try them themselves
along with others responsible for the violence. So, late in 1999 after Indonesia
had withdrawn from East Timor and the United Nations had begun to establish
its mission to help the territory recover and move toward statehood, the
at http://www.etan.orglet99c/november/14-20/18unoffi.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2004); Ian Timberlake, The
Man Who Organized the Timor Vote Looks Back With Few Regrets, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 21, 1999;
Marian Wilkinson National Affairs Editor, Exposed: Indonesia's Scorched Earth Plan, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Jan. 31, 2000.
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international community embraced the idea of creating two parallel justice
systems. One, in Indonesia to try high-level Indonesian officials and another in
East Timor, under United Nations-auspices as part of the United Nations'
transitional administration, to focus primarily on East Timorese offenders. It
seemed at the time to be the most viable political solution.
And this could have been a rather elegant solution, given genuine political
will. However, Indonesia was defiant and manipulative all along the way.
Throughout the process, it acted only when pressured and then only did the bare
minimum to deflect pressure until the next time-they took a hide-and-seek
approach to delivering justice. Mostly, Indonesia did the hiding and the inter-
national community did the seeking, but sometimes the international community
hid, too.
First, Indonesia tried to avoid establishing a judicial process all together,
but pressure was applied, and the ad hoc Human Rights Court in Indonesia was
established. Then, the mandate was severely restricted to cover only crimes
committed after August 1999. Again, pressure was applied, and the mandate
was expanded to include two distinct months (April and September) of 1999 and
three municipalities (not all thirteen). One strategy reportedly used by the
Secretary-General with the Indonesians was to tell them that if their process
were a failure there would be more pressure on the United Nations to sponsor
its own tribunal. The underlying message, of course, was for the Indonesians
to do just enough to prevent any momentum from building for another ad hoc
international court.
When Indonesian prosecutors finally issued indictments, eighteen indivi-
duals were charged, including some important military and police commanders,
but notably lacking from the list was General Wiranto, Defense Minister and
Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces during the relevant time (and now
a Presidential candidate).7 His indictment had been anticipated after he was
identified by Komnas-HAM, a governmental human rights body, as being most
responsible for the violence in 1999 in an excellent report issued on January 31,
2000.8 When trials finally began in 2002 there were many problems, among
which, witnesses and judges were intimidated by the presence of military
officers and militia members in the gallery who made menacing comments;
Indonesian prosecutors, some believing that the military were heroes, failed to
present all available evidence; prosecutors often recommended below-minimum
standard sentences; judges were poorly trained, lacked resources and were
unable to exert adequate control in the courtroom.
7. National Journal Group, Ex-Indonesian Military Chief Wiranto Seeks Presidency, U.N. WIRE,
Aug. 7, 2003; Abdul Khalik, Key BNI Suspect Arrested, JAKARTA POST, Nov. 20, 2003.
8. Action in Solidarity with Asia and the Pacific, Indonesian Commission of Investigation into
Human Rights Violations Report, Jan. 31, 2000, http://asia-pacific-action.orglsoutheastasialeasttimor/
resources/reports/comnaset.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
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In the end, the trials also produced a distorted legal record of events. The
official court record portrays the violence in East Timor as a purely East
Timorese conflict in which Indonesia benevolently intervened to separate two
fighting parties. After the first two verdicts were announced in August 2002,
the Secretary-General felt compelled to release a statement and clarify that there
had not, in fact, been irregularities in the United Nations' vote-counting which
Indonesian judges, prosecutors and defendants stated had contributed to the
widespread violence.9 At the same time, the United States also issued a
statement in which it pronounced its disappointment that "prosecutors in these
cases did not fully use the resources and evidence available to them from the
United Nations and elsewhere."1° In the verdicts of the six people charged, five
were acquitted and one was convicted. Those acquitted were all members of
Indonesia's security services, four in the army and one in the police. The
conviction was of the former civilian governor of East Timor, Abiio Soares,
who himself was Timorese, not Indonesian. He was sentenced to three years for
murder and persecution as crimes against humanity.
Of the eighteen individuals tried by the Indonesian Human Rights Court,
twelve were acquitted, and six convicted with shockingly low sentences. All
convicted remain free pending appeal even though only one has actually filed
an appeal. The last trial resulted in the three-year sentence of General Damiri
who at the time oversaw all military operations for East Timor from his base in
Bali. Not only did the prosecution recommend he be acquitted but he missed
four consecutive hearings during his trial-he was busy with other matters.
Where? In Aceh province, where he was overseeing the government's brutal
clampdown on pro-independence supporters.1 2 He, too, remains free pending
an appeal, which has not been filed.
9. Press Release, U.N. News, Anna Speaks Out Against Allegations of Irregularities in U.N.-
Backed East Timor Vote, Aug. 25, 2002, available at http://www.unnews.co.kr/pdf/pd_01 1/0111 .pdf (last
visited Jan. 21, 2004); Press Release, U.N. News, Secretary-General Endorses Human Rights Commissioner's
Concerns Over Indonesia Tribunal (Aug. 8, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/
sgsm8338.doc.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
10. Reuters, U.S. Criticizes Prosecutors in East Timor Trial, Aug. 19, 2002, available at
http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/News/20_8_02.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2004).
11. Five indicted for Suai Church massacre, Herman Sedyono, Lieutenant Colonel former Bupati
(District Chief) of Covalima District; Liliek Kushadianto, Lieutenant Colonol former commander Suai District
Military Command; Ahmad Syamsudin, Captain and former chief-of-staff of Suai District Military Command;
Sugito, Lieutenant and former Commander of Suai Military Sector Command; Colonel Gatot Subiyaktoro,
Lieutenant and former police chief of Suai; see International Center for Transitional Justice, Intended to Fail:
The Trials Before the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court in Jakarta: app. 1, http://www.ictj.org/downloads/
intendedtofailwithannexes--final.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2004).
12. Indonesian General on Aceh Duty Again Skips His Trial for Rights Abuses, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, May 22, 2003; LaksamanaNet, White Flag from Prosecutors, June 8, 2003, available at
http://www.laksamana.net/print.cfm?id=5507 (last visited Jan. 24, 2004).
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IV. THE SPECIAL PANELS IN EAST TIMOR
I am reluctant to be too critical of the East Timorese judicial process
because for a long time it seemed like a hopeful and novel approach to resolving
some of the tough issues, and there have been some very dedicated people
working to ensure the process moved ahead and victims were heard. Two years
ago I would have been extremely upbeat, today I am less so. But there is some
good news coming out of the trial process in East Timor although the people of
East Timor are still far from achieving the justice they deeply desire and
deserve.
Despite being chronically under-resourced, the prosecution unit set up in
East Timor under United Nations direction has accomplished a lot in its short
and difficult life. As of December 2003, the Unit has filed 81 indictments with
the Special Panels charging a total of 369 people. Of those indicted, 281
accused remain at large and are presumed to be in Indonesia, including across
the border in West Timor. Forty-six accused have been convicted and sentenced
to terms ranging between four and thirty-four years, one has been acquitted. 3
In October 1999, the United Nations established its transitional administra-
tion to help East Timor on its way toward independence (which it declared in
May 2002). In March 2000, the United Nations' mission in East Timor passed
a regulation that listed crimes over which the District Court in Dili, East
Timor's capital, would have exclusive jurisdiction. It listed genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and certain "ordinary" crimes (namely murder,
sexual offenses and torture).
The Regulation stipulated that special panels of judges, composed of both
East Timorese and international judges, could be established to hear these cases.
It also clarified that forming such panels did not preclude the jurisdiction of an
international tribunal for East Timor in the event such a tribunal was estab-
lished.
Three months later, in June 2000, the Special Panels were formed. They
are composed of one East Timorese and two international judges. There are
now two such panels and they have jurisdiction to try the serious crimes
mentioned above committed prior to October 25, 1999, the date the United
Nations' mission was established.
The temporal jurisdiction of the panels is an example of one-way
accountability efforts in East Timor have been undermined. While the panels
have the authority to look back at crimes committed before October 25, 1999,
the prosecution unit has repeatedly focused on crimes committed solely in 1999,
claiming it only has jurisdiction over this period. The United Nations' hired
13. Tim Alfa Militiamen Found Not Guilty of 1999 Murder of Los Palos King but Convicted of
Violence Against Property or Persons U.N. Serious Crimes Unit Press Release, (Dec. 15, 2003) (on file with
author).
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personnel in the Unit decided early on that it would investigate ten priority cases
focusing on serious events that occurred in 1999. In 2003, the Unit completed
its investigations and indictments on these cases. But rather than pursuing some
of the pre-1999 cases, the Unit has now busied itself with indicting crimes that
occurred in every district in 1999, regrettably ensuring it has no time or
resources to look back in time.
The Unit estimates that 1,300 people were killed in 1999 and that at least
one individual could be indicted for each murder. But to what end? What, in
fact is the purpose of indicting hundreds of individuals if a serious effort is not
made to ensure they end up in custody? This has been another anomaly to the
process in East Timor. Even though the United Nations' transitional administra-
tor for East Timor managed early on to secure a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with the Indonesian government to cooperate with the Unit and to
extradite people to East Timor, no pressure was ever applied and the MOU
became meaningless after the first United Nations mandate expired at the time
East Timor gained its independence.
In February 2003, the prosecution received its biggest disappointment
when, after years of work, it issued its highest-level indictment against eight
top-ranking Indonesians, including General Wiranto."4 Of those indicted, five
had been nominally prosecuted in Indonesia's ad hoc Human Rights Court,
including two who were acquitted and three who were sentenced to between
three and five years by the Indonesian court. The United Nations immediately
distanced itself saying it was not a United Nations' indictment but one issued
by the East Timorese government.
The Unit was devastated by this response, since the Secretary-General him-
self in April 2002, just ten months earlier, in his report to the Security Council
stated that the Serious Crimes Unit would "focus its investigations on ten
priority cases and on those persons who had organized, ordered, instigated or
otherwise aided in the planning, preparation and execution of the crimes." 5
14. In addition to General Wiranto, the following individuals were indicted by the Serious Crimes
Unit on Feb. 24, 2003: Major General Zacky Anwar Makarim, Head of Special Team of the Indonesian
Armed Forces (TNI); Major General Kiki Syahnakri, Commander of the Martial Law Operations Command
in East Timor; Major General Adam Rachmat Damiri, Commander of the Regional Military Command IX
covering East Timor, Colonel Suhartono Suratman, Commander of the Sub-Regional Military Command 164
in East Timor until Aug. 13, 1999, Colonel Mohammad Noer MUIS, Commander of the Sub-Regional
Military Command 164 in East Timor from Aug. 13 1999, Lt. Colonel Yayat Sudrajat, Commander of the
Tribuana VIII Task Force and Commander of the Intelligence Task Force Sub-Regional Military Command
164 in East Timor, Governor Abilio Jose Osorio Soares, Governor of East Timor; see East Timor Action
Network, Crimes Against Humanity Charges for Former Indonesian Minister of Defense, Top Indonesian
Military Commanders and East Timor Governor, Feb. 25, 2003, available at http://www.etan.org/et2003/
february/23-28/28info.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
15. Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East
Timor, U.N. SCOR, S/2002/432, at 12 (Apr. 17, 2002).
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Given the clarity of this statement it was a surprise to the Unit, the East
Timorese government and those of us advocating justice for East Timor, when
the Secretary-General's office backed away from its previous support.
Despite its best efforts, there are several indications that the Unit has con-
tinued to face tremendous political pressure from the United Nations, friendly
governments, Indonesia and even the East Timorese government, to curb the
Unit's work. Being a United Nations-established and United Nations-supported
body it relies entirely on allocations made to it. The United Nations' current
mandate expires in May 2004 and discussions are underway about the level to
which the Unit will continue to receive support. In October 2003, it appeared
almost certain the mandate of the Prosecution section and judges panels would
be extended. It is less clear now.
V. CONCLUSION
Indonesia and East Timor have a lot to teach us about how things can get
off track if political interests trump the genuine desire to uncover the truth and
hold individuals accountable for serious international crimes. The same poten-
tial for abuse and manipulation exists within the International Criminal Court,
which relies heavily on the principle of "complementarity," the principle that
gives States first chance to investigate and prosecute individuals believed to be
responsible for serious violations of international law. Holding such trials is
difficult under any circumstances, but it is particularly difficult for countries
emerging from years of bitter-armed conflict and oppression.
It is critical that no one hide behind a country's promises if there is no
reason to believe the promise is being made in good faith. It is not difficult to
judge sincerity-actions do speak louder than words. No one was surprised that
Indonesia made a mockery of the justice process it established but you will still
find people who say, "but we cannot really judge the process until all the
appeals have been completed." Well, what if the appeals are never filed, should
we continue to deceive ourselves into believing for the next five, ten, fifteen
years that Indonesia is on the brink of making good on its broken promises? 16
Misplaced trust in such circumstances is damaging on multiple levels. There is
a real fear that half-measures in justice only sow the seeds of future dissent by
producing a false historic record and creating deep-seated resentment and anger
16. On December 2, 2003, the South China Morning Post reported that Eurico Guterres, head of the
notorious Aitarak militia in East Timor, had recently formed a militia in Papua despite his 10-year conviction
by the Indonesian ad hoc Human Rights Court. Following his conviction, he has remained free pending an
appeal, which has not been filed. Further, the article revealed that Timbul Silaen, former Indonesian chief of
police in East Timor in 1999 whose acquittal by the Jakarta court was widely criticized, will head up the police
in Papua, replacing outgoing police chief, Budi Utomo. See Marianne Kearney, Timor's Guterres Forms
Papua Militia, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 2, 2003, available at http://iiasnt.leidenuniv.nl:8080/
DR/2003/12/DR_2003_12_03/2 (last visited Jan. 24, 2004).
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among the victimized populations. Serbia is a good example. Policy makers
currently point to Serbia as a perfect candidate for national trials, yet neither the
government, nor its citizens are yet willing to acknowledge any serious level of
responsibility for the wars that tore-through that region in the 1990's.
Such actions also undermine confidence (including investor confidence)
in not only a country's legal system but in its political system and in its ability
to deal fairly and create a stable environment over the long-term.
To try to offset some of the damage done in Indonesia and East Timor,
there is a push, as I mentioned at the beginning, to create a high-level review
commission comprised of between three and five judges and international law
experts to review the legal processes employed in Indonesia and East Timor.
It was an effort initiated here in New York by the International Center for
Transitional Justice, Human Rights Watch, Etan, Amnesty International and
others working with Sergio de Mello, East Timor's first transitional administra-
tor, who was also guiding this process. Since his unfortunate death in Iraq, the
effort to form the commission has moved to the Secretary-General's Office, but
it has not been received energetically.
Frankly, evidence indicates that the Secretary-General and many other
political leaders, including the United States administration, would like to see
justice for East Timor and Indonesia taken off the table especially given the war
on terrorism and Indonesia's important role in that fight. We must ensure this
does not happen. It is challenging to weigh immediate political exigencies with
the long-term commitment required in seeing through a justice process. Hold-
ing abusers accountable for serious violations of international law has become
a tool political leaders can use. Once employed, there must be a long-term and
steady commitment to seeing the process through-anything short, sends a
confusing message and provides an opportunity for hardliners to undermine the
peace process, obfuscate the truth, and ultimately create future instability.
In one of Judge Patricia Wald's cases before the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, she eloquently warned that "pragmatism should
not be allowed to trump principle or the soul of a nation will wither."' 7 Here I
believe we are considering the essence of international justice and the risk of
undermining its credibility over the long-term by politicizing the process. The
United Nations sees a role in justice for itself in the future but the organization
must do right by the processes it has already begun in order to ensure a solid
foundation is established upon which we can build with confidence.
17. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
INTRODUCTION TO THE ILW PANEL ON "NEW
INITIATIVES IN INVESTMENT LAW: USING
TRADE AGREEMENTS TO 'CONTROL' CAPITAL
MOVEMENT RESTRICTIONS"
Cynthia Lichtenstein
The Panel speakers on this topic were Deborah Siegel, Esq., Senior Coun-
sel, Legal Department, International Monetary Fund (whose paper follows),
Professor Jagdish Bhagwati, University Professor, Columbia University (giving
the viewpoint of an economist), and Mr. James Wallace, standing in for Randall
Quarels, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, United States Department
of the Treasury. The Treasury Department was at the forefront of the negotia-
tion of the "transfers" provisions of the recently concluded United States-Chile
and United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreements, which were discussed by
the Panel. Cynthia Lichtenstein, the organizer and moderator of the Panel,
introduced the topic as follows:
The subject matter of this Panel is the "free transfers" provision that the
United States government has recently been inserting into the bilateral free trade
agreements that it has been negotiating with a number of countries. Such a
provision appears in the investment chapter contained in the most recent free
trade agreements, namely with Singapore and Chile, and the Fact Sheet on
United States-Singapore free transfers (which may be found at www.ustr.gov)
states that "retaining the principle of free transfers sends a strong signal to the
markets that the U.S. and Singapore support the free flow of capital and
recognize its importance in economic development." That Fact Sheet also
provides that "The free transfers provision of the Singapore FTA meets an
important Trade Promotion Authority... objective-'freeing the transfer of
funds relating to investments."'
The background to these transfer provisions is important to consider. We
all know that there is an important linkage between both trade in goods and
services and payments for those goods and services, and that payments are made
in currency. Thus the GATT and WTO efforts at liberalization of trade are
paralleled by the IMF Agreement provisions outlawing restrictions on payments
for current transactions. Equally, when an investor wants to take out of the host
country dividends or interest on a foreign direct investment, the investor needs
to be allowed to convert the host country currency dividends or interest into a
currency that the investor needs.
Now, it is possible to extend these concepts further: if what one is trying
to create, as the European Community is in the process of doing, is an integrated
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financial market, it is necessary to provide for free convertibility for short term
investments, or what we call "portfolio investments." However, for a legal
system to provide that currency will be freely transferable not only for current
payments (as is the obligation of most parties to the International Monetary
Fund Agreement), but also for all capital investments whether short term or long
term, is a bit more problematic for the host government. Macroeconomic
management may require the ability to staunch, extreme, and sudden capital
outflows.
This problem does not arise in the case of foreign direct investment, which
by definition involves control of a host country enterprise. The foreign investor
cannot in any event instantaneously withdraw his investment since the investor
will want to get the control premium on resale of the investment as well as any
appreciation. However, in the case of short term investments in debt or equity,
so-called "hot money flows," the investor wants assurance that it can take its
money and run at the first sign of economic difficulty of the host country. There
is considerable academic writing today on this phenomenon of herd behavior in
the case of short-term capital inflows. It is this desire on the part of portfolio
investors to have convertibility at the very moment that a better return is sighted
elsewhere that may be considered to necessitate the inclusion in any transfer
provisions in a treaty of a safeguards clause.
It may be noted that the grandparent of all investment agreements with a
free transfer clause, the aborted Multinational Investment Agreement which was
being drafted under the auspices of the OECD (the "MAr'), in its last draft of
the definition of "investment" (which was highly inclusive as is the definition
in the most recent United States bilateral Free Trade Agreements, covering not
only direct investment but also all forms of intangible property), contained a
footnote to the definition that said: "The Negotiating Group agrees that this
broad definition of investment calls for further work on appropriate safeguard
provisions."
However, the United States-Chile and United States-Singapore free trade
agreements' transfer provisions do not include any safeguard clauses. What I
wanted to tell you, as an introduction to the Panel, is the history of the European
Community's handling of capital controls in the process of their creation of their
financial single market, as I think that history is rather enlightening. In the
process of creating a "single market" as the European Community's economic
integration process is called, a detailed history of the liberalization of inter-
member state capital movements is given in Bermann, Goebel, Davey, and Fox,
European Union Law, 2nd Ed., in their Chapter thirty two on Free Movement
of Capital and the Integrated Financial Market. I cannot give here all of that
detail, but very briefly, by 1988, after the Commission's 1985 White Paper on
Completing the Internal Market urged greater liberalization of capital move-
ments, the Community enacted Directive 88/361 to implement then Article 67
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of the Treaty of Rome. Briefly, that Directive required abolition of all restric-
tions on movements of capital taking place between persons resident in the
member states. However, its Article 3 provided that "where short-term capital
movements of exceptional magnitude impose severe strains on foreign exchange
markets and lead to serious disturbances in the conduct of a member state's
monetary and exchange rate policies," the Commission, after certain consulta-
tions, might authorize the member state to take protective measures, "the
conditions and details of which the Commission shall determine." In short, a
safeguard clause was provided, but the measures taken by the states in an
emergency would be overseen by the Commission. Paragraph two of Article 3
permitted the member state itself to take the protective measures "on grounds
of urgency should those measures be necessary." In this case, the Commission
was to decide whether the member state might continue to apply the measures,
or whether it should amend or abolish them, and in any event, the period of
application of the protective measures was limited to six months.
Now with the introduction of the Euro for twelve of the fifteen member
states, and a unified control of monetary policy for those twelve states, the
Treaty was amended by the Maastrict Agreement to impose an absolute
prohibition of all restrictions on the movement of capital, not only between
member states, but also between member states and third countries. However,
the Council was given authority in Article 57 to adopt measures on the
movement of capital to or from third countries "involving direct investment...
the provision of financial services or the admission of securities to capital
markets." Equally, Article 59 gives the Council the power to take "safeguard
measures with regard to third countries for a period not exceeding six months
if such measures are strictly necessary."
What then of restrictions on capital movements imposed by member states
not forming part of Euroland? Article 56 of the Treaty would seem to forbid
them without any safeguard provision whatsoever. However, it may be noted
that the earlier Directive permitting the use of safeguards has not been repealed
and conceivably could be applied by the three outsiders. It will be extremely
interesting to see what the situation is for the newly acceding ten member states
who surely will not at first become part of the European Monetary Union. Will
they be required to completely liberalize capital movements in accordance with
Article 56? Presumably, however, Directive 88/361 remains on the books, and
in any event, Article 59 of the Treaty continues to allow the Council, after
consulting the European Central Bank, to take safeguard measures with respect
to any difficulties that the new member states might experience with respect to
their currencies from inflows or outflows from third countries. Thus, the
European Union has not opted for the kind of free transfers provisions that the
United States has negotiated with Singapore and Chile.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States recently signed separate Free Trade Agreements (FTA' s)
with Singapore and Chile. The agreements contain similar chapters on invest-
ment rules. These chapters seek to increase investment between the signatories
through the articulation of strong disciplines, including by providing for free
transfers of funds related to covered investments. This is a laudable goal insofar
as increased trade and investment flows can be beneficial and clear rules on
transfers prevent arbitrary administration of exchange transactions. Nonethe-
less, the FTA's blanket prohibitions on capital restrictions, even in the context
of an economic and financial crisis, raises concerns about the ability of
signatories to manage macroeconomic imbalances and consistency with the
work of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Furthermore, the "cooling off"
provisions of the dispute resolution provisions-while innovative-are not a
substitute for clear legal rules on a balance of payments safeguard and
consistency within the IMF Articles of Agreement. This note discusses how the
rules of these investment chapters overlap with the law and work of the IMF,
particularly in the context of managing economic and financial crises that affect
its membership and the international community writ large.'
* Deborah E. Siegel holds the position of Senior Counsel, Legal Department International
Monetary Fund. This article expresses the personal views of the author and does not necessarily represent the
views of the institution. It does take into account, however, discussion of related issues in the IMF's
Executive Board and other work by the IMF staff.
1. Much of the analysis herein is drawn from an article by Mr. Sean Hagan, Deputy General
Counsel, Legal Department, IMF, published in U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., TRANSFER OF FUNDS, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IT/23, U.N. Sales No. E.00.ILD.38 (2000).
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11. INCREASED PROMINENCE OF INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS
While the investment rules covered in these FTA's are similar in many
respects to the disciplines contained in Bilateral Investment Agreements
(BIT's), it is significant that they are not stand-alone BIT's. The FTA's in
which they are included necessarily cover a range of commercial transactions
that is broader than BIT's. Indeed, in order to be consistent with the most
favored nation requirement of the WTO Agreements, the FTA' s are required to
cover "substantially all trade" (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), Article XXIV.) Thus, these agreements are likely to have significantly
more impact in increasing commercial activity between the parties than would
a stand-alone BIT.
Use of investment agreements for a wide range of transactions has already
begun to expand. Traditional BIT's include a broad definition of investment
that allows for evolving coverage of new instruments even though they
originally focused in practice on foreign direct investment and (somewhat later)
financial instruments associated with an enterprise. Depending on the text of
the agreements, investors in "hot money" transactions (e.g., high yield overnight
deposits and other derivative financial products) could seek protections of the
investment rules. Two features of the recent FTA's accentuate this phenome-
non-their public notoriety and their explicit coverage of various financial
products as investments. It is possible that this visibility will attract speculative
capital flows more than under a traditional BIT, as well as legal action under the
investor-state arbitration rules should recourse to capital controls or other
measures arise in the context of economic or financial sector crises.
An increasing number of regional or bilateral agreements are including
chapters with investment rules. The United States has stated, moreover, that it
intends to "raise the bar" in terms of scope and level of commitment in such
agreements. Still, recent experience has highlighted the unexpected nature of
economic and financial crises. Thus, even for relatively stable countries like
Singapore and Chile, the potential liability associated with the prohibition on
any exchange controls, even temporary controls in the context of a crisis, is
worrisome. To the extent that these provisions serve as models for future
agreements with higher risk countries, this concern is more pronounced and
could potentially interfere with the support that the international community
expects from the IMF.
E. IMF MANDATE ON RELATED MATTERS
The rules in investment agreements overlap with the mandate of the IMF
in several ways. Although the Fund is best known for its financing function, it
also has important regulatory powers. The purposes of the IMF include
promoting international monetary cooperation and assisting in the establishment
of a multilateral system of payments in respect of current international
transactions (IMF Articles of Agreement, Article I, paragraphs (i) and (iv)). To
this end, members are prohibited from imposing restrictions on the making of
payments and transfers for current international transactions without the
approval of the IMF (Article VIII, Section 2(a)), with a limited exception related
to restrictions existing at the time the country joined the IMF (Article XIV).
This area of the IMF's mandate constitutes the IMF's jurisdiction; refraining
from such restrictions constitutes an obligation of members, for which they
could be subject to sanctions from the IMF. The Fund may also ask a member
to restrict capital transfers.
The overlap between the investment chapters' and the Fund's jurisdiction
extends beyond the FTA's coverage of current account payments and transfers
(e.g., interest and dividends). The definition in the IMF Articles of "current
international transactions" is not limited to the prevalent concept of payments
and transfers for trade in goods and services, but extends to transactions covered
in the investment agreements that would be considered "capital" in other
contexts. Such transactions include moderate amounts for amortization of
principal on debt instruments and for depreciation of direct investments (Article
XXX(d)).
The IMF Articles authorize the IMF to "approve" restrictions on payments
and transfers for current international transactions that are subject to its
jurisdiction when these restrictions are needed for balance of payments reasons.
This power in the Articles reflects the recognition of the membership that it may
be necessary to impose restrictions in times of severe balance of payments
crisis. The IMF has established policies on criteria for approval of restrictions
which require, besides that these restrictions be necessary for balance of
payments reasons, that they refrain from discriminating among IMF members
and be temporary; approval is usually for one year. Restrictions imposed for
national security reasons are subject to a separate approval procedure (Decision
144-(52/51)).
Management of the capital account and the control of the outflow of
foreign exchange is, of course, also important in the IMF' s financing function.
Another purpose of the IMF is to make available temporary balance of
payments financing in times of balance of payments difficulties and in support
of programs of macroeconomic stabilization and structural reform (Article I,
paragraph (v)). The availability of IMF resources normally plays a catalytic role
for financing from the rest of the international community.
Financing alone is rarely a solution, however, and indeed may not stop the
hemorrhaging associated with an economic and financial crisis. Thus, in cases
of severe balance of payments crisis, it may be necessary for the country to
impose exchange restrictions on a temporary basis to safeguard its balance of
payments. Nonetheless, the IMF's discussions with the member will focus on
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the fact that the circumstances giving rise to the crisis will normally require the
member to adjust its underlying economic policies over the medium or long
term. This understanding will be reflected in the conditionality associated with
the IMF's financial support. However, even if adjustment measures are
undertaken immediately (and others will take time to implement) they are
unlikely to have their intended effect right away. Thus, should a circumstance
arise where it is appropriate for the member to impose exchange restrictions, the
key point is the temporary nature of such restrictions, as prolonged reliance on
restrictions will both delay recovery and make the implementation of the
necessary reforms more painful.
There are three key provisions in the IMF Articles relevant to the potential
for temporary restrictions on foreign exchange outflows. The first is Article
VIII, Section 2(a) which, as noted above, contemplates approval for restrictions
on payments and transfers for current international transactions (as defined
under Article XXX(d)). The approval function under Article VIII, Section 2(a)
is not limited to countries receiving Fund financing and serves as an exception
to the obligation to refrain from such restrictions.
The other two provisions related to the possible imposition of restrictions
on foreign exchange outflows are contained in Article VI of the LMF Articles
of Agreement. Under Section 3, restrictions imposed on capital transactions do
not require the IMF's approval. However, according to Section 1 of that
Article, under a provision designed to safeguard its resources, the IMF may
"request" that a member using IMF resources impose capital controls to prevent
a large or sustained outflow of capital. The scope of this latter provision is
broad in the sense that it applies to any capital outflow; in other words, it is not
limited to the payments and transfers for capital transactions defined as
"current" in Article XXX(d). The legal status of the request is not an obligation.
The member is not required to impose the restrictions or be faced with breach
of obligation; rather the request is a condition for Fund financing, in that failure
to comply could lead to a declaration of ineligibility to use Fund resources.
The IMF's surveillance function also comprises the review of a member's
capital account policies. Under Article IV of its Articles, the IMF exercises
surveillance over members' economic, financial, and exchange rate policies.
Conducting surveillance is an obligation of the Fund, as well as of the member.
Surveillance involves comprehensive discussions of each member's economic
policies as well as member's exchange and payments system, especially with a
view to the effect on its exchange rate. IMF surveillance has given increasing
attention to capital account issues, as capital flows are increasingly important
means of allocating savings, promoting growth, and facilitating balance of
payments adjustment. Capital account restrictions may also feature surveillance
in any case where a country's use of capital restrictions is directed at attempting
to support inappropriate exchange rate policies.
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IV. PROBLEMS WITH INCONSISTENT APPROACHES
The absence in either of the two FTA' s of a balance of payments safeguard
or a reference to consistency with the IMF's Articles raises important concerns
with respect to the work of the Fund.
First, from a jurisdictional perspective, the FTA's could give rise to
inconsistent rights and obligations vis-A-vis the IMF Articles of Agreement. To
the extent that an FTA covers transactions that would be defined as "current"
payments and transfers under the IMF' s Articles (Article XXX(d)), they overlap
with IMF jurisdiction under Article VIII, Section 2(a). For example, the FTA's
require the signatories to permit transfers comprising dividends, interest, royalty
payments, management and other fees, payments made under a contract entered
into by the investor or the covered investor, including payments (e.g.,
amortization) made pursuant to a loan agreement, which would all be subject to
the RMF's jurisdiction.
In the event of a financial crisis in which the signatory may be forced to
impose restrictions, it may consider restrictions on countries that are not FTA
signatories, in order to avoid acting inconsistently with the FTA prohibitions.
But, restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions
are subject to approval by the LMF and one condition for such approval is
nondiscrimination among members of the Fund. Because a restriction by an
FTA country against non-FTA countries would discriminate among the Fund's
membership, it could not be approved under the IMF's policies and would
therefore be inconsistent with the member's obligations under Article VIII,
Section 2(a).
Conversely, the parties to the FTA agreement could be subject to
inconsistent treaty provisions if a restriction were approved by the IMF but were
not permitted under the FTA agreement. This could happen if the FTA does not
permit an IMF member to exercise its right to impose a restriction that is
consistent with the Fund's Articles (e.g., one approved under Article VIII,
Section 2(a) or maintained under Article XIV). This inconsistency could be
avoided in treaty drafting. For example, when the work of the World Trade
Organization was expanded to include service transactions, the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), was drafted to include exceptions to
the transfer obligation for measures imposed consistently with the IMF's
Articles.
Second, the absence of a balance of payments safeguard is particularly
striking in view of the IMF's financing function. Because of Article VI, Section
1 of the Fund's Articles described above, the FTA's create a risk that in
complying with its obligations under the FTA, a member could be rendered
ineligible to use the Fund's resources under the Fund's Articles. Chile and
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Singapore are relatively mature markets with a solid record of macroeconomic
and financial sector management and, given the availability of more sophisti-
cated and less costly policy tools, are unlikely to resort to capital control
measures. Nonetheless, despite improvements in crisis prevention analysis, a
risk remains that economic and financial crises may emerge in countries where
they are not anticipated. Moreover, given that these provisions are likely to
serve as models for future agreements, the implications are different for other
emerging and developing countries with limited capacity to absorb balance of
payments or financial system shocks.
A precedent for including a balance of payments safeguard in an FTA is
found in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, among the
United States, Canada, and Mexico), and in the investment context specifically,
in the draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment negotiated (but not
concluded) under the aegis of the OECD. The GATT and the GATS also
include safeguard provisions calling for consultation with the IMF. While
employing different styles, these agreements address the problem by balancing
authority to impose controls in appropriate circumstances with disciplines on
their duration and rules such as nondiscrimination. Furthermore, in order to
ensure consistency between those treaties and the work of the IMF, the GATS
(Article XI) acknowledges the authority of the IMF to make a request for a
member to impose capital controls, although the Fund has never found it
necessary to do so in practice. The GATS rules providing for unrestricted
payments and transfers related to the covered services were written to expressly
exclude controls imposed at the "request" of the IMF-a reference to Article VI,
Section 1 of the IMF's Articles.
Third, the pressure on an FTA signatory to accept the draconian provisions
in the style of the Chile and Singapore investment chapters in order to conclude
the FTA may also be counterproductive in the context of the IMF's surveillance
function. Surveillance serves as a key instrument in the IMF's ongoing dialog
with members in the evolution of their macroeconomic and exchange rate
policies and may include the pace and sequencing of liberalization of the
economy. These comprehensive consultations serve an important role in crisis
prevention analysis. Importantly, this discussion takes place in the context of
the member's overall macroeconomic environment rather than the more limited
market opening perspective that tends to drive bilateral trade and investment
agreements.
Another speaker at this conference proffered the "cooling off' period
provided in the dispute settlement provisions of the two FTA's in response to
these potential inconsistencies. While a detailed discussion of the dispute
settlement rules are beyond the scope of this article, the key point is that a
signatory country could still be held liable to investors for even temporary
restrictions that were imposed in connection with resolution of an economic and
financial crises. The "cooling off' period delays when a claim may be initiated,
but the treaty continues to hold the signatory liable if a panel determines that
any restrictions imposed "substantially impede transfers" and the liability
applies retroactively even if the restrictions have subsequently been removed.
A helpful, but not dispositive, discussion of this standard is contained in a letter
from United States Under Secretary for International Affairs, John B. Taylor to
the Managing Director of Singapore's Monetary Authority, Koh Yong Guan
(reportedly available on the USTR website). This letter articulates the United
States government' s agreement to a "rebuttable presumption" that certain forms
and effects of restrictions "will be deemed not to substantially impede transfers"
including, for example, that the controls be nondiscriminatory. Nonetheless,
this letter does not bind panels, is likely to be ignored by investors bringing
claims under the investor-state arbitration, and does not fully address the point
that restrictions may indeed need to have substantial effects in order to serve
their purpose.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The provisions in the United States-Chile and United States-Singapore
FTA's that disregard potential need for a temporary safeguard and the related
role of the IMF are unnecessarily severe in that the contrary approach would not
detract from the goals of these investment agreements. When the potential for
exchange restrictions arises, the IMF does not treat the restrictions as a solution
to the problem; rather, it is based on the recognition that the restrictions may be
necessary as a temporary matter while adjustment measures have a chance to
have their intended effect. Indeed, the general obligations under IMF
jurisdiction are to refrain from exchange restrictions and to the extent that such
restrictions are approved, IMF policy requires them to be temporary and
nondiscriminatory. As reflected in conditionality accompanying its financial
support, the IMF policies recognize that over the longer term, the external
environment that necessitated restricting the outflow of foreign exchange will
usually require the member to adapt by introducing corrective macroeconomic
and, in some cases, structural reforms, rather than relying on exchange controls.
Other international treaties serve as useful models of agreements that take
these issues into account. Both the GATT and the GATS contain a balance of
payments safeguard in similar form as well as a deference to IMF jurisdiction
(GATT, Articles XII, XV, and XVIII; GATS, Articles XI and XII). The draft
MAI did so at the time that negotiations were terminated for other reasons
(Draft MAI, Section IV). These provisions were accepted by the United States.
An alternative approach is represented by NAFTA, which, like the FTA' s, is not
a multilateral agreement. Given the increased prominence of investment
agreements and their inclusion in FTA's, as well as the importance of the issues
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to the international community, a meaningful dialog with the IMF and its staff
should be encouraged in order to ensure consideration of the issues in a broader
context than bilateral market access negotiations.
EARLY AMERICAN CONFLICTS AND MODERN
AFRICAN PRACTICES: A COMPARATIVE
COMMENTARY ON CONSTITUTIONALISM
Gloria J. Browne-Marshall*
I am most honored to introduce this panel titled African Countries at the
Crossroads of Human Rights Development, the Rule of Law, and Economic
Priorities. Africa is often unfairly viewed as a monolith, when, in reality, it is
the home of numerous distinct peoples and cultures. Africa's place in the
history of mankind as the foundation of civilization is clouded by the brutal
conflict, neglect, and economic disaster that has taken place there over the past
decades. This panel will focus on the status of human rights conditions,
economic obstacles, and constitutional achievements in particular African
countries.
However, to truly begin such a discussion regarding Africa, we must first
address the tacit comparative analysis between Africa and America which takes
place all too often. This introductory essay asks the question: Are we fair in
our assessment of Africa? This question is asked because it appears that too
many scholars have forgotten America's early history when analyzing Africa's
current political, social, and economic circumstances. It is easy to provide an
international assessment of Sub-Saharan Africa, as a region prone to violence
and devoid of the Rule of Law. But, this paper proposes that the present image
of America held stable by its adherence to the Rule of Law, i.e. constitu-
tionalism, may not be a historically accurate one by which emerging African
nations should be judged.
The modem African conundrum has been of war and deprivation both
natural and otherwise juxtaposed with great potential and rich resources. After
a devastating period of economic, social and political colonialism, African
countries emerged as independent states. One imagined that as Ghana, the first
Sub-Saharan country to demand and receive independence from its colonial
power marked its independence in a bloodless transition in 1959, other African
nations would follow suit in similar manner.' History has shown that this was
* Gloria J. Browne-Marshal is an Assistant Professor at John Jay College. She is Executive
Director-Counsel of The Law and Policy Group, Inc. (NY). Professor Browne-Marshall has written
extensively on issues of constitutional law, international law, and the rights of racial minorities.
1. For a discussion of Ghana's independence, see F.K. BUAH, A HISTORY OF GHANA (MacMillan
Education Limited: London and Basingstoke 1998).
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not to be the case. For any number of valid reasons, war and conflict have
haunted Africa's emerging nations.
These countries gained independence with constitutions utilized for the
purpose of guidance and protection. Initially, the constitutions of the colonial
powers fell away to amendments which were scrapped for new constitutions
drafted to recognize the unique experience of the emerging nation state. Yet,
violence continued. It is assumed that a constitution acts as a shield and buttress
against civil war, economic depression, international conflict, political
oppression, human rights abuses, corruption, and coups.
In this post-cold war era, America's global influence has been to pro-
nounce the Rule of Law as a goal for all countries seeking international respect.
The Rule of Law is most often evidenced in a document deemed a constitution
setting forth governmental responsibilities, individual rights, and societal
protections. The document would also contain the basic structure and proce-
dures for addressing grievances. It is not unusual for a newly independent
country to inherit the constitution of the existing colonial power or have it
foisted upon it. America was no different. Political conflicts lead to the
scrapping of the old document in favor of a new constitution which takes into
account such issues as lessons learned: protections for political minorities and
institutional checks and balances. Newly emerging African nations followed
this well-established constitutional path.2 Yet, abuses continue: war, man-made
famine, economic upheaval, political oppression, and corruption have come to
describe modem Africa. Adherence to the Rule of Law has become analogous
with western economic and political stability. Once the constitution is in place
prosperity will soon follow. However, the simplicity of the image belies the
economic upheaval, civil war, and racial oppression that remain a part of
America's relatively short history. Multiple wars, political strife, riots,
assassinations, uprisings, and international consternation are often ignored in the
face of America's present day success. Even in this country of overlapping
constitutional protections, the history of America is a bloody one. The
economic success of this country along with the longevity of its Constitution has
overshadowed the turbulence that remains a part of American history.
Early America adopted much of its laws from English common law as well
as the laws of other former colonial powers such as France, Spain, and The
Netherlands. It was not until 1787 that representatives of the thirteen indepen-
dent colonies met in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to draft a constitution. After
two years of struggling over language, structure, and the intricacies of shared
power, the United States Constitution was ratified in 1789. That Constitution
and its ten Amendments, ratified in 1791, were greatly influenced by power
struggles between the colonists and Britain's King George. The Articles of the
2. GHANA CONST. (1992).
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United States Constitution set forth the structure of powers of the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches. The ten Amendments to the Constitution were
drafted to protect individuals suspicious of government. This Bill of Rights
provides for the freedom of speech, the press, assembly, religious practices, and
of protest against governmental actions real and imagined. The Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendments provide for protections of individuals in criminal
proceedings against unreasonable government searches and seizures, double
jeopardy, and self-incrimination. Trials are a public affair. An individual has
a right to confront witnesses, consult counsel, and receive effective representa-
tion at no cost if one is unable to afford an attorney.
Each state of the United States has its own constitution. Each individual
state constitution sets forth individual rights and protections in further detail.
For nearly two centuries the United States Supreme Court would apply the
protections of the Bill of the Rights only to the federal government. The states
protected its citizens as each state saw fit to do so. The United States Supreme
Court incorporated the protections and freedoms found within the Bill of Rights
into the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
thus extending these provisions to the states. Yet, the courts' dockets are
brimming with cases claiming constitutional violations.
The present image of American stability belies a history of conflict.
America did not gain its independence from British rule in a bloodless
transition. The war for American independence from Great Britain took place
between 1776 and 1783. Following on the heels of the War for Independence,
America fought the British again in the War of 1812 during which the capital
city was burned to the ground. Although there were skirmishes with outside
nations, American expansionism brought wars with Native American nations
which would ultimately result in the loss of over half of the Native American
population in North America.
The Mexican-American War was fought between 1846 and 1848 during
which the United States believed that an expansion into Mexico was justified
as part of a Manifest Destiny or divine ordination. The Civil War, 1861-1865,
remains the bloodiest of all American wars. This war between the states was
fought to define the future economic, political, and social control of this nation.
More American lives were lost during this war than all of the wars from colonial
times to present. Two hundred thousand lives were lost in a single battle.
The economic structure of the American South was destroyed during the
Civil War. Atlanta, a prized city today, was burned to the ground in 1864. One
should examine post-war reconstruction with an eye towards the American
South. Decades of economic struggle were required before the South began to
recover from the devastation of war. Even today, the American South lags
behind the North in certain areas of advancement such as public education.
Southern rebel cities such as Charlotte, Memphis, and Birmingham, once
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centers of racial conflict, are thriving in the new millennium. However, these
economic and political changes have taken well over a century to occur. Race
riots and rebellions against racial oppression have taken place in America's
North as well as the South for over two hundred years. The most recent one in
Michigan in 2003.
America is comprised of many different ethnic groups, religious beliefs,
and nationalities. However, the melting pot theme of American co-existence
has been challenged even at its inception. Africans were introduced to the
English colonies as early as 1619. The Africans in America were reduced to
slavery as an economic measure first and foremost. The early Americans
required labor to produce tobacco and other crops. Europeans attempted to
enslave the Native Americans. The Native Americans could not withstand the
diseases brought by the Europeans. While the African withstood the European's
diseases, they found it difficult to hide in foreign terrain familiar to the escaped
Native American. The African in America remained either enslaved or without
the rights of the white man.3 The Civil War brought a close to slavery in
America.4 However, the racial oppression of Blacks was not condoned by
culture. An interpretation of the Constitution by our United States Supreme
Court would institute racial apartheid in America for nearly fifty years.5 The
terrorist organization known as the Ku Klux Klan was formed in 1868; the same
year Blacks were given equal protection under the laws.6 Blacks received the
right to vote in 1870. However, racial terrorism preventing them from
exercising their political rights for nearly a century.' Approximately 5,000
Black men, women, and children have been murdered in the United States by
lynching (hung, burned alive, shot, dismembered).
Federal, state, and local governments would enact laws to relegate Asians
to a non-citizen labor class. The United States Supreme Court upheld the
placing of persons of Japanese descent into internment camps during World War
II, 1942-1946, based on fears of disloyalty following the bombing of Pearl
Harbor by the Empire of Japan.8 The information forming the basis for this
imprisonment was found, decades later, to be untrue. Prisons and jails are filled
with a number of Blacks and Latinos disproportionate to their population. Over
3. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
4. U.S. CONST., amend. XIII (slavery ends).
5. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (separate but equal is upheld by the United States
Supreme Court); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racial separation in public schools
is inherently unequal).
6. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV (1868) (equal protection under the law was given to all persons).
7. Black males were given right to vote. U.S. CONST., amend. XV (1870).
8. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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two million people are incarcerated in America's prisons and jails.9 America is
the only industrialized Western nation with a death penalty, a disproportionate
number of whom are people of color. As of this writing, there are approxi-
mately 3,700 people on death row awaiting a sentence that may include death
by lethal injection or the electric chair. Such a death sentence is sanctioned by
the United States Constitution. Yet, the world squirmed upon hearing that Ms.
Amina Lawal of Nigeria had been sentenced to death by stoning.
The argument in this essay is quite simple. A constitution may offer gui-
dance and a level of security, but, it cannot prevent sin. Mistakes, horrible
actions, greed, murder, and willful destruction will take place. However, it is
not inevitable. The frequency with which it takes place undermines any opti-
mism to the contrary. Nation-building takes time. The first English settlement
in North America was formed in 1620 in Jamestown, Virginia. Too many
people have fought, died, or were sacrificed for the nation the world has come
to know as the United States of America. It is a country that continues to
struggle with its rule of law, minority rights, economic challenges, and political
forces. The United States Constitution is under siege following the events of
September 11, 2001. The American response to this act of terrorism was disap-
pointingly common-as common as any emerging nation.
The youth of African governments and their constitutional ambitions
should be viewed in historical context that takes into consideration these
important factors. Additionally, the centuries of displacement wrought by the
slave trade must be considered. One must be mindful of the deeply rooted
influence European colonial powers played in African colonies concerning all
areas political, economic, and cultural development.1° The relatively short time
frame in which African countries have gained independence must be considered.
One must also take into account the continued influence of American, European,
and South African leaders in newly formed African countries. Events that are
indeed brutal and perplexing are, unfortunately, not unique to Africa. Sadly, it
may be part of a natural post-independence experience. One need only look at
the American post-independence experience to at least consider the possibility
of such a premise.
9. Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Nation's Prison and Jail Population Exceeds 2
Million Inmates for First Time (Apr. 6, 2003), available at http:l/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/pjimO2pr
.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2004).
10. For an examination of the influence of Europe on Africa from a pre-colonial period through the
initial stages of African independence, see WALTER RODNEY, How EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA
(1982).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The human rights of people with disabilities traditionally have been
ignored in mainstream international human rights theory and practice and in the
work of international institutions.' Today, however, a small but rapidly growing
transnational advocacy network of disability activists is emerging to challenge
this neglect around the effort to develop an international convention on the
rights of people with disabilities.
* Director of Advocacy and Legal Counsel, Landmine Survivors Network; LL.M., George
Washington University Law School, 1995; LLM., University of Edinburgh, 1992; LL.B. University of
Edinburgh, 1991. The author wishes to acknowledge the following individuals for their ongoing encourage-
ment and support: Judge Thomas Buergenthal, Professor Louis B. Sohn, Professor Ralph Steinhardt, and
Professor Julie A. Mertus.
1. For an extensive study of this and other issues pertaining to the rationale for an international
convention on the human rights of persons with disabilities, See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, A WHITE
PAPER: UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PEOPLE
wrrH DISABILITIES 41-43, 58 (2002).
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The inclusion of this panel topic in the program for the International Law
Weekend is significant for two reasons. First, it should be noted that disability
as a topic historically has been marginalized in the study and practice of inter-
national law and in the international human rights law field in particular. In
fact, disability has remained largely invisible-one need only look at the leading
texts on international human rights law to discover this invisibility,2 though the
convention drafting process we are focusing on today represents an important
step toward integrating disability into the mainstream of international human
rights law.
Second, in general, disability has not been regarded as a human rights
issue. Rather, disabled people, instead of being seen as claimants of their own
rights, are regarded instead as objects of pity, people whose lives need fixing or
who are in need of help in the most paternalistic sense.3 This has had very
disturbing consequences, with serious and systemic violations across the full
spectrum of human rights, going unnoticed, unreported, and unaddressed.
Mainstream human rights groups have not integrated disability in their work,
although Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have publicly
acknowledged their historical neglect and have committed to addressing this gap
through undertaking reporting on human rights violations against people with
disabilities.4 Treaty bodies have not integrated disability into their monitoring
process in any ongoing and consistent fashion-notwithstanding some particul-
arly good work by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in
General Comment 55
This panel is significant for a second reason. As the program title suggests,
international law is in a period of crisis, and indeed, the need for more human
rights standard setting is being called into question even by scholars and
practitioners in the international human rights field. The Geneva-based Inter-
national Council on Human Rights Policy has a forthcoming study which is
looking precisely at the question of whether the focus of the human rights
movement should be in a new standard setting or whether primary attention
should be directed toward implementation of existing standards.6 This is of both
2. As an example, one of the leading textbooks in the international human rights law field, contains
no index entry for "disability," "people with disabilities" or similar terms, in contrast to multiple entries for
other minority groups. See HENRY STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT
(2d ed. 2000).
3. For more on traditional models of disability, see GARETH WILLIAMS, Theorizing Disability, in
DISABILITY STUDIES 123 (Gary L Albrecht, et al. eds., Sage Publications 2001).
4. See, e.g, Statement of Kenneth Roth, Summit on Human Rights and Disability, National Council
on Disability, Washington, D.C., Apr. 8, 2002 (transcript on file at the National Council on Disability).
5. Persons with Disabilities, ICESCR Comm'n., General Comment 5, 1 lth Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/1995/22 (1994).
6. For more information on this project, see the website of the International Council on Human
Rights Policy, http://www.ichrp.org (last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
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practical and theoretical consequence for those of us working in the area of
disability rights.
I will begin my presentation by reviewing where we are in terms of NGO
participation to develop a convention on the human rights of people with dis-
abilities. I will then draw some conclusions about modalities of NGO participa-
tion and their implications both for international law and for the success of the
treaty process in general. I will then, time permitting, review some of the key
issues on convention content that are likely to come under consideration in the
months ahead.
II. NGO PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCESS TO DEVELOP AN
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS
wrrH DISABILIrIEs-WHERE WE ARE
The Mexican initiative which launched the process to develop a new
convention on the rights of people with disabilities, introduced two years ago
before the UN General Assembly,' came as a surprise to the NGO community
and, in particular, those working on issues relating to the rights of people with
disabilities. While the surprise was welcomed, much work needed to be done
in order to mobilize the disability community from around the world and to
bring it together in some coordinated way to participate meaningfully in the
process and ensure its success.
The international disability community has historically been disparate and
divided, working only in the informal sense within the UN system. The NGO
focal point on disability within the UN system has been the International
Disability Alliance (otherwise referred to as IDA), a loose federation of seven
international disabled people's organizations: Disabled Peoples' International,
Rehabilitation International, the World Network of Users and Survivors of
Psychiatry, the World Blind Union, Inclusion International, the Deaf Blind
Federation, and the World Federation of the Deaf. Together, IDA has followed
disability issues within the UN system, has participated in the monitoring of the
non-binding UN Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for People
with Disabilities,' and served as that instrument's Panel of Experts, as appointed
by the UN Special Rapporteur on Disability. This group has not worked closely
with mainstream human rights organizations.
There have been major challenges to coordination given the fact that the
IDA has worked largely as an isolated entity and on a separate track from
7. For a copy of the UN General Assembly Resolution creating the Ad Hoc Committee, see Com-
prehensive and Integral International Convention to Promote and Protect the Rights and Dignity of Persons
with Disabilities, 3rd Comm., 56th Sess., Agenda Item 119(b), U.N. Doc. A/C 3/56/L.67/Rev.1 (2001).
8. Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, U.N., 85th
Plen. Mtg., 1, Part IV, U.N. Doc A/Res/48/96 (1993).
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mainstream human rights organizations and indeed other groups whose partici-
pation is thought necessary to achieve success in a human right standard setting
process. It was not at all clear that a broad, cross-disability NGO grouping
could be formed at all, much less achieve the level of coordination and consen-
sus necessary to push a process to develop an international treaty forward.
However, having said that, during the first two sessions of the Ad Hoc
Committee, some major and unprecedented successes were achieved:
NGOs lobbied hard for access to and meaningful participation
in the first session of the Ad Hoc Committee in July-August
2002. They succeeded in winning a decision on access for
ECOSOC accredited groups as well as a separate process for
non-ECOSOC accredited groups.9 The modalities of participa-
tion were also quite generous-fears that the process would be
restrictive because it was a UN General Assembly Ad Hoc
Committee (as opposed to a process convened under a UN
structure more favorable to NGOs) turned out to be unfound-
ed.' o NGOs enjoyed generous rights of participation as observ-
ers, with the right to submit written statements as well as to
make oral interventions, a right that was supported by the Chair
of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Gallegos from Ecuador.
" NGOs producedjoint statements and provided a daily Disability
Negotiations Bulletin" which formed the political messaging
and NGO information platform for the process. At one point
during the first week of the first Ad Hoc Committee Session
when negotiations threatened to break down, a strongly worded
open letter to delegates in the Bulletin was acknowledged by
government delegates to have had significant impact in turning
things around. This was a positive meeting, although no defini-
tive decision was made to pursue a treaty.
During the second Ad Hoc Committee session, these forms of participation
continued, with disabled activivists from both the developed and developing
countries participating in far greater numbers than the previous year.
9. See Accreditation and Participation of Non-governmental Organizations in the Ad Hoc
Committee to Consider Proposals for a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention to Promote
and Protect the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, U.N.G.A. Res. A/RES/56/510, available at
http://www. un.orglesa/socdev/enable/rights/adhocngo82e.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
10. See Decision on the Modalities of the Participation ofAccredited Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions in the Ad Hoc Committee to Consider Proposals for a Comprehensive and Integral International Con-
vention to Promote and Protect the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Aug. 2, 2002, available
at http://www.un.orglesalsocdev/enablelrights/adhocdecision2.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
11. See http://www.worldenable.net/rights/adhoc2meet.htm.
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NGOs worked hard to broaden participation, bringing disability
activists from around the world to New York. Landmine
Survivors Network partnered with Disabled Peoples Interna-
tional to train disabled activists from all regions of the world to
participate in the two week Ad Hoc meeting. This significantly
broadened participation by NGOs from the developing world.
All in all, there were hundreds of NGOs registered to partici-
pate. Within one day of the commencement of the session, the
Ad Hoc Committee made the decision to move ahead to
develop a convention, and the attention shifted to the process by
which a convention would be elaborated. The rest of the two
week period was a long and difficult negotiation regarding the
structure of a working group which would be tasked with
developing a negotiating text for the third session of the Ad Hoc
Committee. NGOs were divided on many aspects of these
issues, as were governments. In the end, NGOs successfully
lobbied for seats for 12 NGO participants on the Working
Group. Furthermore, these participants would be selected by
NGOs themselves. The seven IDA groups plus five regional
representatives were selected. Procedures for participation in
the Working Group will be in accordance with procedures
already established for NGO participation in the Ad Hoc
Committee. This entire scenario is totally unprecedented in
international human rights standards setting process, even more
inclusive that the Rights of the Child Convention process,
which represented a high mark of NGO participation in the
human rights sphere.
I have just returned from a regional meeting in which the NGO
representative from West Asia-Adnan Al Aboudy, who is the
Director of Landmine Survivors Network's Jordan Network -
convened a broad consultation of experts and advocates from
his region in order to develop a regional contribution to the
Working Group meeting in January.' 2
12. For the report of the meeting, see Landmine Survivors Network, Expert Dialogue and Arab
Regional Consultation: Amman, Jordan Issues Related to the Drafting of an International Convention on
the Human Rights of People with Disabilities (Oct. 20-21, 2003), available at www.landminesurvivors.org
(last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
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1UI. NGO POSITIONING IN RELATION TO SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES CONCERNING
THE ELABORATION OF A CONVENTION
The main focus during the first two meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee
mandated to consider proposals for the elaboration of an international conven-
tion on the rights of persons with disabilities has been to convince governments
of the need for a specialized convention on the human rights of people with
disabilities. The central objective of NGO lobbying, therefore, has been to set
forth a clear rationale for the treaty, addressing, for example, the point that
absent a specialized convention, disability will not be successfully integrated
into the UN human rights system, the international human rights movement, or
the work of other important actors such as development organizations.
Now that we do indeed have a process to develop a convention, NGOs
engaged in the process are starting to articulate more concrete positions on the
content of a convention. 3 Regional meetings, engaging both governments as
well as non-governmental actors, are likewise engaging in more substantive
elaboration of what the content and structure of a new convention might
include.
As I mentioned earlier, I just returned from a meeting in Jordan-a
Roundtable Expert Dialogue and Regional Consultation on Issues related to the
Drafting of an International Convention. The purpose of this meeting was to
examine some of the key substantive issues at this early stage of the negotiation
process. Hosted by Landmine Survivors Network in cooperation with the
Jordanian National Disability Council, the meeting brought together some 50
disability activists-people with disabilities who represent some of the NGO
leadership within the Middle East. This group, several of whom attended the
second session of the Ad Hoc Committee this past June, participated in a human
rights training session for two days, the outcome of which was an NGO
statement of issues relating to the content and structure of a new convention.
This training session was followed by a two-day consultation and roundtable
dialogue which included NGO activists, as well as governmental participants
from around the region, representatives from both the UN Department for
Economic and Social Affairs (which serves as the Secretariat for the Ad Hoc
process) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the
Special Rapporteur on Disability, representatives from Amnesty International
and Human Rights Watch, and leaders from disability and development
organizations, such as Action on Disability and Development in the United
Kingdom. The two events marked the first time that the region had brought
together groups from disability, human rights and development communities for
13. For copies of NGO position paper contributions relating to the content of a proposed convention,
see http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/adhocdocs.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
the common purpose of pursuing a dialogue on strengthening the content of
human rights law to make effective the enjoyment of human rights by people
with disabilities. This meeting looked at the following issues:
" Core guiding principles and objectives to support the elabora-
tion of an international convention on the rights of people with
disabilities. There is as yet no consensus on the precise objec-
tives and core principles that form the foundation for the con-
vention. What is interesting from a legal standpoint is that
some emerging positions on this issue support the elaboration
of sections in the operative part of the convention setting forth
the objectives-the purpose for the convention-as well as a
section on guiding principles. This mirrors the approach we see
particularly in international environmental agreements and
indeed other framework conventions developed in the last ten
years. The content of disability guiding principles-such as
participation, non-discrimination, autonomy, international co-
operation-will be highly significant not only in terms of the
development of more precise substantive obligations in the
civil, political, economic, social and cultural realm, but also in
terms of providing a basis for the interpretation and progressive
development of the convention by a treaty monitoring body,
treaty bodies of other principal human rights conventions, and
indeed by international tribunals.
" The elaboration of an implementation system in a new conven-
tion. Major questions which will be the focus of the negotia-
tions in the years ahead will be:
i) What is the relationship between the UN Standard Rules
and its voluntary monitoring system and a new system of
implementation?
ii) What will be the role of the UN Special Rapporteur on
Disability and a new convention?
iii) What will be the impact on the development of a monitor-
ing system in a new convention of the current effort to
reform the human rights treaty bodies? On this last point,
Australia has come out strongly opposed to a new treaty
monitoring body, and in fact has continued to argue that
the human rights of people with disabilities could best be
addressed not in a specialized convention, but in a proto-
col to an existing human rights convention. This approach
makes little sense as a practical or theoretical matter, and
the NGO community has rejected any attempt to annex
and further marginalize disability rights within the human
rights law system generally.
20041 Lord
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The integration of disability and development in a new conven-
tion. Attention was focused not on the inclusion of the right to
development in a new convention as a few have suggested, but
rather how barriers to implementation by developing countries
in particular might successfully be addressed within the context
of an implementation system. One concept to consider is the
incorporation of supporting measures of implementation akin to
the kind of provisions we have seen successfully incorporated
into international environmental law agreements, such as a pro-
vision to support public education and awareness-raising
through training. Such measures are understood within the
disability content and the UN Standard Rules as a precondition
to the equalization of opportunities for people with disabilities.
Other examples of supporting measures would include informa-
tion gathering, information exchange, and the formation of tech-
nical advocacy bodies that might support, for example, the
elaboration of guidelines and technical assistance on accessibil-
ity standards. The issue of development is likely to be conten-
tious and yet it need not be a huge barrier to success of the
future negotiations if understood in the context of measures to
support implementation.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the momentum generated by the United Nations General Assembly to
be productively maintained and utilized, the process by which the convention
on the rights of persons with disabilities is developed must continue to be
inclusive of people with disabilities, including the most marginalized groups.
The current effort is notable for its generous rights of participation among
NGOs, particularly in view of the decision to give 12 seats on the Working
Group that will formulate a negotiating text to NGO representatives, and
represents a further progressive development in international law-making.
LITIGATING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN UNITED
STATES COURTS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Elizabeth F. Defeis*
During the last quarter of a century, litigation in United States courts to
address human rights abuses that occur beyond the shores of the United States
has increased dramatically. Although lawsuits have been successful, recovery
at least in monetary terms has been meager. In addition, there has developed a
concentrated strategy to limit access to United States courts for purposes of
addressing human rights violations committed abroad.
What can be done to strengthen the rule of law and provide a forum for
addressing human rights abuses? Clearly, an amendment to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act to permit suits against state actors accused of human
rights abuses would be the most effective mechanism. However, apart from
this, several other options remain, including suit pursuant to the Alien Tort
Claim Act, the Torture Victim Protection Act, and the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. These comments provide an overview of
the legislative mechanism available to address human rights abuses.
The most utilized legislative device for reaching human rights abuses is the
Alien Tort Claims Act.' In 1789, the First Congress of the United States in
1789 drafted legislation that was to have a profound impact on international law
and human rights. The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), enacted as part of the
First Judiciary Act that district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action brought by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States. Despite its importance today, the
legislative history of ATCA remains unclear. Some scholars, judges, and the
Bush administration have urged that the act should be construed narrowly.
They argue that the Act was designed solely to address piracy or violations of
diplomatic immunity and does not confer a private right of action. However,
there is scant empirical evidence to support either a narrow or a broad reading
of the statute.
For almost 200 years, the ATCA lay dormant. In 1980, however, a
decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Filartiga v. Penna-!rala2
* Elizabeth F. Defeis is a Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. Professor Defeis
would like to thank her research assistant, Jill Dawson, J.D. Candidate, Class of 2005.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003).
2. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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reviewed the statute and concluded that it provided a basis for domestic
litigation to address human rights abuses committed abroad.
The facts of the case are well known. In 1979 Dolly Filartiga filed suit in
the federal district court of the Eastern District of New York alleging that
Americo Pena-Irala a police official in Paraguay had tortured and murdered her
brother in Paraguay for the political activities of his family. The lawsuit was
brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act. The district court dismissed the
action on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the term "law of nations," as
employed in ATCA, excludes the law that governs a state's treatment of its own
citizens. The plaintiff appealed the district court's ruling to the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.
In a groundbreaking ruling, the Second Circuit reversed the district court
and held that the lawsuit could proceed. After reviewing United Nations
resolutions, numerous international, regional, and national sources of law, the
Second Circuit held that torture was firmly prohibited by international law. It
stated: "In light of the universal condemnation of torture in numerous
international agreements, and the renunciation of torture as an instrument of
official policy by virtually all of the nations of the world (in principle if not in
practice), we find that an act of torture committed by a state official against one
held in detention violates established norms of the international law of human
rights, and hence the law of nations. This violation can occur regardless of the
nationality of the parties."'
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that "whenever an alleged torturer
is found and served with process by an alien within our borders, the Alien Tort
Claims Act provides federal jurisdiction."4 When the case was remanded, Pena-
Irala defaulted and the district court entered a judgment in favor of the Filartiga
family and awarded $10 million in damages. Efforts to collect the judgment
have been unsuccessful.
Since 1980, victims of human rights abuses have filed an increasing
number of lawsuits seeking civil remedies for injuries that occur outside the
United States. The plaintiffs are from countries such as Argentina, Bosnia,
Burma, Chile, China, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Indonesia,
Nigeria, Paraguay, and the Philippines and defendants include companies such
as Coca-Cola for activities in Columbia, Chevron Corporation in Nigeria, and
Exxon Mobile Corporation on behalf of Indonesian villagers. These cases
allege numerous violations of international law, including arbitrary detention,
forced disappearance, torture, extra judicial killing, genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity. Several of the lawsuits have resulted in substantial
damage awards.
3. Id. at 878.
4. Id.
Defeis
Cases involving the ATCA are pending in the federal courts at the
appellate and district court levels and in December 2003 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,5 a case that might well resolve
the jurisdictional issues arising under the ATCA.
The Sosa case involved the kidnapping of a Mexican Doctor, Humberto
Alvarez-Machain by Mexican officials in Mexico at the behest of the US Drug
Enforcement Administration. He was then taken to Texas for trial for the
torture and murder of a DEA Agent. In his first appeal to the US Supreme
Court, Alvarez-Machain challenged the jurisdiction of the District Court on the
grounds that the kidnapping violated the terms of the extradition treaty between
Mexico and the United States and also that it violated international law. The
Supreme Court rejected the jurisdictional challenge and noted that although the
kidnapping might well have violated international law it did not violate the
terms of the extradition treaty.6 Alvarez-Machain was then tried and acquitted
in the Texas Court. He subsequently brought two lawsuits, one against the
United States and federal agents for false arrest and the other against his
Mexican kidnapper, Jose Francisco Sosa under the ATCA. The District Court
awarded him a judgment of $25,000 against Sosa and the award was upheld by
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The United States Government filed a brief
urging the Supreme Court to grant Certiorari arguing that the Ninth Circuit's
broad reading of the ATCA was "fraught with foreign policy implications and
the potential for interference with the exercise of constitutional responsibilities
by the political branches."7  The Government requested the Court decide,
"Whether the ATS creates a private cause of action for aliens for torts
committed anywhere in violation of the law of nations or treaties of the United
States or, instead, is a jurisdictions granting provision that does not establish
private rights of action."'
Pending in the federal appellate court is the case of Doe v. UNOCAL.9
Over ten years ago, the Burmese military cleared out entire villages to make
way for oil pipelines. Several human rights groups alleged that the villagers that
were displaced were forced to work against their will, and were raped or
tortured if they refused. However, rather than suing the Burmese government
in Burma, the victims sued in the United States, under the Alien Tort Claims
Act. The suit alleged that UNOCAL, an American oil company, was responsi-
ble for hiring the Burmese military to provide security during the construction
of the Yadana pipeline project. A federal trial court dismissed the case on the
5. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 73 U.S.L.W. 3370 (U.S. Dec. 1, 2003).
6. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 519 U.S. 1006, cert. denied (1996).
7. Linda Greenhouse, Reviewing Foreigners' Use of Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2003, at
A29.
8. Id.
9. 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
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ground that there was not a close enough nexus between the oil company and
the abuses. However, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit held that
UNOCAL could be found liable if the company aided and abetted the Burmese
military in committing human rights abuses. This standard was a more lenient
standard of proof than that offered by the trial court, which required that the
villagers prove that the company actually directed the abuses. In February
2003, the Ninth Circuit court of appeals in San Francisco decided to rehear the
appeal before the full eleven-judge Court.
The government filed a brief in the case on behalf of UNOCAL, stating
that if the case were allowed to go to trial, it would interfere with American
foreign policy, and may disrupt the war on terrorism. As argued in the Sosa
case, the government argues that the ATCA merely confers subject matter
jurisdiction and does not imply a private right of action. Rather, they argue that
the act should be limited to the narrow class of cases involving piracy or
diplomatic immunity.
Indeed, in virtually all the pending ATCA cases, the government has filed
briefs putting forward this position. For example, the United States filed a
Statement of Interest in a case now pending in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York. In re South African Apartheid Litiga-
tion,' 0 was brought by victims of apartheid in South Africa seeking compensa-
tion for human rights abuses suffered under the apartheid regime. Both the
present government of South Africa and the United States have intervened
urging the court to dismiss the suit. The United States noted that the Govern-
ment has a substantial interest in the proper interpretation and application of the
ATCA because it implicates profound separation of powers concerns and
serious consequences for both the development and expression of the Nation's
foreign policy. It noted further that "the government of South Africa has, on
several occasions and at the highest levels, made clear that these cases do not
belong in United States courts and they threaten to disrupt and contradict its
own laws, policies, and processes aimed at dealing with the aftermath of
Apartheid as an institution."" Presumably, the case will not be decided until the
Supreme Court renders its decision in the Sosa case. In a further effort to limit
liability of United States companies doing business abroad, in May 2003,
President Bush signed Executive Order 13303 which limits the applicability of
the ATCA and immunizes oil companies operating in Iraq from the execution
of any judgment against Iraqi petroleum products. However, the order does not
apply to other activities in Iraq.
Although the Alien Tort Claims Act has been the principal mechanism for
litigating violations of human rights in United State courts, its reach is limited.
10. In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litigation, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
11. Id.
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The act applies to lawsuits filed by foreign nationals but not United State
nationals and does not provide jurisdiction for lawsuits against foreign
governments. In response to these jurisdictional limitations, Congress passed
the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA)" and an amendment to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). 3
The Torture Victim Protection Act supplements the remedies available
under ATCA. It establishes civil liability for acts of torture and extra judicial
killing committed abroad. According to the Senate report accompanying the
TVPA, torture violates standards of conduct accepted by virtually every nation,
and prohibition of such actions has attained the status of customary international
law. The TVPA was not intended to replace ATCA, rather, it was designed to
work in conjunction with that statute.
The TVPA differs from ATCA in several respects. Unlike ATCA, the
TVPA is not limited to plaintiffs who are foreign nationals but allows United
States citizens to sue for damages as well. However, the TVPA allows only
civil actions for torture or extra judicial killing. ATCA contains no such
restriction. The TVPA also contains two additional restrictions. First, a plain-
tiff must exhaust adequate and available remedies in the place in which the
conduct giving rise to the claim occurred. Second, no action shall be main-
tained unless it is commenced within ten years after the cause of action arose.
This provision may be tolled, however, for good cause.
In 1994, in the implementing legislation for the Convention Against
Torture, the federal criminal code was amended to provide that any United
States national or person physically located within the United States could be
held criminally liable for torture that he or she commits against anyone
anywhere. 4 However, no criminal action has been brought under the law not-
withstanding the presence of torturers within the United States (many of whom
have been defendants in ATCA suits) and despite the fact that under the Torture
Convention the United States is obliged to prosecute or extradite any torturers
within its territorial jurisdiction.
Although the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act
authorize civil actions against public officials and private individuals, they do
not provide jurisdiction for actions against foreign governments. The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act is the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a
foreign state in United States courts. Under the FSIA, a foreign state is pre-
sumed to be immune from suit unless one or more of the codified exceptions to
immunity apply. These exceptions include cases of waiver, commercial
activity, and certain claims in tort and property.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003).
13. id. § 1602.
14. Id. § 1350.
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Shortly after the passage of the FSIA, the United States Supreme Court in
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 5 held explicitly that the
FSIA was the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign government in
the courts of the United States. The Court ruled that even if the case involves
a violation of an international law, the cause of action must fit within one of the
specific exceptions of the FSIA in order for the Federal courts to have
jurisdiction.
In order to circumvent the unambiguous language of the Amerada Hess
case to allow suits against the foreign governments for alleged human rights
abuses, several creative arguments have been developed over the years. Some
have been based upon a jus cogens exceptions to immunity. For example, In
Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 16 an American citizen who survived the
Holocaust sued the Federal Republic of Germany to recover money damages for
injuries he suffered, and slave labor he performed, while a prisoner in Nazi
concentration camps. The Plaintiff argued that the Third Reich impliedly
waived Germany's sovereign immunity under the FSIA by violatingjus cogens
norms of the law of nations. It argued that a foreign state that violates these
fundamental requirements of international law thereby waives its right to be
treated as a sovereign. The court, however rejected this argument and held that
an implied waiver depends upon the foreign government's having at some point
indicated its amenability to suit. However, there was a strongly worded dissent
by Judge Patricia Wald. She argued that Germany implicitly waived its
immunity by engaging in atrocities in this case. Reminding the court that
American law incorporates international law, Judge Wald concluded that as a
matter of proper statutory construction, the only way to reconcile the FSIA's
presumption of foreign sovereign immunity with international law is to interpret
the act as encompassing the principle that a foreign state implicitly waives its
right to sovereign immunity in United States courts by violating jus cogens
norms.
Earlier, the Ninth Circuit had also rejected thejus cogens argument. The
1992 case of Siderman de Blake v. Republic ofArgentina, 7 involved allegations
of official torture against the government of Argentina. The plaintiffs argued
thatjus cogens norms enjoy the highest status within international law, and thus
prevail over and invalidate other rules of international law in conflict with them.
Since sovereign immunity itself is a principle of international law, it is trumped
byjus cogens. The Ninth Circuit agreed that official torture is a violation of the
jus cogens principle of international law. However, it found no implied waiver
of the FSIA. The court noted that the FSIA contains no exception to immunity
15. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
16. 813 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1992), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1121 (1995).
17. 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1985).
based on jus cogens. It held that if violations of jus cogens committed outside
the United States are to be exceptions to the immunity, Congress must make
them so.
Several other lower court cases have been based on the jus cogens excep-
tion to the immunity. However, all were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Thus, it seems clear that absent congressional action, the FSIA cannot be imple-
mented to sue foreign government for human rights abuses no matter how
egregious. Congress did however act in a limited instance to compensate
victims of terrorism, and enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996. This Act amended section 1605 of the FSIA by adding a new sub-
section, which created a new exception to foreign sovereign immunity. Under
this section United States nationals may bring suit against foreign sovereigns for
personal injury resulting from torture, extra judicial killing, air sabotage,
hostage taking or provision of material support or services for such an act, if the
foreign state is designated as a state sponsor of terrorism."8
This amendment to the FSIA followed the original drafting pattern used in
the FSIA, and simply added an additional exception to the original five excep-
tions. Although very broad, this exception has several limitations on its
applicability. The amendment will apply only if the foreign state is designated
as a state sponsor of terrorism by the State Department. Even if a state is so
designated, courts will deny jurisdiction if the victim was not a national of the
United States or if a plaintiff cannot show that the offending state was afforded
a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim in accordance with accepted
international rules of arbitration.
In 1997 the amendment itself was amended to accommodate the victims
of the Lockerbie tragedy. An American citizen sued under the Act claiming
damages on behalf of his wife, a UK citizen who died in the crash. Although
the sponsors of the law claimed that the exception was meant to apply if either
the victim or the survivor is an American citizen, the language of the statute
required both the victim and the survivor to be American citizens. An amend-
ment to the amendment adopting the either/or language and allowing the case
to go forward was passed on April 24, 1997.1"
In the last five years, judgments under the Act have brought verdicts of
hundreds of millions of dollars and more than $200 million have been paid from
frozen assets and from the United States, which has a right to recover from those
assets. A consolidated suit against Osama bin Laden, Al Queda, Afghanistan
and the Taliban, Iraq and Sadam Hussein based upon the September 11 th attacks
was brought in the Southern District of New York. The Court dismissed the
claim against Saddam Hussein. However, the court ruled that the survivors of
18. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 1601-11 (2003).
19. Lawyers Solve Lockerbie Case Glitch Just in Time, NAT'L L.J., May 19, 1997, at A08.
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persons who were killed in the World Trade Center terrorist attack had pre-
sented enough evidence, "albeit barely," to be awarded $104 million in damages
against the state of Iraq, Osama bin Laden, and his terrorist network.20
The court, addressed what it described as several "novel" issues concerning
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and civil recovery under the Antiter-
rorism Act, the so-called Flatlow Amendment. The two cases joined under
Smith v. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan21 sought to show through the opin-
ions of experts, including former CIA Director James Woolsey Jr., that Iraq
helped train Al Qaeda terrorists, and provided them with safehouses and forged
documents.
A default judgment in favor of the families of the victims was granted and
in accordance with the statute and an inquest was held. The court decided that
the attack on the World Trade Center met the definition of "international
terrorism" in the Antiterrorism Act, and then turned to the standard of proof
required against the Iraqi defendants under the FSIA, which states that, "[n]o
judgment by default shall be entered by a court of the United States ... against
a foreign state ... unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by
evidence satisfactory to the court." 2
Without a Second Circuit case expressly defining the meaning of the
phrase "evidence satisfactory to the court," the court noted that other courts hold
conflicting views about the appropriate standard. While some courts have
required "clear and convincing evidence," the court applied a more relaxed
standard, which it said is "a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable
jury to find for plaintiff." The court then addressed that section of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act known as the Flatlow Amendment, which withdraws
sovereign immunity for cases of state-sponsored terrorism. It noted that the
amendment, while providing a cause of action against foreign officials or
employees whose state has sponsored acts of terror "does not expressly provide
a cause of action against the foreign state itself." Nevertheless, the court held
that the Flatlow Amendment provides a cause of action against a foreign state.
In turning to the issue of whether the World Trade Center attack was perpetrated
by Al Qaeda with the aid of material support from Iraq, the court viewed the
testimony of experts and concluded: "Although these experts provided few
actual facts of any material support that Iraq actually provided material support,
their opinions, coupled with their qualifications as experts on this issue, provide
a sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to draw inferences which could lead to
the conclusion that Iraq provided material support to Al Qaeda. ' 23
20. Smith v. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
21. Id.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (2003).
23. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 232.
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The decision represents only the first chapter in litigation seeking to hold
foreign states responsible for the events of September 11 th.
One concern facing lawyers representing the families of those who died in
the World Trade Center attack is collecting damages. President George W.
Bush has decided that most of the $1.8 billion in frozen Iraqi assets in the
United States should go toward rebuilding Iraq, with about $300 million of that
money set aside for prisoners of the regime who were used as human shields.
However, the plaintiffs are seeking to collect from the billions of dollars
allegedly stolen by the Hussein family and other Iraqi officials.
An amendment to the FSIA similar to the 1996 Anti-terrorism Act address-
ing the concerns regarding the scope of the FSIA to coverjus cogens violations
as well as gross human rights violations is warranted. Such an exception would
be a narrow one and would apply only to the most grave human rights abusers.
Although several legislative proposals have been introduced to amend the FSIA
to add an exception for immunity in cases of human rights violations they have
not been acted upon.
Similarly, while the ATCA has been effectively used to address human
rights abuses committed abroad, serious questions have been raised concerning
whether the act itself is merely a jurisdictional statute or whether it confers a
private right of action. In addition, national security and foreign relations con-
cerns have raised questions implicating the political question doctrine and
separation of powers issues. These concerns, coupled with the ever-expanding
scope of the ACTA and the desirability of addressing human rights abuses
should be the starting point for critical analysis in this area.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I would like to start with a self explanatory and worthwhile quote from His
Late Majesty Haile Selassie which reads as follows: "Throughout History it has
been the inaction of those who could have acted, the indifference of those who
should have known better, the silence of the voice of justice when it mattered
most, that has made it possible for evil to triumph."
His Majesty Haile Selassie pointed this out on October 4th 1963, and forty
years later we have on the agenda a theme which would not be taking such a
great amount of time, should those words have been given due attention by the
international community, and more specifically by the United Nations, which
is the major international institution advocating brotherhood, justice, equity and
solidarity; indeed advocating for humanity altogether. Instead, history
witnessed, very recently, the world's sheer indifference to a genocide that took
* Stanislas Kamanzi is the Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United
Nations. His University Studies include a Master's Degree in Environment and Development, from the
University of Natal-South Africa. There, he specialized in Geographical Information Systems and Water
Resource Management, an area where much of his research has been conducted. From April 1988 to February
1992, Mr. Kdmanzi was a civil servant in territorial administration (ex Commune Gituza's Assistant Mayor
in charge of Economic and Technical Affairs). From February 1992 to June 1993, he was a Member of the
staff in charge of Documentation, Research and Evaluation at Inades Formation Rwanda. From June 1993
to April 1994 he served as Sous-Prfet of the Kinihira Sous-Prfecture (Byumba Demilitarized Zone). From
December 1994 to January 1998, Mr. Kamanzi was Assistant Lecturer at the National University of Rwanda's
Department of Geography, and then became a Junior Lecturer there until November 2002. Mr. Kamanzi was
appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Rwanda to France in September 1999, and in November 2002,
became Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Rwanda to UN.
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place in my country, Rwanda, which claimed within only a hundred days, the
lives of a million people, and brought suffering to those who survived, be they
those targeted by it or some of those who, under different circumstances carried
it out. Rwanda' s genocide took place a few decades after millions of heartfelt
"never again"s had been pledged by the international community following the
Holocaust.
II. RWANDA'S UNFOLDING GENOCIDE BENEATH THE GAZE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Rwanda's genocide took place as a culmination of developments that could
have left nobody with the least doubt that this tragedy was approaching the near
horizon. Being on the ground, the UN was aware of it. Those countries who
happened to own the most sophisticated information techniques and the
indisputable right to monitor on a daily basis the various crises occurring in
different comers of the planet, and which handle the destiny of the world
through the United Nations' decision-making spheres were well informed of its
probability.
The genocide occurred as those who were carrying it out were endowed
with the privilege of sitting on behalf of Rwanda as a non-permanent member
of the Security Council. Together with their fourteen fellow-members, they
debated whether what was happening in Rwanda was genocide or simply civil
or tribal conflict, as some revisionist tendencies still put it.
This leads me to ask whether the UN really plays a significant role in
preventing genocide or at least in mitigating its impact when it is taking place.
Considering the above and the latest Security Council's shortcomings in
decision-making on sensitive security matters, one would be skeptical of the
capacity of the United Nations to play an efficient role in preventing human
catastrophic conflicts including genocide. No matter the UN Charter provisions,
no matter the goodwill of some enlightened men and women and no matter the
issuance of strong resolutions, that time when humankind will be totally
immune from such barbaric and inhumane acts as genocide has not yet come!
III. How THE UN MIGHT PREVENT GENOCIDE
To adopt a more optimistic note and try to stick to my theme, I would like
to advance some ideas on what I think should be the role of the UN in prevent-
ing genocide.
1. Preventive Justice
The UN should first and foremost put a serious emphasis on preventive
justice. Coming back to the case of Rwanda, it is true that the ICTR was set up
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to judge those suspected for having committed genocide in Rwanda. But how
many genocide perpetrators have been judged so far? How many are still at
large and how many enjoy protection from powerful countries where they have
been gratified with safe haven? How long did it take to the United Nations to
find out that the ICTR was an unproductive heavy machine run by a careless
engineer, under exorbitant costs?
There is, in this regard, a need to ensure that exemplary justice is made
both for the sake of the victims, and also to deter those likely to easily respond
to the sirens of genocide for various motives. It is then the role of the UN to
ensure that international law is duly used for that purpose, notwithstanding some
hegemonic and political interests.
2. National Sovereignty
During the 58th ordinary session of the UN, delegations took turns at the
podium to request profound reforms within the UN. The UN functions under
an array of principles stemming from the core essence of the UN Charter. These
principles include the principle of non-interference in a sovereign nation's
matters no matter the circumstances. The principle has the merit of preventing
abusive interventionism but it also-and this needs to be underscored-has in
most of the situations favored those totalitarian governments with no concern
at all for basic human rights.
The Rwandan genocide was easily carried out as a result of this principle.
Eminent diplomats from the most human rights sensitive and democratic coun-
tries would surprisingly argue that a non-interference policy was the most advis-
able, especially in a country where their national interests were not at stake.
It is in this regard that the UN has to play a crucial role. In the envisaged
reforms, provisions for an indisputable "responsibility and right to protect" for
international community members, and the "right to be protected" for the
would-be victims, should more than ever be set forth in the UN texts. The rele-
vant regulations should be enforced on a "beyond borders" basis. The principle
of sovereignty should no longer matter as long as ruthless leaders threaten
human lives.
It is incomprehensible that, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, when
the world is aiming at a fair share of the economic benefits of globalization,
under the steadfast lead of the United Nations, the same United Nations fail, just
for the sake of complying with what has frequently become a deliberately
abused principle of national sovereignty, to ensure a share of the natural global
values inherent to humankind.
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3. UN Reform
The United Nations can efficiently handle genocide prevention if some
conditions were fulfilled within its superstructure. I would suggest, among
others, the following:
(1). Establishment of an early-warning mechanism within
the United Nations
This mechanism would help maintain a special focus on geographical areas
with looming genocidal conflicts so as to mobilize resources to counter any
escalation in this respect, through conflict prevention and resolution processes,
in close interaction with the involved parties.
(2). Vertical and horizontal exchange of information
UN agencies in member states are in a position to monitor the socio-
political developments in those countries facing such grave crises as genocide.
There should be mechanisms of regular and fast transfer of information to the
UN's headquarters. Within the headquarters there should also be mechanisms
for exchanging this information amongst the UN technical departments in order
to provide decision-making organs with sound information to rely on.
(3). The integrity of the UN personnel
UN personnel should truly subscribe to moral and ethical obligations
compelling them to give due and independent consideration to the information
on hand in order to bring wise and positive guidance to the decision-making
process.
(4). Emphasis on the moral and ethical motivation in
decision-making processes
Almost ten years after the 1994 Rwandan genocide took place, the world
again witnessed with dismay in the course of 2003 how the trustee of the
security of the world, the Security Council, has failed. It could not come up
with adequate decision-making that would quickly put an end to grave human
suffering owing to differences of political views and considerations. In this
regard, I would suggest that a move be made so that a moral and ethical rational
prevails over any other interests.
IV. CONCLUSION
The complexity and the sensitivity of the issues I have raised should
encourage further exchanges of views in a broader framework. There is a need
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to make sure that the world achieves a significant step forward so that we can
claim for all time "never again." The challenges are immense but not insur-
mountable.
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Arbitration is the preferred method of settling commercial disputes
internationally. While there are many reasons, a large body of practice and law
provide a certainty and finality that are missing even in transnational judicial
determinations. The United States is not a party to any treaty on the enforce-
ment of judgments. Not only is the United States not a party to any multilateral
convention on the enforcement of judgments, it is not even a party to any
bilateral convention on the enforcement of judgments.
There have been two major developments concerning international
commercial arbitration over the past year. The first concerns the unauthorized
practice of law and the second concerns interim measures of protection.
I. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAWl
This issue first arose in Hong Kong in the late 1980s. The outcry was so
strong that Hong Kong felt it necessary to "clarify" that non-Hong Kong
counsel could appear in Hong Kong arbitrations.2
A number of United States jurisdictions had considered whether or not
appearing as an agent for a party in an arbitration (usually a domestic arbitra-
tion) constituted the practice of law. The older the case was, the more likely the
jurisdiction would find it did not constitute the practice of law.
This issue was first considered in the United States Court of Appeals for
the DC Circuit.3 The District of Columbia Motor Club (actually a Connecticut
corporation) was the local representative of the American Automobile
* Member, Brown & Welsh, P.C. of Meriden, Connecticut-http://brownwelsh.com; Chartered
Arbitrator, Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (London)-http://www.arbitrators.org; Freeman, Worshipful
Company of Arbitrators (London)-http://www.arbitratorscompany.org; Co-Chair ABILA International
Commercial Law Committee. Email: HPLowry@BrownWelsh.com.
1. After this article was written, the Illinois Appellate Court ruled that representing a party to an
arbitration does not constitute the practice of law. Colmar, Ltd. v. Fremantlemedia N. America, Inc., 801
N.E.2d 1017 (III. App. 2d 2003).
2. David St. John Sutton, The UNCITRAL Model Law: An Australian Perspective, 6 ARB. INT'L
348-59 (1990).
3. Am. Auto. Assoc. v. Merrick, 117 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
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Association.4 As part of their membership services to some 29,000 local
members, the motor club attempted to do two things: to amicably adjust claims
for property damage to automobiles for or against a member where the amount
in controversy does not exceed $100; and to resolve such claims by arbitration
if two members were involved.5
Members "consulted" a layman at the Motor Club concerning claims for
damages to their automobiles sustained in accidents.6 If the member so
requested, the Motor Club endeavored to collect the claim by writing to the
other person involved in the accident, stating the amount of damages, presenting
the claim, and requesting an answer relative to adjustment, or else the name of
the insurance carrier. If no response is received, the Motor Club sends a follow-
up letter concluding as follows:
Unless we hear from you within the coming week, we shall be
obliged to advise our member that apparently no amicable settlement
can be made of this matter, and to place the case in the hands of his
counsel. We trust that such action will not be necessary, and that the
matter may be amicably adjusted.7
If a response is received, the Motor Club will discuss the accident either
with the third person or with his insurer.8 "Such discussion includes such
subjects as right of way, provisions of traffic regulations, who is at fault,
contributory negligence.., and the like."9 If a settlement is made, the Motor
Club's employee fills out release forms for signature of the proper party."0
If no amicable settlement can be reached, the member is so informed and
advised to get his own attorney or to proceed in the small claims court." If two
members of the Motor Club are involved in the same accident and consult the
Motor Club, the two claims are submitted to arbitration. 2
The local bar association brought suit to enjoin this unauthorized practice
of law.'3 While the appellate court agreed there was an authorized practice of
law, the court noted that simply representing a party to an arbitration did not
constitute the practice of law.' 4
4. Id. at 23.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 24.
7. Id.
8. Am. Auto. Assoc., 117 F.2d at 24.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Am.. Auto. Assoc., 117 F.2d at 23.
14. Id. at 25.
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Williamson v. John D. Quinn was cited with approval in a study by the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York that representing a party in an
arbitration did not constitute the unauthorized practice of law. 5 The court
mentioned a number of factors in its decision that representing a party to an
arbitration does not constitute the practice of law:
1. An arbitration record is less complete than a court record.
2. The rules of evidence do not apply.
3. The usual court procedures common to civil trials (such as
discovery) are absent or curtailed.
4. The procedure is informal.
This case was cited with approval in another federal case where an attorney
not admitted in New York (but who had a New York office) was allowed to
cover attorneys' fees for an arbitration conducted in Mexico City.'6 New York
law seems fairly clear: a foreign lawyer may represent a party in an
arbitration. 7 Regrettably, this marked the high water point of this school of
thought.
In a case that received much attention at the time, California held that
representing a party to an arbitration constituted the practice of law.' This case
arose in the context of a legal malpractice action and prevented a law firm from
recovering fees for substantial work performed in connection with an arbitration
to be held in California. California then adopted a procedure to allow out-of-
state counsel (but only from the United States) to easily obtain permission to
represent a party to an arbitration. 9 Counsel from other countries still may not
represent clients in arbitrations held in California.2'
The Arizona Supreme Court then held that representing a party to an
arbitration constituted the practice of law. 2' Arizona defines the practice of law
as:
those acts, whether performed in court or in the law office, which
lawyers customarily have carried on from day to day through the
centuries constitute the practice of law. Such acts ... include render-
ing to another any other advice or services which are and have been
15. 537 F. Supp. 613, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
16. Siegel v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera Industrial y Comercial, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11455, at * 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
17. Id.
18. Birdbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Super. Ct. of Santa Clara County, 949 P.2d
1, 9 (Cal. 1998).
19. Id. at 7, citing CAL. CT. R. 983.4.
20. Id.
21. In re Frederick C. Creasy, Jr., 12 P.3d 214, 219 (Ariz. 2000).
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customarily given and performed from day to day in the ordinary
practice of members of the legal profession,
2
Given the fact Creasy was a disbarred lawyer, the Arizona Supreme Court found
conducting a cross-examination during an arbitration clearly constituted the
unauthorized practice of law and violated their disbarment order.23
The next case where representing a party was held to constitute the practice
of law was The Florida Bar v. Rapoport. 4 Rapoport was a member in good
standing of the District of Columbia Bar and represented a variety of clients in
federal securities arbitrations (and advertised for such cases in Florida news-
papers). 25 Ruling that Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion on Nonlawyer Repre-
sentation,26 was directly on point, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that Rapo-
port was not authorized to represent clients in securities arbitrations within
Florida.27
The Connecticut Bar Association's Unauthorized Practice of law com-
mittee recently issued informal opinion 2002-02, holding that it would be an
unauthorized practice of law for an attorney admitted only in New York to
represent a party to a domestic arbitration held within Connecticut.28 However,
a statute mandates the opposite conclusion concerning international arbitrations
-representing a party to an international arbitration does not constitute the
practice of law within Connecticut. 29
With this background, foreign counsel will have to be careful about
appearing in arbitrations within the United States even if local counsel is
employed. Very often unauthorized practice of law statutes are criminal statutes
that can have very unfortunate effects.
22. Id. at 217.
23. Id.
24. 845 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2003).
25. Id. at 875.
26. The Florida Bar re: Advisory Opinion-Nonlawyer Representation Sec. Arbitration, 696 So.2d
1178 (Fla. 1997).
27. Id. at 877.
28. Conn. Bar Ass'n. Informal Op. 2002-02 (2002), available at
http://brownwelsh.com/Archive/CBA arbitration-ethicaLopinion.pdf. (last visited Mar. 20, 2004).
29. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 51-88 (2003).
The provisions of this section shall not be construed as prohibiting: (i) A town clerk
from preparing or drawing deeds, mortgages, releases, certificates of change of name
and trade name certificates which are to be recorded or filed in the town clerk's office
in the town in which the town clerk holds office; (2) any person from practicing law
or pleading at the bar of any court of this state in his own cause; or (3) any person from
acting as an agent or representative for a party in an international arbitration as defined
in subsection (3) of section 50a-101.
II. INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION
Arbitration awards are generally enforced under the 1958 New York
Convention on The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.30
For arbitral awards under Inter-American system, the enforcement mechanism
can be found in the 1975 Panama Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration.3 Each of these two conventions also provides a mech-
anism for enforcing agreements to arbitrate. Similar mechanisms are found in
UNCITRAL's 1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.32
However, none of these legal documents provide a mechanism for enforcing
interim measures of protection (sometimes called "IMPs").
The arbitration rules promulgated by the American Arbitration Associa-
tion's International Centre for Dispute Resolution,33 the International Chamber
of Commerce,' the London Court of International Arbitration,35 and Chicago
International Dispute Resolution Association,36 and UNCITRAL's ad hoc
rules37 all provide for interim measures of protection. Everyone is certain the
arbitral tribunal may issue such orders, but no one has described what they are
in any detail, the circumstances for their issuance, or how they are to be
enforced.
30. As of Nov. 3, 2003, 134 countries were parties to this convention. See Status of Conventions
and Model Laws, available at http://www.uncitral.org/english/status/status-e.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 2004).
31. See generally Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30,
1975, 14 I.LM. 336 (1975), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-35.htm (last visited
Feb. 26, 2004). The current parties are: Arg., Bol., Braz., Chile, Colom., Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Sal., Guat.,
Hond., Mex., Nicar., Pan., Para., Peru, U.S., Uru, and Venez.
32. See generally Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, UNCITRAL Annex I, U.N.
Doc. A/40/17 (1985), available at http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb.htm (last visited
Feb. 26, 2004).
33. See generally AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, INT'L DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES (2003),
available at http://www.adr.org/index2. I.jsp?JSPssid=15747&JSPsrc=upload/LIVESITE\Rules_Procedures\
Nationaljnternationa.\..\focusArea\intemationa\AAA175current.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 2004).
34. See generally INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF ARBITRATION (1998), available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/rules.asp (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
35. See generally THE LONDON COURT OF INT'L ARBITRATION, ARBITRATION; RULES, CLAUSES &
COSTS (1998), available at http://www.lcia-arbitration.comltownlsquaretxvc24/arb/uk.htm (last visited Feb.
29, 2004).
36. See generally CHICAGO INT'L DISPUTE RESOLUTION ASS'N, THE ARBITRATION RULES OF
CHICAGO INT'L DISPUTE RESOLUTION ASS'N (1999), available at http://cidra.org/rules.htm (last visited Feb.
26, 2004).
37. See generally G.A. Res 31/98, UNCITRAL, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17, chap V, sect. C, U.N.
Doc.A/31/17(1976), available at http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules.htm (last visited
Feb. 26, 2004).
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There are several different categories of interim measures of protection:
1. Preservation of evidence.
2. Preserving the status quo while the arbitration proceeds.
3. Ensuring the ultimate award will be effective (commonly called
a prejudgment remedy in the domestic context).
While interim measures of protection are more commonly used in
commercial arbitration, they are generally applicable to any kind of arbitration.
In each and every commercial dispute, there is a concern about whether or not
the ultimate judgment will be paid. In each and every arbitration, there are two
parties to the transaction that cannot be parties to the arbitration: the taxman
and the bankruptcy trustee.
It is hornbook law that third parties cannot be bound by an arbitrator's
decision. This means an interim measure of protection issued by an arbitral
tribunal (without more) is often useless (especially against the taxman and the
bankruptcy trustee).
The procedure for issuing an interim order of protection under the
American Arbitration Association rules, International Chamber of Commerce
rules, London Court of International Arbitration rules, and the Chicago
International Dispute Resolution Association rules is not clear. Whether or not
interim measures of protection can be used to secure future arbitration awards
is unclear. The only clear point is the arbitral tribunal may issue interim
measures of protection.
The standards for judicially issued prejudgment remedies vary from court
to court, even in the United States. Some legal systems require only probable
cause.38 Some legal systems require exigent circumstances. Judicial prejudg-
ment remedies are not entitled to full faith and credit recognition even within
the United States, suggesting they will be even more difficult to enforce
internationally than judgments.
Even if an arbitral tribunal issues an interim measure of protection, it is
uncertain if a court will enforce it or how a court should enforce it. It is even
uncertain how the arbitral body itself will enforce it. The dividing line between
court order and arbitral tribunal ordered interim measures of protection is not
clear even in the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law.39
Recognizing the importance of this topic, UNCITRAL has begun
deliberating. At the present time, it is unclear what UNCITRAL is actually
deliberating. Only after the final text is concluded is it likely that the parties
38. See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-278 (2003).
39. Compare UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 36, at art. 9, with UNCITRAL Model Law, id.,
at art. 17.
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will have decided if this will be an amendment to the 1958 New York
Convention," an interpretive document for the 1958 Convention4' or an
amendment to the UNCITRAL Model Law.
UNCITRAL has been working from the following text:42
Enforcement of interim measures of protection
(1) Upon an application by an interested party, made with the
approval of the arbitral tribunal, the competent court shall
refuse to recognize and enforce an interim measure of
protection referred to in article 17, irrespective of the
country in which it was ordered, if:(a) The party against whom the measure is invoked
furnishes proof that:
(i) [Variant 1] The arbitration agreement referred
to in article 7 is not valid
[Variant 2] The arbitration agreement referred
to in article 7 appears to not be valid, in which
case the court may refer the issue of the [juris-
diction of the arbitral tribunal] [validity of the
arbitration agreement] to be decided by the
arbitral tribunal in accordance with article 16
of this Law;
(ii) The party against whom the interim measure is
invoked was not given proper notice of the
appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral
proceedings [in which case the court may
suspend the enforcement proceedings until the
parties have been heard by the arbitral tribu-
nal]; or
(iii) The party against whom the interim measure is
invoked was unable to present its case with
respect to the interim measure [in which case
the court may suspend the enforcement pro-
ceedings until the parties have been heard by
the arbitral tribunal]; or
40. This will undoubtedly create some transition issues between states that adopt the amendment
and states that do not.
41. This document would be effective immediately and would not require any action on the part of
the present States Parties to adopt it. However, these is some question of how far a new concept may be
placed in an old document before it becomes clear to everyone the "interpretation" is really a disguised
amendment.
42. Report of the Working Group on Arbitration on the Work of Its Thirty-Eighth Session,
UNCITRAL, 36th Sess., Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/524 (2003), available at
http://www.uncitral.orglenglish/sessions/unc/unc-36/acn9-524-e.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 2004) [hereinafter
Report of the Working Group].
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(iv) The interim measure has been terminated,
suspended or amended by the arbitral tribunal;
(b) The court finds that:
(i) The measure requested is incompatible with
the powers conferred upon the court by its pro-
cedural laws, unless the court decides to refor-
mulate the measure to the extent necessary to
adapt it to its own powers and procedures for
the purpose of enforcing the measure; or
(ii) The recognition or enforcement of the interim
measure would be contrary to the public policy
of this State.
(2) Upon application by an interested party, made with the
approval of the arbitral tribunal, the competent court may,
in its discretion, refuse to recognize and enforce an in-
terim measure of protection referred to in article 17, irres-
pective of the country in which it was ordered, if the party
against whom the measure is invoked furnishes proof that
application for the same or similar interim measure has
been made to a court in this State, regardless of whether
the court has taken a decision on the application.
(3) The party who is seeking enforcement of an interim mea-
sure shall promptly inform the court of any termination,
suspension, or amendment of that measure.
(4) In reformulating the measure under paragraph (1) (b)(i),
the court shall not modify the substance of the interim
measure.
(5) Paragraph (1) (a)(iii) does not apply
[Variant 1] to an interim measure of protection that
was ordered without notice to the party against
whom the measure is invoked provided that the
measure was ordered to be effective for a period not
exceeding [30] days and the enforcement of the
measure is requested before the expiry of that
period.
[Variant 2] to an interim measure of protection that
was ordered without notice to the party against
whom the measure is invoked provided that such
interim measure is confirmed by the arbitral tribunal
after the other party has been able to present its case
with respect to the interim measure.
[Variant 3] if the arbitral tribunal, in its discretion,
determines that, in light of the circumstances re-
ferred to in article 17 (2), the interim measure of
protection can be effective only if the enforcement
Lowry
order is issued by the court without notice to the
party against whom the measure is invoked."
The casual reader should remember first drafts are never quite as good as
final drafts. Undoubtedly the negative pregnant of the first section of this draft
will be fixed before it reaches its final form.
The first feature of section 1 is the requirement the arbitral tribunal must
"approve" the application for interim measures of protection. The concept of
allowing the arbitral tribunal to consider the question of interim measures of
protection before a court seems appropriate, as long as the arbitral tribunal has
been established. A request for interim measures of protection should not be
denied or delayed simply because the arbitral tribunal had not been appointed
yet.
The latter part of section 1 refers to recognizing and enforcing an interim
measure of protection. This suggests the arbitral tribunal has actually issued an
order for an interim measure of protection. But what happens if the tribunal
orders an interim measure of protection but does not approve the application to
the court to confirm it? Does this deprive the court of jurisdiction? Apparently
it does under this draft.
Why should there be a two-step process when a single step would be
preferable? The simplest procedure should be preferred to promote the
economical enforcement of interim measures of protection ordered by arbitral
tribunals. If an arbitral tribunal orders an interim measure of protection, it
should be assumed the tribunal has no objection to a court enforcing that order.
If the tribunal objects to a court enforcing the order, the tribunal may terminate,
suspend or amend its order at any time.
It should be noted that the application to enforce can be made to the court
by any "interested party." Presumably this definition is somewhat broader than
simply a "party" to the arbitration. It seems possible a third party may try to
enforce an interim measure of protection under some very rare circumstances.43
Under certain circumstances, an interim measure of protection should not
be enforced. The first is when the arbitral tribunal has no jurisdiction. Lacking
jurisdiction, the tribunal should not have issued the order in the first place. The
question is who should determine the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.
Under international arbitration, the doctrine of "competence-competence"
receives great support. The arbitral tribunal has the competence to determine
its own jurisdiction. This means variant 2 of subsection 2 will undoubtedly
receive a great deal of support.
The next major area of concern is the level of due process afforded the
defendant (although an interim measure of protection could be awarded against
43. Possibly a third party stakeholder might in the context of an interpleader.
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a plaintiff). If a party is not afforded an opportunity to present its case (because
it was issued ex-parte improperly" or was not aware the tribunal had been
appointed45), the interim measure of protection should not be enforced. Under
such circumstances, the matter should be referred back to the arbitral tribunal
for further proceedings.
There is a further level of inquiry under section 5 about the arbitral
tribunal's authority to issue ex-parte interim measures of protection. Virtually
everyone agrees interim measures of protection should be able to issue ex-parte
orders of interim protection. The question is under what circumstances are ex-
parte orders appropriate. The three variants under section 5 try to provide that
guidance. Time will tell which one is adopted.
A court should not enforce an interim measure of protection if it is not
within the power of the court. 6 If the court feels it can do so, the court may
reform the interim measure of protection so it will (i) conform to its own
procedural laws and (ii) not violate the enforcing court's state's public policy.4 7
Such a reformation should not change the essential substance of the arbitral
tribunal's order.4"
In short, UNCITRAL's initial draft is a good attempt to modify the Model
Law to show when (and how) a court should enforce an interim measure of
protection order by a tribunal. While it is far from perfect, it will provide the
courts with explicit guidance on how they should evaluate requests to enforce
interim measures. Once these legal issues are resolved, the number of
applications to courts will undoubtedly increase.
44. Report of the Working Group, supra note 42, at 16.
45. Id. at 15.
46. Id. at 17.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 14.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A Special Commission of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law will meet during the first nine days of December 2003 to consider a Draft
Text on Choice of Court Agreements. That text was prepared by an informal
working group in March of 2003, and is the fruit of nearly a decade of
negotiations.' Those negotiations originally sought a rather comprehensive
convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments,
with a preliminary draft convention being prepared in October 1999, and further
revised at the first part of a Diplomatic Conference in June 2001. When it
became clear that some countries, particularly the United States, could not
agree to the convention being considered, negotiations were redirected at a
convention focused on bases of jurisdiction upon which consensus could be
achieved. The result is now a text limited to one basis ofjurisdiction; that is the
consent of the parties.
While the current Draft Text is more limited in its scope and effect than
drafts previously considered, it offers the possibility of both realistic success
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for International Legal Education, University of
Pittsburgh. The author is a member of the U.S. Delegation to the Special Commission at the Hague Con-
ference on Private International Law charged with negotiating a convention on jurisdiction and the effect of
foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters, and was a member of the Working Group session that
produced the Draft Text on Choice of Court Agreements in March 2003. The comments in this article are
those of the author and should not be taken to reflect the position of the U.S. government, or the Hague
Working Group.
1. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Report on the work of the informal working
group on the judgments project, in particular on the preliminary text achieved at its third meeting - 25-28
March 2003 (June 2003), available at ftp://ftp.hcch.net/doc/jdgm-pd22e.doc. (last visited Jan. 17, 2004)
[hereinafter Hague Conference].
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in its conclusion and adoption, and a foundation from which to consider
possible future work on multilateral harmonization of jurisdiction and the
enforcement ofjudgments. I will briefly review the substance of the Draft Text
in order to explain its purpose, recognize its limits, and acknowledge issues yet
to be decided. This review supports the conclusion that the Draft Text presents
a workable foundation for a very useful convention.
II. THE DRAFT TEXT RULES
The Draft Text is perhaps most easily understood if one thinks of it as the
litigation counterpart to the New York Arbitration Convention.' Like the New
York Convention, this treaty would establish rules for enforcing private party
agreements regarding the forum for resolution of any resulting disputes, and
rules for recognizing and enforcing the decisions issued by the chosen forum.
Thus, a Hague Choice of Court Convention would serve the business world by
providing for choice of court agreements, a measure of predictability similar to
that now provided for arbitration agreements under the New York Arbitration
Convention. Exclusive choice of court agreements in business-to-business
contracts would be honored by courts in contracting states, and the resulting
judgments would be enforced.
Article 1(1) begins the process of defining the scope of the convention by
providing that it "shall apply to agreements on the choice of court concluded in
civil or commercial matters." This sets the basic focus of the convention on
one basis of jurisdiction: choice of the court by the parties involved. Article
1(2) takes a carve-out approach to the scope issue by listing types of contracts
to which the convention does not apply. Article 1(3) is similar in approach,
listing exclusions from Convention coverage in terms of subject matter of the
dispute. Of these exclusions, the most important is that found in Article
l(2)(a), which limits the Convention to business-to-business choice of court
agreements by excluding coverage of consumer contracts.3 This is done by
adopting language very close to that found in Article 2(a) of the U.N. Sales
Convention,4 stating that the Convention shall not apply to agreements in which
at least one party is a consumer ("acting primarily for personal, family or
household purposes").
2. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,
21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
3. Hague Conference, supra note 1, at 1 (2)(b) (explaining that the other type-of-contract exclusion
from scope is found in art. 1(2)(b), which excludes "individual or collective contracts of employment.").
4. U.S. Ratification of 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods, 52 Fed. Reg. 6264 (Mar. 2, 1987); see also Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, 19 LL.M. 668 (1980).
The Draft Text deals with both exclusive and non-exclusive choice of
court clauses. Article 2(1)(b) creates a presumption that if you list only one
court or country, the clause is exclusive. This is important to enforcement of
the agreement, because only exclusive choice of court clauses are entitled to
Convention enforcement under Articles 4 and 5. This changes in the Article 7
rules, however, where judgments emanating from courts taking jurisdiction on
the basis of any valid choice of court agreement (exclusive or non-exclusive)
are entitled to recognition and enforcement under the Convention.
The Draft Text creates three basic rules upon which the operation of the
Convention turns. They are:
1) The court chosen by the parties in an exclusive choice of court
agreement has jurisdiction;
2) If an exclusive choice of court agreement exists, a court not
chosen by the parties does not have jurisdiction, and shall decline to
hear the case; and
3) A judgment resulting from jurisdiction exercised in accordance
with a choice of court agreement (exclusive or non-exclusive) shall be
recognized and enforced in the courts of other Contracting States.
Article 4(1) sets out the basic rule that the court chosen by the parties in
an exclusive choice of court clause "shall have jurisdiction:"
If the parties have agreed in an exclusive choice of court agreement
that a court or the courts of a Contracting State shall have jurisdiction
to settle any dispute which has arisen or may arise in connection with
a particular legal relationship, that court or the courts of that Contract-
ing State shall have jurisdiction, unless the court finds that the
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed.
This rule applies only to international business-to-business contracts
containing choice of court agreements. Thus, Article 4(2) provides that the rule
does not apply "if all the parties are habitually resident" in the Contracting
State in which a case is brought, and they have "agreed that a court or courts of
that same Contracting State shall have jurisdiction to determine the dispute."
There is no explicit rule providing whether or not a court which is chosen
in an exclusive choice of court agreement may decline to hear the case based
on discretionary grounds such as forum non conveniens. The Secretariat's
Report states that one of the Convention's "three aims" is that "the chosen court
has to hear the case."5 This, however, is inconsistent with the explicit language
5. Hague Conference, supra note 1, at 6.
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of Article 5 that allows a court not chosen in such an agreement to hear the case
if "the chosen court" has "declined jurisdiction."6 Thus, the explicit language
of Article 5(c) would suggest that such discretionary doctrines are not affected
by the Draft Text.7
Article 4(3) does make clear that Convention rules govern only in
personam jurisdiction, and that private parties cannot create subject matter
jurisdiction that does not otherwise exist in a national legal system. Thus, for
example, parties cannot agree to submit a dispute to a specialized court when
only the local courts of general jurisdiction have subject matter jurisdiction
over the type of dispute in question within the chosen legal system.
While Article 4 serves to tell the chosen court how to respond to an
exclusive choice of court agreement, Article 5 provides the rule applicable in
courts that are not chosen. Thus, a court in a Contracting State that is not
selected in an exclusive choice of court agreement "shall decline jurisdiction
or suspend proceedings." The only exceptions to this rule occur when:
(a) that court finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative
or incapable of being performed;
(b) the parties are habitually resident in that Contracting State and
all other elements relevant to the dispute and the relationship of the
parties, other than the choice of court agreement, are connected with
that Contracting State; or
(c) the court chosen has declined jurisdiction.8
The Draft Text includes no general public policy exception to enforcement
of a choice of court agreement. This is consistent with the structure of the New
York Arbitration Convention, which provides no public policy exception in its
Article II obligation of Contracting States to recognize arbitration agreements,
but does have an Article V public policy exception to the Article II obligation
to recognize and enforce the resulting arbitral awards.9
The second exception to deference by a derogated court to the chosen
court is the counterpart to the Article 4(2) domestic case rule for chosen courts.
Thus, Article 5(b) allows a court not chosen to determine that the case is a local
matter within the Contracting State in which that court sits, and thereby refuse
6. Id. at 18.
7. One might argue that the chosen court's Article 4(1) authority to determine that "the agreement
is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed," or the domestic case exception under Article
4(2), constitute explicit Convention rules by which the chosen court could "decline jurisdiction." This runs
counter to the explicit language of the text, however, since these are exceptions to jurisdiction under the
Convention and not authority to decline jurisdiction that otherwise exists.
8. Hague Conference, supra note 1, at 18.
9. See New York Convention, supra note 2, at 2519 - 20.
to respect the choice of the parties in the choice of court agreement. This can
occur, however, only if "all other elements relevant to the dispute and the
relationship of the parties, other than the choice of court agreement, are
connected with that Contracting State."
Article 7 provides the basic rule on recognition and enforcement of a
judgment issued by a court of a Contracting State, and for which jurisdiction
was founded on a choice of court agreement. Such a judgment "shall be"
recognized and enforced. Unlike the language of Articles 4 and 5, the terms of
Article 7 do not limit the recognition and enforcement obligation to judgments
resulting from exclusive choice of court agreements, but authorize recognition
and enforcement under the Convention of judgments resulting from all choice
of court agreements. The definitional provisions of Article 2(1) operate to
mean that Contracting States are obligated to enforce judgments resulting from
both exclusive and non-exclusive choice of court agreements. This result is
intentional. Rules obligating courts to respect non-exclusive choice of court
agreements would have been much more complex and difficult at the Article 4
and 5 stage.
While the scope of the general recognition and enforcement rule is broader
than the general jurisdictional rule, it is also subject to more exceptions. Here,
there arises, again, a basic issue of definition and structure. Article 7(1)
provides an exhaustive list ° of grounds for refusing recognition and enforce-
ment if the judgment is based on an exclusive choice of court agreement.
Article 7(2) then provides additional grounds for refusal if the judgment is
based on "a choice of court agreement other than an exclusive choice of court
agreement." This reflects the fact that the general rule on recognition and
enforcement found in Article 7(1) applies beyond the types of cases emanating
from Article 4 jurisdiction under the Convention.
The list in Article 7(1) includes grounds for non-recognition that should
seem familiar to anyone accustomed to the Brussels Convention and Regula-
tion, the New York Arbitration Convention, or the U.S. Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act. A court in a Contracting State may refuse
recognition or enforcement if:
(a) the court addressed finds that the choice of court agreement was
null and void;
(b) the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent
document, including the essential elements of the claim, was not
10. Hague Conference, supra note 1, at 20 (explaining that recognition or enforcement may be
refused "only" if one of the listed grounds is satisfied. Note, however, that courts "may" refuse recognition
and enforcement under this provision, meaning that non-recognition is not mandatory if one of the listed
grounds is satisfied).
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notified to the defendant in sufficient time and in such a way as to
enable him to arrange for his defense;
(c) the judgment was obtained by fraud in connection with a matter
of procedure;
[(d) the judgment results from proceedings incompatible with
fundamental principles of procedure of the State addressed;] or
(e) recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible
with the public policy of the State addressed."
The Article 7(2) grounds for non-recognition represent an acknowledg-
ment that non-exclusive choice of court agreements may produce parallel
proceedings resulting in inconsistent judgments. Thus, non-recognition may be
allowed where contrary obligations exist as a result of parallel proceedings.
While the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 7 allow non-
recognition, they do so only in limited circumstances. Paragraph (3) follows by
strengthening the effect of the original judgment, providing that the court asked
to recognize and enforce a judgment cannot review the merits of the decision
in the originating court.
The Draft Text changes the result in earlier drafts on the issue of validity
of a choice of court agreement. There was the belief within the Working Group
that incorporation of a choice of law rule in the text would tip the balance on
things like shrink-wrap contracts. Thus, there is no provision allowing a
contract to be held void, for example, if its terms are "manifestly unjust," and
there is no choice of law rule. What we have is the rule that a choice of court
clause shall be enforced unless the clause is null and void. This approach was
taken from Article 1(2) of the New York convention, and a court will apply its
own rules on validity. This rule is found in 3 places: Article 4 (for the court
chosen), Article 5 (for courts not chosen), and Article 7 (for the recognizing
court). In each instance, the court has to decide the validity of the agreement
under the law it deems to be applicable. Thus, while "formal" validity of a
clause is governed by Article 3, substantive validity is left to the court seized
in each of the three possible situations.
1m. CONCLUSION
With over 130 Contracting States, the New York Convention has had a
significant impact on dispute resolution practice in international transactions.
The existence of a system that supports the enforcement of both agreements to
arbitrate and the resulting arbitral awards adds predictability and efficiency that
cause business parties often to favor arbitration over litigation. The availability
of a convention that would do for litigation what the New York Convention has
11. Id.
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done for arbitration would serve to place litigation and arbitration on a more
equal footing in global commerce, thus allowing parties to transnational
transactions the opportunity to select the form of dispute resolution based on
its individual merits.
The March 2003 Draft Text on Choice of Court Agreements offers a
framework for the negotiation of a workable Hague Convention. Such a
convention would both present a valuable opportunity to place litigation on a
more equal status with arbitration for international private dispute resolution,
and serve as a foundation for discussion and development of further progress
in the realm of cross-border jurisdictional practice in national courts. Thus, it
seems that the Draft Text can bring the focus of jurisdiction and judgments
work at the Hague Conference into the realm of the possible, building on the
consensus that does exist for a convention dealing with jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement ofjudgments. It offers a valuable opportunity that
brings with it few, if any, disadvantages.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In September 2002, President Bush and his national security team released
the annual review of the United States' National Security Strategy. The review
departed from earlier reviews in that it embraced the use of preemptive strikes
against rogue states which possess or seek to possess weapons of mass
destruction and which harbor or support terrorist organizations.'
* Holds the Rebecca Grazier Professorship of Law and International Relations, American
University. Ph.D., Cambridge 1998; J.D., Stanford Law School 1990; B.A., UC Davis 1987. From 1991-
1993 Professor Williams served as an Attorney-Advisor in the United States Department of State's Office of
the Legal Advisor for European Affairs. During the course of his legal practice, Professor Williams has
assisted nearly a dozen states and sub-state entities in major international peace negotiations, and has advised
numerous governments across Europe, Africa and Asia on matters of public international law.
•* Senior Research Fellow, Public International Law & Policy Group; J.D. Candidate, American
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1. "We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to
threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends." Press
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On March 19, 2003, the United States, together with nearly thirty coalition
partners, initiated a successful military campaign to liberate Iraq from the
regime of Saddam Hussein. Many commentators view the liberation of Iraq as
the first use of the doctrine of preemption against a state, which was perceived
to possess the ability and the motive to either use weapons of mass destruction
or transfer those weapons to terrorist organizations for use against the United
States or its allies.
While there has been significant political discussion as to the utility and/or
risks associated with the doctrine of preemption, the legal debate has to date
been fairly limited. Legal commentators have either criticized the doctrine as
illegal, or have sought to provide a legal justification for the doctrine. Few if
any have sought to define the legal parameters of the doctrine.
The purpose of this article is to help define the appropriate legal parameters
for use of the doctrine.2 While the traditional Caroline criteria remain relevant
for conventional preemption, it is necessary to develop a refined set of criteria
for the use of preemptive force against rogue states, which possess weapons of
mass destruction and harbor or support terrorist organizations.
When developing the parameters for the modem doctrine of preemption it
is important to bear in mind that the doctrine, as set forth in the National
Security Strategy, applies only to rogue states, which possess or seek to possess
weapons of mass destruction, and which harbor or support terrorist
organizations. To be subject to preemptive military action, a state must possess
all three of these characteristics. It is important, however, to also note that once
a doctrine is established, the requirements for its use may quickly become
elastic, to the point that one or more of these characteristics may be deemed
sufficient to invoke preemption. In this case, the criteria would of course need
to be heightened, and thus it is important to develop criteria, which may be more
stringently applied in the event the doctrine is more liberally applied then
currently envisioned.
To accomplish the objective of defining parameters for the modem
doctrine of preemption this article will first review the strategic rationale for
preemption, and a detailed definition of the modem doctrine. This will be
followed by a review of the United States' government's legal rationale and a
review of the emerging legal debate before discussing the applicable parameters.
The article will conclude with the argument that in order to guard against the
unwarranted application of the doctrine a specific set of clearly defined criteria
Release, President George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Sept.
2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2004) [hereinafter National
Security Strategy].
2. This article is an expanded version of a presentation delivered as part of a panel discussion at
the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Branch of the International Law Association. The panel was
organized and chaired by Professor Ved Nanda of Denver University's School of Law.
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must be developed for its use. The article then proposes that in order to be
consistent with the intent of the National Security Strategy and to comply with
general norms of international law, a state must demonstrate before it
undertakes the use of preemptive military force that its actions are necessary in
light of the certainty of attack, the opportunity for successful preemption, and
the failure of peaceful multilateral efforts. The use of force also must be
grounded in legitimacy, be collectively supported, and be proportionate.
II. THE RATIONALE FOR A MODERN DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTION
As set forth in the National Security Strategy, the evolution of the doctrine
of preemption arises from the radical transformation of the post cold-war
security environment and the perceived need to counter the threat posed by
terrorist organizations and rogue states who may possess or seek to possess
weapons of mass destruction, or who may be able to inflict substantial harm
through unconventional attacks such as those of September 11, 2001.
The necessity of preemption is heightened by 1) the nature of weapons of
mass destruction, which can "be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used
without warning,"3 and 2) the covert nature of terrorist's attacks and the
resulting inability to predict when and where an attack may take place. As
explained in the Security Strategy,
Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can
no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past.
The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's
threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by
our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We
cannot let our enemies strike first.4
The necessity for the doctrine is also derived from the fact that the targets
of terrorist attacks are primarily civilian populations. Moreover, given the
nature of terrorist organizations and rogue states deterrence cannot be relied
upon as an effective means of defense.5
Finally, the doctrine is a natural outgrowth of the increasing inability of
international organizations to muster the political will among their member
states to prevent crimes against humanity or to neutralize terrorist
organizations.6 Similarly, international law has been slow to adapt to changing
3. National Security Strategy, supra note 1, at 15.
4. Id.
5. For more detail on the efforts of the United States to develop a strategy for confronting "un-
deterrable enemies," see ]lan Berman, The Bush Strategy at War, 74 THE NAT'L INT., 51-57 (2003/04).
6. The most recent examples include the inability of both the United Nations and the European
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international norms, such as humanitarian intervention,7 and to the increased
organizational and technical sophistication of terrorist organizations. In fact,
even if international organizations were able to muster the political will to
confront terrorism in a more aggressive manner, there is little indication that
terrorist organizations or rogue states respond to the types of inducements or
sanctions employed by international organizations.
The recent decision of Libya to cease its attempts to acquire nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and to open its facilities to
inspection by American and British, as well as international inspectors, is
perceived as providing additional support for the utility of the modem doctrine
of preemption.
mH. DEFINING THE MODERN DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTION
The essence of the doctrine as set forth in the National Security Strategy
is that because the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture
it may act preemptively to forestall or prevent hostile acts by rogue states which
possess or seek to possess weapons of mass destruction, and harbor or support
terrorist organizations.'
The doctrine also includes a commitment to undertake proactive counter-
proliferation efforts such as detection, active and passive defenses, and
counterforce capabilities, which are to be fully integrated into defense policy.
This is to be coupled with strengthened nonproliferation efforts to prevent rogue
states and terrorists from acquiring the materials, technologies, and expertise
necessary for weapons of mass destruction through diplomacy, arms control,
Union member states to intervene to prevent the crimes against humanity in Rwanda or Bosnia, including the
Srebrenica massacre in what was designated a United Nations safe area. In the case of Srebrenica, over 7,000
unarmed civilians were massacred in large part because the Japanese civilian United Nations official and the
French United Nations military commander blocked air strikes requested by the Dutch peacekeepers in the
city. The subsequent use of limited air strikes in Gorazde, forced through by the British government,
prevented a similar massacre there. PAUL R. WILLIAMS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE? WAR
CRIMES AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 48 (Rowman & Littlefield 2002). Similar
examples include the unwillingness of the any international organization to take any meaningful action against
the Taliban and Al Qaeda despite their gross violations of human rights and clear intent to sponsor terrorist
activities abroad until after 9/11.
7. In the case of the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, it was carried out without United
Nations' approval, and with minimal actual political and military support from NATO member states other
than Great Britain and the United States. Moreover, the international community largely responded to the
humanitarian intervention with the argument that while the use of force to prevent crimes against humanity
and genocide in this case was illegal, it was legitimate.
8. The National Security Strategy also identifies these states as frequently possessing the additional
criteria of brutalizing their own people, displaying no regard for international law and rejecting basic human
values. National Security Strategy, supra note 1, at 14.
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multilateral export controls, and interdiction. 9 Finally, the National Security
Strategy identifies the need to undertake effective consequence management to
respond to the effects of WMD use in order to minimize the effects of their use
and to dissuade terrorists from their use.'0
Other chapters of the National Security Strategy set forth a plan for
strengthening alliances, promoting human dignity, working to defuse regional
conflicts, promoting global economic growth, and expanding and deepening the
process of democratization. All of these initiatives are interrelated and to the
degree they are successful they reduce the actual need to undertake preemptive
action against rogue states possessing WMD.
Unfortunately, many critics of the modem doctrine of preemption fail to
acknowledge that the doctrine is set forth within the broader approach of
increasing efforts at counter-proliferation, strengthening alliances, and reducing
the causes of conflict. Similarly, critics fail to acknowledge that the doctrine is
applicable in only the most narrowly tailored circumstances involving rogue
states, terrorists and weapons of mass destruction and thus invoke the slippery
slope argument that the National Security Strategy will lead to the increased use
of preemption between states with long running conflicts such as China/Taiwan,
and North Korea/South Korea,1 or "the renewed drug trade in Afghanistan
infiltrating Iran, or the occupation of uninhabited nominally Spanish islets in the
Strait of Gibraltar by Moroccan forces.' 12
There is, of course, a legitimate concern that once established the doctrine
will be stretched to apply to cases such as India/Pakistan or the Arab states and
Israel. 3  To guard against the unwarranted evolution of the doctrine it is
necessary to articulate a precise legal rationale and legal criteria for determining
when preemptive action is appropriate.
IV. LEGAL RATIONALE
While legal rationales are not customarily provided as part of the National
Security Strategy, it is important when developing a new or evolved doctrine for
9. To accomplish this objective since May 2003 the United States has led efforts to establish the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The PSI is an alliance of like-minded states that have agreed to
strengthen existing international security agreements, increase intelligence sharing and undertake coordinated
interdiction efforts. For more on the PSI, see Berman, supra note 5.
10. National Security Strategy, supra note 1, at 14.
11. See Richard N. Gardner, Neither Bush nor the "Jurisprudences, " 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 585, 588
(2003).
12. Michael J. Kelly, Time Warp to 1945 - Resurrection of the Reprisal and Anticipatory Self-
Defense Doctrines in International Law, 13 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 37 (2003) (citing Kashmir,
Lebanon, and China/Taiwan).
13. See Jane E. Stromseth, Law and Force After Iraq: A Transitional Moment, 97 AM. J. INT'L L.
628 (2003); see also Gardner, supra note 11.
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the United States' government to subsequently issue a legal rationale. The role
of a legal rationale is to provide some justification for the evolved doctrine, to
provide parameters so that the doctrine is appropriately applied by the
government, and so that an unreasonably expanded version of the doctrine is not
used as a pretext for illegitimate acts by other governments.
The National Security Strategy does briefly articulate a foundation for the
modem doctrine of preemption by noting that "for centuries, international law
recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take
action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of
attack.' '
4
The National Security Strategy further notes that "Legal scholars and inter-
national jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence
of an imminent threat, most often visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air
forces preparing to attack."15 The Security Strategy then argues that the concept
of imminent threat must be evolved to reflect the capabilities and objectives of
rogue states and terrorists that seek to attack by unconventional means. 6
Presumably, the Department of State should have followed up the National
Security Strategy with a formal document defining the evolved concept of
imminent threat and a set of legal criteria, which could be used to determine
when a preemptive strike might be legally appropriate. Rather, the Legal
Advisor for the Department of State has made publicly available a Memoran-
dum of Law addressed to a joint roundtable of experts from the American
Society of International Law and the Council on Foreign Relations. 7 The Legal
Advisor and the Assistant Legal Advisor for Political/Military Affairs also
published their views in the American Journal of International Law under the
title, Preemption, Iraq, and International Law. 18
The ASIL-CFR Memorandum seeks to lay the foundation for an articula-
tion of the new parameters for the use of preemptive force. In the memoran-
dum, the Legal Advisor argues that "in the era of weapons of mass destruction,
definitions within the traditional framework of the use of force in self-defense
and the concept of preemption must adapt to the nature and capabilities of
today's threats."' 9 The Legal Advisor defines the traditional framework as
permitting the preemptive use of proportional force only when it is necessary,
14. National Security Strategy, supra note 1, at 15.
15. Id.
16. National Security Strategy, supra note 1.
17. Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser, Dep't of State, to Members of the
ASIL-CFR Roundtable, The Legal Basis for Preemption (Nov. 18, 2002), available at
http://www.cfr.orglpublication.php?id=5250 (last visited Feb. 25, 2004) [hereinafter Taft Memorandum].
18. See Wiliam H. Taft V & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 97 AM.
J. INT'L L. 557 (2003).
19. Taft Memorandum, supra note 17.
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with the concept of necessity including "both a credible, imminent threat and
the exhaustion of peaceful remedies."'2
The Legal Advisor argues that imminence should be viewed in terms of
urgency rather than timing of the response. The Legal Advisor argues further
that the credibility of the threat must be based on the capacity of the state or
terrorist organization to carry out the threat and upon an assessment of the intent
of the state or terrorist to act. By example, the Legal Advisor argues that the use
of force to change the governing regime in Afghanistan was a legitimate use of
preemption to prevent and deter an imminent attack. Here the attack of
September 11 was viewed as "establishing that the enemy intended to attack
again.' So long as the enemy maintained its capacity to attack, the United
States was entitled to take preemptive action.22
In sum, the Legal Advisor concludes that,
The United States reserves the right to use force preemptively in self-
defense when faced with an imminent threat. While the definition of
imminent must recognize the threat posed by weapons of mass
destruction and the intentions of those who possess them, the decision
to undertake any action must meet the test of necessity. After the
exhaustion of peaceful remedies and a careful, deliberate considera-
tion of the consequences, in the face of overwhelming evidence of an
imminent threat, a nation may take preemptive action to defend its
nationals from unimaginable harm.
The AJIL article asserts that the United States' action against Iraq was not
illegal preemption as:
1) One of the primary objectives of the action was to preempt Iraq's
possession and use of weapons of mass destruction;
2) There were substantial risks associated with "allowing the Iraqi
regime to defy the international community by pursuing weapons of
mass destruction;"
3) Past actions of Iraq over a protracted period of time indicated that
it posed a threat;
4) The act of preemption represented an "episode in an ongoing
broader conflict initiated - without question - by the opponent;" and
5) The use of force was consistent with previous resolutions of the
Security Council.23
20. Id.
21. Id. The Legal Advisor also cited the "record of past support for the rebels," which was relied
upon by the British in justifying their attack on the Caroline. Id. at 2.
22. Id.
23. Taft IV & Buchwald, supra note 18, at 563.
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While the article addresses the criteria of intent and capability, it does not
clearly address the criteria of imminence/urgency as outlined in the ASIL-CFR
memorandum.
V. RECENT COMMENTARY
As is to be expected recent scholarly commentary on the modem doctrine
of preemption encompasses a range of diverse views. Some commentators
argue that the doctrine is patently illegal and that it is the obligation of lawyers
to denounce the doctrine as such.24 Others assert the doctrine may be legal, but
it is politically unwise and the White House should undertake a slow
retrenchment from the doctrine,25 or that it should devote its efforts to
revitalizing the United Nations Security Council, 26 or to a reinterpretation of the
United Nations Charter which will permit the use of force against states which
fail to prevent terrorists from conducting operations from their territory.27 Still
others fear that the use of the doctrine will erode the integrity of the United
28Nations' system and its ability to prevent future conflicts, or worse, that it will
lead to a "period defined by the geopolitics of raw power and militaristic
influence., 29  Finally, many commentators embrace the modem doctrine of
preemption as a reasonable evolution of the Caroline doctrine and seek to refine
the criteria by which it is applied.3"
While many of the criticisms against the modem doctrine of preemption
are well reasoned and must be taken into account as the doctrine is further
refined, it is important to avoid an overly rigid interpretation of existing
international law, which might prevent the reasonable development of a doctrine
24. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 607 (2003).
25. See, e.g., Miriam Shapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT'L
L. 599 (2003). Some foreign policy commentators have expressed a concern that the effect of elevating the
status of preemptive self-defense to a doctrine will increase international resistance to United States foreign
policy and make it very difficult to obtain support from allies when necessary. See Michael E. O'Hanlon,
Susan E. Rice & James B. Steinberg, The New National Strategy and Preemption, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
POLICY BRIEF No. 113, Dec. 2002, available at http://www.brook.edu/comm/policybriefs/pbl13.pdf (last
visited Mar. 17, 2004).
26. See Stromseth, supra note 13, at 638.
27. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 11.
28. See, e.g., Richard A. Falk, What Future for the UN Charter System of War Prevention?, 97 AM.
J. INT'L L. 590 (2003); See also Tom Farer, The Prospects for International Law and Order in the Wake of
Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 621 (2003).
29. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 12, at 3.
30. See, e.g., Ruth Wedgwood, The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and
Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT'L L 576 (2003); John Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq,
97 AM. J. INT'L L. 563 (2003).
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necessitated by the dramatic change in the ability and intent of rogue states and
terrorists to use weapons of mass destruction.
Unfortunately, in the 1990's, while some commentators were welcoming
the return to strict legal limits on the exercise of power by the United States and
its European allies,3 the overly ridged interpretation of certain fundamental
principles of international law produced dire consequences. For instance, an
overly aggressive application of article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter
coupled with the collective passivity of Europe, and to a certain extent the
United States, facilitated Slobodan Milosevic's genocide against the people of
Bosnia, kept the international community at bay during the massacres of nearly
2 million people in Sudan, and allowed the Hutu to massacre nearly a million
Tutsi in Rwanda. The strict adherence to article 2(4) also cooled the willingness
of states to take action against the Taliban regime and Al Qaeda despite the
gross human rights violations of the former, and the efforts of the latter to train
nearly 35,000 terrorists.
In the case of Yugoslavia, the ridged adherence to 2(4) in the face of state
sponsored genocide and crimes against humanity came to a close when the
United States and its NATO allies, without United Nations Security Council
approval, undertook a humanitarian intervention in Kosovo to prevent the
genocide of Kosovo Albanians by Serbian forces.
The initial response by legal commentators was less than satisfactory.
Many commentators simply declared the humanitarian intervention to be illegal.
Others attempted to preserve the sanctity of an outdated legal regime by
declaring that while the humanitarian intervention was illegal it was legitimate.
If in fact the humanitarian intervention was illegal, then the fault lies with
outdated international law and not with the effort to use force to prevent
genocide. Such expedient attempts to find legitimacy where legality is denied
in fact erode the force and effect of legal constraints.
In crafting a response to the modem doctrine of preemption, legal
commentators should bear in mind the lessons from these earlier conflicts.
First, an overly strict adherence to legal norms may produce highly dangerous
consequences, and those norms may therefore be in need of modernization. For
example, in the case of modem preemption, if it is illegal to use force to
preempt a rogue state and/or terrorist organization from using weapons of mass
destruction against civilian populations, then it is international law, which is in
need of repair.
Second, just as national security doctrines must evolve to effectively con-
front new threats to national and international security, so to must international
law evolve to constrain and guide the use of these new doctrines. In these
circumstances, the role of lawyers is not merely to pronounce on legality and
31. See Franck, supra note 24, at 609-10.
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illegality, but to develop parameters to ensure the application of new doctrines
consistent with the fundamental objectives of international law and to guard
against the erosion of legitimate limits on the new doctrine.
The remainder of this article is dedicated to developing a set of clear legal
criteria by which to determine when it is legal to use force to preempt the use
of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states and/or terrorist organizations.
VI. THE LEGAL PARAMETERS OF THE MODERN DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTION
President Bush, in the National Security Strategy appropriately recognized
that while the United States must "adapt the concept of imminent threat to the
capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries... the United States will not
use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use
preemption as a pretext for aggression." In order to prevent the preemption
from being used as a pretext for aggression it is necessary that the criteria be
grounded in the basic principles of the Caroline doctrine and that they be clearly
articulated.
As set forth in the now famous Webster letter, in order for a preemptive
attack to be considered legitimate, the attacking state must demonstrate that its
actions were necessary in light of the imminence of attack; it had no other
choice of means; it had no time to deliberate; the extent of the attack was not
excessive or unreasonable.32
The parameters for the modern doctrine of preemption must reflect that
serious threats are now posed by entities other than another state's armed forces
or an organized militia with a clear command structure. These threats are also
directed not against a state's armed forces or state institutions, but instead
involve the likelihood of purposeful attacks against civilians with no objective
other than to cause massive casualties. These threats are compounded by
advances in technology and the nature of the opposing forces, which have the
effect of further eclipsing the traditional legal doctrines applicable to preemptive
self-defense.
Guided by the Caroline precedent it is reasonable to consider that in order
for a preemptive attack against rogue states, which possess weapons of mass
destruction and which harbor or support terrorist organizations to be considered
32. These elements are encapsulated in what has become known as the "Caroline incident," named
after the now infamous Caroline dispute of 1837. The cause of the dispute was the British attack and
destruction of an American steamer, which was being used to ferry supplies to a group of armed Canadian
insurgents rebelling against the British Crown. The British claimed that their actions were preemptive and
necessary under the traditional doctrine of self-defense. Secretary of State Daniel Webster stated that in order
for the British to defend their actions as preemptive they were required to demonstrate that they met the
criteria noted in the text above. See Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Secretary of State, to Henry S. Fox,
Esq., Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Her Britannic Majesty (Apr. 24, 1841), reprinted
in 29 BRITISH & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS, 1812-1934, at 1129, 1138 (British Foreign Office 1857).
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legitimate, the attacking state must demonstrate that its actions were necessary
in light of the certainty of attack, the opportunity for successful preemption, and
the failure of peaceful multilateral efforts. The use of force also must be
grounded in legitimacy, be collectively supported, and be proportionate.
A. Certainty of Attack
The central principle of Caroline, that of imminence-is no longer entirely
applicable in the case of rogue states and terrorist organizations cooperating in
the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Terrorist attacks, by their nature are
inherently imminent as they may occur at anytime-without warning. A more
feasible criterion may be certainty of attack based on past practice.
The practicality of the "imminence" criteria is substantially limited by the
fact that terrorist attacks are not preceded by the traditional indicators such as
the mobilization of forces or the fueling of missiles. Similarly, terrorists do not
follow the traditional escalation timeline of peacetime to crisis situation to
conflict. Compounding this development are radical changes in technology,
which have enabled terrorist organizations to develop the capacity to inflict
massive causalities without warning. Given that Al Qaeda has openly expressed
its intent to continue to wage a war of terrorism against the United States and
its allies, and the inherent ability of terrorist organizations to strike without
warning, the criteria of imminence lack substantial utility. A more useful
criterion would be that of "certainty of attack."
The certainty of attack may be determined by a combination of essential
factors such as the global reach and capacity of the terrorist organization, the
high probability of attack based upon past practice, a manifested intent to injure,
the likely magnitude of harm and credible intelligence showing an escalating
threat.33 It may also be necessary to limit the determination of certainty to the
foreseeable future.
B. Opportunity for Successful Preemption
A second criteria related to the original element of imminence would be the
opportunity for successful preemption. Because of the nature of terrorist
operations, a state may be unable to take legitimate preemptive action once the
threat is imminent because it may have no means for locating or physically
33. Michael Waltzer, in a Cold War context, defined when "first strikes" were legitimate by indicat-
ing that imminence of attack was less important than "sufficient threat." Sufficient threat was characterized
by "a manifest intent to injure, a degree of active preparation that makes that intent a positive danger, and a
general situation in which waiting, or doing anything other than fighting, greatly magnifies the risk." See
MICHAELWALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: AMORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 81 (3d.
ed., Basic Books 2000) (1977).
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preventing the attackers from carrying out an attack using weapons of mass
destruction. In such cases, it is reasonable to allow a state to defend itself when
the opportunity for successful preemption arises.34
The opportunity for successful preemption is influenced by the nature of
the entity against which preemption is being used. Rogue states given their
static nature tend to present a wide opportunity for preemptive action, thus
increasing the importance of the certainty of attack and the failure of peaceful
multilateral efforts. Terrorist organizations, which operate covertly, present a
more narrow opportunity for successful preemption and thus preemptive action
may be appropriate when a lower threshold is reached concerning the two other
criteria.
C. Failure of Peaceful Multilateral Efforts
Whereas the Caroline doctrine requires a determination of no other choice
of means for preventing an attack, the nature of a terrorist attack with weapons
of mass destruction requires a more precise criteria such as a more long term
failure of peaceful multilateral efforts. The failure of peaceful multilateral
efforts may be judged by the extent to which the state relying upon preemptive
action has undertaken to invoke multilateral mechanisms to prevent the
proliferation of WMD and to resolve conflicts which give rise to the potential
use of these weapons. Efforts at creating multilateral coalitions to impose
economic and diplomatic sanctions are also relevant. It is important, however,
to acknowledge the unfortunate prevalence of collective passivity in the face of
grave international threats.35 In the face of collective passivity, a state should
not be barred from taking preemptive action.
D. Grounded in Legitimacy
The preemptive action must be grounded in legitimacy as evidenced by
support in United Nations Security Council resolutions or in the resolutions of
relevant regional bodies.36 While direct and explicit authorization by the United
Nations Security Council for preemptive force is the most clear basis for
preemptive action, such authorization is seldom available due either to the
circumspect manner in which the United Nations Security Council addresses
issues, or to collective passivity as discussed above. It is however, necessary
for the preempting state to have a solid legitimate claim to preemptive action
other than its own unilateral determination of a threat.
34. See Yoo, supra note 30, (proposing the criteria of "window of opportunity").
35. See Wedgwood, supra note 30.
36. See Taft IV & Buchwald, supra note 18.
Williams, Lyons & Neuwirth
E. Collective Support
Once peaceful measures are exhausted, there still remains the necessity of
a multilateral component. Collective support requires the preempting state to
find support among other states, either political or military support, before
undertaking a preemptive action. While the condition of near universal
multilateralism, such as through the United Nations or the Security Council, is
ideal it is not the only option. Multilateral institutions are subject to political
motivations even in the face of undeniable threats to civilian populations. The
requirement of collective support establishes a threshold that requires
widespread recognition of the necessity and acts against politically motivated
unilateralism, without subjecting the determination to a formulaic process.37
F. Proportional Response
Proportionality remains a fundamental rule governing all legal use of force.
While the traditional definition from the law of war does not directly apply
when using force against terrorist organizations, the underlying principles still
apply.38 The preemptive use of force must entail the minimum force necessary
to neutralize the threat.
VII. CONCLUSION
Through the end of the Cold War, threats were posed by state-to-state
conflict with clear timelines for escalation and attack and guidelines for
legitimate use of force. With the threat changing to non-state actors and states
that support them, there is a change of circumstances and a shift in doctrine as
evidenced by the 2002 National Security Strategy. To minimize the danger that
the modem doctrine of preemption may be used as a pretext by some states for
aggression, it is necessary to apply clearly specified criteria. These criteria
require that in order for a preemptive attack against rogue states which possess
or seek to possess weapons of mass destruction and which harbor or support
terrorist organizations to be considered legitimate, the attacking state must
demonstrate that its actions were necessary in light of the certainty of attack, the
37. See id.
38. Proportionality measures governing the law of war are explicitly detailed in Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16
LL.M. 1391 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978). The principle of "proportionality" effectively requires that the
anticipated loss of life and property damage resulting from the use of force not be excessive compared to the
military objective. The "precautionary" principle requires that all possible precautions be taken to minimize
civilian loss of life and damage to civilian objects. These principles are combined with the principle of
"humanity" which prohibits unnecessary destruction of property or weapons that cause unnecessary suffering.
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opportunity for successful preemption, and the failure of peaceful multilateral
efforts. The use of force also must be grounded in legitimacy, be collectively
supported, and be proportionate.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the growing number of international organizations dedicated to the
conservation and management of living marine resources, very few generate the
controversy of the International Whaling Commission (IWC). The IWC
remains an explosive point of friction between the deeply committed anti-
whaling forces, on the one hand, and the handful of remaining stalwart whaling
states and their supporters, on the other. As the organization approaches its
sixtieth year of operation it is useful to review where it has come from to better
understand where it may be going. Equally as important is a discussion of some
of the key challenges, both internal and external, that the IWC presently faces.
This paper addresses these issues. While this work is neither a complete
review of the history of the IWC nor a comprehensive survey of its institutional
strengths and weaknesses, it will provide an overview and a context as to where
the IWC sits as an international resource management organization. What will
the IWC most likely have to reconcile in the early years of the 21st Century to
remain a critical regulatory body and a legitimate forum in the future?
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I. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE IWC
The IWC was the product of the 1946 International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling (ICRW).' Before the ICRW, the dreadful mismanage-
ment of cetaceans (whales, dolphins, and porpoises) by the nations of the world,
and more specifically the whaling industry, resulted in the collapse of almost all
commercially valuable whale stocks.2 To be clear, the ICRW was an agreement
among whaling states for whaling interests. Even though the convention
purported to manage a marine resource, the ICRW could not be confused with
what we would today call an environmental agreement. The last paragraph of
the preamble leaves no mistake about its purpose: "[h]aving decided to
conclude a convention to provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks
and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry[.]" 3
Despite this attempt to place some regulation and oversight around whaling
practices, under the guiding hand of the IWC important whale populations
continued to decline at alarming rates. For decades, the member states of the
IWC met annually and set unsustainable quotas that did little more than
guarantee short-term profits for whalers. Partly because of the abject failure of
the 1WC to achieve its objectives and partly because of the growing global
environmental consciousness of the 1960s and 1970s, a movement took hold to
end commercial whaling.
By 1982 the membership of the 1WC had grown to thirty-seven members.
Many of these newer members were not whaling states at all. Rather, they
joined the 1WC at the urging of save-the-whales activists simply to vote against
the practice of commercial whaling. At the annual meeting in 1982 the IWC
voted to impose a moratorium on commercial whaling that fully took effect in
1986. The moratorium was largely justified by its advocates on the scientific
uncertainly surrounding the population assessments of key stocks. The
moratorium remains in effect. As certain stocks have undoubtedly recovered,
however, the pressure to lift the moratorium grows with each passing year. The
moratorium on commercial whaling affects neither scientific research whaling4
nor aboriginal subsistence whaling5 both of which are provided for under
1. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161
U.N.T.S. 72 (entered into force Nov. 10, 1948), available at http://www.iwcoffice.org (last visited Mar. 17,
2004) [hereinafter ICRW]. Articles III through VII establish the IWC and confers upon it authority to manage
and conserve cetacean resources.
2. For a more detailed discussion of the history of the IWC and whaling in general see Howard
Scott Schiffman, The Protection of Whales in International Law: A Perspective for the Next Century, 22
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 303 (1996); Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to
Life, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 21 (1991).
3. ICRW, supra note 1, at pmbl.
4. Id. at art. VIII.
5. Id. at sched., para. 13; Article 1(I) elevates the Schedule to an integral part of the ICRW. Id.
at art. 1(1).
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separate provisions of the ICRW. Both scientific research whaling and
aboriginal whaling remain contentious issues in the IWC (discussed below).
The annual IWC meetings remain grinding plates of controversy as Japan,
Norway, Iceland, and most recently some newer members (as of November
2003 the membership of the IWC had grown to fifty-one states) seek leverage
to reverse the moratorium. The battles within the IWC do not occur in a
vacuum. Rather, they must be understood against the backdrop of wider ten-
sions between utilization and conservation of living marine resources. To add
to the mix, concern for animal rights and welfare constitute an important part
of the debate. The modem law of the sea is a good point of departure to
understand these controversies.
Im. WHALES, UNCLOS, AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The status of whales in international law took on a new and more
thoughtful dimension with the conclusion of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).6 UNCLOS is one of the most
significant achievements of the United Nations. It provides a comprehensive
framework for the modem law of the sea and mandates the proper conservation
and management of marine resources. More importantly, with regard to the
status of whales UNCLOS recognizes marine mammals as a special resource
deserving of additional consideration. Specific provisions of UNCLOS are
devoted to the conservation, as opposed to the utilization, of marine mammals
in a state's waters. Article 65 of UNCLOS provides:
Nothing in this Part restricts the right of a coastal State or the com-
petence of an international organization, as appropriate, to prohibit,
limit or regulate the exploitation of marine mammals more strictly
than provided for in this Part. States shall co-operate with a view to
the conservation of marine mammals and in the case of cetaceans
shall in particular work through the appropriate international
organizations for their conservation, management, and study.'
The applicable provisions of UNCLOS may be viewed as the lex specialis
most directly addressing the status of cetaceans under the law of the sea today.
This contrasts with the treatment of other living marine resources, such as fish,
6. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (as of this
writing UNCLOS is before the United States Senate for advice and consent in contemplation of ratification)
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
7. Id. at art. 65 (emphasis added). Article 120 extends this status to the high seas. See id. at art.
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where provisions favoring consumption and utilization balance more general
obligations to conserve those resources.
Article 65 is relevant to the role of the IWC in that it mandates states to,
"work through the appropriate international organizations for their conservation,
management and study." While the IWC is not mentioned by name its long
history allows one to conclude that the drafters of UNCLOS had it in mind.
Significantly, however, the use of the plural "organizations" also indicates that
additional organizations, present or future, may have been contemplated as well.
The favorable treatment of cetaceans in UNCLOS should also be under-
stood in the context of the rise of international environmental law that largely
began with the Stockholm Conference of 1972. Significantly, the commence-
ment of the negotiation of UNCLOS was rather contemporaneous with
Stockholm and its immediate aftermath. While UNCLOS is a comprehensive
document addressing virtually all aspects of ocean usage it is also undeniably
an environmental treaty with articles requiring the control of pollution, sustain-
able utilization of resources, and general obligations to protect and preserve the
marine environment.
Whales are a vanguard species in the environmental movement because of
their intelligence, beauty, and communal lifestyle. The fact that they are con-
sidered to be a consumable resource by some ignites passionate debate about
ethics, animal rights, human rights, cultural preservation, cultural relativism,
and resource utilization. Although discussion about these issues is not limited
to cetaceans and arises elsewhere within the framework of international environ-
mental law, it is hard to find another species where the volume of the debate is
as loud.
Concern for the protection of whales is not limited to whaling. Whales,
like all marine species, are susceptible to pollution.8 Recent scientific evidence
suggests specific vulnerabilities of cetaceans to the effects of global warming.9
In addition, the collapse of key fish stocks upon which cetaceans feed
complicates their management. The ability, not to mention the willingness, of
the IWC to address these problems will be a significant challenge in the future.
IV. THE IWC TODAY: A HOUSE DIVIDED
At the present time the IWC is truly divided over the character and role of
the organization. Norway, Iceland, and Japan clearly favor a resumption of
consumptive use of cetaceans. On the other hand, many more members oppose
8. MARK P. SIMMONDS, Evaluating the Threat from Pollution to Whales, in THE FUTURE OF
CETACEANS IN A CHANGING WORLD 317 (William C.G. Burns & Alexander Gillespie eds., Transnational
Publishers, Inc. 2003).
9. WILLIAM C.G. BURNS, Climate Change and the International Whaling Commission in the 21st
Century 339 (William C.G. Bums & Alexander Gillespie eds., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2003).
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whaling and the consumptive use of cetaceans in the first instance. These states,
and the environmental non-governmental organizations supporting their efforts,
proceed not only from a resource management prospective but also from an
ethical standpoint. This perspective views whales and dolphins as special crea-
tures deserving of special protection. Anti-whaling advocates often point to
their sentience, intelligence, and communal lifestyles to justify a higher con-
servation status.
This battle between stalwart whalers and passionate conservationists is not
new to the IWC. This was certainly present in the drive for the moratorium in
the early 1980s and seems to be at play as the pendulum swings back in favor
of some consumptive use. As one examines the dispositions of the IWC's
newest members such as Mongolia and some small island states that have tradi-
tionally not expressed much interest in whaling issues, one is left to wonder if
pro-whaling interests have not borrowed a page from the conservationists'
playbook? Norway, Japan, and Iceland remain the whaling stalwarts but it does
appear as if they have successfully recruited some allies into the IWC to shift
debate in their favor.
With the new membership alignment in mind, it is helpful to review the
most contentious issues on the IWC agenda. Although the overall strategic goal
of the pro-whalers is the ultimate repeal of the moratorium on commercial
whaling, the issues receiving the most attention continue to be: scientific
research whaling, aboriginal whaling, and, in 2002, the re-entry of Iceland.
A. Scientific Research Whaling
As noted above, the ICRW allows member states to unilaterally grant their
nationals permits to catch whales for the purpose of scientific research.' ° The
limits of this provision have been seriously tested in recent years by Japan.
Japan maintains large-scale research of whaling programs in Antarctica and the
North Pacific." These programs remain controversial and have raised
objections by the IWC. Over the years the IWC has issued over thirty resolu-
tions suggesting limits on the use of scientific permits and, in many cases,
expressed concern about the value and methods of Japan's programs in
particular. Most recently, in Resolution 2003-3 the IWC called upon Japan to
halt its research whaling activities in the Southern Hemisphere or replace it with
non-lethal research methods. 2 This follows similar resolutions in previous
10. ICRW, supra note 1, at art. VIu.
11. See Recent Japanese Scientific Permits, IWC website, at http://www.iwcoffice.org/sciperms
.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
12. See Resolution (2003-3) on Southern Hemisphere Minke Whales and Special Permit Whaling,
available at http://www.iwcoffice.org/Resolutions2003/Resolution%202003.htm#Permits (last visited Mar.
17, 2004).
20041
372 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 10:367
years and feeds the concerns of those who see aggressive research whaling as
an excuse to hold the place of the commercial whaling industry until the
moratorium can be repealed.13
B. Aboriginal Whaling
Another major point of contention in recent years has been the issue of
aboriginal whaling rights. Many opponents of whaling consider the issue of
aboriginal whaling to be a proxy for the debate on commercial whaling while
the moratorium is in effect. To be sure, a genuine and good faith debate is
underway as to the extent of the rights of certain native tribes around the world
to conduct sustainable subsistence whaling. The IWC presently recognizes
several such claims.
14
Perhaps the most controversial aboriginal claim is that of the Makah Tribe
of Washington State. The United States government recognized the whaling
rights of the Makah in the 1855 Treaty of Neah Bay. Although the Makah
abstained from whaling activities for approximately 70 years, the tribe decided
to revive its traditional whaling practices after the gray whale was removed
from the endangered species list of the Endangered Species Act in 1994.
Although the United States government has long since eschewed commercial
whaling it was nevertheless sympathetic to the Makah's claim as it has been to
those of other Native American tribes. In the mid- 1990s the United States tried
to secure a quota of gray whales for the Makah in the IWC.
Because other IWC members were fearful that additional aboriginal quotas
would create a loophole for Japan and Norway to claim rights for "community
based" whalers the United States was initially unsuccessful in its attempts to
secure a gray whale quota for the Makah in the IWC. In 1997 the United States
and Russia submitted a joint proposal for the aboriginal quota of pacific gray
whales. Until this point only the Russian Chukotka tribe enjoyed an aboriginal
quota for grays. This bilateral arrangement also included sharing the quota on
bowhead whales enjoyed by Alaskan natives. Ultimately, because of the
bilateral deal between the United States and Russia and how they presented the
quota request, the IWC never formally recognized the Makah quota. The IWC
effectively side-stepped this issue by simply specifying that the aboriginal quota
for Eastern North Pacific Gray Whales may be "taken by those whose tradi-
tional, aboriginal, and subsistence needs have been recognized."' 15
13. For a discussion of the objections to scientific research whaling in its existing forms see Howard
S. Schiffman, Scientific Research Whaling in International Law: Objectives and Objections, 8 ILSA J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 473, 475 (2002).
14. See Catch Limits for Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling, at http://www.iwcoffice.org/Catches
.htm#Aboriginal (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
15. Id. (presently listed for the years 2003-2006).
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Conspicuously, the Makah were never identified by name as a beneficiary
of the quota. This created an uproar among anti-whaling advocates who
claimed such specific recognition by the IWC was necessary for the quota to be
consistent with the ICRW and international law in general. The better legal
interpretation is probably contrary. The fundamental characteristic of inter-
national environmental law embodied in Principle 21 of the Stockholm
Declaration recognizes the primary right of states to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies.' 6 On the other hand, shifting the
focus from international law to domestic, was the Makah hunt even consistent
with United States law? At the present time, this is still rather unclear.
In 1999, the Makah resumed the hunt and succeeded in killing a young
gray whale. This mobilized the anti-whaling forces to seek remedies in United
States courts. In addition to questions raised under international law, United
States law also presents obstacles to the Makah continuing the hunt. The Ninth
Circuit has ruled that the government's Environmental Assessment for the
Makah hunt does not satisfy the requirements of the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) and the Marine Manual Protection Act (MMPA). 7 At the
present time the prospects for future Makah hunts remains uncertain.
The Scientific Committee of the IWC is currently in the process of
developing new management regimes for aboriginal subsistence whaling.
Aboriginal whaling, like scientific research whaling, is an ideological battle-
ground during the time of the commercial moratorium. The volume of the
debate over these issues has more to do with their ability to keep the IWC
focused on the consumptive use of cetaceans than the relatively modest number
of whales taken by these activities.
C. The Re-entry of Iceland to the IWC
In 1992 Iceland left the IWC exasperated by the fact that whaling interests
were no longer adequately represented in the organization. Iceland decided to
return in 2002 and was successful in doing so with a reservation to the
moratorium. 8 Iceland's re-entry was not only controversial but it represented
something of a strategic shift in how pro-whaling states view the IWC and its
potential to preside over a resumption of the consumptive use of cetaceans.
Abandoning the IWC in favor of the establishment of some consumptive
16. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF/48/14, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972), at Principle 21.
17. See Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by 350 F.3d 815 (9th Cir.
2003); Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2000).
18. For the text of Iceland's reservation see Iceland and her re-adherence to the Convention after
leaving in 1992, available at http://www.iwcoffice.org/Iceland.htm (Mar. 17, 2004).
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friendly organizations, was, and still is to a certain extent, a possible strategy for
whaling states.
Should whaling states reject the IWC entirely to seek newer consumptive
friendly organizations this would be viewed with great disfavor by states with
which they share common interests in many other areas. It perhaps could be
seen as derogation from the duty to cooperate in the conservation of cetaceans
as required by UNCLOS.' 9 Although the North Atlantic Marine Mammal
Commission (NAMMCO) is sometimes mentioned as a potential forum to put
forward a consumptive regulatory framework in competition with the IWC, it
is highly unlikely to do so.2° First, it is most doubtful whether NAMMCO is
organizationally empowered to enact any regulation at all.2" Second, its history
indicates that, thus far anyway, it is content to concentrate on scientific research
and not the direct management of marine mammal resources.
Iceland's return in 2002 suggests that, at least in the short term, the IWC
will be the forum where the future battles between consumption and conserva-
tion of cetaceans will be waged. With the most recent additions to the member-
ship of the IWC the odds are more even. With the undeniable increase in the
populations of certain key species the arguments for sustainable whaling
likewise improve. On the other hand, in the highly polarized arena that is the
IWC nothing is so certain.
D. The Berlin Initiative
Despite the factors indicating apparent gains by pro-whaling interests, at
the IWC's annual meeting in 2003 it adopted the so-called "Berlin Initiative"
by a vote of twenty-five to twenty with one abstention.22 This resolution
establishes a "Conservation Committee," which will be comprised of all IWC
members. The Conservation Committee will prepare and implement the "Con-
servation Agenda" of the IWC. Environmental NGO's like Greenpeace are
excited about the prospect of a "Conservation Agenda" within the IWC.23 Pro-
whaling states are naturally skeptical.24
19. See Howard S. Schiffman, The Competence of Pro-Consumptive International Organizations
to Regulate Cetacean Resources, in Burns & Gillespie, supra note 8, at 173-76.
20. See id. at 176-85.
21. See id. at 176-77.
22. See Final Press Release of the 55th Annual Meeting, available at http://www.iwcoffice.org/
FinalPressRelease2003.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
23. See Berlin Initiative Attracts Worldwide Support, available at http://www.greenpeace.org.nz/
news/newsmain.asp?PRID=534 (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
24. Press Release, Japanese Fisheries Agency, June 16, 2003, Berlin Initiative Final Blow to IWC,
available at http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/whale/whatsnew/O30616JapanBerlinBlow.pdf (last visited Mar. 17,
2004).
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For the time being the Berlin Initiative and the rather predictable contro-
versy surrounding it simply serves to highlight the continued tensions within the
IWC. It raises important questions about the future of the IWC as an inter-
governmental organization and whether or not it will have the confidence of its
members, including a measure of respect from pro-whaling states, going
forward. Without this confidence, we will likely see issues of cetacean manage-
ment devolve to other international organizations. Some of these organizations
will have a conservation focus and some a consumptive-friendly focus. This
decentralization of cetacean management will certainly not foster the
international cooperation on this issue envisaged by UNCLOS.
V. CONCLUSION
Will the IWC permit some form of commercial whaling in the near future
or have the status of whales as intelligent, sentient creatures overtaken by
arguments for their consumptive use? The future of cetaceans is in many ways
bound up with the future of the IWC itself. The IWC remains a house divided
and there are no signs of genuine reconciliation anytime soon. The issues of
scientific research whaling and aboriginal subsistence whaling are mere
reflections of the deep ideological divisions between pro-whaling and anti-
whaling advocates. Whether or not the IWC continues to function as a premier
institution in international resource management remains to be seen.
UNCLOS provides the legal framework within which cetacean
conservation and management needs to proceed. States on both sides of the
ideological divide need to cooperate to fulfill these objectives. The alternative,
that is, continued rancor, risks squandering what has already been achieved in
the recovery of key species. Whatever challenges the IWC faces today are
actually far less daunting than those it faced before the days of the moratorium.
Whales are a vanguard species among wildlife resources and the IWC is
a vanguard organization in international resource management. From an
institutional perspective, whether or not the IWC is successful will tell us a great
deal about international environmental law and its institutions in the 21st
Century. For the sake of present and future generations, one can only hope that
all 1WC member states understand their responsibilities to successfully meet
these challenges.
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I. INTRODUCTION
My task is three fold. I shall first give a very brief introduction to the topic
of self-determination within the general jurisprudence of the proliferation of
international dispute settlement mechanisms. Next, I shall explore why this
proliferation of fora has not occurred for settling claims to self-determination.
Finally, I want to suggest a particular mechanism for the settlement of self-
determination claims that may, in the long term, prove successful.
I. SELF-DETERMINATION
Much, perhaps too much, has been written about the topic of self-determina-
tion. We have moved from Woodrow Wilson's pronouncement at the conference
to confirm the Treaty of Versailles' on through tomes of scholarship on the
definition of who, or which groups, have a right to claim self-determination,2 to
* Professor of Law and Director of the International Law Concentration at Suffolk University Law
School, Boston, MA.
1. Full text of Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919 (including original text of each of the 440 treaty
articles), Department of History at the University of San Diego, at http://history.acusd.edu/gen/text/versailles
treaty/vereontents.htmi (last visited Mar. 16, 2004). See also EDWARD MANDELL, WHAT REALLY HAPPENED
AT PARIS: THE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE, 1918-1919, 407 (Charles E. Merrill ed. 1921) and
NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION 2-3 (Margaret Moore, ed., Oxford Univ. 1998).
2. See generally NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION (Margaret Moore ed., Oxford
Univ. 1998); see also Steven R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States,
90 AMER. J. INT'L. L 590 (1996).
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long discussions on the content of the right.3 Internal and external self-deter-
mination,4 measures of autonomy versus secession 5 have all been extensively
canvassed. The only principles that can be asserted with any confidence in this
area are that colonial peoples,6 and peoples living under foreign occupation,7
have a right to rule themselves. Beyond that, all is political will, supported
sometimes by sections of world opinion. That there have been successful claims
to self-determination,' even secession,9 which represents the far end of the self-
determination graph has not done much to move any part of the norm toward
acceptance, except the colonial or foreign occupation rule. East Timor fought
a bloody war and gained independence from Indonesia.' ° Eritrea has fought
several bloody wars with Ethiopia and has gained independence," but Biafra
was not successful in gaining independence from Nigeria despite thousands of
deaths.' 2 Dozens of other groups dare not raise their claims.
In spite of all of the accumulated scholarship, groups that claim self-deter-
mination have very few fora in which to present their claims. War is often the
only alternative. The Supreme Court of Canada did render a thoughtful judg-
ment on the legality of Quebec's claim to secession but that decision was only
what the Canadians call a reference opinion, and what we would call an
advisory opinion, rendered after a request by the Canadian authorities. 3 The
purpose of this panel is to examine possible fora and mechanisms for resolving
3. For history and content of right of self-determination, see DOV RONEN, THE QUEST FOR SELF-
DETERMINATION, 1-70 (Yale Univ. Press 1979).
4. Ralph Wilde, From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial
Administration, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 583, 590 (1991).
5. Pierre Bienvenu, Secession By Constitutional Means: The Decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L & POL'Y 185 (2001).
6. REFERENCE RE: SECESSION OF QUEBEC, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
7. Michael J. Dennis, Human Rights in 2002: The Annual Sessions of the UN Commission on
Human Rights and the Economic and Social Council, 97 AM. J. INT'LL. 364,365 (2003); see generally Adam
Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 44
(1990).
8. Jonathan L Charney, Self-Determination: Chechnya, Kosovo, and East Timor, 34 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 455 (2001).
9. JORGE M. VALADEZ, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND SELF-
DETERMINATION IN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES 211 (Westview Press 2000).
10. Richard Falk, The East Timor Ordeal: International Law and Its Limits, 32 BULLETIN OF
CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS 49 (2000).
11. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, ELUSIVE PEACE: NEGOTIATING AN END TO CIVIL WARS 103 (Brookings
Institution 1995).
12. Thomas D. Grant, East Timor, the U.N. System and Enforcing Non-Recognition in International
Law, 33 VAND.J.TRANSNAT'LL. 33 (2000); JAMES D.D. SMITH, STOPPING WARS: DEFINING THE OBSTACLES
TO CEASE-FIRE 44-47 (Westview Press 1995).
13. REFERENCE RE: SECESSION OF QUEBEC, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217; see also Pierre Bienvenu,
Secession By Constitutional Means: The Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession
Reference, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L & POL'Y 185 (2001).
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claims to self-determination, short of war. I think it is not unreasonable to
suppose that, for example, if the Kosovars had been able to present their claims
to self-determination in a recognized settlement mechanism, perhaps only at the
level of the restoration of the autonomy they had previously enjoyed, such a
process may have prevented the bloody conflict in Serbia/Montenegro/
Kosovo. 4 If that supposition is true, and could reasonably be expected to be
replicated many times over for other self-determination claims, finding
settlement fora becomes an enterprise of huge and worthwhile consequences.
Im. PROLIFERATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETrLEMENT MECHANISMS
There has been much scholarship on the proliferation of international
dispute settlement mechanisms. I refer to the numerous books, periodical
articles, and studies that address the phenomenon of the recent proliferation of
international courts and other international dispute settlement mechanisms.'
5
There is a wonderful two-volume book, now in its second edition, published by
the Max-Planck Institute called Dispute Settlement in Public International Law,
written by Karin Oellers-Frahm and Andreas Zimmerman.16 These two volumes
set out to provide a comprehensive account of all the available dispute
settlement mechanisms for interstate disputes. The book also contains al of the
relevant instruments creating the settlement mechanisms. The mechanisms
described range from the weakest systems, such as a reporting obligation, to the
most formal, such as a full-fledged court, and everything in between. The table
of contents alone runs to eighteen pages. Another good source for viewing the
developments in this area can be found at the web site of the Project on
International Courts and Tribunals put out by New York University. 7
The scholarship addressing the proliferation of international dispute
settlement fora falls into several categories. The international relations scholar-
ship tends to ask why these new institutions have been thrown up at this
particular time. They develop a theory of legal and institutional change and try
to fit the phenomenon with the framework of a theory of change. 8
14. ANDREW J. BACEVICH, WAR OVER KosovO: POLITICS AND STRATEGY IN A GLOBAL AGE
(Columbia Univ. Press 2001); see generally Timothy Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War: Why
the Holbrooke Agreement Failed, 116 POL. Sci. Q. 499 (2001).
15. See generally D.A. Mundis, Current Developments At the Ad Hoc International Criminal
Tribunals, 1 J. INT'L. CRIM. JUSTICE 197 (2003); S. de Bertodano, Current Developments in Internationalized
Courts, I J. INT'L. CRIM. JUSTICE 226 (2003); see also Rosalyn Higgins, The ICJ, ECJ, and the Integrity of
International Law, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (2003).
16. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN PUBLIC INT'L LAW (Vol. I and U) (Karin Oellers-Frahm & Andreas
Zimmerman eds., Springer 2d ed. 2001).
17. Project on International Courts and Tribunals, New York University, at http://www.pict-pcti.org
(last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
18. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations
Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L 205 (1993).
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The legal scholarship tends to be either descriptive, that is, it details,
sometimes ad nauseam, how the particular institution was created, the scope of
its remit, and the problems that may be anticipated in its operations.' 9
Sometimes the legal scholarship is anxious about the complications of too many
fora.2" Where these two lines of scholarship, international relations and
international law come together is where they ask what effect the proliferation
phenomenon will have on the theoretical framework of their particular
discipline. Here the general and common theme has been the demise of the
state-centered sovereignty system.2 The frequently observed exponential rise
in transnational movement of peoples, goods, and services has resulted in both
the inability of purely national institutions to accommodate such transnational
activity and has exposed the limits of a separate sovereignty system. The
creation of institutions to deal with transnational activity is seen as a direct
functional outgrowth of the movement and communications revolution.22
At this point, the scholarship settles down into three main categories. First,
there are the zealous internationalists who welcome the creation of virtually any
new international institution with joy, see it as one more step on the road to
global governance and are entirely happy with the nails being driven into the
coffin of sovereignty.23 At the other end of the spectrum are the die-hard
nationalists, who resist all new international regimes, whether in the form of
multi-lateral treaties, such as the Kyoto Protocol,24 or the establishment of new
institutions, such as the International Criminal Court.25 This group tends to
come from those who live in economically and militarily powerful states and for
whom the old state sovereignty system meant "winning." This group rightly
understands that the creation of international mechanisms that its country does
not (either entirely or perhaps even partially) control means the end of its
19. VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (two volumes) (Transnational
Publishers Inc. 1995).
20. See generally Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Institutions of International Justice, 52 J. INT'L AFFAIRS 473
(1999).
21. Id.
22. J.M. CHAPMAN & PAUL REUTER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 53 (Praeger 1961); see
generally Robert 0. Keohane, International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?, 110 FOREIGN POL. 82
(1998).
23. Rosalyn Higgins, The ICJ, ECJ and the Integrity of International Law, 51 INT'L & COMP. L. Q.
1, 12 (2003); Ian Ward, The End of Sovereignty and the New Humanism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2091 (2003).
24. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11,
1997, UNFCC. See full text of protocol, at http://unfccc.intresource/docs/convkp/kpeng.html (last visited
Mar. 16, 2004).
25. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), at http://www.un.orglaw/icc/index
.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2004). See also DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
16, at 2069.
dominance over preferred outcomes to any dispute that may arise." They write
vehemently about the illegitimacy of such institutions and resist participation
in such international regimes.27 In the middle of these two groups, the
internationalists and the nationalists, with their very different approaches
towards the appropriate basis and scope of international law, are the groups I
will call the "cautionaries." They observe the phenomenon of proliferation of
international settlement mechanisms but tend to concentrate on recounting the
flaws of such mechanism and pointing out what these mechanisms cannot be
expected to do.28 On the whole, I think they represent the group that suspects
they have seen the future in such institutions, but are not sure they like the
future because they recognize that the old mold-the state centered system-is
waning. The uncertainty of what will rise in its place troubles them.
Some areas of international law now have a choice of dispute settlement
mechanisms and those mechanisms are already working well. For example, if
we take continental shelf disputes: such disputes can be settled between states
diplomatically, via arbitration, at the ICJ or at the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea. In the area of international commercial dispute resolution there
are a plethora of venues available. 29 The scholarship in this area is already well
into methods for assessing preferences in terms of procedural rules, substantive
rules and enforceability.3"
Just as I believe that law and settlement systems within a state reduce the
likelihood of civil disturbances within the state, so I believe that the availability
of well established and respected institutions for the settlement of international
disputes, including claims to self-determination, makes it a lot less likely that
we shall see wars breaking out. The issues that have settlement mechanisms in
place seldom give rise to armed conflict. Because of the variety of available
26. Jed Rubenfeld, The Two World Orders, 27 WILSON Q. 22, 25 (2003):
Our willingness to promote and sign on to international law would be second to
none-except when it came to any conventions that might require a change in U.S
domestic law or policy. The principal organs of U.S foreign policy... emphatically
resisted the idea that international law could be a means of changing internal U.S law.
27. Kathleen M. Kedian, Customary International Law and International Human Rights Litigation
in United States Courts: Revitalizing the Legacy of the Paquete Habana, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1395
(1999) (quoting from Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis,
75 YALE L.J. 517, 575 (1966) and Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law,
33 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 665, 708-09 (1986)).
28. Jose E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truth and Consequences, 38 TEXAS INT'L
LJ. 405 (2003).
29. For more detail of international commercial law and tribunals, see Sunil R. Haijani, The
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods in United States Courts, 23 HoUS. J. INT'L L.
49 (2000).
30. Id. (quoting United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)
art. 7, 19 I.L.M. 671, 672 (opened for signature Apr. 11, 1980)).
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settlement mechanisms for continental self delimitation disputes, it is now much
less likely that there will be wars over such disputes.
IV. CAUSES OF ARMED CONFLICT
Another favorite topic of both international relations, and lately interna-
tional law, is examining the causes of war and asking whether anything reduces
the likelihood of conflict. This is, of course, of crucial importance to self-
determination claims because they so often result in bloodshed. The much-
touted "findings" of some scholars is the observation that democracies never
fight each other.31 These scholars have elaborate definitions of conflict and
what counts as a democracy.32 Having observed this "fact," they then set about
proselytizing for democracy.
Now, democratic governance usually implies a whole series of beliefs in
the worth of the individual, transparency of governmental structures, various
individual freedoms, and restrictions on governmental excesses all of which
certainly have value in themselves, although some of the newer democracies
challenge these linkages. The jury is still out on whether democracy, as such,
will ultimately reduce interstate conflict particularly where some democracies
seem trigger-happy in starting wars with non-democracies whenever they like.
A much more convincing argument about reducing conflict is that international
dispute settlement mechanisms reduce the likelihood of interstate conflict. As
the availability of dispute settlement mechanisms grow, so the likelihood of
conflict shrinks. Now, it may well be that such institutions are more likely to
be established if the basic governmental structure of states is democratic and,
if that is so, we should encourage democracy for that reason, as well as all the
other reasons, but I think it takes more than mere democracy to create
international settlement mechanisms.
What it takes, fundamentally, is a belief in international settlement with
international rules. This means a fundamental belief that nationally cabined
rules will not work. The question then arises as to why claims in certain well
established areas of international law, such as self-determination, have virtually
no place to be resolved in (other than inhospitable national courts) and what
would be the outcome if there were some place to take such claims.
31. R.J. Rummel, Eliminating Democide and War through an Alliance of Democracies, 18 INT'L
J. ON WORLD PEACE 55, 56-57 (2001).
32. See generally WHAT Is DEMOCRACY? (Alain Touraine & David Macey trans., Westview Press
1997); EDWARD MCWHINNEY, CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER IN
A REVOLUTIONARY AGE (Holmes & Meier 1981).
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V. THE LACK OF SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS FOR
SELF-DETERMINATION CLAIMS
First, why is there such a dearth of settlement fora for claims to self-
determination? My guess is that because claims to self-determination strike
directly at the heart of the state sovereignty system, they will be among the last
to find a hospitable forum for settlement. Many international issues are
necessarily transnational and thus create pressure for international settlement
mechanisms. Environmental concerns need to be settled internationally because
environmental problems are no respecters of national borders.
One of the difficulties for peoples' claims to self-determination is that
"peoples" always live within a state. Even if a people live in several states, such
as the Kurds, each one of them lives within a state. Each state can then see the
"problem" of self-determination as an intra-state problem, entirely within the
state's domestic jurisdiction. The state exists to control and regulate the life of
the people and resources within its jurisdictions. The prospect of relinquishing
control over peoples and resources is the prospect of dismembering the existing
state. This prospect is unwelcome to all states and their resistance to agreeing
to participate in fora that may result in the loss of their very limbs is not
surprising. The ultimate question here is whether territorial integrity/sove-
reignty trumps self-determination of peoples or vice-versa: whether we are
willing to adapt our legal rules to restrain the tyranny of the majority within the
state, as we do in our national system for certain subjects, or whether we will
reduce claims of self-determination to the age-old law of the jungle: might is
right. To ask the question should be to answer it. Will nation states allow a
question they perceive as intra-national to be resolved by international standards
and international institutions?
VI. CHALLENGING PROPOSAL
I want to propose what I see as the mechanism that holds out the best hope
of success for providing a peaceful resolution to claims for self-determination,
though I confess it is a distant dream. I refer to the drafting of a treaty defining
the right of self-determination, defining to whom the right applies, and creating,
within the four comers of the proposed treaty, a mandatory dispute settlement
mechanism. Clearly, states would have to agree to such a treaty. That may
seem unlikely at the moment. It took at least 50 years to establish the
International Criminal Court. Criminal trials were seen as the prerogative of
states and the whole notion of the existence of international crimes was hotly
disputed. But we have to start somewhere and the treaty route may hold the
most promise.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The right of self-determination is vitally important to indigenous peoples.
Self-determination is closely linked to cultural survival, economic development,
and the realization of other basic human rights. This right has gradually
achieved firm recognition in international law. At present, however, there is no
specific forum or process for resolving indigenous claims to self-determination.
Indeed, none of the instruments that reference the right to self-determination,
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, provide
specific remedies for addressing violations of this right. Moreover, there are no
definitive definitions regarding the contours of this right that could help guide
* Professor Lone M. Graham is an Associate Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law School
in Boston, Massachusetts. She would like to thank Kristen Carpenter, Valerie Epps, and Stephen McJohn for
their support.
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the resolution of such claims. Thus, the focus of this paper is twofold: to
analyze some of the more difficult issues that a dispute resolution mechanism
might face in addressing indigenous claims to self-determination and to
articulate an optimal process or forum for resolving such claims.
Part II of the paper addresses the threshold issue of the meaning of the
phrase "indigenous self-determination." Much has been written on what the
right of self-determination encompasses and who is entitled to that right.'
National courts,2 human rights bodies,3 and states4 have similarly expressed their
views on the meaning and scope of this term. This section explores the meaning
of self-determination for indigenous peoples and the challenges that indigenous
peoples have faced in having their right to self-determination recognized.
Part Im of this paper analyzes the issue of development and control of lands
and resources by indigenous groups. While closely linked to Part I, this issue
merits a separate section because of its significant potential for derailing
attempts to resolve indigenous claims to self-determination. Yet it is a key
aspect of indigenous self-determination in that it is fundamental to the cultural,
physical, economic, and political survival of indigenous groups.
Part IV of this paper examines the self-determination experiences of some
indigenous groups in the Americas. The legal contours of self-determination are
continuously shaped by the realities of practice. Thus, examination of the
experiences of groups struggling for the realization of this right is an important
step in the creation of any effective dispute resolution mechanism. Within the
context of these cases, the section also analyzes some existing fora for
addressing indigenous human rights claims and analyzes how these fora might
be adapted to better address self-determination claims.
Part V summarizes my findings regarding the appropriate fora for resolving
indigenous claims to self-determination, as well as factors that may be crucial
to the resolution of such claims.
HI. UNDERSTANDING INDIGENOUS SELF-DETERMINATION
Before we can attempt to articulate a process for settling claims of self-
determination, we need to understand what that phrase might mean to those
asserting it. The circumstances, needs, and concerns of indigenous peoples are
1. See e.g., S. James Anaya, A Contemporary Definition of the International Norm of Self-
Determination, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & COMP. PROBS. 131 (1993); Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination Of
Peoples (1995); Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self- Determination (1990). See also The Right
to Self-Determination: Historical and Current Developments on the Basis of United Nations Instruments, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1, at 31 (1981) (Aureliu Cristescu, Special Rapporteaur).
2. REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC, [ 1998] 37 LL.M. 1340.
3. See e.g., Hum. Rts. Comm., The Right to Self-Determination of Peoples (Art. 1): 13/03/84.
CCPR General Comment 12.
4. See infra notes 26-48 and accompanying text.
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as diverse as the communities that they embody. Yet, in the past several
decades, indigenous groups from around the world have come together in a
variety of forums to discuss and articulate a vision of indigenous self-
determination-what that phrase might mean to culturally distinct groups of
peoples and how it might play out in individual cases. While the scope of this
paper does not provide an opportunity to fully explore this effort, this section
highlights some key aspects of this movement, which should inform any process
designed to resolve future claims.
A. Indigenous Peoples
A major question that may arise in the context of resolving indigenous
claims to self-determination is how to define "indigenous peoples." While con-
troversy surrounds the use and application of the word "indigenous," some
common elements can be discerned both from scholarship as well as inter-
national, regional, and state practices: groups with distinct cultures, histories,
and connections to land (spiritual and otherwise) that have been forcibly incor-
porated into a larger governing society. S. James Anaya in his book Indigenous
Peoples in International Law explains the relevance of these elements:
[T]he term indigenous refers broadly to the living descendants of
preinvasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by others. Indige-
nous peoples, nations, or communities are culturally distinctive
groups that find themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the
forces of empire and conquest. The diverse surviving Indian
communities and nations of the Western Hemisphere, the Inuit and
Aleut of the Arctic, the Aborigines of Australia, the Maori of New
Zealand, the tribal peoples of Asia, and other such groups are among
those generally regarded as indigenous. They are indigenous because
their ancestral roots are imbedded in the lands in which they live, or
would like to live, much more deeply than the roots of more powerful
sectors of society living on the same lands or in close proximity.
Furthermore, they are peoples to the extent they comprise distinct
communities with a continuity of existence and identity that links
them to the communities, tribes, or nations of their ancestral past.5
The UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which will
be discussed shortly, emphasizes above all the importance of self-identification.6
The Chairperson-Rapporteur to the UN Working Group on Indigenous
Populations has similarly emphasized the importance of flexibility in defining
5. S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1996).
6. Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, at art. 8, U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/1995/2, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (1994).
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the term "indigenous."7 Yet she also suggests some possible factors "relevant
to the understanding of the concept of 'indigenous:"'
a) Priority in time, with respect to the occupation and use of a
specific territory;
b) The voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness, which
may include the aspects of language, social organization,
religion and spiritual values, modes of-production, laws, and
institutions;
c) Self-identification, as well as recognition by other groups, or by
State authorities, as a distinct collectivity; and
d) An experience of subjugation, marginalization, dispossession,
exclusion, or discrimination, whether or not conditions persist.'
If a state accepts the "indigenousness" of a particular group, than this is not
a particularly difficult issue for any forum designed to resolve self-determina-
tion claims. However, a number of countries, particularly in Asia, have
consistently denied the existence of such groups within their borders. Therefore
this may well be a serious hurdle for some groups.
A tremendous amount of scholarship has also been devoted to the question
of who are "peoples" entitled to the right of self-determination. Few today can
dispute the notion that "peoples" include sub-national groups that are part of a
larger territorial sovereign unit.9 Just as international law has evolved from
being solely concerned with the rights and duties of sovereigns to include the
individual and collective rights of human beings, so too has self-determination
evolved into a legal precept benefiting "human beings as human beings and not
sovereign entities as such.""° Of course that doesn't address the more difficult
question of what groups constitute "peoples" for purposes of exercising a right
7. In her working paper on the concept of "indigenous people," Chairperson-Rapporteur Daes
states that "the concept of 'indigenous' is not capable of a precise, inclusive definition which can be applied
in the same manner to all regions of the world. However, greater agreement may be achieved with respect
to identifying the prinicipal factors which have distinguished 'indigenous peoples' from other groups in the
practice of the United Nation system and regional intergovernmental organizations." Working Group on
Indigenous Populations, Working Paper by the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, on the
concept of "indigenous peoples," Comm. on Hum. Rts., Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, 14th Sess., UN Doc. ECN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2 (1996) [hereinafter Working
Paper Daes].
8. Working Paper Daes, supra note 7, at para. 69; Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigen-
ous Peoples: A Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 57, 114-16
(1999).
9. See e.g., REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC, [1998] 37 I.L.M. 1340, 1373 (1998); Report
of the Human Rights Committeee, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/47/40 (1992).
But see infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
10. See, ANAYA, supra note 5, at 76, 77-80.
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to self-determination. Factors commonly referenced, but by no means exclu-
sive, include: common racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural history;
some claim to territory or land; and a shared sense of political, economic, social,
and cultural goals. Indigenous groups often meet each criterion. Yet this
definition of peoples fails to fully contemplate the essence of the phrase
"indigenous peoples." Another factor often overlooked but nevertheless ger-
mane to addressing indigenous claims to self-determination is the role of
history. This historical undertaking requires both an inward examination that
allows Native peoples to reconstitute their own histories and identities and an
outward examination that acknowledges and addresses the wrongs that
accompany indigenous claims to self-determination.
B. Self-determination
Another key step in the resolution of indigenous claims to self-deter-
mination is to better define what is meant by the term "self-determination.""
While the term has often been equated with secession, we know that its meaning
11. The early origins of the concept of self-determination are well articulated: from the Marxist
precepts of class liberation, to the Wilsonian ideals of democracy and freedom, through its incorporation into
the United Nations Charter. The push for decolonization in the 1960s shed new light on the right of self-
determination, focusing on its humanistic components. By 1970, we see a shift in legal doctrine with the
inclusion of the right of self-determination in the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations, which envisions both a collective right to fully participate in the political life of a nation
and some form of relief for those who are denied full participatory rights. See Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in accordance with the
Charter of the U.N.G.A. Res. 2624, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 [hereinafter
Declaration on Friendly Relations] (1970). Within the international human rights movement, both the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights states that "all peoples have the right of self-determination." See International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) (Annex to G.A.
Res. 2200, 21 GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 490, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 LLM. 368 (1967); (G.A. Res.
2200,21 GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. AJ6316) (1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. This includes the right
to "freely determine their political status," to "freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development,
and to "freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources." Id. As the Canadian Supreme Court in its 1998
opinion on the secession of Quebec noted, "the existence of the right of the people to self-determination is
now so widely recognized in international conventions that the principle has acquired a status beyond 'con-
vention' and is considered a general principle of international law." See REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF
QUEBEC, 2 Can. S.C.R. 217, at para. 111 (1998), citing e.g. A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A legal
reappraisal 171-72 (1995). Critics of group rights generally and the right of self-determination for sub-
national groups in particular highlight the potential for political instability and violence as a reason for oppos-
ing such a right. However, this focus tends to miss the mark. The claims exists; violence and instability can
be reduced by providing groups with peaceful and effective processes for addressing alleged violations.
Indeed, situations such as East Timor, Kosovo, Eritrea, and Chechnya may have taken a different less violent
course had international procedures and institutions been in place to address these claims early on.
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is much more nuanced than that, especially where indigenous peoples are
concerned. The UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is
a good place to start, since it reflects indigenous peoples' own stories and own
struggles for recognition of rights that are essential to their very survival. 2
The UN Draft Declaration embodies what is meant by the phrase "indigen-
ous self-determination," in that it specifies various freedoms, conditions, and
rights necessary for culturally distinct peoples to be fully in control of their own
destinies. 3 As Professor Anaya suggests, these rights, conditions, and freedoms
fall within several normative categories: non-discrimination, respect for cultural
integrity, control over lands and resources, social welfare and development, and
self-government." Adoption of the Draft Declaration by the General Assembly
12. Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/1995/2, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (1994) [hereinafter U.N. Draft Declaration]. The U.N. Draft
Declaration is a document that is being considered by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights for eventual
consideration by the General Assembly. See infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text for more information.
13. The Draft Declaration includes an express recognition of the right of self-determination, but
doesn't stop there. It addresses a number of important collective rights, such as protection against genocide
and ethnocide, protection of socioeconomic rights, including the right to own, possess or use lands and natural
resources, as well as the right to autonomy or self-government. See U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 12,
at arts. 1-36.
14. See ANAYA, supra note 5, at 97-125. Critics who oppose indigenous self-determination might
contend that many of these norms are readily achievable irrespective of any recognition of a separate group
right. It is true that nondiscrimination, respect for culture, right to welfare and development, and protection
of property are already an integral part of conventional and individual human rights law. However, this
analysis fails to recognize the inextricable link between each of these norms and the norm of self-government,
as well as the collective nature of the right of self-determination. It is through the process of political
autonomy that indigenous peoples reclaim control of their land and natural resources, rebuild their social and
economic infrastructure, protect their way of life, and enhance their democratic participation in the larger
society. The U.N. Draft Declaration on Indigenous People Rights offers the clearest written articulation of this
interrelationship between the right of self-determination and other important human rights.
The preamble to the 1992 Indigenous Peoples Earth Charter illustrates further the meaning of indigenous self-
determination:
We the indigenous peoples walk to the future in the footprints of our ancestors.
From the smallest to the largest living being, from the four directions.
From the air, the land and the mountains, the creator has placed us, the indigenous
peoples upon our mother earth.
The footprints of our ancestors are permanently etched upon the lands our peoples.
We, the indigenous peoples maintain our inherent right to self-determination. We have
always had the right to decide our own forms of government, to use our own ways to
raise and educate our children, to our own cultural identity without interference.
We continue to maintain our rights as people despite centuries of deprivation,
assimilation, and genocide.
We maintain our inalienable rights to our lands and territories, to all our resources-
above and below--to our waters. We assert our ongoing responsibility to pass these
on to our future generations.
We cannot be removed from our lands. We, the indigenous peoples, are connected by
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would provide guidance to any process designed to resolve future claims. This
is no easy task, however, given the opposition to this document by some states,
particularly to the notion of self-determination. 5 The next section provides
further analysis of this opposition. By examining the current debates surround-
ing the draft declaration we can gain a clearer picture of the kinds of issues that
a dispute resolution forum will be faced with resolving. For instance, how does
secession relate to the right of self-determination, how does one bridge the
ideological divide between individual and group rights, and to whom and under
what circumstances does the right to development attach vis-A-vis the right to
self-determination?
C. Controversy Surrounding the Adoption of the UN Draft Declaration
In the past several decades, indigenous peoples have garnered international
support for their rights to live and develop as distinct communities. 6 Their
efforts have brought about significant changes in both conventional and custo-
mary international law. For instance, in 1982, the United Nations Economic
and Social Council, along with the United Nations Human Rights Commission
authorized the formation of a Working Group on Indigenous Populations, made
up of five experts from the Sub-commission on the Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities.1' The Working Group's original mandate was
the development of international standards concerning the rights of indigenous
populations. In 1993, a Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples was completed and subsequently adopted by the Sub-commission. That
same year, the General Assembly proclaimed the International Decade of the
World's Indigenous People. These two events are conceptually linked in that
adoption of the Declaration by the General Assembly is a major goal of the
Decade.8
the circle of life to our lands and environments.
We, the indigenous peoples, walk to the future in the footprints of our ancestors.
15. See infra notes 26 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., ANAYA, supra note 5, at 45-58; see also Programme of Activities for the International
Decade of the World's Indigenous People (1995-2004) (para. 4), G.A.Res. 50/157 of Dec. 21, 1995, annex.,
Introduction, at http://www.unhchr.chlhtmllmenu6/2/fs9.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
17. Hum. Rts. Comm. Res. 1982/19 (Mar. 10, 1982); E.S.C. Res. 1982/34, May 7, 1982, U.N.
ESCOR, 1982, Supp. No. 1, at 26, U.N. Doc E/1982/82 (1982), at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/
Huridoca.nsfTestFrame/691996bd9d67c914c 1256965004df3d3?Opendocument (last visited Mar. 18, 2004).
18. In 1995, The Commission on Human Rights established an open-ended, inter-sessional working
group to consider the various provisions of the draft declaration. Upon completion of its work, the group will
send its draft to the Commission. If the Commission is satisfied, the draft will be approved by the Economic
and Social Council, which will in turn submit it to the Third Committee. Upon approval by the Third Com-
mittee, it will be submitted to the General Assembly for final adoption. The goal was to finish this work by
the end of the Decade in 2004, but for reasons discussed later in this paper this is not likely to occur.
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The Draft Declaration represents a monumental achievement for indigen-
ous peoples. As Professor Turpel notes:
First and foremost, it represents a remarkable feat of international
legal drafting by Indigenous peoples, human rights experts, and State
representatives. This kind of power-sharing of the pen is dramatic
because Indigenous peoples and their governments have been
virtually shut out of the institutions of the United Nations, relegated
to the status of 'individuals' or 'non-governmental organizations. " 9
In fulfilling its mandate to facilitate and encourage dialogue between
Governments and indigenous peoples, the working group reached out to large
numbers of indigenous nations and organizations-many of whom played a
pivotal role in the drafting of the declaration.2" For reasons more fully explored
in Part Il, this kind of participation by indigenous groups in the design and
implementation of any future dispute resolution mechanism cannot be
undervalued. As Professor Robert Williams' suggests "the Working Group's
Draft provides one important measure of the power of indigenous peoples' own
stories to transform legal thought and doctrine about the rights that matter most
to them."'"
As noted earlier, the draft declaration specifies important freedoms, condi-
tions, and rights necessary for distinct peoples to be fully in control of their own
destinies.22 Yet it is not a one sided agreement but rather represents-in the
19. M. E. Turpel, Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples-Commentaries, 1 C.N.L.
R. 50 (1994).
20. The current working group on the draft declaration is similarly designed to provide for
significant participation by indigenous groups, even those lacking consultative status with the Economic and
Social Council.
21. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Frontier of Legal Thought III: Encounters on the Frontiers of Inter-
national Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE
LJ. 660, 683-84 (1990).
22. Part I of the U.N. Draft Declaration affirms the right of non-discrimination, full participation
in the life of the State, and self-determination generally. Article 3 of this part mirrors the language found in
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights that
indigenous peoples "have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." Part II addresses collective
rights to live as distinct peoples, including protection against genocide and ethnocide. Part III protects the
cultural, spiritual, and linguistic identities of indigenous peoples. Part IV addresses education, labour, and
communication rights. Part V and VI focuses primarily on development and socioeconomic rights, including
the right to own, possess, or use indigenous lands and natural resources. Part VII focus on certain political
rights, including the right to determine citizenship and maintain institutional structures. Most notably Article
31 states that:
Indigenous peoples, as a specific form of exercising their right to self-determination,
have the right to autonomy or self-government, in matters relating to their internal and
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words of Chairperson-Rapporteur Erica-Irene Daes-"a fair balance between
the aspirations of indigenous peoples and the legitimate concern of States.
23
Indigenous organizations and representatives have expressed support for the
declaration in its current form, with a willingness by many to consider changes
that strengthen and clarify the original text, are non-discriminatory, and are
consistent with international law.24 States involved in the working group
consultations have had varying views on the Draft Declaration. Some have
expressed a willingness to accept the declaration as it currently stands, including
Article 3.25 However, several prominent states have expressed strong opposition
to key aspects of the declaration. 6 By far the most controversial aspect of the
declaration is its use of the terms "peoples" and "self-determination."
For instance, the United States' position on the declaration has remained
fairly constant during the past eight years: indigenous peoples are not "peoples"
who are entitled to the full panoply of rights associated with the right of self-
determination. In its 1995 Statement on Article 3, the U.S. stated that "there
[are] no international practice[s] or international instruments that recognizes
indigenous groups as peoples in the sense of having the legal right of self-
determination. 27 In 1998 it articulated its objections in somewhat broader
terms contending that "no international practice or instrument recognizes sub-
local affairs, including culture, religion, education, information, media, health, housing,
employment, social welfare, economic activities, land and resource management,
environment and entry by non-members, as well as ways and means for financing these
autonomous functions.
Finally, parts vIII and IX address implementation and interpretation of the declaration.
23. Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: First Revised Text of the Draft Universal
Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 3 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/33 (1989).
24. See, e.g., Statements submitted by non-governmental organizations in consultative status with
the Economic and Social Council at Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Second Session, by International
Indian Treaty Council, E/C. 19/2003/NGO/l; Joint Statement to the 9th Intersessional Working Group on the
U.N. Draft Declaration for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, at www.treatycouncil.org/
new-page_55211221212.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004); 8th Intersessional Working Group on the Draft
Declaration on the Rights of the World's Indigenous Peoples, Report of the Tetuwan Oyate Teton Sioux
Nation Treaty Council, at www.tsntc.org/files/12_02_IWG.htm (last visited Feb. 11,2004) [hereinafter Report
of the Teton Sioux].
25. See Report of the working group established in accordance with Commission on Human Rights
resolution, 1995/32, E/CN.4/2003/92 (Jan. 6, 2003) (Chairperson-Rapporteur: Mr. Luis-Enrique Chavez)
[hereinafter Report of Working Group 2003]. See also Summary of the Informal Intersessional Consultations:
Geneva Sept. 16-19, 2002, at www.treatycouncil.org/new-page_-552.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2004)
[hereinafter Informal Consultations 2002].
26. See id. See also Lorie M. Graham, Self-determination for Indigenous Peoples After Kosovo:
Translating Self-determination "Into Practice" and "Into Peace," 6 ILSA J. OF INT'L & COMP. L 455, 462
(2000).
27. See id.
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national groups as having the legal right of self-determination"2 8 and further that
the United States has "concerns about adopting a declaration which suggests
that all indigenous groups have a right to be sovereign, independent states. 29
In the 2002 working group consultation, the United States shifted its position
somewhat arguing for the adoption of a right of "internal self-determination."3
However, the United States is not alone in its objections. Other Western
countries with significant indigenous populations have expressed similar con-
cerns. 31 In particular they cite concerns over what impact the full realization of
indigenous self-determination would have on the territorial integrity and
political unity of sovereign and independent states. This rhetoric is neither
surprising nor new. States have had a long history of arguing against self-deter-
mination claims on the basis of territorial sovereignty, and much scholarship has
been written on this issue. On closer examination, however, these objections by
states appear somewhat specious.32 Yet without a strategy for addressing these
fundamental objections no amount of process will help to resolve disputes over
the right to self-determination. Thus, the next two subsections as well as Part
II offers an analytical framework for addressing those objections.
1. The Right to Secession
Many of the states that oppose the use of the terms "peoples" and "self-
determination" do so on the grounds that it would signify some right to seces-
sion. The comments of the United States quoted above clearly signify this
concern. However, these comments suggest a fundamental misunderstanding
about the "substantive" and "remedial" aspects of indigenous self-determina-
tion,3 as well as a desire to apply different international standards where
indigenous peoples are concerned.
As suggested by Professor Anaya, substantive self-determination includes
the right to participate "in the creation of or change in institutions of govern-
ment" as well as the right "to make meaningful choices in matters touching
upon all spheres of life on a continuous basis" such as economic, cultural, and
social development.34 "The substance of the norm," however, "must be
distinguished from the remedial prescriptions that may follow from a violation
28. See id. After Kosovo, it is difficult for the U.S. to continue to make such a claim regarding sub-
national groups.
29. See id.
30. See Informal Consultations 2002, supra note 25, at 21.
31. See Report of Working Group 2003, supra note 25; see also Informal Consultations 2002, supra
note 25.
32. See infra notes 33-49 and accompanying text.
33. See ANAYA, supra note 5, at 80-85.
34. id. at 81-82.
of the norm."35 Secession is only one possible remedy to a violation of the right
of self-determination and a limited one at that. Traditionally, secession was
seen as the primary remedy for undoing colonization. It has also been
considered an appropriate remedy in cases of alien occupation or subjugation.
The more recent trend has been to apply that remedy to denials of self-deter-
mination involving serious human rights violations. The Canadian Supreme
Court in its decision on the possibility of secession for Quebec summed up the
right of secession as follows:
[T]he international law right to self-determination only generates, at
best, a right to external self-determination in situations of former
colonies; where a people is oppressed, as for example under foreign
military occupation; or where a definable group is denied meaningful
access to government to pursue their political, economic, social, and
cultural development.3
6
This interpretation is further supported by the United Nations' 1970 Declaration
on Friendly Relations, which suggests limitations on the territorial integrity and
sovereignty of a state when that state fails to conduct itself "in compliance with
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." 7 Indeed,
during the December 2002 working group consultations, Norway proposed
amending the UN Draft Declaration to include an express reference to the 1970
Declaration on Friendly Relations:
BEARING IN MIND that nothing in this Declaration may be used to
deny any peoples their right of self-determination, yet nothing in this
Declaration shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
State conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples.38
The Norway proposal merely reflects current law on the balance between
the remedy of secession for violations of the right of self-determination and the
protection of territorial integrity of existing states that meet their obligations of
a government representing the whole people. However, its incorporation in the
declaration is viewed by some as problematic in that it suggests a stagnation of
the right of self-determination that is not applicable to other peoples entitled to
35. Id. at 80.
36. REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC, [1998] 37 LL.M. 1340.
37. See supra note 11.
38. See Report of Working Group 2003, supra note 25.
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the same right. Self-determination is a dynamic legal norm that is continuously
shaped by the realities of practice. Such changes should inure equally to the
benefit of all who are entitled to exercise that right.
39
Moreover, it is important to remember that indigenous self-determination
embodies something much more than a claim to secession; in its fullest sense,
it embodies the right of indigenous peoples to live and develop as culturally
distinct groups, in control of their own destinies and under conditions of
equality. If these rights are honored, secession becomes a moot point. Given
the limited legal and practical reach of the remedy of secession perhaps
something more fundamental is at issue here. Progress toward the adoption of
the draft declaration seems to be stalled, in part, as a result of some perceived
conflict between individual and group identities.
2. The Individual v. The Group
The 2002 working group consultation proceedings suggest an ongoing
struggle between the affirmation of individual rights and recognition of group
rights generally. While the draft declaration guarantees basic human rights of
all individuals, such as the right of non-discrimination, it covers much more
than that-at its core is the recognition of a set of collective rights that are
essential to the survival of indigenous peoples as peoples. A 1988 working
group report notes that "the harsh lessons of past history showed that recogni-
tion of individual rights alone would not suffice to uphold and guarantee the
continued dignity and distinctiveness of indigenous societies and cultures." 4
The UN Draft Declaration reflects this view. For instance, Article 7 provides
for protection against "ethnocide" and "cultural genocide," including any act
that that deprives indigenous peoples of "their integrity as distinct peoples."
Other articles recognize collective rights to land, culture, education, language,
and institutions of government. 41
However, it is because of its strong affirmation of group rights that I
believe the document is perhaps meeting so much resistance. It has fallen
victim to the longstanding ideological debate over whether group rights are a
proper subject matter of human rights. There are both philosophical and
political strands to this debate, which is centered on the liberal democratic
39. As of August of 2003, progress had not been made on the approval of the self-determination
articles. The 9th Intersessional Working Group on the UN Draft Declaration was to be held in the fall of 2003,
where further progress on the declaration may have been made.
40. See Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Sixth Session, U.N. ESCOR
CN.4, U.N. Doc. E/CN4/Sub.2/1988/ 24 at 21, para. 77 (1988). See generally Williams, supra note 21, at 685-
88.
41. See, e.g., U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 12, at arts. 8, 12, 13, 14, 15,25,26,27,28,29,30,
31, 32.
principles of individual rights.42 In short, that we are all entitled to be treated
as individuals apart from our race, ancestry, ethnicity and so on, and that to
acknowledge group rights in their fullest sense is to create a political quagmire
that will lead to social and civil unrest. Of course the reality of the situation is
that collective rights are already very much a part of international law, from the
United Nations Charter to the International Covenants on Civil and Political
Rights as well as Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. As Professor Thomas
Pogge argues group rights "are at the very heart our international order."43
Yet representatives from various states continue to deny the existence of
collective rights-a resistance which is reflected in the working group
proceedings. As of August 2003 only two of the forty five articles of the UN
Draft Declaration had been approved, both dealing with principles of individual
rights and equality: Articles 5 which states that "every indigenous individual
has the right to a nationality," and Article 43 which states that "All the rights
and freedoms recognized herein are equally guaranteed to male and female
indigenous individuals."" Moreover, during the September 2002 informal
inter-sessional consultations some states expressed concern "over collective
(rather than individual) rights to land" articulated in Article 26 of the declara-
tion.45 Similar concerns were expressed regarding the "collective" intellectual
property rights articulated in Article 29.46 And while there seems to be a general
consensus that indigenous peoples "need to be protected from genocide or racial
hatred," several states continued the debate over "the issue of a collective
identity/rights v. individual identity/rights" when discussing Article 7 on the
right to be protected against ethnocide.47 One state went as far as to denounce
any claim to group rights, stressing that "human rights belonged to individuals."
Several others agreed "that the individual should be the focus and principle
beneficiary of human rights. 48 Contrast this with comments from an Indige-
nous Peoples Preparatory Meeting at the 1989 Working Group session that:
The concept of Indigenous peoples' collective rights is of paramount
importance. It is the establishment of rights of peoples as groups, and
not merely the recognition of individual rights, which is one of the
42. See, e.g., Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities,
66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1291 (1991); Robert Cullen, Human Rights Quandary, 71 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 79-88
(Winter 1992/93); Carole Goldberg, American Indians and "Preferential'" Treatment, 49 UCLA L. REV. 943,
974-76 (2002).
43. THOMAS W. POGGE, GROUP RIGHTS AND ETHNICITY, ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 187, 192-
93 (Will Kymlicka & Ian Shapiro eds., 1997).
44. See, e.g., U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 12, at arts. 5, 43.
45. See Informal Consultations 2002, supra note 25.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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most important purposes of this Declaration. Without this, the
Declaration cannot adequately protect our most basic interests.49
Since self-determination is a collective right of peoples, the difficult
question for the resolution of future claims is how to close the ideological divide
between individual and group rights. A partial answer to that question lies with
a better understanding of what aspects of group rights states are concerned with
(beyond secession). The proceedings surrounding the Draft Declaration suggest
that states are particularly concerned with indigenous peoples' collective
exercise of development, of land and resource rights.
3. Development
For indigenous peoples the right to development, including control over
land and resources, is critical to their survival as distinct peoples. Yet the right
to development remains a major point of contention for many states. Given
both the complexity and importance of this issue to the future resolution of
indigenous claims to self-determination, it is dealt with in more depth in the
following section on the economics of self-determination.
IlI. THE ECONOMICS OF SELF-DETERMINATION
One reason why the issue of development may be so controversial is
because it is inextricably linked to the right of self-determination. For instance,
both human rights covenants link the right of self-determination to the right of
peoples to "pursue economic, social, and cultural development," to dispose of
their "natural wealth and resources," and to maintain their "own means of sub-
sistence. ' 50 Article 55 of the UN Charter similarly links the "right of self-
determination" with the promotion of "higher standards of living, full employ-
ment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development.",5' This
linkage is an important one particularly where indigenous peoples are
concerned, and is best summed up in a recent UN study on lands and indigenous
peoples:
[A] number of elements.. . are unique to indigenous peoples:
i) a profound relationship exists between indigenous peoples and
their lands, territories, and resources;
49. Indigenous Peoples' Preparatory Meeting, Comments on the First Revised Text of the Draft
Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples (July 28, 1989), quoted in Williams, supra note 21, at 686.
50. See ICCPR, supra note 11, at art. 1; ICESCR, supra note 11, at art. 1.
51. See U.N. Charter, art. 55, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/ch-chp9.htm (last visited Feb.
17, 2004).
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ii) this relationship has various social, cultural, spiritual, economic,
and political dimensions and responsibilities;
iii) the collective dimension of this relationship is significant; and
iv) the inter-generational aspect of such a relationship is also
crucial to indigenous peoples' identity, survival, and cultural
viability. 2
For many indigenous nations, land is a major economic resource and in
some cases serves as the primary means of subsistence. Equally important to
the economic stability and growth of indigenous communities is the ability to
control other forms of property, such as cultural and intellectual property
rights.5 3 However, the right of development is not just a matter of economics,
but one of personal survival. Native peoples from around the world continue
to confront serious issues of poverty and its social consequences. As Professor
Anaya notes with respect to indigenous peoples worldwide, "the progressive
plundering of indigenous peoples' land and resources over time" along with
systemic "discrimination" have "impaired or devastated indigenous economies
and subsistence life, and left indigenous peoples among the poorest of the
poor."54 Control over economic resources provides a basis on which to reverse
these socio-economic trends.
There is also a strong connection between indigenous cultures and
socioeconomic rights. This connection is reflected in some recent UN human
rights decisions, such as Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, in which the Human
Rights Committee found that the cultural survival of Lubicon Lake Band of
Cree Indians was tied to its ability to control natural resource development on
its ancestral lands." Economic self-sufficiency provides indigenous peoples
with the freedom and ability to practice their cultures and to preserve and
enhance those cultures. Yet culture is more than just an end goal; it is itself a
"critical factor" in the development process in that it "informs and legitimizes
52. Indigenous People and Their Relationship to Land: Second Progress Report on the Working
Paper, Erica-Irene Daes, Special Rapporteur, U.N. SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND
PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/18 (June 1999).
53. See, e.g. U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 12, at art. 29; see also Study on the Protection of
the Cultural and Intellectual Property of Indigenous People, Erica-Irene Daes, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. ECN.4/Sub2/1993/28
(July 1993); Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People: Final Report of The Special Rapporteur, Erica-
Irene Daes, U.N. SUBCOMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26 (June 1995).
54. See ANAYA, supra note 5, at 108.
55. See Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication No. 167/184 (Mar. 1990), at
http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/undocs/session45/167-1984.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2004); U.N. Doc.
Supp. No. 40 (A/45/40) at 1 (1990), at http://www.un.org/documents/galres/45/a45r040.htm (last visited Mar.
18, 2004). This case is explored more fully in part m of this paper.
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conceptions of self, of social and political organization, of how the world works,
and how the individual and group appropriately work in the world. 56
Economic self-sufficiency is similarly connected to political self-
determination. It is through the exercise of self-government that indigenous
peoples are able to maintain and strengthen the institutions upon which strong
economies are built. As one economist notes in relation to the experiences in
Latin America and Asia, "the key to economic growth is not Uust] resources, it's
institutions. It's things like stability in government, clear rules governing
contracts and effective institutions." Finally, you have an issue of participa-
tion-indigenous peoples seek to be actively engaged in any decision-making
process that affects their economic rights, especially natural resource develop-
ment decisions that are being made by states and third parties claiming rights
through a state.
The UN Draft Declaration encompasses many of these ideas on economic
control, protection, enhancement, and participation. The Preamble to the
Covenant recognizes "the urgent need to respect and promote the inherent rights
and characteristics of indigenous peoples, especially their rights to their lands,
territories, and resources, which derive from their political, economic and social
structures and from their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and philoso-
phies." 7 It further notes "that control by indigenous peoples over developments
affecting them and their lands, territories and resources will enable them to
maintain and strengthen their institutions, cultures, and traditions, and to
promote their development in accordance with their aspirations and needs. 58
While development rights are dealt with primarily in Articles 21-30, a number
of other articles touch upon those rights demonstrating their broad reach.
At the 2002 working group consultations, key development articles were
discussed and debated. While some states expressed support for these articles,
a number of states expressed reservations.59 Some purportedly went as far as to
suggest that the economic aspects of the right of self-determination may not
apply to indigenous peoples. 60 Others took a less draconian view, focusing on
the breadth of the articles and their impact on third party rights.6'
56. DUANE CHAMPANE, ECONOMIC CULTURE, INSTITUTIONAL ORDER, AND SUSTAINED MARKET
ENTERPRISE: COMPARISONS OF HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN INDIAN CASES, PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND INDIAN ECONOMIES 245-46 (Terry L. Anderson ed. 1992).
57. See U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 12, at Annex 1.
58. id.
59. See generally Report of the Working Group 2003, supra note 25, at para. 27-49; see also
Informal Consultations 2002, supra note 25.
60. See Report of The Teton Sioux, supra note 24, at 7.
61. Article 26 provides for the right of indigenous peoples to "own, develop, control, and use the
lands and territories, including the total environment of lands, air, waters, coastal seas, sea-ice, flora, and fauna
and other resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used." Several states were
concerned that the language was "extremely broad and did not recognize the rights of other parties." Similar
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State resistance to indigenous peoples' rights to land and resources is not
limited to the UN Draft Declaration. Many current disputes between states and
indigenous groups center on this issue.62 For instance, the San Andres Accords,
which are negotiated peace accords between the Zapatistas and Mexican
government, are close to collapse because Congress chose to remove the
provisions that provide for local indigenous control of land and resources.63
Many of the cases that end up before international bodies deal with similar
issues. One example would be the recent decision by the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights involving the Awas Tingni of Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast, in
which the Court held that the Awas Tingni had the right to demarcation and
protection of their traditional and customary lands under the American
Convention on Human Rights. 6 Several other major cases involving the issue
of the economic rights are working their way through the Inter-American human
rights system---cases which could in theory change the legal landscape with
respect to the legitimacy of a state's resistance to international recognition of
indigenous rights to land and resources.65
However, this resistance may not be completely muted by judicial or quasi-
judicial decisions if we do not understand what lies at its core. Why are some
states so opposed to the notion of indigenous development when as a practical
matter it would help to alleviate the dire poverty that exists in many native com-
munities? A partial answer may lie in the fact that economics has historically
played a crucial role in the process of state-making (particularly control of
concerns were expressed regarding Article 25 on the recognition of the special relationship between
indigenous peoples and their lands, Article 27 restitutions of lands and resources, and Article 28 on the con-
servation, restoration and protection of lands and resources. See Informal Consultations 2002, supra note 25,
at art. 26. In response to these claims, indigenous delegations noted that the articles are "appropriately drafted
in a broad manner so as to accommodate all the possible land and resource rights of indigenous peoples in the
different regions of the world." Report of the Teton Sioux, supra note 24, at 12. On third-party rights,
several states expressed concern over the interests of the non-indigenous parties that live on or have interests
in lands claims by indigenous peoples. Indigenous representatives noted in regard to third party rights that
some states were portraying "an incomplete and distorted picture of the historical and contemporary context
relating to indigenous peoples." Id. Finally on Article 29 dealing with intellectual property rights, some states
took issue with the collective aspects of those rights since such a right was not presently recognized in
domestic or international legal systems. See Informal Consultations 2002, supra note 25, at art. 29.
62. See S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights
over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS.
J. 33 (2001).
63. In Sept. of 2002, Mexico's Supreme Court upheld the revised Accords which deleted reference
to local control of lands and resources.
64. See The Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Judgment of Aug. 31,2001, http://www.law.arizona.edu/Journals/AJICUAJICL2002/vol 19 .htm (last visited
Feb. 18, 2004); see also, S. James Anaya & Claudio Grossman, The Case ofAwas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A New
Step in the International Law of Indigenous Peoples, 19 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2002).
65. See Anaya & Williams, supra note 62.
2004]
402 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 10:385
major economic exchanges within a defined territory) and thus may be viewed
by some states as a backdoor to eventual secession and independence.6 6 It also
may be that indigenous peoples' right to development is caught up in the debate
regarding possible linkages between human rights law and international
economic and trade law.67 Indigenous peoples' rights have been primarily the
province of international human rights law, whereas the right to development
has often taken shape within the contours of the policies of the Bretton Woods
system. This system led to the creation of a separate set of international bodies
and instruments, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the
General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade, and more recently the World Trade
Organization. 6' Human rights advocates have spoken out against the threats that
globalization may pose to non-trade rights.69 Until perhaps more recently,
however, the law of trade and economics has remained separate from other non-
trade concerns such as human rights, labor, and the environment. 7' As
Professors Chinkin and Wright explain
[d]evelopment, as channeled through the financial, monetary, and
trading wings of the Bretton Woods system, had tended to entrench
and extend a Western free market economic model. This capitalist
model depends on growth and expansion, the proliferation and export
of First World technology, the gearing of developing economies to
servicing First World industrial needs, and the exploitation of Third
World economic and social structures."'"
Human rights, on the other hand, have often been invisible in this free market
system of rules and institutions.
However, in the UN Draft Declaration, indigenous peoples' rights to self-
determination are connected to development rights, which are in turn connected
to other important human rights, such as the right to be free from environmental
degradation, the right to a basic standard of living, the right to subsistence, and
66. See generally Diane Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety: International Reponses to Ethno-
Separatist Claims, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 11 (1988).
67. Cf. Sara Dillon, A Farewell to "Linkage": International Trade Law and Global Sustainability
Indicators, 55 RUTGERS L. REv. 87 (2002); Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, The Hunger Trap: Women,
Food, and Self-Determination, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 262, 304-07 (1993).
68. Cf. G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the
World Trade Organization, 44 DuKE L.J. 829 (1995).
69. See, e.g., Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 273 (2002). See also JOSEPH E. STIGL1TZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (Norton
2002).
70. See, e.g., Dillon, supra note 67.
71. See Chinkin & Wright supra note 67, at 306.
the right of equality, to name a few.72 These connections may be perceived by
some states as significantly impacting the larger debate over whether trade and
economic law should be linked to non-economic concerns. A related issue is
the impact that this linkage may have on multinational corporations doing
business with nation-states, particularly since the Draft Declaration requires
states to consult with indigenous peoples prior to commencing any development
project that affects their lands, territories, and resources.
Each of these concerns can be answered in turn. It is important to note that
the Draft Declaration is not a declaration of absolutes. In the words of Professor
Robert Williams, it does "delegitimate the five-hundred-year-old legacy of the
European doctrine of discovery" by recognizing indigenous peoples right to
occupy and control traditional lands and resources.73 Yet states also retain a
large measure of control over key economic resources.74 This does not mean
that states can ignore the concerns and rights of indigenous peoples with respect
to the development of those resources. States must protect indigenous peoples'
"total environment," seek their "free and informed consent," and provide them
with "just and fair compensation" prior to moving forward with any project
affecting indigenous lands and resources.75 In this way, we see a clear link
between the economic rights of the state and the human rights concerns of
indigenous peoples-linkages which are already occurring in other aspects of
international economic and trade law.
One example would be the World Bank's decision to adopt a "holistic
approach to development" that takes into consideration "the interdependence of
all elements of development-social, structural, human, governance, donors,
environmental, economic, and financial. 76 Beginning in 1982, the World Bank
issued its first policy directive on "Tribal People in Bank-financed Projects,"
which focused on protecting tribal land rights and health services. This policy
was strengthened in 1991 with the development of Operational Directive 4.20,
which was designed to promote "the rights of indigenous peoples to participate
in, and benefit from, [World Bank] development projects."77 These newer
72. See U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 12.
73. See Williams, supra note 21, at 691.
74. See id.; see also U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 12, at art. 30.
75. Id.
76. See Richard Cameron Blake, The World Bank's Draft Comprehensive Development Framework
and the Micro-Paradigm of Law and Development, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 159, 160 (2000), (citing
to World Bank Group, Comprehensive Development Framework, at http://www.worldbank.org/cdf (last
visited Mar. 17, 2004)).
77. The World Bank & Indigenous Peoples, The World Bank Fact Sheet (Aug. 2002), at
http://lnweb I8.worldbank.org/ESSD/essdext.nsf/43ByDocName/TheWorldBankndigenousPeoples-
FactSheetl5lKBPDF/$FLE/IndigenousPeopleExtemalBriefWSSD2002.pdf. (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
Operational Directive 4.20 specifically requires that indigenous peoples have "a voice in projects that affect
them;" that "adverse impacts on indigenous peoples are avoided, or if not possible, minimized or mitigated;"
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policies and directives are more in line with conventional and emerging
customary law regarding indigenous rights to lands and natural resources, as
well as rights to self-determination.78
In sum, given the importance of development rights to the cultural, politi-
cal, and social survival of Native peoples it is unrealistic to believe that any
dispute resolution process will be able to adequately address indigenous claims
to self-determination if no strategy is in place to resolve these complementary
economic claims. While we may be tempted to try to separate these rights in the
way that they have been historically separated into economic/trade law and
human rights law, the trend in international law is to develop policies and
instruments that recognize their co-dependence. States who are negotiating or
addressing the self-determining rights of indigenous peoples should therefore
adopt similar approaches.
IV. EXPLORING MECHANISMS FOR RESOLVING INDIGENOUS CLAIMS
Thus far the paper has attempted to better define what is meant by
indigenous self-determination, while at the same time identifying and analyzing
some of the major hurdles to resolving claims to self-determination, such as the
issue of control of land and resources and the right to development. This
section explores actual processes or mechanisms that may be used for resolving
such claims. It includes an analysis of some of the mechanisms already in use
by indigenous groups in their struggle for self-determination and then distills
from these experiences a list of factors that may be helpful to the resolution of
future of claims. The focus here is on the indigenous peoples of the western
and that "project benefits are tailored to the specific needs of indigenous peoples." This policy is undergoing
additional revisions to "ensure that the development process fosters full respect for the dignity, human rights,
and cultures of indigenous peoples." Id. The draft Operational Policies 4.10 strengthen earlier policies by
"providing clearer provisions for early and meaningful consultation and informed participation of affected
groups... adding new mandatory requirements regarding the commercial use of natural resources... on
lands owned, or customarily used by, indigenous groups . .. and adding new mandatory requirements
regarding the commercial use of cultural resources (including indigenous knowledge)." Id. See generally
Fergus MacKay, Universal Rights or a Universe unto Itself?. Indigenous Peoples' Human Rights and the
World Bank's Draft Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 527 (2002).
78. See, e.g., Anaya & Williams, supra note 62. For instance in its concluding observations to
Canada, the U.N. Hmn. Rts. Comm. noted the important link between indigenous peoples' rights to land and
resource allocation and the right to self-determination. See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Canada, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 65th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 105 (1999).
In regard to the "aboriginal peoples" of Canada, the "Committee emphasize[d] that the right to self-
determination requires, inter alia, that all peoples must be able to freely dispose of their natural wealth and
resources and that they may not be deprived of their own means of subsistence." Id. at para. 8. It further noted
that the "practice of extinguishing inherent aboriginal rights" to lands and resources was "incompatible" with
article 1 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Id.
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hemisphere, although many of the points are applicable to indigenous groups
elsewhere in the world.
While the draft declaration does not establish its own dispute resolution
mechanism, it does envision the establishment of "mutually acceptable and fair
procedures, such as negotiations, mediation, arbitration, national courts, and
international and regional human rights review and complaint mechanisms" for
the resolution of disputes with States.79 Many of these mechanisms are already
being used by indigenous groups in their struggle for self-determination, with
varying degrees of success. The following sections analyze the strengths and
weaknesses of some of the more readily used mechanisms.
A. UN Human Rights Committee
The Human Rights Committee has been the most active UN treaty-based
body to address indigenous people's claims to self-determination. The two
mechanisms in which this right has been explored are the state reporting
procedures of the ICCPR and the individual complaint procedures under the
Optional Protocol. Through its reporting procedures, the Committee has urged
a more comprehensive reporting of actions taken by states to implement Article
1 of the ICCPR as it applies to those nations' aboriginal peoples.8" This is an
important concession in terms of official recognition by a UN body that the
right applies to those groups. However merely requesting that a government
pay closer attention to the implementation of this right does little to ensure that
the right is actually honored. If a government chooses to ignore the recommen-
79. See Fact Sheet No. 9 (Rev. 1), The Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Programme of Activities for
the International Decade of the World's Indigenous People (1995-2004) (at para. 4), G.A. Res. 50/157 of Dec.
21, 1995, annex., at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs9.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2004); see also U.N.
Draft Declaration, supra note 12, at art. 39.
80. Like most UN human rights treaty regimes, the ICCPR requires state parties to submit periodic
reports on the measures taken to give effect to the rights recognized in the treaty. See ICCPR, supra note 11,
at art. 40. The Committee is then required to study the reports and offer comments to the state parties. In its
1984 general comment on the right to self-determination, the Committee noted in particular the persistent
failure of states to meet their reporting obligations under Article 1. See The Right of Self-Determination of
Peoples (Art. 1): 13/03/84, CCPR General comment 12, para. 3. The Committee stressed the need for states
to provide information on each paragraph in article 1, including information on the political, economic, social
and cultural aspects of the right of self-determination. Id. In recent concluding observations to reports sub-
mitted by Canada, Norway and Mexico, the U.N. Human Rights Committee emphasized the importance of
this concept as it applies to those nations' aboriginal peoples. See Concluding Observations of the Human
Rights Committee: Canada, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 65th Sess., at para. 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/Cn/9/
Add. 105 (1999); Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Mexico, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts.
Comm., 66th Sess., at para. 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CI79/Add.109 (1999); Concluding Observations of the
Human Rights Committee: Norway, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 67th Sess., at paras. 10, 17, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add. 112 (1999).
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dations of the Committee, the reporting procedures of the ICCPR provide no
real means of enforcement.8 '
Thus, indigenous groups have turned to yet another ICCPR mechanism to
assert violations of that right-the complaint procedure adopted under the
Optional Protocol. This strategy has brought about mixed results. One example
would be the Lubicon Lake Band of Cree Indians case in which Canada was
accused of violating the First Nation's right to self-determination when it
allowed oil and gas exploration on the Band's aboriginal lands. 82 The Human
Rights Committee dismissed the self-determination claim, noting that the
optional protocol was designed to address complaints based on violations of
individual and not group rights.83 In the end, the Committee did allow the
submission under Article 27, the rights of persons, in community with others,
to enjoy their own culture---demonstrating an important link between cultural
integrity rights and the right to self-determination.8'
Yet similar to the Committee's reporting procedures, the enforcement
aspects of the Protocol are almost non-existent. In the Lubicon case, it's been
20 years since the Committee's decision against Canada and the dispute is still
ongoing. Thus, while the Human Rights Committee has been willing to identify
what amounts to self-determination violations (or more appropriately violations
of important norms associated with that right), it can offer very little in the way
of ensuring that this right will be ultimately realized.
B. Inter-American System
As an alternative, indigenous peoples have taken their claims to regional
bodies-such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the
Inter-American Court. Unlike the Human Rights Committee, the Commission
has demonstrated a willingness to entertain claims filed by indigenous groups
for violations of group rights. It has also shown a strong interest in mediating
disputes between indigenous groups and member states. However, much like
the Human Rights Committee, this system has built procedural and substantive
limitations.
For instance, in a case involving the Miskto Indians of the Atlantic Coast
of Nicaragua, the Commission refused to entertain a direct claim for a violation
of the right to self-determination, equating that right with decolonization
81. This is a criticism that is often voiced in relation to the human rights treaty system generally.
On the other hand, reporting under the UN human rights treaty regime does offer a quasi-public forum for
making the world aware of lack of compliance by a state. Yet the process offers no immediate relief to groups
being denied their right to self-determination.
82. See Lubicon Lake Band, supra note 55, at para. 2.1.
83. See id. at para. 13.3.
84. See id. at para. 13.4.
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procedures.85 In the end, the report actually supports indigenous self-determina-
tion, or the norms that surround indigenous self-determination, in that it called
for an institutional reordering of the Nicaraguan state to protect the group
integrity and development rights of the Miskto Indians. 86  The decision also
helped to bring about negotiations between the Nicaraguan government and
indigenous leaders. However, as the following discussion shows, another
shortcoming of the present system is the issue of compliance.
Since the Miskto case, the Inter-American Commission has received a
number of petitions that address key aspects of the right of self-determination.
One such case, The Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v.
Nicaragua, also involved the Indians of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua. 87 The
Inter-American Commission expressed concern with Nicaragua's continued
failure to demarcate and protect Awas Tingni traditional land and resource
rights.88 Thus, the case proceeded, upon submission by the Commission, to the
Inter-American Court on Human Rights. The Court ruled in favor of the Awas
Tingni Community.89 It was a seminal decision in that the Court included
85. See Inter-American Comm. on Hum. Rts., Report on the Situation of Human Rights of a Segment
of the Nicaraguan Population of Mikito Origin & Resolution on the Friendly Settlement Procedures Regard-
ing the Human Rights Situation of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Mikito Origin, O.A.S. Doc.
OEA/Ser.LIV/II.62, doc. 10, rev. 3 (1983), OEA/Serv.LIV/lI.62, doc. 26 (1984), at http://www.cidh.oas.org/
countryrep/Miskitoeng/toc.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Mikito Report]. See also ANAYA,
supra note 5, at 87-88. Clashes between the indigenous peoples of the Atlantic Coast and the Sandinista
government arose shortly after the government assumed power in 1979 and attempted to force the indigenous
communities to assimilate to the political and social objectives of Sandinista National Liberation Front. See
Mikito Report, Part I. Demands by the Indians of the Atlantic Coast for political autonomy and self-
determination were met with violent resistance by the government. The Indians sought relief before the Inter-
American Commission on Human rights (Inter-Am. C.H.R.), asserting, among other things, violations of their
inherent rights to traditional lands, political autonomy, and self-determination.
86. See Mikito Report, supra note 85, at Part Three, Conclusions and Recommendations.
87. See The Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am C.H.R.,
Judgment of Aug. 31, 2001, http://www.law.arizona.edu/Journals/AJIClUAJICL2002/col19 .htm (last visited
Feb. 18, 2004). See also, Anaya & Grossman, supra note 64. In 1995, the Awas Tingni community had
submitted a petition to the Inter-American Commission seeking assistance in the recognition of their rights
to lands that they had historically occupied and which were essential to their survival. The Nicaraguan
government had refused to demarcate Awas Tingni communal lands as required by domestic law and had in
fact offered logging concessions on parts of that land to a foreign company, leading the Awas Tingni to seek
relief before the Commission. The petition alleged, among other things, violations of the right to property
under the American Convention on Human Rights as well as violations of the right to cultural integrity under
article 27 of the ICCPR. See S. James Anaya, The Awas Tingni Petition to the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights: Indigenous Lands, Loggers, and Governmental Neglect in Nicaragua, 9 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 157 (1996). See generally Li-ann Thio, Battling Balkanization: Regional Approaches Toward Minority
Protection Beyond Europe, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 409, 435-36 (2002).
88. Anaya & Grossman, supra note 64, at 8. See also Anaya, supra note 87.
89. See The Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am C.H.R.,
Judgment of Aug. 31, 2001, http://www.law.arizona.edu/Joumals/AJICI/AJICL2002/col19l.htm. (last visited
Feb. 18, 2004).
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communal property rights within the tenure of property protected under regional
human rights law. As noted in Section ll of this paper, a major stumbling
block to the resolution of indigenous self-determination claims centers around
assertions of rights to lands and resources. This case helps bring clarity to the
scope of those rights as they exist within the Inter-American human rights
regime.
With that said, states like the United States (who are not subject to the
Inter-American Court's jurisdiction) tend to ignore such decisions, despite their
importance in articulating general human rights obligations applicable to all
OAS member states. One recent example would be a case involving the
Western Shoshones of Nevada and two of its elders, Carrie and Mary Dann.90
The United States is ignoring a decision by the Commission that U.S. claims to
Western Shoshone lands are illegal under international law and that the United
States has used illegitimate means to assert ownership over those lands.9 Since
the Commission's decision is not legally binding (in the same way that a
decision from the Inter-American Court would be), it appears that the United
States will have the last say on what happens in this matter, leaving the
Shoshones with no further regional or international recourse. 92
90. Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Report No. 75/02, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
(2002), at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/casesnl5-02a.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2004) [hereinafter Dann
Report].
91. The case has a long and complicated history. In short, the Western Shoshones maintain that they
have never relinquished aboriginal title to certain lands and resources and that the US is claiming rights to
those lands and resources as a result of a process that illegally discriminates against Native Americans,
denying the Dann sisters and other Shoshones basic due process rights as well as rights to property and non-
discrimination-key aspects of indigenous self-determination. After several years of review and com-
munications with the parties, the Commission ruled in favor of the Dann sisters. In order to come in
compliance with its human rights obligations, the Commission recommended that the United States (1)
provide the Danns and other Shoshone members with an equitable remedy for determining their land rights
(which may include adopting appropriate legislation or other such measures) and (2) review its laws,
procedures, and practices to ensure that the property rights of Indigenous persons are determined in
accordance with the rights established in the American Declaration. See Dann Report supra note 90.
Throughout the proceedings, the United States has denied not only the substantive claims but the
Commission's jurisdiction to hear such claims. The United States' defiance has been most evident in its
continued confiscation and sale of livestock that the Dann sisters were grazing on aboriginal lands and its
attempt to move forward on the distribution of funds for those lands based on what the Commission found
to be an illegitimate and discriminatory process. See, e.g., Report by Amnesty International on the Western
Shoshone case, at http://www.amnestyusa.orgljustearth/indigenous-people/westemshoshone.html (last
visited Feb. 24, 2004).
92. The United States is not a party to the American Convention and has not accepted the
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court. Thus the decision of the Commission is non-binding. The
Commission could take additional measures such as attempting to verify compliance or holding additional
hearings, but the United States does not seem amendable to any services the Commission may have to offer
in resolving this dispute.
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It is worth noting that there are other ways in which alleged violations of
indigenous self-determination have been dealt with in the Inter-American
system. This includes country studies, on-site investigations, and even a
Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The
Commission has the power to initiate country studies and, with the permission
of the state, on-site investigations relating to human rights violations. In the last
several years, the Commission has focused more closely on the indigenous
human rights issues in its country reports.93 This heightened attention has led
to increased awareness and in some cases the taking of positive steps by the
affected country in protecting the group rights of indigenous populations within
their borders.
The Commission has also prepared, at the request of the OAS General
Assembly, a Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples.94 Similar to the UN draft declaration, the American declaration was
prepared in consultation with indigenous groups and OAS member states, and
is now under review by a working group established by the General Assembly.
Interestingly enough, the right to "self-determination" is not explicitly
mentioned in the draft American declaration. Perhaps this is intentional as a
means of avoiding the issues that have bogged down the U.N. Draft Declaration
process. The OAS Declaration has been criticized by some for the lack of
proper input by indigenous groups and because of concerns that it waters down
the rights articulated in the U.N. Draft Declaration.95 And it may well be true
that some of the provisions of the OAS Declaration in its current form are
weaker than its UN counterpart. At its core, however, it attempts to do much
of what the UN Declaration does with respect to recognizing and upholding the
various norms essential to realizing the right to indigenous self-determination.
For instance, Article XV mirrors in many respects the language found in the two
UN human rights covenants that "indigenous peoples have the right to freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social,
spiritual, and cultural development." 96
93. The Commission has reported on situations involving indigenous peoples in Guatemala,
Paraguay, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, and Brazil to name a few. See http://www.cidh.oas.org/publi.eng.htm
(last visited Mar. 17, 2004). The Commission's annual reports have similarly focused on the human rights
conditions of indigenous peoples throughout the Americas. See id.
94. See Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, at http://www.cidh.oas
.org/ndigenous.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Proposed Declaration].
95. Resolution regarding the Draft OAS American Declaration of Rights of the Indigenous Peoples,
at http://www.treatycouncil.org/section_211554.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2004) (International Indian Treaty
Council Resolution on the proposed declaration).
96. See Proposed Declaration, supra note 94. Cf. Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of
Indigenous Peoples:A Global Comparative and International LegalAnalysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 57, 104-
07 (1999).
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In sum, the Inter-American system has been utilized by indigenous peoples
of the Americas to assert their rights to cultural integrity, land and resources,
non-discrimination, and greater political autonomy-all key norms associated
with the right of self-determination. Moreover, the General Assembly, the
Inter-American Commission, and the Inter-American Court have all shown a
willingness to extend a measure of group protection to indigenous peoples,
although there has been some reluctance to do so within the express framework
of the internationally prescribed right to self-determination. In addition, the
Commission has shown a strong interest in mediating disputes between
indigenous peoples and member states. Yet cases like the Western Shoshone
demonstrate the limits of the Inter-American system (at least as it is currently
structured) in providing lasting remedies to indigenous peoples. These limita-
tions have substantial consequences for indigenous peoples who are already
struggling to survive on the edges of society.
C. State Systems
This is not to say that all states are ignoring the important changes which
are occurring regionally and internationally. States throughout the Americas,
and the world for that matter, are well aware of the momentum that has been
created in the area of indigenous rights and international law and are responding
through their own systems of law, again with varying degrees of success. This
section will highlight some of those changes, from constitutional and legislative
reform to negotiated settlements. However, not all of these changes have led to
improved conditions for indigenous peoples, even within states that have taken
substantial steps to conform domestic law to international law and practice.
Thus this section will also explore some of the shortcomings implicit in any
process that leaves resolution of indigenous self-determination claims to states
without proper regional or international oversight.
In Latin America during the '80s and '90s many countries amended their
constitutions in ways that offered greater protection to the rights of indigenous
peoples.97 Of all the constitutional changes Colombia's is perhaps the most
comprehensive providing for the right of self-government within indigenous
territories, which includes among other things, the right to administer justice,
levy taxes, and regulate resources.98 This decentralized system of government
places control at the community level allowing for self-determination to take
hold in accordance with indigenous customs and traditions. With respect to
natural resource development by the state, the indigenous communities are
guaranteed the right of meaningful consultation and protection against further
97. See, e.g., Anaya & Willams, supra note 62 at 59-64; Wiessner, supra note 96, at 74-89.
98. CONSTrrUCION POLMCA arts. 246-47, 285-87 (Colon.).
derogation of their economic, social, and cultural integrity rights.9 9 It similarly
provides protection for the cultural identity and diversity of Colombia's
indigenous peoples, through such things as the recognition of Native languages
and control over education." Unfortunately, Colombia's civil war has pre-
vented indigenous peoples from realizing most of these rights.
Many other Latin American countries have taken constitutional steps to
protect the political, social, economic, and cultural rights of indigenous peoples,
each with a varying degree of success often tied to the larger political and
economic stability of the country. For instance, the 1998 Ecuadorian Constitu-
tion recognizes the collective rights of indigenous people to "maintain and
develop their spiritual, cultural, linguistic, social, political and economic tradi-
tions," including protection of their community lands from seizure or taxation.° 1
Like the Colombian constitution, the indigenous peoples of Ecuador have the
right to be consulted regarding non-renewable resource exploration and
exploitation and to benefit from those activities. They also retain certain rights
to renewable resources found on their lands and to the promotion of indigenous
"bio-diversity management, traditional forms of social organizations, and
collective intellectual property."'' 0 2 With respect to self-government, Article 224
provides for the establishment of indigenous territorial districts with the
eventual development of "autonomous [governing] entities."1"3 Yet political
unrest and economic degradation, particularly in Ecuador's Amazon region,
continue to threaten the cultural and economic traditions of Ecuador's
indigenous peoples. It similarly struggles with the issues of under-representa-
tion of indigenous groups in national and regional politics." 4
Nicaragua is yet another example of a country that has undergone major
legal reform that has yet to be realized in practice. The Nicaraguan Constitution
guarantees, among other things, the land and resource rights of indigenous
peoples based on their traditional and customary patterns of use and occu-
pancy.' 05 Legislation adopted in 1987 went even further, establishing autonom-
ous political regions for the indigenous communities of the Atlantic Coast. 1
06
99. Id. at art. 330.
100. Id. at art. 246.
101. CONSTITUCION Ch. 5, art. 84 (Ecuador).
102. See Anaya & Williams, supra note 62, at 62.
103. CONSTITUCION art. 225 (Ecuador).
104. Inter-American Comm. on Hum. Rts., Report on the Situation in Ecuador, OEA/Ser.L/V/I.96,
Doc. 10 rev. 1, Apr. 24, 1997, at http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/ecuador-englindex%20-%20ecuador
.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
105. CONSTITUTION POLrICA arts. 89, 180 (Nicar.).
106. See Autonomy Statute for the Regions of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua, Law No. 28, Chap.
2, arts. 6-9, at http://translate.google.conL/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=http://www.csd.gob.ni/autonomiaca
.htm&prev=/search%3Fq%3DEstatuto%2Bde%2Ba%2Bautonom%25C3%25ADa%2Bpara%2Ba%2Bre
gi%25C3%25B3n%2Bde%2Bla%2Bcosta%2Batl%25C3%25A1 ntica%2Bde%2BNicaragua%26hl%3Den
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However, the Awas Tingni case demonstrates Nicaragua's failure to implement
these constitutional and legislative changes, most notably in its refusal to
demarcate and protect indigenous lands and culture.
One place outside Latin America where constitutional reform has made a
difference in some cases is Canada.'t 7 A well-known example is the 1993
Nunavut Land Claims Agreement between the Inuit people and the Canadian
government. 10 8 The Premier of Nunavut has stated that prior to the passage of
%261r%3D%26ie%3DUTF-8%26oe%3DUTF-8 (last visited Mar. 18, 2004); see also CONSTITUCION
POLITICA art. 181 (Nicar.).
107. In the 1980's Canada underwent important constitutional reform, which included added protec-
tions for the rights of Canada's aboriginal peoples. See generally, Anaya & Williams, supra note 62, at 65;
Wiessner, supra note 96, at 66-71. The 1982 Constitution Act recognized and affirmed "The existing
aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada." Can. Const. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. n1
(Rights of Aboriginal Peoples of Canada), sec. 35(1). In addition, Section 25 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms recognized that the rights and freedoms articulated therein "shall not be construed as
to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal
people of Canada." While the Constitution does not expressly discuss indigenous self-government or political
self-determination, such rights are an inherent part of the aboriginal and treaty rights recognized under the
Constitution. Realization of aboriginal or treaty rights to lands and resources, to improved socio-economic
conditions, and to cultural survival is all inextricably linked to the ability of indigenous peoples to govern
themselves and to determine their own destiny in accordance with their traditions and cultures.
108. See Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her Majesty the Queen
in right of Canada, athttp://www.tunngavik.comlsite-eng/nlca/nlca.htm. (last visited Mar. 17, 2004). The story
of the Inuit people and their encounter with the Europeans is a familiar one. See Premier Paul Okalik,
Nunavut-North America's Newest Democracy, available at http://www.gov.nu.calNunavut/English/premier/
press/nand.shtml (last visited Mar. 17, 2004). Europeans began to arrive in what is now Nunavut in the 1600s,
looking for a passage to Asia. What they found were small nomadic villages that followed the migration
routes of the caribou and other animal herds. They were a self-governing people who managed their own
lands and resources according to their own laws and customs. And while encounter brought changes in their
lives, they held fast to their way of life until the early 1960s when the Canadian government decided to move
the Inuit from a land-based economy to a community-based one. It was then that most of the cultural upheaval
occurred, as the Inuit people were forced to adopt a foreign system of government and lost control over their
lands and resources. However, the 1970s brought about renewed activism and interest in indigenous rights
leading to a number of aboriginal groups being formed in Canada, particularly around the issue of land and
resources. In 1971 a national Inuit organization was formed to protect the interest and rights of the Inuit
people. This renewed interest in the protection of indigenous rights was aided by a number of important court
decisions, most notably Calder v. Attorney General for British Columbia, in which three of the seven judges
supported the claims of the Nisga'a people regarding their aboriginal ownership of lands. Although the
Nisga'a Indians technically lost the case, with three judges concluding that their rights hand been extinguished
and one dismissing on procedural grounds, it signaled a change in the Court's thinking on aboriginal rights.
This provided the impetus necessary to push the Canadian government toward negotiation of outstanding
aboriginal claims. It was during this time that the Inuit began to push for recognition both of their self-
governing rights and their rights to land and resources. In 1975, they presented a draft land claims agreement
to the Canadian government and open discussions regarding the establishment of a public government.
However, it wasn't until 1982, with the passage of the Constitution Act and Charter that things really began
to change for the Inuit people. As earlier noted, these constitutional changes offered a measure of legal
security for the Inuit people which allowed for them to move forward with settlement. In 1985, the federal
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the 1982 Canadian Constitutional Act there was "little incentive to negotiate and
sign a land claims when a subsequent government had the power to overturn
that agreement, if it so chose."1" The Land Claims Agreement provides for
"constitutionally-protected rights to land, money, renewable resources, and
social and political development."" 0  The Agreement also establishes an
arbitration board to resolve certain claims arising under the agreement. The
most well known aspect of the agreement, however, was the eventual establish-
ment of Nunavut, a new Canadian territory. The Inuit people chose to exercise
their right to self-determination through a public government structure. Yet
eighty-five percent of the population of Nunavut is Inuit and, not surprisingly,
Inuit worldviews have strongly influenced government operations and policies.
Other First Nations have negotiated agreements with Canada that similarly
provide for a measure of self-government and control over lands and resources.
Each accord varies, depending on the circumstances and needs of individual
nations. For instance, the Sechelt Indian Band in British Columbia chose a
municipal form of government under the Sechelt Self-Government Act,"' which
transfers certain local powers to the band as well as ownership rights to some
2500 acres of original reserve land. Other powers, such as police and court,
remain with the federal government. Another example would be the Nisga'a
Final Agreement,1 2 which establishes ownership and self-government rights to
some 1900 square kilometers of land in the lower Nass Valley of British
Columbia. This includes all subsurface and timber resources located on those
lands, as well as a host of other rights relating to wildlife and fisheries. In terms
of self-government, the agreement provides for the establishment of a central
government and four village governments and includes the right to police
themselves and establish their own court systems. Individuals who are not
Nisga'a citizens, but who lived on Nisga'a lands, have the right to be consulted
or participate in some capacity regarding decisions that affect their rights. Their
rights are similarly protected by the Canadian Constitution and the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
The above examples demonstrate that Canada has had some success in
addressing the self-determining right of aboriginal peoples through treaty-type
negotiations and agreements. This process has been greatly aided not only by
government announced its support for a new northern territory providing the last important component to the
realization of the Inuit peoples' right to self-determination.
109. Paul Okalik, Nunavut-North America's Newest Democracy, Dec. 3, 2001, at 4, available at
http://www.gov.nu.ca/Nunavut/English/premier/press/nand.shtml (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
110. Id.
111. Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act, [1986, c. 27], available at Sechelt Indian Band Self-
Government Act, c. 27 (1986), available at http://www.canlii.org/ca/sta/s-6.6/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
112. See Nisga Final Agreement, at http:llwww.ainc-inac.gc.calpr/agr/nsgalnisgafb-e.html (last
visited Feb. 25, 2004).
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the constitutionalization of indigenous rights but by the willingness of the
Supreme Court to begin to adapt Canadian law to contemporary human rights
law on indigenous peoples. Yet there are still a number of outstanding claims
in Canada, many of which are stalled as a result of an inability to reach
agreement regarding the control of natural resources and development. Lubicon
Lake, discussed earlier, is a perfect example."3 Situations like that of Lubicon
Lake, and even some of the cases in Latin America, would benefit tremendously
from the establishment of an international body that was empowered to mediate
claims that have failed to reach a negotiated settlement within a given period of
time. This proposal is discussed in more detail in the final section of this paper.
Similar issues arise in the context of the United States, which has officially
recognized and supported the policy of self-determination since the 1970s." 4
The United States has, in the past twenty years, negotiated new land and self-
government agreements with a number of indigenous nations." 5 Yet a major
shortcoming of these negotiated settlements is that US domestic law is so
lopsided in favor of federal "plenary power" that this may have precluded a fair
and balanced settlement with respect to the rights of certain tribes." 6 This is
especially true if the tribe was claming rights to lands rich in natural
113. See Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication No. 167/184 (March 1990), U.N. Doc.
Supp. No. 40 (A/45/40) at 1 (1990).
114. Since the early 1970s, the legislative and executive branches of the United States government
has recognized and supported a policy of self-determination for indigenous nations or Indian tribes located
within its exterior borders. However, this has not always been the case. Between 1778 and 1871 the United
States entered into some 800 treaties with Indian nations, about half of which were ratified by the Senate.
These treaties, at least in the eyes of Native nations, were considered solemn, government-to-government
exchanges designed to ensure the sovereign rights of tribes to their lands and territories. However, formal
treaty making with tribes ended in 1871 and with the push westward increased pressure was placed on Indian
nations to "assimilate" and adopt the ways of the dominant society. Perhaps the worst of the federal policies
during this time with respect to the self-determining rights of Indian nations was the allotment policy which
promoted the break up of communal land into individual parcels and the sale of so-called "excess" land to
non-Indians. 1934 ushered in a new era of self-government for tribes in the United States with the passage
of the Indian Reorganization Act. This law was designed to improve the deplorable economic conditions of
tribes and their citizens by supporting tribal self-government. However, by the 1940s we were seeing a
reversal of this support for tribal self-government toward policy of termination. It was during this time that
the Indian Claims Commission Act took effect, creating a special forum for the settlement of indigenous group
claims against the United States. While the ICC could have been a useful mechanism for bringing justice to
the indigenous peoples of the United States for violations of their aboriginal and treaty rights, it was from the
outset tainted by the policy of termination. The 1970s were a turning point in federal/Indian relations, with
the adoption of the policy of self-determination. This has been accomplished through a series of laws that
touch upon key aspects of the right to indigenous self-determination, such as education, Indian child welfare,
cultural rights, self-government, and economic development.
115. See, Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1778h (2003).
116. In addition, current federal practice does not always conform itself to either domestic or
international norms on the rights of indigenous peoples, as evidenced by the recent Inter-Commission decision
involving the Western Shoshone.
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resources."' Perhaps even more disturbing is the recent trend in the United
States Supreme Court to cut back on the self-determining rights of tribes within
their own sovereign borders."' Indian nations in the United States retain and
exercise a large degree of self-determination perhaps more so than any other
country where indigenous peoples reside. However, since these rights have
been subject to legislative and judicial abrogation, indigenous nations in the
United States are in a very precarious situation, always uncertain of what future
policies or decisions may bring their way. An international forum for exploring
and resolving indigenous claims to self-determination could be a valuable tool
for United States tribes, if for no other reason than it would help to level the
playing field somewhat." 9
D. United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues
One such forum that might be able to assume that responsibility in the
future is the newly created United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous
Issues. 2 A discussion regarding the creation of this forum began at the Vienna
117. Compare Maine Indian Claims Settlement, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-1735 (2003) with Connecticut
Indian Land Claims Settlement, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1760 (2003).
118. The United States Constitution denotes Indian tribes as one of three types of sovereigns that
Congress has the power to regulate commerce with, and while one might think that such constitutional
recognition would include the right not to interfere with the internal affairs of a tribe, the courts to date have
not read such a limitation into the United States commerce clause. Long ago the United States Supreme Court
proclaimed Indian nations to be "domestic dependent nations," whose powers are subject to the "plenary
power" of Congress. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). According to the U.S. Supreme Court, Congress has both the power to
abrogate treaties with Indian nations and pass laws that affect their internal rights and interests so long as those
laws are rationally related to Congress' unique trust obligation toward tribes. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535 (1974). Thus, unlike the situation that now exists in Canada, the rights of indigenous peoples
in the United States have never been constitutionalized, at least not to point where they are insulated from
legislative or judicial reform. Yet during the early years of the self-determination, the US Supreme Court
advanced a rather robust definition of tribal sovereignty. It reaffirmed their status as self-governing political
entities with distinct sovereign powers, such as the power to raise revenue, enact and enforce laws, remedy
disputes, and conduct government-to-government relations with the US and other domestic governmental
bodies. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n,
411 U.S. 164 (1973). The Court also recognized an important limit on the exercise of the federal govern-
ment's plenary power, stating that the power was "not absolute" but rather needed be judged against the
federal government's unique trust obligation toward Indian nations. See, e.g., Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm.
v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977). Yet in the last few years the US Supreme Court has been moving in the
opposite direction providing less protection to tribes and actively engaging in what some have referred to as
"judicial termination." See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
119. The problem of course lies with getting countries like the United States to sign on to such a
process. As earlier noted, an important step would be to reach some agreement on the UN draft declaration,
particularly around the issue of what the right of self-determination entails for Native peoples.
120. For more information on the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, see
http://www.unhchr.ch/indigenous/ind-pfii.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2004). Any process designed to resolve
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Conference on Human Rights and, after many years of consultation with
indigenous groups, was finally established by the Economic and Social Council
in 2002. The Forum provides advice and information to the Council on indigen-
ous issues relating to "economic and social development, culture, the environ-
ment, education, health and human rights.'' More specifically, it is empow-
ered to:
"provide expert advice and recommendations on indigenous
issues to the Council, as well as to programmes, funds and
agencies of the United Nations... [;]"
indigenous claims to self-determination should keep the following two things in mind: First, it is important
to create a space in which native peoples voices can be heard. Secondly, in formulating such a process it
would be valuable to look not just at existing western processes but also at indigenous processes involving
dispute resolution. Many state and international processes through procedural or evidentiary requirements
have excluded valuable information and suppressed indigenous voices. Yet resolution of indigenous claims
to self-determination cannot come about without taking into account both the historical realities and the goals
and aspirations of Native peoples. The processes of storytelling and listening cannot be undervalued as
means of collecting this information and creating pathways to justice. Recall, for instance, the case involving
the Western Shoshone and two of its tribal members, Carrie and Mary Dann before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. The case reached a regional human rights body because there was no
competent domestic forum in which the Shoshone and other Indian nations could articulate their own stories
regarding the historical and contemporary wrongs committed by the United States government. And it is not
only in domestic processes that this is akn issue. It has come up for instance in the context of discussions
regarding the UN Draft Declaration, in particular around Article 36 which deals with the recognition and
enforceability of Indian treaties and other related agreements. Article 36 provides for the enforceability of
treaties in accordance with "their original spirit and intent," which means looking beyond the text to other
relevant information that would help shed light on what the parties intended when they signed the agreement.
Some states have advocated for the removal of this language, despite objections from indigenous groups that
such a change might preclude indigenous knowledge such as oral history from being considered in the
interpretative process. See Informal Consultations 2002, supra note 25. Cf. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1110. (Supreme Court of Canada overturned a lower court's ruling on the inadmissibility of
oral history to establish aboriginal land occupancy. The Court further noted that in relation to the disposition
of indigenous lands and resources there "is always a duty of consultation..." And in some cases this duty
"will be significantly deeper than mere consultation." It may "require the full consent of an aboriginal
nation."). This brings us to the second issue regarding the value of exploring indigenous processes to ensure
that the self-determination mechanisms provide the greatest opportunity for indigenous participation and input.
An extensive exploration of the key aspects of these processes may be helpful in ensuring meaningful
participation. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to undertake such an examination, one ancient method
of dispute resolution that might be looked at is tribal peacemaking. While the process varies from nation to
nation depending on custom and culture, tribal peacemaking in general entails a "form of horizontal justice"
in which non-adversarial strategies are employed to bring about "conciliation and the restoration of peace and
harmony." See William Bradford, "With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts": Reparations, Reconciliation,
and An American Indian Plea for Peace and Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 164 (2002); see also Phyllis
Bernard, Community and Conscience: the Dynamic Challenge of Lawyers' Ethics in Tribal Peacemaking, 27
U. TOL. L. REV. 821 (1996).
121. See supra note 120, United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, at http://www
.unhchr.ch/indigenous/indpfii.htm. (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
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" "raise awareness and promote the integration and coordination
of activities related to indigenous issues within the UN system
[;]" and
" "prepare and disseminate information on indigenous issues."
The Forum is made up of sixteen members, eight of whom are nominated
by governments and elected by ECOSOC, and eight of whom are appointed by
the President of ECOSOC following formal consultations with governments on
the basis of consultations with indigenous representatives. Each member serves
in his or her personal capacity as an independent expert for a term of three
years. One of the most positive attributes of the new forum is its level of
openness. For instance, when the Permanent Forum held its first annual session
in May of 2002, over 1000 indigenous representatives from around the world
were present. The 2003 session was attended by some 1,800 individuals from
500 different indigenous nations and organizations. Over seventy states and a
number of UN agencies including the World Bank also participated in the
session.
In 2003, the Forum did debate whether to make indigenous self-determina-
tion the focus of its 2004 annual session. Ultimately, the Forum tabled that
issue for another year, deciding instead to focus on the rights of indigenous
women. Given the Forum's reluctance to tackle the self-determination issue, the
question remains how useful it will be, or can be, in resolving these types of
claims. The fact that a permanent forum even exists in the UN is an important
first step. Not only does it create a mechanism for allowing indigenous peoples
to participate in formal decision-making at the UN, it also sends a message that
indigenous issues are matters of international (and not just domestic) impor-
tance. Additionally, the Forum's mandate appears broad enough to allow for
the development of future procedures designed to address issues that directly
affect the self-determining rights of indigenous peoples. Indeed, many of the
issues that the Forum is charged with addressing-economic and social
development, culture, the environment, education, health, and human rights-
encompass key aspects of indigenous self-determination. Yet it is too early in
the Forum's history to know exactly what particular functions or levels of
processes it will assume in relation to the realization of this right. The next
section offers some thoughts on what role the Forum might play in the future
resolution of these claims.'22
122. The Forum is not the only UN non-treaty based process available to indigenous peoples. Other
processes beyond the Permanent Forum include the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, which
is charged both with standard-setting duties as well as the task of reviewing national developments regarding
the promotion and protection of indigenous peoples' rights. See Fact Sheet No. 9 (Rev. 1), The Rights of Indi-
genous Peoples, Introduction at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs9.htm. (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
Although the Working Group's mandate does not authorize it to examine specific complaints, some have
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V. SUMMARY
An abundance of activity around indigenous peoples' rights has unfolded
at the UN and elsewhere during the last 25 years, culminating in the creation of
a Permanent Forum. The question that remains then, is whether these processes
are sufficient to address disputes over indigenous self-determination or whether
something more can be done to help bring about the realization of the norms
associated with that right. None of the processes reviewed thus far are designed
specifically to hear claims of self-determination and many, like the Human
Rights Committee and the Inter-American Commission, have foreclosed the
possibility of an indigenous group invoking that principle directly. Addi-
tionally, state constitutions or agreements generally do not reference the right.
Yet the norms that surround indigenous self-determination--control of lands
and resources, protection of culture, social and economic development, and
some form of autonomy or self-governance-have been the focal points of
many of the claims that have worked themselves through domestic, regional,
and international channels. Thus, self-determination, as a practical matter, has
been at the heart of most of these cases even if the term itself has been rarely
invoked.
In terms of the success of the various processes in resolving actual
disputes, there appears to be no single factor that is likely to bring about a
resolution. Yet the above cases do suggest some common factors that seem to
aid the process:
" increased activism and mobilization by indigenous groups;
• domestic constitutional (and judicial) reform that recognizes
and solidifies the rights of indigenous peoples;
suggested that "an informal complaint procedure has emerged de facto in the deliberations of the UN Working
Group." ANAYA, supra note 5, at 159. This is due in part to the openness of the Working Group's public
sessions, in which indigenous communities and organizations are allowed to speak freely and offer written
submissions for further consideration. Id. The Working Group also receives written material from govern-
ments, specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations and NGOs, and can conduct visits to individual
countries to gain to collect and disseminate information. In addition to the Working Group a number of
studies have been prepared for the Economic and Social Council on key issues affecting indigenous peoples,
such as the study on treaties and agreements with indigenous peoples and the study on the protection of the
heritage of indigenous peoples. See Fact Sheet No. 9 (Rev. 1), The Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Introduction,
at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs9.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2004). More recently a Special
Rapporteur was appointed by the Commission on Human Rights to study "the situation of the human rights
and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people." See ANAYA, supra note 5. The Special Rapporteur's
mandate includes, among other things, the power to receive information and communications on alleged indi-
genous human rights violations, to conduct fact-finding missions relating to those violations, and to formulate
recommendations on measures that can be taken to prevent and remedy those violations. Additional
complaint procedures that have been utilized by indigenous groups to address alleged violations of human
rights include ECOSOC Resolutions 1235 and 1503 procedures. See ANAYA, supra note 5, at 160-61.
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" a state's willingness to partake in meaningful dialogue, particu-
larly on such thorny issues as control of land and resources;
* and some type of quasi-judicial/mediation procedure to ensure
a proper balance of power among the parties, especially in the
area of follow-through.
Another consistent theme that seems to emerge in many of the cases
previously discussed is the usefulness of negotiated settlements. States seem
more amenable to such a process and, if done in a manner respectful of
indigenous views and objectives, it creates the space necessary to ensure that all
interested parties have a voice in the final agreement. Additionally, a negotia-
tion model seems better suited to address the many complexities that surround
indigenous claims to self-determination. However, many of the cases also
suggest that negotiated settlements without sustained regional or international
oversight may prove to be difficult.
This brings us back to the issue of the Permanent Forum and what role it
could play in the future resolution of indigenous claims to self-determination.
As currently formulated, the Forum has the power to provide "advice" and
"information" on indigenous issues. However, indigenous groups would be
better served by the creation of a formal mediation or even perhaps an
arbitration mechanism within the Forum itself. The body could be charged with
several functions, such as assisting with the drafting of bilateral agreements or
serving as formal mediator, particularly where bilateral talks have failed to bring
about a timely resolution. The difficulty, of course, lies with getting parties to
partake in such a forum. Perhaps they would be more amenable to such a
process, if it lacked binding authority as is the case with the UN Human Rights
Committee. Then again, such a body may suffer from the same deficiencies as
other UN human rights mechanisms. 123 In the beginning it would be helpful to
make the process voluntary and even non-binding until states and indigenous
nations are comfortable with the Forum's ability to resolve such claims in a fair
and objective manner. Ultimately, however, it may be useful to institute a
binding dispute resolution mechanism that steps in and resolves or helps to
resolve claims that have not been settled within a reasonable period of time.
The Forum would be empowered to issue binding decisions, including
articulating appropriate remedies for addressing both past and ongoing
violations of the right to self-determination.
In closing, the late Ingrid Washinawatok once wrote that the United
Nations is a place of talk and discussion, not necessarily a place of resolution.'24
123. Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement Mechanisms,
15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 183 (2002).
124. Ingrid Washinawatok, International Emergence: Twenty Years at the UnitedNations, 14 NATIVE
AMERICAS 13 (1997).
2004]
420 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 10:385
The struggle for indigenous peoples then is how to transform this system into
one that not only "talks about" justice, but also "dispenses" it. An international
self-determination forum that is designed to assist in the negotiation of claims
between indigenous peoples and nation-states would be a step in the right
direction. A structure for such a forum has already begun to unfold with the
creation of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. Yet the scope of the
Forum's powers as it relates to the development of agreements between these
two parties will need to be clarified. In terms of the substantive rights that will
inform such a dialogue, many have already been articulated in various
international and regional human rights instruments and through state practices,
and can be further clarified and enhanced with the adoption of the UN Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The right to self-determination of peoples, alongside the equality of
nations, large and small, has been recognized as a basic norm of international
law. It is mentioned in the Charter of the United Nations,' and has been
afforded a special place of prominence in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' and in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.3 It features prominently in the United Nations
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples of 19604 and the Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations of 1970.' On the regional level, it has
been endorsed by no less than the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.6
II. THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
There are few concepts in international law that have been distorted as
much as the right to self-determination in attempts to afford credibility to group-
* Johan D. van der Vyver is I.T. Cohen Professor of International Law and Human Rights at
Emory University School of Law.
1. U.N. CHARTER arts. 15 and 73 [hereafter U.N. Charter].
2. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1,999 U.N.T.S. 171.
4. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res.
1414, U.N. GAOR, 1 th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
5. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR,
25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
6. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, para. VIII, 14 I.L.M. 1292
(1975).
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related aspirations. This is partly due to the fact that the right to self-determina-
tion over time acquired different shades of meaning that are not always clearly
distinguished or evaluated in their proper historical context.
The idea of a right to self-determination of peoples originally emerged
from socialist economic thought. Lenin (1870-1924) and Joseph Stalin (1879-
1953) invented the concept in the early parts of the twentieth century to explain
the standing of political communities within the over-arching and universal
economic structures of communism. 7  The prominence of the right to self-
determination in international law has been attributed to the American President,
Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924), whose Fourteen Point Address of January 8,
1918 has been cited as "transforming self-determination into a universal right."8
President Wilson included in those Fourteen Points one that proclaimed, "[a]
free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims,
based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such
questions of sovereignty the interests of the population concerned must have
equal weight with the equitable claims of government whose title is to be
determined." 9 This statement has come to be regarded as the basis of the
League of Nations policy for dealing with the subordinate communities of the
world empires that were defeated and dissolved through World War I.1°
The substance of the right to self-determination has not remained static.
In fact, four quite different meanings of the right to self-determination can be
distinguished, depending in each instance on the nature and disposition of the
peoples claiming that right."
7. According to Antonio Cassese, "the first forceful proponent of the concept [of self-
determination] at the international level" was Lenin. See A. CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES:
A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 15 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1995). Earlier, Joseph Stalin had written a detailed
pamphlet on self-determination, entitled: Marxism and the National Question (1913). See CASSESE, op. cit.,
at 14. But, according to Cassese, Lenin's Thesis on the Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-
Determination, published in March 1916, contained "the first compelling enunciation of the principle" of self-
determination of peoples.
8. Robert Friedlander, Self-Determination: A Legal-Political Inquiry, 1 MICH. ST. DCL L REV.
71, 73 (1975).
9. Fourteen Points Address delivered on January 8, 1918 to a joint session of Congress by
President Woodrow Wilson, Point 5. See 1 PUB. PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON: WAR AND PEACE, at 155-59
(eds. R.S. Baker & W.E. Dodd. New York/London: Harper & Brs. 1927).
10. V. VAN DYKE, HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITED STATES, AND WORLD COMMUNITY 86 (New York:
Oxford Univ. Press 1970).
11. See Johan D. van der Vyver, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Constitutional and International
Law, 5 EMORY INTL L. REV. 321, 395-416 (1991); Johan D. van der Vyver, Self-Determination and the
Peoples of Quebec, 10 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 14-19 (2000); JOHAN VAN DER VYVER, Self-Deter-
mination and the Right to Secession of Religious Minorities under International Law, in PROTECTION THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 251,258-61 (Peter G Dachin & Elizabeth A.
Cole. eds., Colum. Univ. Press 2002); J.D. van der Vyver, Cultural Identity as a Constitutional Right in South
Africa, 14 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 51, 53-56, 58 (2003).
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Initially, when World War I was drawing to a close, the idea of self-
determination of peoples was advanced to legitimize the disintegration of the
Ottoman, German, Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires," and within that
context the right to self-determination vested in "ethnic communities, nations
or nationalities primarily defined by language or culture" whose right to disrupt
existing States derived justification from its substantive directive:13 self-
determination here denoted the right of "peoples" in the sense of (territorially
defined) nations to political independence.' 4
Following World War II, the emphasis of the concept of self-determination
shifted to the principle "of bringing all colonial situations to a speedy end,"15 the
repositories of the concerned right in this sense were colonized peoples, and the
substance of their right denoted political independence "of peoples that do not
govern themselves, particularly peoples dominated by geographical distant
colonial powers."16
12. See A. CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 131-34 (Oxford: Clarendon Press
1986); Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination, 66 AM. J. INTL L. 459, 463 (1971); Friedlander, supra note 8,
at 71.
13. Nathaniel Berman, Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and International Law, 7 WIS.
INT'L L.J. 51, 86-87 (1988).
14. It should be noted, though, that even then secession from existing empires was not a right in
itself. In the advisory opinion of the International Committee of Jurists in the Aaland Island Case it was
pointed out that "the right of disposing of national territory" was essentially an attribute of sovereignty and
that "Positive International Law does not recognize the right of national groups, as such, to separate
themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple expression of a wish, any more than it
recognizes the right of other States to claim such a separation." Report of the International Committee of
Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon
the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question, LEAGUE OF NATIONS 0. J. (Supp. 3) at 5 (1920). It was only
when "the formation, transformation and dismemberment of States as a result of revolutions and wars create
situations of fact which, to a large extent, cannot be met by applying the normal rules of positive law" that
"peoples" may either decide to form an independent State or choose between two existing ones. Id. at 6. In
such circumstances, when sovereignty has been disrupted, "the principle of self-determination of peoples may
be called into play": new aspirations of certain sections of a nation, which are sometimes based on old
traditions or on a common language and civilization, may surface and produce effects which must be taken
into account in the interests of the internal and external peace of nations. Id.
15. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 1, 31 (May 22); see also Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31 (June 21) (holding that the right to self-determination was appli-
cable to "territories under colonial rule" and that it "embraces all peoples and territories which 'have not yet
attained independence').
16. Berman, supra note 13, at 54. See also CASSESE, supra note 12, at para. 43, at 76; VAN DYKE,
supra note 10, at 87; Lynn Berat, The Evolution of Self-Determination in International Law: South Africa and
Namibia, and the Case of Walvis Bay, 4 EMORY INT'L L REV. 251, 283 (1990) (referring to self-determination
and the equal right of peoples as "twin aspects of decolonization"); Emerson, supra note 12, at 463; 0.
Schachter, The United Nations and Internal Conflict, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 401,
406-07 (J.N. Moore ed., John Hopkins Press 1974); G. Tesfagiorgis, Self-Determination: Its Evolution and
Practice by the United Nations and its Application in the Case of Eritrea, 6 WiS. INT'L L.J. 75, 78-80 (1987).
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In the 1960's, yet another category of "peoples" came to be identified,
namely those subject to racist regimes, and here the concept substantively
signified the right of such peoples to participate in the structures of government
within the countries to which they belong: 17 the "self' in self-determination was
no longer perceived to be territorially defined sections of the population in
multinational empires, and did not only comprise peoples under colonial rule or
foreign domination, but also came to be identified with the entire community of
a territory where the social, economic, and constitutional system was structured
on institutionally sanctioned racial discrimination.18
Finally, the right to self-determination has been extended to national or
ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities within a political community whose
particular entitlements are centered upon a right to live according to the tradi-
tions and customs of the concerned group. In terms of the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, self-determination as currently perceived thus entails the
following principle: "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the
right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own langu-
age.' 9
The Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities similarly speaks of "the right [of national
or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities] to enjoy their own culture, to pro-
fess and practice their own religion, and to use their own language, in private
and in public, freely and without interference or any form of discrimination."20
17. The linkage within the confines of the right to self-determination of systems of institutionalized
racism and colonialism or foreign domination may be traced to the United Nations General Assembly's
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their
Independence and Sovereignty of 1965, in which the United Nations demanded of all States to respect "the
right to self-determination and independence of peoples and nations, to be freely exercised without any foreign
pressure, and with absolute respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms," and to this end proclaimed
that "all States shall contribute to the complete elimination of racial discrimination and colonialism in all its
forms and manifestations." Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the DomesticAffairs of States
and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp.
No. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
18. This development was probably prompted by the claim of South Africa that the establishment
of independent tribal homelands as part of the apartheid policy constituted a manifestation of the right to self-
determination of the different ethnic groups within the country's African population. Not so, responded the
international community. The tribal homelands were a creation of the minority (white) regime and did not
emerge from the wishes, or political self-determination, of the denationalized peoples themselves.
19. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 3, at art. 27; see generally Felix
Ermacora, The Protection of Minorities Before the United Nations, IV RECUEIL DES COURs 246 (1983).
20. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/136, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 210, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/135 (1992).
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The repositories of a right to self-determination are "peoples." According
to Yorum Dinstein, peoplehood comprises two elements: an objective
component, designated by the factual contingencies upon which the unity of the
group depends; and a subjective component, constituted by a certain state of
mind-the consciousness of belonging, and perhaps the will to be associated
with the group.2'
The concept of "peoples" is not territorially defined. On September 30,
1996, the Governor in Council of Canada referred numerous questions pertinent
to the secessionist policy of Quebec's ruling Party to the Supreme Court of
Canada for its opinion.2 Those questions included one inquiring whether or not
there is a right to self-determination under international law that would give the
National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec the right to effect
secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally. The Canadian Supreme Court
for several reasons answered this question in the negative.23 It should be evident
to everyone that the inhabitants of Quebec, being composed of a variety of
ethnic or cultural, religious and linguistic population groups, do not constitute
a people as defined in international law, and for that reason alone cannot claim
a right to self-determination. Sections of the population of Quebec, united by
a common ethnic extraction, cultural heritage, religious affiliation, or linguistic
preference could of course lament the denial of their right to self-determination
on the grounds that they are not permitted to accede to a life-style dictated by
their national or ethnic, religious or linguistic identities. But that is defacto not
the case-at least not as far as (Francophone) Quebecois are concerned.
In virtue of the right to self-determination, governments, through their
respective constitutional and legal systems, are required to secure the interests
of distinct sections of the population that constitute minorities in the above
sense. The Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities clearly spells out that obligation:
protect, and encourage conditions for the promotion of, the concerned group
identities of minorities under the jurisdiction of the duty-bound State;24 afford
to minorities the special competence to participate effectively in decisions
pertinent to the group to which they belong;25 do not discriminate in any way
against any person on basis of his/her group identity,26 and in fact take action to
21. Yoram Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25 INT'L L. Q. 102, 103
(1976).
22. REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
23. Id.; see also van der Vyver, Self-Determination and the Peoples of Quebec, supra note 11.
24. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
Minorities, supra note 20, at arts. 1.1 and 4.2.
25. Id. at art. 2.3.
26. Id. at art. 3.
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secure their equal treatment by and before the law. The Declaration further
provides that, "[sitates shall take measures to create favorable conditions to
enable persons belonging to minorities to express their characteristics and to
develop their culture, language, religion, traditions, and customs, except where
specific practices are in violation of national law and contrary to international
standards. 28
It is submitted that the national-law limitation is to be conditioned by the
international-standards criterion: it presupposes municipal regulation that
remains within the confines of international standards and does not place undue
restrictions upon the group interests of minorities.
The Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities specified minority rights in much the same vein: it
guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws;29 States
Parties promise to provide, "the conditions necessary for persons belonging to
national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the
essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions
and cultural heritage."3 States Parties recognize the right of persons belonging
to a national minority, "to manifest his or her religion or belief and to establish
religious institutions, organizations and associations," 31 and the Framework
Convention guarantees the use of minority languages, in private and in public,
orally and in writing. 32
Failure of national systems to provide such protection to sectional interests
of peoples within their area of jurisdiction, or merely the perception of being
marginalized, must be seen as an important contributing cause of the tireless
aspirations toward the establishment of homogenous States for sections of the
political community with a strong group consciousness: the Muslim community
of Kashmir, the Basques in Northern Spain, the Hindu factions in Sri Lanka, the
Catholic minority in Northern Ireland, the Christian community in Southern
Sudan, the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, people of Macedonian extraction in
Florina (Northern Greece), and many others.
27. Id. at art. 4.1.
28. Id. at art. 4.2.
29. European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, art. 4.1., 1995 E.T.S.
157, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 35 (1995).
30. Id. at art. 5.1.
31. Id. at art. 8.
32. Id. at art. 10.1; see also the European Charter for Regional Minority Languages, 1992 E.T.S.
148 (1992), available at www.conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/148.htm (last visited Feb. 18,
2004).
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ll. SELF-DETERMINATION AND A RIGHT TO SECESSION
It must be emphasized, though, that the right of peoples to self-determina-
tion does not include a right to secession.33 Not even in instances where the
powers that be act in breach of a minority's legitimate expectations. Three
compelling arguments are decisive in this regard:
" The right to self-determination is almost invariably mentioned
in conjunction with the territorial integrity of States, 34 and
reconciling the two principles in question necessarily means
that self-determination must be taken to denote something less
than secession.
" The right to self-determination vests in a people, while a new
State created through secession is essentially territorially
defined3" (it is a defined territory that secedes from an existing
State and not a people).36
" The right to self-determination is a collective group right
(entitlements included in that right can be exercised by individ-
ual members of the concerned group, either individually or
collectively) while a right to secede is an institutional group
right (where permissible, the decision to secede must be taken
by a representative organ of the territorially defined group on
behalf of the group as a whole).
General definitions of the right to self-determination, such as the one
contained in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples proclaiming the right of peoples to "freely determine
their political status" and the right to "freely pursue their economic, social, and
33. See VAN DYKE, supra note 10, at 88; Berman, supra note 13, at 87; Emerson, supra note 12,
at 464-65.
34. See, e.g., Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, supra note 6, at
arts. IV (territorial integrity) and VIII (equal rights and self-determination of peoples).
35. According to Hermann Mosler, "States are constituted by a people, living in a territory and
organized by a government which exercises territorial and personal jurisdiction." H. Mosler, Subjects of
International Law, VII ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 442,449 (R. Bernhardt ed., Elsevier,
North Holland 2000) (1984). Karl Doehring defined a State in international law as "an entity having exclusive
jurisdiction with regard to its territory and personal jurisdiction in view of its nationals." K. Doehring, State,
in X ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 423 (R. Bernhardt ed., 1987); Herman Dooyeweerd
defined the foundational function of a State in terms of "an internal monopolistic organization of the power
of the sword over a particular cultural area within territorial boundaries." H. DOOYEWEERD, III A NEW
CRITIQUE OF THEORETICAL THOUGHT 414 (1969) (maintaining that the leading or qualifying function of the
State finds expression in a public legal relationship which unifies the government, the people and the territory
constituting the political community into a politico-juridical whole). Id. at 433ff.
36. See Dinstein, supra note 21, at 109 (noting that peoples seeking secession must be located in
a well-defined territorial area in which it forms a majority).
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cultural development '" '37 should therefore not be seen as a general sanction of a
right to political independence but must be limited and understood in the context
of the subject-matter of the document from which they derive: peoples subject
to colonial rule or foreign domination do have a right to political independence;
national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities in an existing State do not.
The definition of self-determination in international instruments including in
that concept the right of peoples "freely [to] determine their political status and
freely [to] pursue their economic, social and cultural development" 38 was
similarly not intended to undermine the rule of international law proclaiming the
territorial integrity of States. The United Nations' 1993 World Conference on
Human Rights said it all when the right of peoples to "freely determine their
political status, and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural develop-
ment" was expressly made conditional upon the following proviso:
This [definition of self-determination] shall not be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of
sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in com-
pliance with the principles of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples and thus possessed of a Government representing the whole
people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind.39
The Supreme Court of Canada in a judgment pertaining to the legality of
cession from Canada of the province of Quebec 4 -should a majority of the
residents of that province through a referendum seek to effect the severance of
that territory from Canada-summarized as follows the distinction between self-
determination (referred to in the judgment as "internal self-determination") and
secession (referred to in the judgment as "external self-determination"):
37. Declaration on the Granting of independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, supra note
4.
38. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 2, at art. 1(1);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 3, at art. 1(1); Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, supra note 4, at art. 2. See also The Principle of Equal
Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
supra note 5, at para. 5; Declaration on the Inadmissibility of intervention into the Domestic Affairs of States
and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, para. 5, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess.,
Supp. No. 14, at 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965); Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation
in Europe, supra note 6, at art. VI.
39. World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 25 June
1993, art. 1.2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/24 (25 June 1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661, at 1665 (1993).
40. See van der Vyver, supra note 11.
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The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to
self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal
self-determination-a people's pursuit of its political, economic,
social and cultural development within the framework of an existing
state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case
potentially takes the form of a right to unilateral secession) arises in
only the most extreme of cases, and then, under carefully defined
circumstances.41
There are many compelling reasons why the destruction of existing
political communities harboring a plural society should be avoided at all costs:
a multiplicity of economically non-viable states will further contribute to a
decline of the living standards in the world community. The perception that
people sharing a common language, culture or religion would necessarily also
be politically compatible is clearly a myth, and disillusionment after the event
might provoke profound resentment and further conflict. Movement of people
within plural societies across territorial divides has greatly destroyed ethnic,
cultural, or religious homogeneity in regions where it might have existed in
earlier times, and consequently, demarcation of borders that would be inclusive
of the sectional demography which secessionists seek to establish is in most
cases quite impossible. Affording political relevance to ethnic, cultural, or
religious affiliation not only carries within itself the potential of repression of
minority groups within the nation, but also affords no political standing
whatsoever to persons who, on account of mixed parentage or marriage, cannot
be identified with any particular faction of the group-conscious community, or
to those who-for whatever reason--do not wish to be identified under any
particular ethnic, religious or cultural label. In consequence of the above, an
ethnically, culturally, or religiously defined State will more often than not create
its own "minorities problem," which-because of the ethnic, cultural or
religious incentive for the establishment of the secession State-would almost
invariable result in profound discrimination against those who do not belong,
or worse still, a strategy of "ethnic cleansing."
Secession is indeed sanctioned by international law-not under the rubric
of a right to self-determination but as a permissible political strategy in its own
right. The restructuring of national borders is sanctioned by international law
in two instances only: (a) if a decision to secede is "freely determined by a
people" 42 -that is, a cross-section of the entire population of the State to be
41. REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 22, at para. 1R6.
42. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Opera-
tion Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, supra note 5. Providing, under the
heading, "'The Principle of Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples:" "The establishment of a
sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the
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divided and not only inhabitants of the region wishing to secede; and (b) if,
following an armed conflict, national boundaries are redrawn as part of the
peace treaty.43 On the first basis alone, could the United Nations find peace
with the reunification of Germany, the break-up of the Soviet Union,44 and
parting of constitutional ways of the Czech Republic and Slovakia.4' The
secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia exemplifies the second principle. The
disintegration of the former Yugoslavia represents a complicated conglomera-
tion of both principles.'
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
The primary responsibility to secure the right to self-determination of
national or ethnic, religious or linguistic sections of the population within a
political community vests in the legislative and executive authorities of the
State. Failure of a government to secure that right can possibly provoke the
following responses within the international community of States.
Should the Security Council of the United Nations be persuaded that denial
of the right to self-determination to a people, and the responses of that people,
take on such proportions as to constitute a threat to international peace and
security, it can, pursuant to powers vested in it by Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, take a decision to that effect and mandate action to bring an end to the
situation at hand as it may find expedient, including sanctions of all kinds and,
emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the
right to self-determination by that people."
43. See CASSESE, supra note 12, at 359-63.
44. It should be specially noted that the USSR Constitution expressly guaranteed the right of each
Republic to secede from the Union. SSSR [Constitution] art. 72, available at
http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/77consO3.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2004).
45. Lee Buchheit specified, as elements for legitimizing secession in any given case, that the section
of a community seeking partition should possess a distinct group identity with reference to, for example,
cultural, racial, linguistic, historical or religious considerations; those making a separatist claim must be
capable of an independent existence, including economic viability (but bearing in mind international aid
programs that might help a newly established political entity over its teething problems); and the secession
must serve to promote general international harmony, or at least not be disruptive of international harmony
or disrupt it more than the status quo is likely to do. LEE BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-
DETERMINATION 228-38 (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press 1978).
46. The Constitution of Yugoslavia authorized secession of its constituent republics. F.R. YUGO.
(1946) art. 1; see also F.R. YUGO. para. I, Introductory Part (Basic Principles) (1963) (depicting Yugoslavia
as "a federal republic of free and equal peoples and nationalities" united "on the basis of the right to self-
determination, including the right of secession"); and id. at art. 1; F.R. YUGO., para. I, Introductory Part (Basic
Principles) (1974) (referring to "the right of every nation to self-determination" and "the brotherhood and
unity of nations and nationalities"). However, the disintegration of the federation did not occur in accordance
with the procedures prescribed for the exercise of the constitutional right to secession, and furthermore
included territorial gains through conquest and ethnic cleansing.
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in extreme circumstances, even armed intervention.47 Relying on the Security
Council to take action would require quite exceptional circumstances. The
Security Council does not readily invoke its Chapter VII powers, its punitive
powers can only be applied to States, and the five Permanent Members (China,
France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) can exercise their
power of veto in the Council to protect themselves or their allies from
condemnation and retributive action.
If denial of the right to self-determination constitutes a consistent pattern
of gross and reliably attested violation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, the matter may be taken under advisement by the Human Rights
Commission under the public procedure provided for in Resolution 1235 of
1967 of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations4 8 or the
confidential procedure provided for in Resolution 1503 of 1970 of the
Economic and Social Council.49 All Member States of the United Nations are
subject to the procedures provided for in ECOSOC Resolutions 1235 and 1503
since those procedures stem from the solemn pledge of Member States, in terms
of Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, "to take joint and separate action in co-
operation with the [United Nations] Organization" for the achievement of
"universal respect for and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction based on race, sex, language or religion. 5°
The proceedings can be set in motion by any person or group of persons who
can be reasonably presumed to be victims of "a consistent pattern of gross and
reliably attested violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms," or who
has direct and reliable knowledge of such violations. 5' A complaint can also be
lodged with the Secretary-General of the United Nations (to be transmitted to
the Human Rights Commission) by a non-governmental organization (NGO)
acting bona fide in accordance with recognized principles of human rights,
which does not entertain political stands hostile to the principles contained in
the UN Charter, and which has direct and reliable knowledge of such
violations.5 2 The procedures are aimed at persuading the culprit State to desist
from the offensive action, and can also prompt the appointment of a special
rapporteur to investigate and report on the situation prevailing in the defendant
State.
47. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 1, at arts. 39-42.
48. Economic and Social Council Resolution 1235 (XLII), 42 U.N. ESCOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No.
1, at 17, U.N. Doc. E/4393 (1967).
49. Economic and Social Council Resolution 1503 (XL VIII), 48 U.N. ESCOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No.
1A, at 8, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add.1 (1970).
50. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 1, at art. 56 (read with art. 55(c)).
51. SUB-COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIEs,
24th Sess., Res. 1 (XXIV), at 50-51, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1070 (1971).
52. Id.
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States Parties to an international covenant or convention may be subject to
procedures designed to bring their violations of the treaty provision relating to
self-determination to a peaceful settlement, but subject to the constraints
applying to the particular covenant or convention. However, procedures
provided for in international instruments for accosting States that violate the
right to self-determination of a people under their jurisdiction provide cold
comfort to victims of such violations. The Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights only makes provision for periodic reports of States Parties on
measures adopted and progress made in achieving the rights enunciated in the
Covenant.53 The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights entails a similar
reporting obligation, 54 but also contains facultative provision for an inter-state
adversarial procedure55 and under its First Protocol in addition makes provision
for an individual complaint procedure.56 The United States has submitted itself
to the inter-State adversarial procedure5 7 but has not ratified the First Protocol.
Should denial of the right to self-determination amount to the intentional
and severe deprivation of fundamental human rights contrary to international
law by reason of the political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, or
gender-based18 identity of the group or collectivity, or on other grounds that are
universally recognized as impermissible under international law, the individual
responsible for the deprivation may possibly be prosecuted in the International
Criminal Court for the crime of persecution,59 or in a national court with power
to exercise universal jurisdiction in the particular case. 6°
The exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC is subject to all kinds of limitations.
The Court's jurisdiction may be triggered by the Security Council of the United
Nations, a State Party, or the Prosecutor acting proprio motu. 6' The exercise of
jurisdiction by the ICC in cases of Security Council referrals are not subject to
53. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 2, at art. 16.
54. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 3, at art. 40.
55. Id. at art. 41.
56. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. GAOR, 31st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316, (1976).
57. 138 CONG. REc. 4783, para 111(3) (1992).
58. The ICC Statute defines "gender" as "the two sexes, male and female, within the context of
society. The terms 'gender' does not indicate any meaning different from the above." This, rather silly,
definition was inserted in the Statute as a compromise with the Holy See and certain Arab States with intent
to preclude the persecution of Gays and Lesbians from the reach of ICC jurisdiction.
59. Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7(l)(h), read with art. 7(2)(g), U.N. Doc.
AICONF. 183/9 (1998), reprinted in 37 LL.M. 1002 (1998) [hereafter ICC Statute].
60. Drafters of the ICC Statute operated under a resolve to include within the subject-matter of the
ICC only crimes designated as such in customary international law, and one may therefore safely assume that
the crimes over which the ICC can exercise jurisdiction are indeed customary-law crimes and therefore subject
to universal jurisdiction.
61. ICC Statute, supra note 59, at art. 13.
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further constraints,62 but a Security Council referral can be vetoed by any of its
Permanent Members. In cases of State Party referrals, there is a further con-
straint: the ICC can only exercise jurisdiction in the matter if the State of which
the perpetrator is a national (the national State) or the State on whose territory
the crime was allegedly committed (the territorial State) has either ratified the
ICC Statute, or has on an ad hoc basis agreed to the exercise of jurisdiction by
the ICC in the particular case under investigation.63 Investigations conducted
by the Prosecutor proprio motu are also only feasible if the national State or the
territorial State has either through ratification of the ICC Statute or a special
declaration agreed to the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC. But here, yet a
further constraint applies: the decision of the Prosecutor to conduct an
investigation must be approved by a three-judge Pre-Trial Division of the ICC.65
The United States has not ratified the ICC Statute. It is bound to veto a
Security Council referral accosting an American national of acts of persecu-
tion.66 If an American national were to be suspected of persecution in a country
other than the United States and that other country has either ratified the ICC
Statute or has agreed on an ad hoc basis to the exercise of jurisdiction by the
ICC in the particular case under investigation, then that person can be
prosecuted in the ICC, provided the ICC can lawfully acquire custody of the
suspect.67 If there is an extradition treaty in place between the United States and
that other State, the latter is given a judicial discretion to either extradite the
perpetrator to the United States or to surrender him or her for trial in the ICC,
taking into account the respective dates of the request for extradition and the
request for surrender to the ICC, the fact that the perpetrator is an American
citizen, and the nationality of the victim(s) of the crime.68 Unconditional
preference is given to status-of-forces agreements mandating a State where
American troops have been deployed to surrender any of those troop to stand
trial in the United States for crimes committed in the other State. 69 The United
62. However, the Security Council cannot confer powers on the ICC that the ICC does not have by
virtue of its Statute. The ICC can, for example, only prosecute persons over the age of 18 years, it only has
jurisdiction in respect of crimes committed after July 1, 2002, it cannot exercise jurisdiction while a State with
a special interest in the matter is willing and able to investigate the alleged crime and, if appropriate, bring the
perpetrator to justice. The Security Council cannot instruct the ICC to deviate from any of these restrictions.
63. ICC Statute, supra note 59, at arts. 12(2) and (3).
64. Id.
65. Id. at arts. 15(3) and (4).
66. American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C. 7401 (2002).
67. The duty to cooperate with the ICC to bring the perpetrator of a crime within the Court's
jurisdiction is based, in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, on state consent. ICC
Statute, supra note 59, at arts. 86, 87(l)(a), 89(1).
68. Id. at art. 90(6).
69. Id. at art. 98(2).
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States can in all cases foreclose the exercise of jurisdiction over any of its
nationals by self-conducting a bonafide investigation into the alleged crime.70
As far as ICC jurisdiction is concerned, it is in the present context
important to note that cultural genocide--deliberate efforts of persons in
authority to destroy a particular culture-is not included in the concept of
"genocide" as a crime that can be prosecuted in that tribunal.71 The definition
of "genocide" in the ICC Statute72 is founded on the one in the Convention on
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,73 and that definition
cannot be extended by the ICC through analogical interpretation.74 A proposal
to include cultural genocide in the Convention definition of "genocide" was
deliberately rejected by the ad hoc Committee on Genocide responsible for its
drafting.75 Furthermore, the only category of acts of genocide under which
cultural genocide could possibly come into play is the one consisting of
deliberately inflicting on an ethnical group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part. "Physical destruction" is not
an element of any of the other enumerated instances of genocide and must
consequently be given a definite meaning in the context of deliberately
inflicting on a group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction. "Physical destruction" means the destruction of the group by
causing the death of members of the group. Destroying a culture without killing
members of the group united by a common cultural extraction does not fall
within the ordinary meaning of "physical destruction".
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V. CONCLUSION
It is the sovereign right of States to regulate their internal affairs in
accordance with national predilections, but States ought to do that within the
70. Id. at art. 17(1).
71. See contra, Kai Ambos & Steffen Wirth, Genocide and War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia
Before German Criminal Courts, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 769, 792-93 (Horst Fishcher, et al. eds., Berlin Verlag:
Arno Spitz GMbH 2001); Steffin Wirth, The Subjective State of Affairs of Genocide-A Destruction, Intention
and Expulsion Crime, in 28 ARGUMENT AND MATERIALS TO THE TIME EVENTS 59, 62 (Munich: Academy
and Politics for Time Events 2001).
72. ICC Statute, supra note 59, at art. 6.
73. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9 1948, art. 2,
78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948).
74. ICC Statute, supra note 59, at art. 22(2).
75. See U.N. C-AOR, 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 83d mtg. at 206, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.83 (1948).
76. See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, The Genocide Convention After Fifty Years, 92 AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L.
PROC. 1, 2 (1998); Julio Barboza, International Criminal Law, 278 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 59 (1999); van der
Vyver, Cultural Identity as a Constitutional Right in S. Afr., supra note 11, at 64-66.
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confines of their obligations under international law.77 As far as the right to
self-determination of peoples is concerned, the United States has a fairly good
record, but not one that is entirely beyond reproach.
In 1998, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Religious Freedom,
Prof. Abdelfattah Amor of Tunisia, conducted an informal investigation in the
United States into compliance in this country with the subject-matter of his
brief.78 Although the state of religious freedom in the United States is by and
large satisfactory, the Special Rapporteur found causes for concern in this
regard in respect of members of the Arab community being singles out for
special scrutiny at airports (which is not a matter of self-determination) and
insensitivity of American authorities to the spiritual values of Native Americans
(which does implicate the right of Native Americans as a people to self-
determination).79
The right to self-determination recognizes in broad outline the fact of
ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic diversities within a political community
(pluralism) as a salient fact that ought to be accommodated in the political
structures and legal arrangements of the State. However, it is equally important
that group alliances based on a common ethnic extraction, cultural heritage,
religious conviction, or linguistic identity ought not to be afforded a role within
the body politic beyond the distinctive attribute that constitutes the bond
between members of the group.
It is of the essence of the right to self-determination that the relevance of
group interests is to be cut down the size, dictated by the nature of the group.
The protected interests of a cultural group are to be confined to cultural
interests, of a religious group to matters of religion, and so on. To afford
political representation in the structures of government to a cultural or a
religious group, would amount to affording to those latter modalities that
qualify the group a pertinence beyond the confines of its true (and useful)
destination in the aggregate of human society.
Enforcement of the right to self-determination through international
mechanisms is problematic, but not hopeless. Existing retributive procedures
by and large culminates in no more than international condemnation. However
one should not underestimate the long-term potential of international censure
77. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(stating that "a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform
a treaty").
78. The visit to the United States was "informal" because the American government declined to
invite Prof. Armor to conduct an investigation in the United States. He came to the country as the guest of
several NGOs and was offered the facilities of a number of Law Schools to conduct an in loco investigation.
79. Report Submitted by Mr. Abdelfattah Amor, Special Rapporteur in accordance with Commission
on Human Rights Resolution 1998/18, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 55th Sess., Agenda Item l1(c),
Addendum, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/58/Add.1 (1998).
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for bringing recalcitrant States to their senses. International reprobation seldom
renders immediate results, but if the condemnation remains widespread and
pressures persist, they are bound to have effect in the long run. Governments
do not like to be seen to be violators of international standards of human rights
protection.
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I. INTRODUCTION'
There are currently over fifty sovereignty-based conflicts throughout the
world, and nearly a third of the Specially Designated Global Terrorists listed by
the United States Treasury Department are associated with sovereignty-based
conflicts and self-determination movements. To date, the "sovereignty first"
international response to these conflicts has been unable to stem the tide of
violence, and in many instances may have contributed to further outbreaks of
violence. To remedy this, the international community is utilizing an evolving
process where sovereignty exists as a spectrum with a range of varying
sovereign statuses as part of that continuum.
Under the doctrine of earned sovereignty, there are three core elements and
three optional elements. The core elements of shared sovereignty, institution
* Paul R. Williams, J.D., Ph.D., holds the Rebecca Grazier Professorship of Law and International
Relations, American University, Washington College of Law. Between 1991-1993, Professor Williams served
as an Attorney-Advisor in the United States Department of State's Office of the Legal Advisor for European
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state entities in international peace negotiations, and has advised numerous governments across Europe, Africa
and Asia on matters of public international law.
** Karen Heymann is a 2004 J.D. and M.A. Candidate and student at the American University
Washington College of Law, in Washington, D.C. Ms. Heymann received her B.A. from Earlham College
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the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Branch of the International Law Association. The panel was
organized and chaired by Professor Valerie Epps of Suffolk University Law School, Boston, Massachusetts.
2. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Cumulative List of
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building and final status necessarily exist in order to guide the sub-state
structure from the intermediate phase through discussions of final status. The
optional elements-conditional sovereignty, phased sovereignty, and con-
strained sovereignty-provide suggestions for shared sovereignty during both
the intermediate phase and final status.
Earned sovereignty is a conflict resolution process that creates an
opportunity for the parties to agree on basic requirements that the emerging
entity must meet during an intermediate phase in order to attain or discuss final
status. Rather than forcing the negotiating parties to determine during
negotiations whether the sub-state entity may or may not be capable or allowed
to exist as an independent state, earned sovereignty allows the parties to make
evaluations of the effect of independence on the parent state as well as emerging
state's success at meeting certain benchmarks before determining final status.
The core elements of earned sovereignty-shared sovereign power, institution
building, and final status-form the structure of this process. An emerging state
will gain varying external and internal powers as it progresses in institution
building throughout intermediate status where sovereign rights are shared with
the parent state or third party, which will finally lead to a pre-determined or
future determined final status. The optional elements of this process provide
options for intermediate status--conditional and phased-as well as for final
status--constrained sovereignty.
The process of earned sovereignty has evolved without name or structure
through its use by international negotiators and state parties to agreements.
State parties to peace agreements have already used this process in an attempt
resolve the conflicts in Kosovo, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Serbia/Montenegro,
East Timor and Papua New Guinea. Presently negotiators have proposed
similar solutions for the Western Sahara and the Israel/Palestine conflicts, and
the involved parties have been discussing similar proposals for Sri Lanka,
Somalia, and Kashmir.
The purpose of this article is two-fold. It attempts to first define and add
structure to this evolving process and second to spur interest and debate among
those involved in the field. Section one provides an overview of the different
core and optional elements that make up the earned sovereignty process.
Section two outlines fundamental principle that sovereign authority and
functions are both plentiful and severable as internal and external autonomous
rights rather than an all or nothing grant of independence. The need for
monitoring and enforcement bodies is then detailed in section three of the
article.
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II. ELEMENTS OF THE PROCESS
As stated above, the earned sovereignty process allows the parties to
negotiate for individual rights that the sub-state entity will possess in different
forms of shared sovereignty until they meet the conditions for final status or
until final status is determined. Therefore, earned sovereignty is characterized
as encompassing six elements-three core elements and three optional elements.
A. Core Elements
The first core element is shared sovereignty. In each case of earned
sovereignty the state and sub-state entity may both exercise sovereign authority
and functions over a defined territory. In some instances, international
institutions may also exercise sovereign authority and functions in addition to
or in lieu of the parent state. In rare cases, the international community may
exercise shared sovereignty with an internationally recognized state.
The resolution of the conflict in East Timor provides an appropriate
illustration of shared sovereignty. East Timor came under United Nations
supervision after it rejected via referendum a proposal, which would have
provided for autonomy within Indonesia. In light of the violent response by
Indonesian military forces and paramilitary groups in East Timor, Indonesia was
forced to recognize the right of East Timor to independence, and the United
Nations replaced Indonesia as the authority responsible for the management of
sovereignty during the transition to full independence for East Timor. During
the period of shared sovereignty, United Nations officials headed the ministries
of Internal Security, Justice, Political Affairs, Constitutional and Electoral
Affairs, and Finance, while East Timorese headed the ministries of Internal
Administration, Infrastructure, Economic Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Social
Affairs. The National Consultative Council was chaired by the United Nations
Transitional Administrator and comprised of three United Nations officials and
over a dozen East Timorese appointed by the United Nations Administrator.
The second core element of earned sovereignty is institution building. This
element is utilized during the period of shared sovereignty prior to the
determination of final status. Here the sub-state entity, frequently with the
assistance of the international community, undertakes to construct institutions
for self-government and to build institutions capable of exercising increasing
sovereign authority and functions.
The suggested Roadmap for Peace in Israel and Palestine is centered on the
need for institution building. The Roadmap requires comprehensive institution
building prior to any further discussions of Palestinian provisional statehood.
The Roadmap provides that the Quartet will assist the Palestinians in construct-
ing a number of institutions necessary for assuming greater attributes of
sovereignty. In particular the Roadmap provides for the restructuring of
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security services, the establishment of an Interior Ministry, the appointment of
an interim prime minister or cabinet with executive decision-making capacity,
the adoption of a Palestinian constitution, and the creation of an election
commission.
The final core element of earned sovereignty is the determination of the
final status of the sub-state entity and its relationship to the state. The parties
may agree upon final status during the initial negotiations, but it may also be
determined at a later, agreed upon date. This flexibility in final status decisions
allows the parties to wait to discuss final status until either the parties and
violence has subsided or until the parties meet certain conditions agreed upon
in the initial agreement. In some instances, such as East Timor the final status
is determined during the initial stages of the process, whereas in others such as
Kosovo it occurs after a period of shared sovereignty and institution building.
At some point during the process of earned recognition, it will be necessary
to determine the final status of the sub-state entity. The options for final status
range from substantial autonomy to full independence. While the nature of final
status is frequently determined by a referendum, it may also be determined
through a negotiated settlement between the state and sub-state entity, often
with international mediation. Invariably the determination of final status for the
sub-state entity involves the consent of the international community in the form
of international recognition.
Kosovo and East Timor represent both routes for determining final status.
In the Rambouillet Accords, the final status of Kosovo was to be determined
three years later by an international conference, which would take into
consideration the will of the people for independence. On the other hand, the
East Timorese rejection by referendum of the proposal for autonomy within
Indonesia settled the question of final status in favor of total independence for
East Timor.
B. Optional Elements
The first optional element is phased sovereignty. Phased sovereignty
entails the accumulation by the sub-state entity of increasing sovereign authority
and functions over a specified time period prior to the determination of final
status. In order to enhance the relationship between shared sovereignty and
institution building some earned sovereignty agreements have incorporated the
element of phased sovereignty. Phased sovereignty involves the measured
devolution of sovereign functions and authority from the parent state or
international community to the sub-state entity during the period of shared
sovereignty. The negotiating parties may correlate the timing and extent of the
devolution of authority and functions with the development of institutional
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capacity and/or conditioned on the fulfillment of certain conditions such as
democratic reform and the protection of human rights.
The Bougainville Agreement, which ended the conflict between the
Bougainville sub-state and Papua New Guinea, implements the optional element
of phased sovereignty. The Agreement gives heightened autonomy for
Bougainville with the gradual grant of increasing control over a wide range of
powers, functions, personnel and resources based on guarantees contained in the
National Constitution.
The second optional element is conditional sovereignty. Conditionality
may be applied to the accumulation of increasing sovereign authority and
functions by the sub-state entity, or it may be applied to the determination of the
sub-state entity's final status. In either case, the sub-state entity is required to
meet certain benchmarks before it may acquire increased sovereignty. These
benchmarks may include conditions such as protecting human and minority
rights, developing democratic institutions, instituting the rule of law, and
promoting regional stability.
The case of Kosovo provides the most detailed example of conditional
sovereignty. In 2002, the United Nations Security Council adopted a proposal
by UNMIK identified as "standards before status." In brief, the United Nations
had determined that before Kosovo could undertake final status negotiations to
secure independence it must meet a number of standards or benchmarks.
According to UNMIK, the general prerequisites of the standards before status
approach required the parties to fully comply with and implement Resolution
1244 and the Constitutional Framework, which included multi-ethnicity,
acceptance, security, and fairness under normal conditions.' Specifically, the
benchmarks covered the areas of functioning democratic institutions, rule of
law, freedom of movement, refugee returns and reintegration, economic reform
and development, property rights, dialogue with Belgrade, and the responsible
operation of the Kosovo Protection Corps.
The last optional element, constrained sovereignty, involves continued
limitations on the sovereign authority and functions of the new state, such as
continued international administrative and/or military presence, and limits on
the right of the state to undertake territorial association with other states. The
Dayton Accords, which ended the Bosnian conflict, were structured around the
concept of constrain sovereignty. The Dayton Accords required many of the
sovereign authorities and functions of the independent state of Bosnia to be
3. U.N. Mission in Kosovo, Standards Before Status, May 2002, available at
http://www.unmikonline.orglpub/focuskos/aprO2benchmarks-eng.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2004); see also
Press Release, U.N. Mission in Kosovo, Highlights Of The Introductory Remarks at a Press Conference By
Michael Steiner, Special Representative Of The Secretary-General In Kosovo, June 27, 2002, available at
http://www.unog.ch/news2/documents/newsen/pc020627.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2004).
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managed by an internationally appointed High Representative for an indetermi-
nate period.4 The Accords also provided for the deployment of international
military forces to maintain internal security. While conditionality is not
explicit, the pattern of practice in Bosnia indicates that the international civilian
authority will be discontinued only upon such a time as Bosnia can adequately
function as an independent state.
III. SOVEREIGNTY AS A BUNDLE OF RIGHTS
In order to best utilize the process of earned sovereignty, which allows for
negotiation on individual sovereign rights and responsibilities, the international
community has begun to re-shape the historical concept of sovereignty. There
are several different meanings of the term sovereignty.5 In the context of this
discussion, sovereignty is concerned with establishing the status of a state entity
in the international system as well as determining its internal governing rights.
Under the conventional view, an entity qualified as a sovereign state if it had a
territory, a population, a government, and international recognition.6 If an entity
did not qualify as a sovereign state, it was deemed a dependent or subordinate
territory of a sovereign state. Thus, an entity was either sovereign or it was not.
There was no concept of an intermediate status such as that suggested by earned
sovereignty.
States perceive sovereignty as a "ticket of general admission to the
international arena."7 A sovereign state is accepted as an equal of other states.
It is entitled to political independence, territorial integrity, and virtually
exclusive control and jurisdiction within that territory.8 The state's sovereign
acts are generally immune from civil suit in other states, its representatives are
entitled to diplomatic immunity from both civil and criminal actions, and its
ruler is entitled to absolute head of state immunity. It can enter into agreements
with other States. It can be a member of international organizations. Dependent
or subordinate territories, in contrast, do not customarily possess any of these
rights in the international system.9
The international community's unwillingness to consider partially
sovereign options for conflict resolution has hindered diplomats in their effort
4. See generally Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia-Yugoslavia: General Framework Agreement
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996).
5. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 9-25 (Princeton Univ. Press
1999) (explaining the four meanings of sovereignty that Krasner describes, we are concerned here with what
Krasner labels "International Legal Sovereignty").
6. Id. at 14-15.
7. MICHAELROSS FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BUNCK, LAW, POWER, ANDTHE SOVEREIGN STATE: THE
EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 12 (Pennsylvania State Univ. Press 1995).
8. KRASNER, supra note 5, at 20-21.
9. KRASNER, supra note 5, at 16-17.
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to construct creative means for resolving conflicts involving attempts at self-
determination or secession. For example, one scholar argues that the Western
powers' inability to move beyond this black and white perception of sovereignty
was partly responsible for both Bosnia's collapse.' The adoption of historical
conceptions of sovereignty was disastrous in the Yugoslavia negotiations
because the opposing parties were unable to move beyond the preservation of
Yugoslavia as a state. This perception has also made it difficult to resolve
conflicts in Sierra Leona and Chechnya. Moreover, the ability to move beyond
the statist/secessionist norm may aid in the resolution of self-determination
conflicts, which are spawning ground of terrorist movements. Terrorism is a
mechanism too frequently used by self-determination and thus solving these
sovereignty-based conflicts may in turn reduce terrorism.
To remedy this, it is necessary for the international community to further
develop sovereignty existing as a spectrum and to recognize a range of varying
sovereign statuses and rights as part of that spectrum. The international
community must therefore recognize that states have both external and internal
powers, which are made up of individual rights that are both plentiful and
severable. The external sovereign rights may include:
1) The right to territorial integrity;
2) The right to defend the state through the use of force;
3) The right to govern by establishing, applying and enforcing law;
4) Eligibility for international organizations;
5) The capacity to act as a legal entity for owning, purchasing
transferring property, etc.;
6) Grant of sovereign immunity for noncommercial activities and
consular relations;
7) Capacity to sign international agreements;
8) The duty to respect other nations; and
9) The obligation to abide by international law.
A state or sub-state's internal governing rights may consist of:
1) Taxation;
2) Determining governing structures and political policies;
3) Providing for social welfare;
4) Regulating the judicial system;
5) Creating internal law; and
6) Managing state infrastructures.
10. Gerry J. Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Postcolonial Age,
32 STAN. J. INT'L L 255, 282 (1996).
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The concept of earned sovereignty enables negotiation on each of these
points. As an example, the intermediate phase entity may not have the
capability to defend itself externally or have a grant of sovereign immunity, but
it does have the legal right to govern itself, lay taxes and law, to be represented
in international organizations, and to sign international agreements. With this
in mind, the importance of using new concepts of sovereignty becomes
apparent. Negotiations that would normally be shut down by the first mention
of independence may now proceed as a negotiation for individual sovereign
rights without the weight of the term "independence." Thus, the parties may
discuss those external and internal rights that the new entity will possess as well
as those that will not be granted to the new entity. In the end, the term
independence is irrelevant. The importance is placed instead on the individual
rights possessed by the new entity.
IV. ENFORCEABILITY/MONTORING
The key to any successful negotiation is the ability to enforce and monitor
the implementation of the agreement. Earned sovereignty is unique in that it
inherently entices compliance. Through the use of the optional elements, the
state must comply with the agreement before it will gain further internal or
external sovereign rights and responsibilities. Because of this concept's nature,
however, monitoring and enforcement play and important role. Regional or
international monitoring groups, or a combination of the two, are necessary for
the optional element of phased sovereignty in order to guarantee that both
parties meet their stated agreements for the sovereign powers delegated in the
next phase of sovereignty. Conditional sovereignty will require a monitoring
agent who will determine whether the parties have met the specified conditions.
Although the monitoring/enforcement body is not as involved for constrained
sovereignty agreements, a body is needed to assure that the parent state is not
denying the sub-state entity its guaranteed rights under the agreement.
Earned sovereignty naturally facilitates enforcement and monitoring by
setting specific guidelines. The guidelines provide the monitoring group with
a symbolic checklist for determination of the success or failure of each tenet of
the agreement.
In many situations, the parties decide that objectives of a monitoring
mechanism are best met when the monitors are international. In these cases, the
monitoring mechanism might be the United Nations, a regional body such as the
Organization of American States or the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, an ad hoc group of nations, or combinations of the
above. Papa New Guinea provides an example of this because the international
Truce Monitoring Group and the presence of a United Nations Political Office
for Bougainville augment the domestic mechanisms.
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V. CONCLUSION
There are currently over thirty active civil wars in the world, the resolution
of which generally results in the extermination or expulsion of the losing party.
The resolution of these conflicts stops the constant cycle of violence. Thus, the
changing face of international conflicts necessitates the exploration and
development of evolving conflict resolution processes such as earned sover-
eignty. No longer do states fight wars until one-side surrenders. The new self-
determination conflicts last for decades where neither side will give up because
each side in the conflict has valid concerns and plenty of financial backing.
While it is not always difficult to get the conflict parties to sit at the negotiating
table, it is often hard to keep them there. The consideration of sovereign rights
as individual negotiating points as well as the ability to consider and discuss the
core and optional elements allows for flexibility in negotiation to combat this
problem.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2002, the United States Congress adopted the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 as a response to the widely-publicized financial scandals
involving the corporate giants Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and others. This
sweeping legislation was designed to ensure the personal liability of corporate
officers for the accuracy of financial disclosures relating to public companies.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sox) applies to issuers of securities that are required
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to file reports under the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).
Sox will also affect over a thousand foreign companies with share listings in the
U.S., as failure to comply with the laws could lead to the de-listing of firms
whose shares are traded there. To a large extent, companies are flying blind
because neither the Securities and Exchange Commission nor the Public Com-
pany Accounting Oversight Board has issued final regulations in some of the
sections. In trying to address many key issues surrounding the current crisis of
confidence in the U.S. system of corporate governance and financial reporting,
Sox has created quite a gray area in its interpretation, and the legal experts,
auditors, and corporate executives are scurrying to find some conclusive
guidance.
Against this backdrop, this paper examines the impact of Sox as it relates
to foreign listed companies or multiple-listed non-U.S. companies, as a result
of legislations proposed or passed in countries outside the U.S. We will focus
on some of possible conflicts between the Act and comparative corporate
governance regulations, and the challenges and opportunities arising for legal
scholars in the U.S. and abroad as a result of the legislation. Although this study
does not propose a complete exemption for foreign issuers from coverage of the
proposed rule, and questions whether such an exemption would be consistent
with the policies underlying the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. However, we must
investigate the scope of either a complete or broader exemption from the
requirements for foreign issuers.
Given the present scope of the Act in its proposed format, would the
proposals conflict with local law or local stock exchange requirements? Are the
problems that the proposals are intended to address dealt with in alternative
ways in other jurisdictions? Would any foreign issuers not consider a listing
solely because of these requirements? Would any foreign issuers that currently
maintain a U.S. listing seek to de-list their securities because of these require-
ments? This paper attempts to address some these important issues of today.
A. Background Conflict with Foreign Corporations
To understand the impact of Sox on foreign company, we must fully recog-
nize the scope of the Act as it relates to a non-U.S. company. Sox's plethora of
new reporting and corporate governance requirements are targeted to all
reporting entities comprising of both U.S. companies and foreign private issuers
filing registration statements to offer securities to the U.S. public as per the
requirements of the Exchange Act. In this context, a foreign private issuer is
defined in SEC Rule 3b-4, and generally includes any corporation or other
organization in corporation or organized under the laws of any foreign country
unless it meets the following two conditions:
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More than 50% of its voting securities are directly or indirectly held of
record by residents of the United States; and any one of the following applies:
• The majority of the executive officers or directors are United
States citizens or residents,
• More than 50% of the assets of the issuer are located in the
United States, or
° The business of the issuer is administered principally in the
United States.
A foreign private issuer with 500 or more shareholders worldwide may not
have made a public offering of its shares in the U.S. or listed in the U.S., but
could have 300 or more'shareholders in the U.S. as a result of private place-
ments to U.S. residents or U.S. residents purchasing its shares in foreign
markets. Such a company would nonetheless have to register its shares with the
SEC and become a Reporting Issuer unless it takes advantage of the exemption
by SEC Rule 12g3-2(b). Several hundred companies have taken advantage of
this exemption, of which the SEC periodically publishes a list of exempt
companies.
Although Sox does not spell out all of the stringent corporate governance
measures the companies are grappling with, it manages to impose a wide range
of compliance through mandated SEC and stock exchange regulations. Except
for some relaxation on reporting frequency, the provisions of Sox as it stands
today does not make major distinction between U.S. and foreign issuers of
securities. U.S. companies file annual reports on Form 10-K, quarterly reports
on Form 10-Q, and form 8-K reports to report certain specified events. Most
foreign private issuers file annual reports with the SEC on Form 20-K, or in the
case of larger Canadian companies, Form 40-K and do not file quarterly reports
or Form 8-K reports (although some foreign companies voluntarily file on
Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K, generally in order to provide a body of disclosure
documents comparable to those of their U.S. business competitors). Since much
of the information to be reported under Sox is required to be included in these
filed reports, foreign private issuers generally are required to provide informa-
tion annually, whereas U.S. companies (and foreign private issuers that volun-
tarily report on U.S. company forms) provide various types of information
sooner or more frequently. Form 6-K reports, by which foreign private issuers
furnish certain information to the SEC, are not quarterly or periodic reports are
not "filed". Consequently, various requirements under Sox that apply to periodic
or quarterly reports filed with the SEC do not apply to reports on Form 6-K.
Therefore, Sox is generally applicable to all companies required to file
reports with the SEC under the 1934 Act ("reporting companies") or that have
a registration statement on file with the SEC under the 1933 Act, in each case
2004]
450 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 10:447
regardless of size (collectively "public companies"). Some of the Sox pro-
visions apply only to companies listed on a national securities exchangel
("listed companies"), such as the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), or the
NASDAQ Stock Market ("NASDAQ"), but not to companies traded on the
NASD OTC Bulletin Board or quoted in the Pink Sheets or the Yellow Sheets.
Small business issuers that file reports on Form 10-QSB and Form 10-KSB are
subject to Sox generally in the same ways as larger companies although some
specifics vary (references herein to Forms 10-Q and 10-K include Forms 10-
QSB and 1O-KSB). Sox and the SEC's rules there under are applicable in many,
but not all, respects to (i) investment companies registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 (the "1940 Act") and (ii) private issuers domiciled
outside of the United States (the "U.S. "; 'foreign issuers"). The rules applic-
able to these entities differ in a number of respects from those applicable to
other entities, but the differences are generally not discussed herein.
B. Accountant Registration with the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board
Section 101 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandates the creation of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The PCAOB is a private-
sector, non-profit corporation, created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to
oversee the audits of public companies in order to protect the interests of
investors and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, fair,
and independent audit reports. The objective of this five-member board is to
oversee the auditing of public companies. The PCAOB is expected to regulate
public accounting firms that prepare audit reports for the companies that fall
under the Exchange Act as defined earlier. The issue becomes thorny as accord-
ing to the provisions of Sox, a foreign public accounting firm that prepare or
furnish audit reports for an issuer and a U.S. public accounting firm is treated
the same. This therefore, makes it illegal for a foreign accounting firm to partici-
pate in the preparation and issuance of audit report of an issuer without having
been registered with the PCAOB. Not only does this impose restriction on
activities of foreign accounting firms but also cause concern with respect to
encroachment of PCAOB in their business practices, a theme we will explore
in additional detail. Thus, among Sox's plethora of stringent requirements, the
ones that we recognize as stumbling blocks for foreign companies to overcome
are:
Registration requirement with the PCAOB duplicates regulatory
boards in other major capital markets. Regulations related to
PCAOB are also at odds with those regulatory entities.
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" Compels auditor independence by restricting listed activities,
without developing equivalence in corporate governance
activities in some of the major economies.
" Sox's auditor rotation rules differ from the approach in other
vital countries, and reasonable people could disagree about
optimal details.
As the corporate governance and transparency requirement of Sox unfolds
for the foreign issuer of securities, we find an evolving cascade of conflicts in
comparative governance, contradictions in corporate laws in differing jurisdic-
tions. In the following we present some specific examples as to how Sox has
unleashed a reign of legal dilemma and provide some suggestions to overcome
those conflicts
II. LEGAL CONFLICTS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION IN RELATION TO
REGISTRATION wrrH THE PCAOB
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has given the PCAOB a wide latitude as the U.S.
government tries to enforce corporate governance by forcing compliance.
However, the statute forgot to take into account that there are well recognized
limits on the outreach of U.S. law and non-U.S. law. Because according to the
3rd Restatement on Foreign Relations Law of the United States, one country's
law can only compel a person in another country to perform an Act "to the
extent permitted by the law of his home jurisdiction". As a result, we are
confronted with several areas of conflict between the comparative corporate
governance regulations, some of which we will identify below.
Mandated by a European Directive, there already exists an effective,
equivalent registration requirement in all the 15 Member States for all EU
auditors. Although the public oversight systems in which these registration
requirements are embedded varies as per the different legal traditions of the
Member States, but they are fully functional and provide adequate corporate
governance guidance. The PCAOB proposals therefore add an unnecessary,
expensive second layer of regulatory control for those EU Audit firms that will
be subject to registration with the PCAOB. Additionally, Sox's mandate on EU
audit firms to register with PCAOB in order to provide audit services to EU and
other companies could cause them to infringe on EU and other European
national laws. This is an area that needs to be further developed in order to
avoid future international relations quagmire. An effective way to circumvent
this issue would be to mutually recognize each other's corporate governance
regulations, and work towards a framework of equivalence, which can gradually
be ratified by both jurisdictions. Anything short of this process would develop
an ambience of retaliatory measures so often repeated in the international arena.
For example, the EU might impose legislations whereby U.S audit firms would
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have to register with all the Member States and be subject to oversight mechan-
isms by an EU equivalent of PCAOB.
Additionally, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was crafted as a response to
multi-billion dollar financial loss. Naturally, the overarching reach of the Act
brings with it a significant number of new reporting and corporate governance
requirements, that are both cumbersome and costly. The PCAOB registration
process is no exception. Because of the additional cost and time involved in
dealing with an added layer of governance, the smaller EU firms might very
well decide not to register with the PCAOB, and thus lose business. Regardless,
the chain of events would put the European firms in a competitive disadvantage
with respect to their U.S. counterparts, which might eventually have a negative
impact on financial markets.
Therefore, the SEC while finalizing the PCAOB rules must take into
consideration these apparent conflicts with other jurisdictions. Corporate
governance by compliance in this era of globalization should also not forget the
accepted principles of international law. Additionally, the sweeping reforms in
U.S. corporate governance in the form of Sox can be seen as a harbinger of
things to come in the global arena. As we discuss this, the EU policy making
board is hard at work implementing corporate governance changes, which the
SEC must recognize and amend sections of Sox as it sees fit. After all,
harmonization is the hallmark of globalization, and for all the economies to
work in unison we must respect each other's laws and adjust ours accordingly.
Therefore, the best approach to deal with this situation is to grant a moratorium
for all the EU audit firms requiring registering with the PCAOB. This will allow
the EU corporate governance reform process to go through and pave the way to
establish a mutually accepted approach based on equivalence principle
mentioned earlier.
Finally, this sentiment was expressed in a memorandum written to the
Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission concerning the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) forthcoming rules
on foreign auditor registration and oversight. The memorandum contends that
the European Union supports the broad aims of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but
expresses their concern about the draft PCAOB rules, discussed in Washington
DC at the March 31, 2002. The consensus among the European Union is that the
contents of the PCAOB draft rules and the registration requirements they
contain will cause major difficulties for European audit firms.
11. AUDIT COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Section 301 of Sox imposes on SEC to direct the U.S. national securities
exchanges and the NASD to prohibit the listing of any issuer's security if that
issuer does not have an Audit Committee comprised entirely of independent
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members. Furthermore, the new listing standards must make explicit that it is
the audit committee's responsibility to appoint, compensate and oversee the
work of the external auditor and that the audit committee is empowered to
engage independent advisors. Let us focus on this issue of auditor's independ-
ence that has come under the microscope as having conflicts with comparative
corporate government legislations in other parts of the World.
A. Conflict with Russian Law under Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002
Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits the listing of securities of an issuer if the
issuer does not meet the following criteria: (i) the issuer's audit committee
members are "independent" as defined by the statute as being unaffiliated with
the issuer and not receiving any compesnatory fee from the issuer other than for
service as a director; (ii) the issuer's audit cnmittee has established preocedures
for addressing complaints relating to audit issues and permitting employees to
anonymously submit concerns regarding accounting or auditing matters; (iii) the
issuer's audit committee is responsible for the appointment, compensation and
oversight of auditors' and (iv) the issuer's audit committee has the authority to
engage advsiors and determine compensation for auditorys and advisors. The
requirement that all members of the audit committee also serve on the board of
directors (see Section 10A (m)(3)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended (the "Exchange Act")), directly contradicts Section 85.6 of the
Russian law governing joint stock companies (the "JSC Law"), which prohibits
members of the audit committee from serving on the board of directors as it
states: "Members of a company's auditing commission/internal auditor may not
simultaneously be members of the company's board of directors/supervisory
board or hold other positions in the company's governing bodies." In this
context, A joint stock company is similar to an American corporation in many
respects. Under current Russian law, all Russian companies whose shares are
publicly traded are open joint stock companies. Such companies generally use
the abbreviation "OJSC" or sometimes simply "JSC" to indicate their corporate
form. Other designations arising under earlier legislation governing similar
entities are also still seen, including "OAO" and "AO".
Another area of conflict comes in with the interpretation of audit
committee as per the intent of Sox. Section 205 of Sox defines the audit
committee as being "established by and amongst the board of directors of an
issuer" and further specifies that, in the absence of such a committee, the term
refers to the "board of directors". However, under the JSC Law, the members
of the audit committee are elected by the company's shareholders, not by the
board of directors. The term Russian for "auditing commission" is revizionnaya
komissiya, which could be translated as "inspection commission" as per the
2004]
454 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 10:447
Russian Federation Law on Joint Stock Companies, Section 85.6 (law N. 208-
FZ of 26 December 1995, as amended) (the "JSC Law") our discussion herein
assumes that, for purposes of compliance with the Act, Russian companies will
treat the revizionnaya komissiya as the equivalent of an audit committee and that
it is the activities of this body which must be brought into harmony with the
Act. This has already caused confusion when compared with the provisions of
Section 301. Given the fact that, the consequences of non-compliance with the
provisions of various sections of Sox are severe, we are at a crossroads as how
to deal with situations under Russian law referred here (Section 48.1, pt. 10 and
Section 85.1 of the JSC Law give further explanation). This then again calls for
revising parts of Section 301, as anything short of that will Russian issuers
already listed in the U.S. to lose their listings. Another consequence will be flow
of capital away from the already besieged U.S. capital markets. Under
applicable Russian law, a Russian company now must be listed on a Russian
domestic stock exchange before it can receive permission from the Federal
Commission on the Securities Market of Russia for an overseas listing.
It is to be further recognized that the spectacular financial debacles of U.S.
corporate giants has caused widespread recognition of enhanced governance and
transparency in Russian corporate sector. This prompted the Russian Federal
Commission on the Securities Market to adopt a model Code of Corporate
Governance. Under its broad provision, the major Russian stock exchanges will
be required under penalty of delisting their listed companies to adopt their own
codes of governance, with the implied expectation that they track the model as
closely as possible in the U.S. Finally, given the fact that Russian corporate
governance and transparency is still in its infancy compared to that of U.S.,
attention must be given as to the evolution of this concept in Russia. In the end,
it is incumbent upon the SEC to modify its requirements to accommodate some
of the conflicts between Russian law and Sox so as to prevent capital flow away
from the U.S.
B. The Conflict with German Corporate Law
Like their European counterparts, German law presents formidable
challenge for the German companies to be fully compliant with the broader
provisions of Sox. The asymmetry between Sox and German commercial code
makes it virtually impossible to be compliant in both jurisdictions. For example,
Section 301 of Sox stipulates that a company's Audit Committee be directly
responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the company's
auditor. On the contrary, German law imposes on the shareholders to appoint
the auditor at their annual general meeting. How can we then prevent a German
company issuing shares to U.S. public from being fined by the regulatory
authorities in Germany or, even from being delisted from Dax?
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1. Dual Board System and Audit Committee Independence
To understand why it is difficult to implement Sox directives on audit
committee independence, we take a closer look at Germany's two-tier board
system. In the German two-tier system of corporate governance, the Manage-
ment Board is responsible for running the company and a Supervisory Board
that is responsible for the appointment and oversight of the Management Board.
German law requires companies with more than two thousand employees to
have at least six staff representatives and six shareholder representatives on the
Supervisory Board. Given that Audit Committee members are typically drawn
from the Supervisory Board, the Audit Committee definitely lacks the
independence called for in Sarbanes-Oxley.
Thus, the governance in the German company is divided between the
Vorstand (a management board comprising the corporate officers) and the
Aufsichtsrat (a supervisory board comprising inside directors, outside directors,
and employee and labor union representatives). Since Sox requires a completely
independent audit committee, difficulty arises as how to account for that
independence. If the Vorstand is considered to be the board of directors for the
purpose of U.S. law, the Aufsichtsrat might come close to achieving independ-
ence requirements of the audit committee. However, if German Law's require-
ment of Aufsichtsrat's employee representation is to be complied with, it is
probably not possible to exclude employee representation entirely from any
Aufsichtsrat audit committee. Therefore, without making any adjustment to the
SEC requirements, it is virtually impossible to have full compliance in both
jurisdictions.
2. Duty Assignments and the Whistle-blowing Process
Sarbanes-Oxley requires the audit committee to appoint auditors, determine
their compensation, oversee their activities, and decide what non-audit services
they may perform. The German stock corporation law (Aktiengesetz) assigns the
appointment responsibility directly to the shareholders, although the
Aufsichtsrat selects the auditors to propose to the shareholders and negotiates
the terms of engagement. While the Aufsichtsrat could exercise some of the
auditor oversight functions contemplated in Sarbanes-Oxley, the German Com-
mercial Code requires the Vorstand to review and comment on the audit report.
This presents a legal dilemma under the Aktiengesetz whether the Aufsichtsrat
can undertake the responsibility of negotiating non-audit services, or whether
this function must legally go to the Vorstand.
A significant reform envisioned in Sarbanes-Oxley is the whistle-blowing
protection accorded to employees. The U.S. requirement for direct audit-com-
mittee supervision of the whistle-blowing process comes in conflict with the
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German law. Because, German law is allows the audit committee to review
auditor interim reports and statements of critical accounting prior to the review
by the Vorstand. There is no requirement of an audit committee to supervise the
whistle-blowing process directly. Again this conflict can be resolved if SEC
allows the Aufsichtsrat to act as a general supervisory authority for U.S. law
purposes. There are other aspects of German practice and U.S. law that appear
incompatible, or have not been given enough time to determine if achieving
compliance under both jurisdictions is feasible. One thing is thus for certain,
that SEC must provide more time to German issuers to come up with structural
requirements that allow them to be compliant in their home jurisdiction as well.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was developed, keeping in mind, among other things,
the theme of globalization in the capital markets. Although globalization is
continuously striving towards achieving convergence in corporate governance
across all economies and capital markets, a fundamental lesson in history is
amiss here. It is a given fact that all corporate philosophies are borne out of
historic domestic traditions, which in turn define the legal governance structure.
Therefore, whenever, a newer norm is to be instituted the historical context and
corporate norms provide organic resistance to the changes. Sox's attempt to
export unadulterated U.S. corporate philosophies not only evokes national senti-
ments but also provokes widespread international criticism. The legal conflicts
and contradictory governance issues suggest that Sox fails to harmonize
corporate norms by not balancing differing jurisdictional requirements.
Problem lays in the fact that, legislative intent and resulting corporate
requirements are distinctly Anglo-American. This is not just a simple matter of
conflict of laws, as law comes from distinct philosophies and cultures. As we
find, in some cases there are direct conflicts, such as with German commercial
codes, which are embedded in very different cultural norms. Even when Sox is
addressing inadequacies in some corporate governance, we find them very
difficult in its applicability, such as, in case of Russia. These two provides two
extreme examples, as the conflicts with other jurisdictions fall somewhere in
between.
The hastily crafted provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley Act are perceived as
overwhelmingly overbearing for home corporations. Because Sox is enacted
with only one agenda in mind, that of maximizing shareholder profits, it comes
in as out of place with some corporate governance regulations. For example, in
Japan, the goal is expanding power, size and market share, goals stringent
provisions of Sox may not advance. In Germany, the focus is survival, and as
a result, we find the statutes of Sox probably are in sharp contradictions with
German laws. We must keep in mind, that overemphasis on audit and control
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might stymie the goal of expansion of capital markets. And, that is perhaps what
the foreign corporations are worried about.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 applies not only to American issuers but
also to foreign issuers subject to SEC reporting requirements under the 1934
Act. However, as we have shown in the preceding paragraphs, for many non-
U.S. corporations, the fit is either superfluous or conflicting. In response to
embarrassing breakdown of corporate governance norms driven by unbridled
executive greed, the government hastily crafted a legislation more to save face
than with much forethought. As a result, this has become nothing more than a
naked exporting of U.S. corporate norms by fiat, threatening other nations
bearing competing conceptions of corporate performance and ways to manage,
measure, and supervise it.
Finally, globalization is nurtured via increasing interdependence of
national economies. It is bolstered by cross-border financing and inter-flow of
capital markets. Its dominant theme is a move toward open economy and
political liberalism, which must be brought forth gradually. Sox's goal of
exporting unadulterated U.S. corporate norms might cause backlash against this
process. To prevent this, SEC must recognize comparative corporate governance
regulation in other countries and work toward modification of Sox based on the
principle of equivalence and reciprocity.
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DISCUSSION ON "DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION ON
TRADE AND OTHER MATTERS"
Hunter R. Clark*
Webster's dictionary defines "diverge" as "to go in different directions
from a common point or from each other; as opposed to converge." The noun
"divergence" is defined as the act or state of diverging or branching off; a going
farther apart; deviation or departure from a norm; difference." The nature of the
divergence between the United States and European Union (EU) has been
described variously. In my own writings, I have observed, "there tends to be
little about which the United States and Europe agree upon these days." Others
have framed the predicament more fancifully. For example, Washington Post
correspondent David Ignatius has likened the overall state of relations between
the United States and Europe to "a marriage that has gotten out of sync," warn-
ing that if the divergence widens, "both sides will soon find themselves on very
unstable ground."
Robert Kagan draws an analogy with romance gone sour in his book Of
Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. "The
danger," he writes, "is that the United States and Europe could become posi-
tively estranged," meaning shrill and indifferent toward one another. (Emphasis
added.) Thomas L. Friedman of The New York Times has gone so far as to
assert that the U.S. is virtually at war with France, declaring, "France is not just
our annoying ally. It is not just our jealous rival. France is becoming our
enemy." A transatlantic public opinion poll published in the September 4, 2003
edition of The Washington Post confirms that, at the very least, Americans and
Europeans have different social and cultural values.
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More so than in the past? Probably. Why? There are any number of
explanations. The Economist, for example, cites demographic trends on one
side of the Atlantic; political developments on the other. In its June 9, 2001,
edition, Economist editors wrote:
The United States is a very different place from Europe, and the
differences will grow. Demographically, Americans are increasingly
Asian and Latino, less inclined when looking "home" to turn to
Europe. Their affection for guns, religion, the death penalty and
genetically modified crops seems strange to Europeans. Just as
baffling to Americans is Europeans' toleration of high taxes, fussy
regulation and indulgent state help for idlers and unfortunates. While
Americans remain individualistic citizens of a nation-state at the
height of its power, Europeans are absorbed in an unprecedented
enterprise of union-building. Good luck to them, Americans may say.
Let them sort out their Balkan backyard.
Broadly speaking, what is it that Americans and Europeans tend to
misunderstand or not like about each other? From the American perspective,
rightly or wrongly, critics tend to view the EU as, among other things,
unappreciative of the American largesse that helped rebuild Europe after World
War II; socialistic in orientation, at the expense of individualism and personal
freedom; disdainfully weak militarily, morally irresponsible, and unwilling to
bear a fair share of the collective defense burden; and a potential competitor on
the world stage, especially on the economic front.
The concern over Europe as a potential competitor is somewhat ironic
since Americans tend to underestimate the extent to which Europe has already
achieved superpower status politically and economically. On the one hand, as
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. points out in his book The Paradox ofAmerican Power: Why
the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone, the United States is more
powerful than any nation in recent history and plays the central role in
globalization. On the other hand, as Nye makes clear, the EU is the closest
thing to an equal of the U.S. and thus a potential challenger. Europe's military
capability is comparatively miniscule, but the economy of the EU is roughly
equal to that of the United States. Moreover the EU's population is larger, and
the EU's share of world exports considerably exceeds that of the United States.
In addition, the EU is simultaneously widening and deepening. A 10-
nation expansion to 25 total members is scheduled for 2004. Cyprus and Malta
will join the EU along with eastern European states-Hungary, Poland, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania-that were
part of the former Soviet bloc. Meanwhile, European leaders are drafting and
debating a new constitution that will modernize and cement their political union.
Bolder ambitions for a broadened world role will likely ensue.
In fact, many Europeans have already developed a strong desire to compete
with the U.S. at the superpower level, or at least diffuse or counter-balance
American military supremacy. At this point in their historical development,
Europeans tend to stress the limits of military power, emphasizing instead the
more enduring influence of what Nye refers to as "soft" power. Exercising soft
power means co-opting rather than coercing others, by setting an example
politically, morally, and economically that they will choose to emulate. In this
regard, Europeans do not believe that American behavior sets a good example
for the rest of the world to follow.
Like many who live outside the United States, Europeans find what has
been called American "exceptionalism" dubious and misguided. Francis
Fukuyama, professor of international political economy at the Johns Hopkins
University School of Advanced International Studies, described the American
sense of exceptionalism in a September 11, 2002, op ed piece for The Washing-
ton Post. He wrote:
Americans believe in the special legitimacy of their democratic
institutions and indeed believe that they are the embodiment of
universal values that have significance for all mankind. This leads to
an idealistic involvement in world affairs, but also a tendency for
Americans to confuse their national interests with universal ones.
Europeans equate American exceptionalism with imperialism and neo-
colonialism because, in their view, it leads the U.S. to behave the way that
empires do. The U.S. is seen as arrogating to itself an ultimate right to act
unilaterally in regard to essential matters, to go its own way and make its own
rules in the world. Or, as Dimitri K. Simes, president of the Nixon Center in
Washington, D.C., explained in the November/December 2003 issue of Foreign
Affairs, "empires generally expect neighboring states and dependencies to
accept their power and accommodate to it. This often contributes to a sense that
the imperial power itself need not play by the same rules as ordinary states and
that it has unique responsibilities and rights."
Europeans also fear the erosion of their culture and traditions-American
"cultural imperialism"-as an unwelcome consequence of globalization. As for
their political orientation, Europeans in fact seem to be more socialistic, and
secular, than Americans, especially at a time when the U.S. seems to be
experiencing, especially in the south, resurgent Christian fundamentalism.
European resentment of the U.S. often takes the form of personal animosity
toward President Bush. Take, for example, Ignatius's report on demonstrations
against the President's visit to London in the Washington Post's November 21,
2003 edition. Ignatius wrote that his European critics "see in Bush all the things
they don't like about America-arrogance, belligerence, boorishness, self-
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absorption." The article quotes one 23-year-old British protestor's description
of Bush as "ignorant, stupid, war-happy and disgraceful," calling him "just as
bad as dictators in other countries." Later in the piece, a London professor asks
rhetorically, "how does one discuss global politics with the rancher from
Texas?" The professor declares, "frankly, he [Bush] doesn't care much about
what the rest of the world thinks."
European disagreements with America encompass a wide gamut, from
world governance to human rights and the environment. Certain policies strike
Europeans as especially egregious. These include the way in which the U.S. has
allegedly minimized the role of the U.N. and the collective security framework;
American opposition to the International Criminal Court (ICC); U.S. abrogation
of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in favor of space-based missile
defense; and U.S. rejection of the Kyoto protocol on global warming.
Europeans are most notoriously at odds with the U.S. over the invasion of
Iraq, objecting to the so-called Bush doctrine, which emphasizes preventive war
and American unilateralism in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks. From their perspective, the United States was all too willing to bypass
the U.N. on Iraq, and they are suspicious of American motives for the Iraq
invasion.
The President's domestic critics share similar sentiments about the Bush
doctrine. For example, in the November 1, 2003 edition of The Economist,
Harold Hongju Koh, professor of international law at Yale Law School and
former secretary of state for human rights in the Clinton administration, tries to
mollify America's overseas critics by distinguishing what Koh calls "American
national culture" from the policies of the current administration. According to
Koh, "each prong of the Bush doctrine places America in the position of
promoting double standards, one for itself, and another for the rest of the
world." He writes:
People living outside America sometimes suggest that the reason [for
the Bush doctrine] is rooted in the American national culture of
unilateralism, parochialism and an obsession with power. With
respect, let me urge you to see it differently. The Bush doctrine, I
believe, is less a broad manifestation of American national culture
than of shortsighted decisions made by a particularly extreme
American administration.
Meanwhile, the United States and European Union are locked in an array
of WTO disputes that my scholarship has characterized collectively as an
escalating trade war. These include, among other things, disagreements over tax
breaks given to American foreign sales corporations (FSCs); the European
import ban on genetically modified, or biotech, crops, referred to derisively in
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Europe as "Frankenfoods"; and government subsidies to Boeing to finance the
development of a new jet that will compete with Europe's Airbus. A long-
running dispute over the European banana import regime has apparently been
resolved. So has a bitter controversy over U.S. retaliatory tariffs on imported
steel, which the Bush administration has rescinded.
Nevertheless, ongoing friction over trade has led at least one observer to
express concern for the long-term health of the multilateral trading system, the
regime put in place under the GATT rubric after World War II that has since
evolved into the WTO. According to Bernard K. Gordon, professor of political
science emeritus at the University of New Hampshire, the U.S. has embraced
a policy of economic "regionalism" that emphasizes bilateral or regional trade
pacts with smaller states, like the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA), over comprehensive trade reform or liberalization in the global
context. In Gordon's view, regionalism poses a long-term threat to the WTO's
relevance and viability.
To Gordon's consternation, however, U.S. trade representative Robert
Zoellick is an ardent regionalist. Apparently, Zoellick regards regional alterna-
tives to the WTO as bargaining chips the U.S. can use to force concessions from
the Europeans in upcoming WTO talks. In an article for the July/August 2003
edition of Foreign Affairs, Gordon quotes a letter Zoellick sent him in late 2001,
outlining the American strategy. Zoellick wrote:
I believe a strategy of trade liberalization on multiple fronts-
globally, regionally, and bilaterally-enhances our leverage and best
promotes open markets. As Europeans have pointed out to me, it
took the completion of NAFTA [North American Free Trade Agree-
ment] and the first APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation]
Summit in 1993-94 to persuade the EU to close out the Uruguay
Round. I favor a "competition in liberalization" with the U.S. at the
center of the network.
Gordon, for his part, fears that a rising tide of Asian regionalism will
propel China into the role of a global trade hegemon. This would not only
diminish American stature and influence in Asia, which is crucial to American
interests, but globally, as well. In other words, Gordon's worry is that under a
regionalist regime, China, not the United States, will become the center of the
network to which Zoellick refers.
Others have suggested that divergence between the United States and
Europe is less consequential than on the surface it may seem. As my fellow
panelist Peter K. J. Berz, first secretary for trade, Washington, D.C. delegation
of the European Commission, will point out, the U.S. and EU are engaged
together in commerce worth some $2 billion a day, roughly three-quarters of a
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trillion dollars annually. The total, combined amount in dispute between the
two sides at the WTO represents a relatively miniscule fraction of this amount.
Moreover, mechanisms for consultation, information exchange, and joint
cooperation have been institutionalized at all levels across the entire spectrum
of American-European interests and relations. The WTO dispute settlement
process itself offers a constructive forum for airing and resolving misunder-
standings or grievances. Nations used to go to war over their trade disputes.
These days, they settle them peacefully at the WTO.
To the extent that American-European relations do need to be enhanced or
repaired, the place to start might be with the following realizations. First, there
is convergence between the U.S. and EU in regard to key issues, like the
economic development of the poorer countries. The U.S. wants aid recipient
nations to commit to the rule of law, economic reform, and the eradication of
poverty, as well as equal rights for women. Similarly, the EU has declared its
goal of making "aid and preferential trade arrangements with the [developing]
states dependent on their democratization, including equality for women and
improved management."
Second, as Nye points out, despite their differences, the United States and
Europe are the parts of the world closest to each other in basic values, which are
rooted in the Enlightenment. Nye also points out that nowhere on the planet do
the United States and Europe threaten each other's vital or important interests.
Lastly, the United States and Europe need each other in a world where
terrorists and their state sponsors seek to obtain or develop weapons of mass
destruction. As The Economist has observed:
[The United States and Europe] are, together, not only the main
engine of the world's economy but the main custodian of its liberal
values. They have strong interests in common, and each has addi-
tional interests in persuading the other to be at least partly involved
in less obvious areas of concern: America needs European help in
Asia, Europe needs American help almost everywhere. Why?
Because neither power, not even the United States, is usually strong
enough, on its own, to carry the day. Moreover, experience-
remember Bosnia-shows that one without the other makes little
headway, whereas the two together can be effective.
Ignatius has concluded, "solutions exist, or can be found, for all the
problems that beset the allies, so long as they prepared to work to settle their
differences."
That work should start with each side coming to grips with the other's
anxieties. Americans must recognize the EU, for it is one of the truly remark-
able accomplishments in human history. Because of the EU, the leading
European nations have maintained peace and achieved economic prosperity
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after two world wars that nearly destroyed their continent and civilization
during the first half of the 20th century. The process and beneficial results have
transformed the European thinking. As Robert Kagan explains in Of Paradise
and Power:
Europeans today are not ambitious for power, and certainly not for
military power. Europeans over the past half century have developed
a genuinely different perspective on the role of power in international
relations, a perspective that springs directly from their unique histori-
cal experience since the end of World War II. They have rejected the
power politics that brought them such misery over the past century
and more. This is a perspective on power that Americans do not and
cannot share, inasmuch as the formative historical experiences on
their side of the Atlantic have not been the same.
He goes on, "within the confines of Europe, the age-old laws of interna-
tional relations have been repealed. Europeans have pursued their new order,
freed from laws and even the mentality of power politics. Europeans have
stepped out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian world of
perpetual peace." In other words, what Americans might regard as Europe's
unwillingness to share the burdens of maintaining order and democracy in a
troubled world is in fact what Europeans see as their mission to spread peace
and the means by which they realized it. American bellicosity and unilateralism
threaten this sense of mission. The United States, by contrast, remains "stuck
in history," as Kagan sees it, with American strategic thought dominated by
what he calls the "lesson of Munich," the inescapable conclusion that villainy
and aggression must be preempted forcefully.
The Europeans should respond with greater sensitivity to the heroic irony
of America's predicament in the world, and with more appreciation. After all,
as Kagan writes, "the United States has played the critical role in bringing
Europe into [its] Kantian paradise, and still plays a key role in making that
paradise possible." The irony for the U.S. is that it cannot, as Kagan puts it,
"enter the paradise itself." Instead, he asserts, the United States, "mans the
walls but cannot walk through the gate." He concludes, "the United States, with
all its vast power, remains stuck in history, left to deal with the Saddams and the
ayatollahs, the Kim Jong Ils and the Jiang Zemins, leaving most of the benefits
to others."
My conclusion is that relations between the United States and European
Union would be enhanced if each side accepted what the other has become, and
the role each has played in the other's destiny.
Clark
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I. INTRODUCTION
I would like to begin by discussing several of the most crucial trade
disputes confronting the United States and the European Union. I will then look
at several factors that continue to link the United States and the EU from a trade
perspective. Finally, I will address the focus of this panel: are these trade
disputes symptomatic of a broader, overall divergence of U.S. and European
interests and perspectives?
11. SOURCES OF FRICTION-SELECTED WTO DISPUTES
The United States and the European Union are currently facing an array of
complex, high profile trade disputes. This is not surprising, because these
entities make up the world's single largest and most important bilateral trade
relationship. The flow of goods, services and investment between the two totals
* Timothy C. Brightbill is a partner with the International Trade and Internet & E-Commerce
Practices Department of Wiley, Rein & Fielding, LLP. He has particular experience in trade remedies and
policy, export controls, and international e-commerce issues. He currently serves as Co-Chair of the American
Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice, International Trade Committee and is an Adjunct
Professor at Georgetown University Law Center. A shorter version of this paper was presented at the
International Law Association International Law Weekend on October 25, 2003. The views are the author's
own, not those of Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP or the American Bar Association.
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more than US $1 billion every day. EU imports and exports of goods account
for about 20% and 25%, respectively, of U.S. trade. The EU comprises about
40% of all U.S. trade in services, and the two entities account for about 50% of
each other's foreign direct investment.'
It comes as no surprise, then, that this relationship has given rise to trade
disputes. These disputes, like the trade from which they arise, are large and
complex. Several of these disputes have reached--or are soon to reach-a
critical point.
A. Foreign Sales Corporations
One of the largest and most intractable disputes of the last few years has
been the United States' tax treatment of Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC). In
this dispute, the EC had challenged a provision of the U.S. Internal Revenue
Code under which these FSCs were provided tax exemptions for foreign trade
income. The EC challenged the exemptions as prohibited export subsidies. A
WTO Panel and Appellate Body agreed, in 1999 and 2000, respectively.2
In response, the United States repealed the FSC and passed the Extraterri-
torial Income Exclusion Act (ETI) in late 2000. The EC challenged this
legislation as well, and again, both a WTO panel and the Appellate Body found
that the ETI Act violated the United States' international obligations. The EU
had already requested authorization from the Dispute Settlement Body to
suspend trade concessions in the amount of $4 billion per year.
Since then, the United States has struggled to implement legislation that
would conform U.S. law to the WTO ruling. Competing proposals from the
chairs of the relevant House and Senate committees are moving forward as we
speak.
House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Thomas has offered legisla-
tion that would repeal FSC and ETI and replace those programs with two cor-
porate tax cuts: one, a 3 percent tax rate cut to all U.S. corporations over six
years, and two, a tax rate reduction of small and medium-sized businesses.
The EU, understandably, is pressing for enactment of corrective legislation.
In particular, the EU has called for repeal of FSC/ETI by the end of this year.
Earlier this month, the European Commission began the procedure of develop-
ing legislation allowing sanctions that would automatically take effect if repeal
does not occur by yearend.
1. Charles W. Smitherman HI, The New Transatlantic Marketplace: A Contemporary Analysis of
United States-European Union Trade Relations and Possibilities for the Future, 12 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
251, 255 (2003).
2. United States-Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations, WT/DS 108/AB/R at 153 (Feb. 24,
2000).
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Commissioner Lamy has also commented directly on the pending FSC
legislation, making two particular objections. First, the EU argues that the
three-year transition period included in the legislation is far too long, since the
United States has already had three years to make the necessary changes.
Second, the EU objects to a "grandfather" provision that would maintain
existing FSC benefits previously established under long-term contracts.
Recently, Commissioner Lamy wrote several key members of House Ways
and Means, and included the following language, which I think is enlightening:
"It would send a very strong signal of transatlantic co-operation to
successfully conclude this complex, sensitive and long-running dis-
pute without resorting to trade sanctions-sanctions which none of us
want."
3
B. Steel Safeguards Measures
A second hot topic that rivals FSC in terms of size, complexity and
political intrigue is the steel safeguards proceeding.4 This was the largest and
most politically charged safeguards action ever taken, and this action has been
condemned not only by the EU but also by most of our other trading partners
as well. As we speak, the Bush Administration is deciding whether to keep the
safeguard measures in place, modify them, or eliminate them altogether.
President Bush, who carried several critical steel-producing states in the
2000 election, initiated the 201 investigation, along with a call for global
negotiations on steel subsidies and overcapacity. The goal was to "solve the
steel problem once and for all."
After one of the largest investigations in its history, the International Trade
Commission made affirmative or divided findings on 16 out of 33 steel pro-
ducts, including most of the largest product categories.5 In March 2002, the
President imposed tariffs on 14 of these products, including 30% tariffs on the
largest product groups. The President excluded our free-trade partners, includ-
ing the NAFTA nations, and 100 developing countries.
The brunt of the tariffs, in large measure, fell on the European Union and
Japan. The EU wasted no time in reacting. In June, it approved a retaliation list
totaling 2.4 billion euros against various U.S. industries, and began threatening
3. See e.g., Letter from Pascal Lamy, EU Comissioner, to Donald Manzullo, Congressman, U.S.
House of Representatives (Oct. 7, 2003).
4. The author represents Nucor Corp. and the U.S. manufacturers of steel bars and other long steel
products.
5. Steel: Monitoring Developments in the Domestic Industry, USITC Pub. 3632, Inv. Nos. TA-204-
9 (Sept. 2003); Steel - Consuming Industries: Competitive Conditions with Respect to Steel Safeguard
Measures, USITC Pub. 3632, 332-452 (Sept. 2003).
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to retaliate immediately unless the United States made substantial changes to the
tariffs. The EU also commenced appeals at the WTO. During this time, steel
prices both in the United States and abroad rose very quickly-by about $100
per ton.
The United States then began a lengthy process of excluding additional
steel products from the remedy. Since March 2002, more than 1000 specific
products have now been excluded. While the exclusion process was lengthy
and painful for everyone involved, it did have an effect on the EU-it softened
the impact of the tariffs enough that the EU agreed to forestall its immediate
retaliation. This didn't matter to the U.S. steel industry at all, which simply
complained that their remedy had been weakened. (Steel prices did reverse
course and start falling, probably due to a combination of causes.) But the fact
that a "trade war" was averted did matter a great deal to both the United States
and the EU, and to many other industries that might have been swept up in the
retaliation.
A WTO panel has already struck down the U.S. steel remedies as contrary
to the Agreement on Safeguards and the GATT. The determination is more than
900 pages in length. The panel found multiple flaws with the U.S. measures,
for each of the different products involved.
The United States appealed to the WTO Appellate Body. The general
consensus is that the United States will again lose. The decision will be
completed on or before November 10, and adopted by the Dispute Settlement
Body 30 days after that. And the European Union has adopted a regulation that
would impose retaliation 5 days after the Appellate Body process is completed.
Even this is hotly disputed. The EU argues that Article 8 of the Safeguards
Agreement gives it this right to "rebalance" its WTO concessions immediately.
The United States argues that normal dispute settlement procedures should
apply, which would give it a reasonable period of time-up to 15 months-to
change its laws or modify its earlier decision. All of this will come to a head in
the coming weeks.
Finally, the President has discretion to modify, reduce, or eliminate the
tariff program. In September, the President received a "midterm review" report
on the 201 measures from the International Trade Commission, which analyzed
both how the domestic steel industry has used this period of relief, and how
steel consumers-and the U.S. economy-have been affected. The Administra-
tion is reviewing this midterm report but it has not yet given any indication as
to how it might rule.
C. Beef Hormone Dispute
The EU has also suffered its share of "losses" at the World Trade Organi-
zation, not to mention difficulty in the implementation of those rulings. One of
470
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the best-known examples of this is the EU beef hormone dispute with the
United States and Canada.
The dispute began when the EU banned the use of six growth-producing
hormones often fed to cattle in the United States and Canada. In 1998, the
WTO Appellate Body found that the EU's ban was not based on a risk assess-
ment, as required by the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures ("SPS").6 In particular, the scientific material used by the EU to
justify the ban was too general in nature, because it did not specifically evaluate
the risks arising from hormone residues in these meat products. After the WTO
ruling, the United States and Canada imposed sanctions of about $125 million.
On October 15, the EU announced that it had complied with the WTO's
ruling, by reviewing available scientific evidence and approving a new EU
directive on the subject. The EU called this new data conclusive scientific
evidence proving the risks and dangers of the hormones, and immediately asked
the United States and Canada to lift their sanctions.7
The United States has not formally responded, but informally, at least one
U.S. official said he was "baffled" by the EU's request. In the United States'
view, the WTO struck down the EU's ban because it had never conducted a
thorough assessment of risk to humans and animals from the hormones. And,
as far as the United States is concerned, there has not been any new risk assess-
ment from the EU. Senator Grassley, chairman of the Committee on Finance,
also said, "I don't see anything new here." 8
D. Biotech Products (Genetically Modified Organisms)
A similar dispute, one involving "biotech products" (also known as
"genetically modified organisms," or GMOs) has been brewing for more than
five years, but is just now moving forward at the WTO.
Since 1998, the EU has applied a defacto moratorium on the approval of
products of agricultural biotechnology-that is, modified corn, soybeans, toma-
toes, etc. The EU has suspended consideration of applications for approval of
such products, or the granting of such approvals. According to the United
States, this has had the effect of restricting EU imports of US agricultural and
food products, in violation of the GATT Agreements on Sanitary and Phyto-
sanitary Measures (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).
6. EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, at 244
(Jan. 16, 1998).
7. EU Urges US, Canada to End Sanctions Over Hormones in Beef, at http://www.eubusiness
.com/afp/031015140642.lebfbkgz (last visited Feb. 5, 2004).
8. EU Puts in Place New Hormone Legislation, Seeks to Lift U.S. Sanctions, available at
http://www.insidetrade.com/secure/dsply-nl_txt.asp?f=wto200l .ask&dh=1 37067712&q=placeholder (last
visited Mar. 17, 2004).
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The United States argues that it wants a scientific, rules-based process for
how these genetically modified foods are assessed. The EU, on the other hand,
maintains that it has recently set up regulations to do so. This summer, for
example, the European Parliament approved new legislation setting labeling and
tracing requirements for food or feed made with GMOs. These new laws could
be approved imminently.
The US and EU avoided taking this genetically modified food fight to the
WTO for years. However, the United States finally decided that the dispute
should be pursued, and has requested the formation of a panel. Some claim that
this is a form of U.S. retaliation, in response to the many recent US losses at the
WTO, on the Steel, FSC, and other issues. Others see it as the U.S. Government
simply caving in to the demands of big agricultural firms in the United States,
which want an opportunity to sell these foods and feed in the EU.
E. Other Disputes
Lest there be any doubt, the list of difficult trade issues between the United
States and the European Union goes on and on, including: geographic indica-
tions, the WTO "Singapore" issues (trade facilitation, investment, competition
policy, and transparency in government procurement); the Byrd Amendment
(which pays collected U.S. antidumping duties back to the domestic industry);
the 1916 Antidumping Act (a U.S. antidumping statute with antitrust-style
remedies of damages rather than antidumping duties); and the OECD Steel
subsidy negotiations.
These cases and disputes have proven difficult to resolve, for a variety of
reasons:
the stakes are very high (billions of dollars involved);
there are factors other than mere trade issues involved (political, cul-
tural);
the United States and the EU have very different regulatory and
political systems, which complicates the ability to change our laws
after a WTO decision; and
WTO implementation is not a straightforward process. The bigger
the case, the more it becomes a protracted negotiation, rather than an
implementation.
11. PROSPECTS FOR RESOLUTION
With all of these storm clouds looming on the horizon-and some even
directly overhead-are there reasons for optimism? Yes, absolutely.
First, the art of compromise remains. The United States and the EU
understand the importance of this trade relationship, and they will preserve it if
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at all possible. Consider the ongoing FSC dispute, where $4 billion in
retaliatory tariffs hang in the balance-what Ambassador Zoellick has likened
to a "nuclear bomb" in the world trade system. Again, the rhetoric has been
harsh. But both sides appreciate the gravity of the problem. And, according to
an article earlier this week in the Wall St. Journal, the EU is now considering
how it could impose these sanctions gradually, rather than all at once. This
approach, according to the Journal, "indicates how much the EU wants to avoid
a full-scale trade crisis with Washington."9
The historical evidence is mixed. Several major trade disputes have been
resolved successfully: wheat gluten, bananas, and others. But the process often
takes a great deal of time. Others, such as FSC, the Byrd Amendment, and the
1916 Act, are still unresolved, years after the original WTO ruling. My
colleague, Hunter Clark, has written extensively about the bananas dispute, and
he calls that outcome "a small but good and significant exception to the overall
decline in American-European relations."' I would characterize the case some-
what differently-not as the exception but as the rule, at least in trade relations.
The US and the EU seem to have been able to resolve their trade differences in
the past-even on big cases, but not without long periods of posturing and
rhetoric.
A second reason for optimism is a related one: the leadership and the
relationship of Ambassadors Zoellick and Lamy. I do not personally know
either of these gentlemen. But, it is widely known that these two ambassadors
have been friends, and marathon runners, for a number of years, dating back to
the diplomatic efforts that led to the reunification of Germany. At that time,
Lamy was chief of staff to Jacques Delors, president of the European Commis-
sion. Zoellick was counselor to Jim Baker, the U.S. secretary of state.
And so, perhaps it is not surprising that just before a critical G-7 confer-
ence, at a point when the WTO negotiations needed a jumpstart back in the
summer of 2001, Ambassadors Lamy and Zoellick wrote a joint editorial in the
Washington Post, where they emphasized, "We have a shared responsibility for
the international economic system... As the two biggest elephants in the global
economy, the EU and the United States need to get our act together on trade.""
And, just months later, the Doha Development Round of trade negotiations was
launched.
Ambassadors Zoellick and Lamy have found a way to work together on
trade, even during a period where our broader diplomatic relations have suffered
9. Matthew Newman, EU May Impose Sanctions on U.S. Gradually, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2003,
at C15.
10. Hunter R. Clark, The WTO Banana Dispute and Its Implications for Trade Relations Between
the United States and the European Union, 35 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 291(2002).
11. Pascal Lamy & Robert B. Zoellick, Editorial, In the Next Round (U.S.-EU Trade Issues),
WASHINGTON POST, July 17, 2001, at A17.
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and been questioned. So it is not surprising that with several of the trade
disputes described above now reaching their boiling point, Ambassador Lamy
will be visiting Washington in less than two weeks. On his agenda, publicly,
is the FSC dispute. And, I am willing to bet, on his agenda-whether or not
publicly, is the steel 201 dispute.
The United States and the EU have worked very closely on several key
WTO issues. They worked together in 2001 to launch the Doha Round. Now,
the biggest question is whether they will meaningfully address the biggest single
obstacle to the negotiations-the question of agricultural subsidies. The two
parties made a common proposal just before the Cancun ministerial, although
it was rejected by developing countries and in part overshadowed by other
issues at Cancun. And before that, the US and EU made another similarly bold
proposition: the removal of all tariffs on all industrial goods by the year 2015.
Notably, we saw a fairly significant split of interests, not between the United
States and the EU, but instead a North-South split, with the United States and
the EU on one side, and the so-called G-21 developing countries on the other.
If the United States and the EU want to show leadership, they will need to work
together to do more than they have done to date, on agriculture and on other
important issues.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A. Has there been a fundamental change in U.S. -EU trade relations?
Despite the many obstacles, which are formidable, the United States and
European Union still have a strong working relationship on trade issues, thanks
in large part to the their common interests, the efforts of Ambassadors Zoellick
and Lamy and their respective agencies. There are some who see the broader
U.S.-EU diplomatic relationship as moving apart, and in some areas, that may
be true. But in the area of trade, I think there is little evidence of a weakening
relationship. At least, not yet.
We could well be engaged in an all-out trade war on any of the trade issues
described above, but we are not. If anything, I think the United States and the
European Union will look to collaborate even more on trade negotiations at the
WTO, particularly given the emergence of the G-21 countries at Cancun.
However, the United States is pursuing other trade alliances as well,
including a long list of bilateral free trade agreements, which seem to be moving
very quickly recently, and the Free Trade Area of the Americas, where the
outcome is somewhat more uncertain. The European Union is doing the same
thing. It is too early to say whether these other efforts will overshadow the
multilateral WTO talks. Another potential concern is whether the United States
will use free trade agreements to drive its political objectives (for example, by
concluding FTAs only with its allies on Iraq).
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B. Is U.S. trade policy increasingly driven by unilateralism?
A law professor at George Mason University, for example, recently wrote
that the United States' filing of the GMO case "evidences a growing U.S.
tendency to rely upon power politics and unilateral intimidation at the expense
of diplomatic and multilateral efforts."' 2 I disagree.
This may be true, unfortunately, of U.S. foreign policy, but it is not true of
U.S. trade policy. The GMO case, at least to me, is an example of the U.S.
Government trying to open an overseas market that is currently closed. The
question is whether the reason why the market is closed is a valid, scientific one,
or not. This is a reasonable question, given the WTO Agreements, and a
legitimate subject for a Panel to consider.
The most unilateral trade action taken by the U.S. Government recently has
been the Steel 201 safeguards. But the WTO does grant Members the right to
take such action in the appropriate circumstances, as limited by the Safeguards
Agreement. Neither the Steel 201 nor the GMO cases demonstrate any real
trend toward unilateralism in trade policy. The greater danger is that U.S.
frustration with the WTO dispute settlement process might weaken U.S. support
for the WTO as a whole. But we have not yet reached that point.
The U.S. safeguard measures were imposed only after a period of serious
injury to the domestic industry, after a unanimous finding of serious injury at
the ITC, and after an extensive review process by the Administration. (In fact,
the EU enacted its own such measures, shortly after the U.S. remedy was
announced.) So I think it is easy, but incorrect, to simply say that the Steel 201
was protectionist and wrong, without any further analysis.
Certainly, on Iraq and on other international issues, there is a strong argu-
ment that the Bush Administration has pursued unilateralism over diplomacy
and consensus. And there are deep cultural and political values that underlie
today's trade disputes, which in some ways continue to drive us apart. But the
United States has not abandoned the goals of free trade and a multilateral
trading system, or its main partner in achieving those goals, the EU.
V. POSTSCRIPT (DECEMBER 2003)
Since this speech in October, one of these critical disputes has been
resolved. On December 4, 2003, President Bush signed a proclamation ter-
minating the U.S. steel safeguard measures, ending the tariff relief 15 months
early. The President took action only six days before the scheduled imple-
mentation of retaliatory tariffs by the EU, Japan, and other nations. This action
12. Stuart S.Malawer, Put Down the Genetically Modified Tomatoes: It's No Time to Pick a Trade
Fight Over Biotech Foods, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 1, 2003, at 44.
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was welcomed by the United States' trading partners and in particular by the
European Union, which removed its own safeguard measures the next day.
The steel safeguard saga arguably confirms this paper's general thesis: the
United States and the European Union will find a way to resolve their trade dis-
putes, but often only at the last possible minute, after other legal and political
options are exhausted, and after unfortunate but expected posturing and rhetoric.
(In the steel case, however, the U.S. Government's endgame rhetoric was
uncharacteristically muted.) While many other seemingly intractable trade
challenges await, one should not underestimate the ability of the United States
and the EU to resolve them-without resort to "trade wars" or a downward
spiral toward unilateralism.
ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL
LAW ASSOCIATION
Tal Becker*
It is a pleasure and an honor for me to participate in this panel discussion.
In my day job, I serve as the legal adviser to Israel's mission to the United
Nations, and most of my comments today emerge less from academic research
into the field of universal jurisdiction, and more from practical experience in
issues related to international criminal justice both at the UN and outside it.
I should make clear though, that my comments are made in a personal
capacity and do not necessarily represent the views of the Government of Israel.
When Dave invited me to participate in the panel, he noted that Israel was
in the unique position of having relied on something somewhat analogous to
universal jurisdiction in the Eichmann case, and having objected to the resort
to universal jurisdiction in the recent case involving Prime Minister Sharon in
Belgium.
Of course, these cases were very different, both factually and legally. [The
Eichmann case was not, strictly speaking, a case of universal jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction there was founded essentially on the passive personality principle,
though novel issues were raised because the crimes prosecuted related to
events against Jews in Europe during the Holocaust and before the establish-
ment of the State of Israel. Still, the link between the prosecution and the State
of Israel was clear, (though it would have made for an interesting legal and
diplomatic interchange had Germany also sought the prosecution of
Eichmann).
By contrast, the case in Belgium against Prime Minister Sharon and other
Israeli officials was based on legislation which, as it then stood, granted
Belgium jurisdiction to try persons for certain crimes, irrespective of when,
where or against whom such crimes were committed. Thanks to a later amend-
ment introduced by the Belgian Senate, there was at one point no requirement
that the alleged offenders even be present in Belgium. In fact, one would be
hard pressed to find any link between Belgium and the alleged offenses for
which Prime Minister Sharon and other Israeli officials were to be charged.
* Tal Becker, B.A., LL.B (Hons), L.L.M, currently serves as the Legal Adviser to the Permanent
Mission of Israel to the United Nations and served as vice-chairman of the Legal (Sixth) Committee of the
58th session of the UN General Assembly. He is also a doctoral candidate at Columbia University. The
views expressed in this address are his own, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Government of Israel.
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In that sense, the case involved a clear, if overly and unduly broad, reliance on
universal jurisdiction. But I will get to that later.]
But in the mind of an Israeli lawyer, the Eichmann case and the Sharon
case serve as bookends to a discussion on universal jurisdiction and frame at
least my thinking about the appropriateness and utility of universal jurisdiction,
as a mechanism for enhancing justice and the rule of law.
It is said that a diplomat is someone who thinks twice before saying
nothing. Unfortunately, that principle is rarely followed, least of all at the UN.
But I will try, at least, to be brief and limit myself to some general observations.
First, universal jurisdiction is concerned above all else with fighting
impunity for certain recognized serious crimes. When dealing with the legal
intricacies of universal criminal jurisdiction, we must always bear in mind that
its moral and legal justification is founded on the notion that certain crimes are
so heinous that they affect the interests of all members of the international
community and give rise to a right, and some say an obligation, to any state to
prosecute the alleged offender, absent any traditional jurisdictional link to the
offense.
But when comparing the interests of states with such traditional links with
those of the international community as a whole, I don't think it accurate to
suggest that these interests are equivalent. In fact, I would argue that there is
really a hierarchy of interests involved in any potential exercise of universal
jurisdiction. The interests of states wishing to assert universal jurisdiction are
lower in that hierarchy to the interests of the state or states with clear
jurisdictional links to the case on the basis of traditional criteria. To some
extent this is because it is only in the state with traditional jurisdictional links
to the offense that broader, but no less important, interests of justice and
reconciliation can be served by the prosecution of the alleged offender.
In my mind, therefore, universal jurisdiction should not, and was not
intended to, operate on a widespread basis as a system of justice. By its very
nature, it is designed to play, at the most, a subsidiary, ad hoc role when
offenders of certain serious crimes risk escaping with impunity. In fact in a
post-ICC age, we could rethink the role to be played, if any, by remote foreign
courts in presuming to judge crimes in relation to which they have no clear
interest. At the very least we need to try to understand the desired relationship
between these two international criminal justice mechanisms-the ICC and
universal jurisdiction-and always bear in mind that from a policy perspective
our efforts and resources should primarily be devoted to enhancing the effective
operation of the judicial system of the state or states with traditional grounds
for jurisdiction.
Along these lines, I think the case could be made at the very least that a
notion akin to ICC complementarity applies with respect to the exercise of
universal jurisdiction. The first limitation on universal jurisdiction should
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arguably be that a state seeking to assert it may only do so if the state with a
traditional jurisdictional link is unable or unwilling to investigate the case in
good faith. I think a few scholars have recognized this approach and it may be
the appropriate conclusion to draw from State practice generally and, after a
somewhat tortuous process, from the final version of the Belgium law.
Second, one of the interesting yet less noted aspects of universal
jurisdiction is that it shifts the priorities and focus from the ones we are used
to seeing in a national criminal prosecution pursued on traditional grounds. As
Professor George Fletcher of Columbia University has pointed out, national
courts are primarily preoccupied with the rights of the accused. The accused
has the most to lose from the trial and national constitutions and criminal codes
of procedure impose great limitations on the criminal process so as to protect
the accused. In fact, we are so concerned with the rights of the accused that we
would rather a guilty defendant go free, than an innocent defendant be wrongly
convicted.
Next in the list of priorities in regular criminal trials are the interests of the
community itself, as represented by the prosecutor bringing the case. A
prosecution conducted in the state with a clear jurisdictional link to the case,
reflects the political, social and economic values of that society. The investi-
gation and prosecution itself often plays a role in the healing and reconciliation
process of a community after a crime, especially a serious crime, is committed.
Finally, there are the rights of the victims that in most national systems
receive, unfortunately, the least attention. The US constitution, for example,
contains numerous provisions on the rights of the accused, but not a word on
the rights of victims. Victims are often less interested in a fair trial or in the
long-term reconciliation process within their community. They are concerned,
first and foremost, with seeing the accused convicted, with ensuring that there
is no impunity.
Universal jurisdiction flips the order of priorities around. To a greater
degree than the ICC, universal jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the
rights of the victim and with ensuring that the accused is convicted. Its focus
is the fight against impunity.
It is argued that the state exercising universal jurisdiction does so partly
due to deterrence considerations. I think the jury is still out on how much of a
deterrence role is really played by universal jurisdiction.
In my view, the central motivation for universal jurisdiction remains that
it is simply unconscionable for the perpetrator of so grave a crime to go
unpunished. As the International Law Association put it in its report of 2000,
"the key rationale of universal jurisdiction, therefore, is not deterrence but
justice."
The prominence given to victims' rights and to battling impunity in this
way has important consequences, which are both procedural and substantive.
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Scant attention has been paid, for example, to the practical and evidentiary
problems posed by pursuing a prosecution in a foreign and unconnected court,
which can amount in some cases, as one Belgian prosecutor has noted, to
conducting "virtual prosecutions."
I will not enter the debate about in absentia prosecutions or the issue of
Head of State or diplomatic immunity, which will be discussed by the other
panelists and was examined by the ICJ in the Congo v. Belgium case. [But the
fact that some scholars and judges are willing to entertain the idea that univer-
sal jurisdiction allows for prosecutions in absentia and does not respect tradi-
tional immunities is testimony to the precedence given by some to combating
impunity. In the view of these advocates, preventing impunity is more impor-
tant than guaranteeing the rights of the accused to be present at trial or
protecting the immunity granted to state officials for the orderly and smooth
conduct of international relations.]
My comments are concerned more with other consequences of this
emphasis on impunity to which I now turn, in my third point.
At the end of September, following a British initiative, the Security
Council conducted an open debate on the subject of the UN role in promoting
justice and the rule of law. In the context of that debate, several states as well
as the Secretary-General made some comments that in my assessment suggest
a growing recognition that an overdue emphasis on fighting impunity can
actually have negative effects. [These effects relate both to long-termprocesses
of national reconciliation and to wider efforts aimed at establishing effective,
fair and lasting judicial systems that would obviate the need to resort to
universal jurisdiction]. In his comments to the Council, the Secretary-General
noted:
At times the goals of justice and reconciliation compete with each
other... the relentless pursuit ofjustice may sometimes be an obstacle
to peace. If we insist, at all times, and in all places on punishing those
who are guilty of extreme violations of human rights it may be
difficult, or even impossible, to stop the bloodshed and save innocent
civilians. If we always and everywhere insist on uncompromising
standards of justice a delicate peace may not survive.
I don't want to overstate the significance of this comment, and it should
be noted that the Secretary-General did temper it with other remarks. However,
in my mind, this represents a fairly remarkable shift in policy that, when
considered together with State practice highlights that universal jurisdiction is
on the retreat. It is, I think, the culmination of an evolving trend that has drawn
lessons, in particular, from the experience over the past decade of the
Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals.
480
Becker
If we draw a line from the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals, which were
international tribunals pure and simple, through to the introduction of the
principle of complementarity in the ICC and finally towards the emphasis on
national or mixed tribunals in Sierra Leone, Cambodia and now in discussions
regarding transitional justice in Iraq and Liberia we can see a fairly clear trend.
The Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals have made important contributions to
international justice, but they have also suffered from some fairly serious
shortcomings. It is somewhat of an embarrassment among some UN circles that
hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent on such a relatively small
number of indictments.
For all their efforts, I have serious doubts as to the long-term contribution
of these tribunals in three areas which should interest all those concerned with
international criminal justice: reconciliation within Yugoslavian and Rwandan
society, establishment of effectivejudicial systems that are crucial to preventing
these societies from sliding back into conflict, and finally, providing an
effective deterrence to future violators.
[In retrospect, the emphasis on complementarity in the ICC can be seen
as an outcome of these considerations. While during negotiations on the ICC
complementarity was viewed by many NGOs as a regrettable necessity in order
to persuade States to support the project, it has now taken on cardinal
significance. As the ICC prosecutor Moreno Ocampo has noted, the success
of the Court will not be judged by the number of prosecutions brought before
it, but by the number of international prosecutions avoided because of the
effective and proper functioning of domestic legal systems. The potential
significance of the ICC lies primarily in the role that it may play, as part of a
broader network of mechanisms, as a catalyst in encouraging national jurisdic-
tions to enhance the rule of law in their societies.]
At the end of the day, the international community is recognizing that there
can be no substitute for serious efforts to strengthen the rule of law within
national societies. Focus on transitional justice and rule of law issues, both
during and after a conflict, remain the most important guarantee of lasting
peace, democratization and stability in a society and it is here that our resources
and energies should be primarily devoted. It is the rule of law, not ending
impunity writ large, that helps societies to emerge from conflict and establish
orderly system that encourage economic investment, prosperity and the
protection of rights. If one takes the long view, such a focus is also really the
best way to fight impunity itself.
Universal jurisdiction plays, at best, a fairly marginal role in these efforts
and sometimes a counterproductive one. It often makes little or no contribution
to internal processes of reconciliation. In fact, sometimes the interests of peace,
justice and stability are better served by respecting national reconciliation
processes and amnesties at the expense of the pursuit of a "perfect justice." It
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would be counterproductive, for example, to pursue the prosecution of
individuals who have appeared before the Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion in South Africa on the basis of universal jurisdiction.
This does not mean that blanket or unjustifiable amnesties should be
respected. But it is one thing for the international community to withhold its
blessing from a political process involving these kind of amnesties. It is quite
another to allow remotejudicial mechanisms to interfere and potentially unravel
delicate political processes of which they are unfamiliar and ill-suited to repair.
[As always, a balance is required. In seeking to strike that balance we must
bear in mind that while the international community can encourage the parties
to a conflict to make the "right" choices, few if any conflicts can be solved
unless the parties themselves live up to their responsibilities.]
Universal jurisdiction also makes only a limited contribution to the
establishment of fair and effective domestic judicial mechanisms. And
sometimes it can even allow parties to pursue or exacerbate their conflict by
advancing political agenda in foreign courts instead of settling it around the
negotiating table.
The resort to universal jurisdiction can, in addition, and has in practice,
been perceived as arrogant interference by States who are hardly in a position
of moral authority to judge the conduct of others. It is important to appreciate
that any exercise of universal jurisdiction does not only involve passing
judgment on the alleged perpetrator, it involves passing judgment on the
judicial system of the State that is deemed to have failed to prosecute the
offender.
One sometimes gets the feeling that the discussion of universal jurisdiction
serves as an easy way out: A way for states to clear their conscience for failing
to prevent or reduce serious human rights violations. A way for developed
states to avoid the difficult tasks of assisting and guiding others towards
enhancing their domestic judicial systems, by purporting to step into their shoes
so as to remove the most egregious cases from the headlines. We should also
not pretend that the pursuit of universal jurisdiction in countries such as
Belgium and Germany for instance is purely altruistic and unconnected with
national interest and perhaps more significantly the national legacy.
I am not suggesting that universal jurisdiction and enhancing the domestic
rule of law are always or necessarily mutually exclusive. Sometimes universal
jurisdiction can play an important and useful role in promoting justice and
encouraging interested states to pursue prosecutions. And perhaps I am placing
undue emphasis on the limits of universal jurisdiction, to counter-balance the
support it has received in academic circles. But I would echo the views of some
those who have suggested that the academic focus on universal jurisdiction at
the expense of a serious examination of the ways to advance the rule of law
within societies may not always be helpful.
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Fourth, it is probably appropriate to make some comments about the need
for significant safeguards against political abuse, if and when universal
jurisdiction is relied upon. Naturally, I am drawn towards using the Sharon
case in Belgium as an example, though there are others. The political nature of
this prosecution was evident in several ways. As Professor Malvina Halberstam
has observed, the prosecution was not instituted in 1993 when the Belgian law
was enacted, but only once Sharon had become Prime Minister. It was not
brought against those Lebanese who actually perpetrated the massacre at the
Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps in 1982, but against those alleged to have
failed in preventing something that they ought to have known was taking place.
This is doubly significant because there is hardly a precedent in the field of
international humanitarian law for examining the legal responsibility of
individuals for their omissions in relation to the conduct of others who are not
operating as de jure or de facto State agents. Certainly, Lebanon did not
examine the possible responsibility of its own forces in failing to prevent, let
alone perpetrating, attacks on civilians during the civil war, and instead
preferred to grant a blanket amnesty.
The fact that an investigation had already taken place in Israel by a
commission, headed by the President of the Supreme Court that held 60
sessions, heard 58 witnesses, considered a mountain of documentary evidence,
and led among other things to the forced resignation of Sharon as Defense
Minister, was not taken into account. And while Belgium did not institute the
prosecution, it was Belgian legislation that made room for it, and it was the
Belgian parliament that intervened in order to overturn the decision of a lower
court so as to allow for the case to proceed in absentia.
Whatever one's view of the events in question, the whole episode in
Belgium illustrates the dangers not just to international relations but also to the
interests of peace and justice in an overly liberal reliance on universal
jurisdiction. The limitations introduced to Belgium's law after complaints were
brought against US officials and after elections were held in Belgium are both
well advised and indicative, I think, of a growing realization of the dangers and
shortcomings of universal jurisdiction, especially in a post-ICC age.
Significant consideration still need to be given to the safeguards that
should be introduced in order to prevent the abuse of universal jurisdiction and
avoid the harmful use of foreign courts as political or public relations weapons
in conflicts that need to be resolved by political dialogue. The adoption of a
notion of complementarity into the exercise of universal jurisdiction, as I
suggested earlier, may be one of a number of mechanisms that should be
expressly endorsed. Other threshold requirements could be introduced, aside
from the more familiar ones that have been considered, for example, in the
work of the International Law Association and the Princeton Project on this
subject.
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Before concluding, I would like just to try to contribute to the discussion
by raising two questions on issues on which I am somewhat conflicted. First,
how should our thinking about universal criminal jurisdiction affect the way we
approach universal civil jurisdiction of the kind advanced, for example, by
some interpretations of the Alien Torts Claims Act? Second, for those who
support the broad use of universal jurisdiction, how do we draw the appropriate
balance between cases where it is better for a disinterested state to pursue a
prosecution and cases where we would prefer the state or states with a vested
interest in the outcome to prosecute? I would be grateful if anyone on the panel
or in the audience would like to share his or her views on these questions.
PROTOCOL TO PREVENT, SUPPRESS AND PUNISH
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS-A NEW APPROACH
Elizabeth F. Defeis*
Trafficking in persons, the illegal and highly profitable recruitment,
transport, or sale of human beings into all forms of forced labor and servitude
is a tragic and complex human rights abuse. The U.S. State Department
estimates that anywhere from 700,000 to four million persons are trafficked
annually worldwide, and that approximately 50,000 women and children are
trafficked annually for sexual exploitation into the United States.' Women and
female children are particularly vulnerable to this slavery-like practice, due
largely to the persistent inequalities they face in status and opportunity
worldwide and the widespread business of prostitution.2
International agreements that address trafficking in women or trafficking
in children date back to the 1904 International Agreement for the Suppression
of White Slave Traffic.' The goal of the Agreement was to halt the sale of
women into prostitution in Europe at a time of adverse economic conditions.
Several subsequent treaties were adopted under the auspices of the League of
Nations and the 1949 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons
and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others4 consolidated all previous
treaties on the subject. It characterized prostitution as "incompatible with the
dignity and worth of the human person," and obligated governments to punish
any person who "exploits the prostitution of another person, even with the
consent of that person."5 The 1949 Convention also criminalized the action of
any person who "(1) keeps or manages or knowingly finances or takes part in
financing of a brothel (or) (2) knowingly lets or rents a building or other place
or any part thereof for the purpose of the prostitution of others."6 However the
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. Professor Defeis would like to thank
her research assistant, Jill Dawson, J.D. Candidate, Class of 2005.
1. U.S. Department of State, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons,
http://www.state.gov/g/tip/ (Feb. 18, 2004).
2. Id.
3. http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/partboo/viiboo/vii_8.html (last visited Mar.
18, 2004).
4. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the
Prostitution of Others, July 25, 1951, 96 U.N.T.S. 271, available at http://www.univie.ac.at/RI/KONTERM/
intlaw/konterm/vrkon_en/html/doku/prostitu.htm#1.0 (last visited Mar. 18, 2004).
5. Id. at art. 1.
6. Id. at art. 2.
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enforcement provisions of the Convention are extremely weak and the
Convention has had very limited value.
The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) prohibits the "exploitation of prostitution of
women."7  It also prohibits "all forms of traffic in women and obligates
governments to "take all appropriate measures, including legislation to suppress
all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women."8
Whether the 1979 Convention intended to recognize a more comprehensive
definition of trafficking, which includes all types of slavery practices, is not
entirely clear, although a strict interpretation of the language used may support
this conclusion.
However, like the previous treaties, the enforcement provisions are weak
and are limited to reporting procedures by states parties although recently an op-
tional Protocol that would allow for direct individual petition has been adopted.
More recently, efforts have been made to address trafficking of children
and child prostitution. For example, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the
Child, which has been ratified by virtually every state but not the United States,
requires State Parties to take all appropriate measures to prevent "the abduction
of, sale of, or traffic in children for any purpose or in any form, "to prevent the
inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity."9
However, once again enforcement is limited to self-reporting by states. Most
recently, the 1999 Convention to Eliminate the Worst Forms of Child Labor
adopted under the auspices of the International Labor Organization prohibits
"the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production of
pornography or for pornographic performances."' 1
In the last 20 years, the rise in the volume of human trafficking has risen
dramatically. The causes include the end of cold war with the concomitant
opening of borders and increased movement of people, emergence of organized
crime and the rise of the sex tourist industry. The number of illegal sex workers
in the European Union ranges from 200,000 to half a million, with some two-
thirds coming from Eastern Europe. Trafficking from this region, once
minimal, now rivals traditional trafficking source regions, such as Asia, Africa
and the Caribbean."
7. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Sept. 3, 1981,
1249 U.N.T.S. 13, available at http://www.safnet.com/cedaw/cedaw.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2004).
8. Id. at pmbl.
9. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2004).
10. Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, June 17, 1999 17, available at www.http://www.
ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/ratification/convention/text.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2004).
11. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Analysis and Statistics, at http://www.unodc.org/
unodc/en/analysisandstatistics.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2004).
Many national legal systems particularly those of the sending countries,
that is, those states from which the victims come, are ill equipped to deal with
the current massive increase in human trafficking. Adequate legislation, limited
law enforcement capabilities, and corruption of local law enforcement
personnel, have all combined to hamper cooperation on an international level.
At the Seventh Session of the Commission on Crime presentation and
Criminal Justice in 1998, Argentina proposed the drafting of a new Convention
against trafficking in minors, citing growing evidence of the involvement of
organized criminal groups in this activity. This initiative was expanded to
incorporate trafficking in all persons. It was decided by member States that the
most appropriate way to deal with the issue was to elaborate a Protocol to the
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
Negotiations on the Protocol were extensive and the Protocol was open to
all states in Palermo, Italy in December 2000.12 The fundamental concept
adopted by the Member States in negotiating the Protocol was to maintain a
carefully crafted balance between law enforcement and the protection of
victims.
The Protocol sets forth three purposes:
" To prevent and combat trafficking in persons, paying particular
attention to women and children;
" To protect and assist victims of trafficking, with full respect for
their human rights; and
* To promote cooperation among States in order to meet these
objectives. 3
The Protocol is not a stand-alone instrument. Rather, it must be applied in
conjunction with the parent Convention, and each state is required to become
a party to the Convention in order to become party to the Protocol. Protocol
offenses are deemed to be Convention offenses for the purposes of extradition
and other forms of cooperation."i The application of the Protocol is governed
by the same rules as the application of the parent Convention. Both instruments
apply in any case involving the investigation or prosecution of an offence that
is suspected of being "transnational in nature" and involving an "organized
criminal group", as defined in the Convention.
12. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Signatories to the UN Convention against
Transnational Crime and its Protocols, at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/crime-cicp-signatures.html (last
visited Feb. 22, 2004) [hereinafter U.N. Office].
13. The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, G.A. Res. 55/25, annex
II, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 60, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. I) (2001) [hereinafter Protocol].
14. Id. at pmbl.
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Although victims and witnesses are also dealt with in the parent Conven-
tion, the protection of, and assistance to, a victim is specified as a core purpose
of the Protocol.' 5 It considers victim assistance, both as an end in itself and as
a means to support the investigation and prosecution of trafficking crimes.
Although there was strong support for a new international agreement to
address trafficking, several issues required extensive negations and even today
are unresolved.
Probably, the most contentious issue concerned the definition of traffick-
ing. Some states, including initially the United States took the position that only
trafficking that involved forced prostitution should be addressed by the Protocol
and hence that a victim's consent would take the act outside of the ambit of the
Protocol.' 6 Others, including many NGO's such as the Coalition Against
Trafficking in Women and Equality took the position that all prostitution should
be addressed since the distinction between forced and free prostitution was
meaningless. 7
On the other hand, it was agreed that requiring countries to make the
consent of victims completely irrelevant could exclude valid defenses and raise
constitutional or other legal issues. The compromise was to specify that, while
the accused traffickers may initially raise consent as a defense, consent to initial
recruitment is not the same as consent to the entire course of trafficking. Any
alleged consent to exploitation must be deemed irrelevant if any of the means
of trafficking listed in the definition have occurred. For example, means of
trafficking include the threat or use of force, coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, the abuse of power or a position of vulnerability, or of the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person such as a
parent.'
8
What is noteworthy is that for the first time, the International Community
has agreed on a definition of trafficking. Essentially, trafficking consists of
actions in which offenders gain control of victims by coercive or deceptive
means or by exploiting relationships, like those between parents and children,
in which one party has relatively little power of influence and is therefore
vulnerable to trafficking.
The Protocol defines trafficking as follows: Trafficking in persons shall
mean "the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons,
15. Protocol, supra note 13, at arts. 4-6.
16. William J. Bennett & Charles W. Colson, The Clintons Shrug at Sex Trafficking, WALL STREET
JOURNAL, Jan. 10, 2000, at A26.
17. Equality NOW Prostitution Statement, at http:llwww.equalitynow.org/english/actions/action-
2301_en.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2004).
18. U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children (Summary), at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/enltrafficking-
convention.htrml (last visited Feb. 22, 2004).
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by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction,
of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or
of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or
similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs."'
' 9
The Protocol requires States to criminalize trafficking, by enacting laws to
reach the prohibited activity. The law enforcement provisions of the Protocol
are mandatory and require law enforcement agencies to cooperate in such
matters as the identification of offenders and trafficked persons, sharing of
information and the training of investigators and victim support personnel.
However, in addition to criminalizing trafficking, the Protocol requires
States to take steps to protect and assist victims of trafficking. It recognizes that
victims of trafficking are often in great danger and in need of assistance and
support, particularly if repatriated to their countries of origin. Under the
Protocol, trafficking victims would be entitled to some degree of confidentiality
in legal proceedings involving traffickers and assistance in legal proceedings.
Under both the parent Convention and the Protocol, countries must also
endeavor to provide for the basic safety and security of victims, and the Protocol
requires that victims be afforded, "...the possibility of obtaining compensation
for damage suffered...., 0
The Protocol encourages social assistance to victims in areas such as
counseling, housing, education and health care needs, although these are not
obligatory. The obligations of States regarding victims fall upon whichever
State the victim is in at a given time.
The legal status of trafficked persons and whether they would eventually
be returned to their countries of origin was also the subject of extensive
negotiations. Generally, the developed countries to which persons are often
trafficked took the position that there should not be a legal right to remain since
this would provide an incentive both for trafficking and illegal migration.
Countries whose nationals were more likely to be trafficked sought as much
protection and legal status for trafficked persons as possible.
The negotiations are still ongoing, but the text presently requires states "to
consider" laws which would allow trafficked persons to remain, temporarily or
permanently in "appropriate cases." States also agree to "facilitate and accept"
the return of victims who are their nationals or who had legal residency rights
when they were trafficked into the destination country. The Protocol incorpo-
rates a series of safeguards to protect victims. Repatriation should be voluntary,
Protocol, supra note 13, at art. 3, par. (a).
Id. at art. 6.
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if possible, and must take into consideration the safety of the victim and the
status of any ongoing legal proceedings. Thus, reducing the likelihood that
victim witnesses will be repatriated before they can testify enhances the viability
of prosecutions.
However, human rights groups have criticized the Protocol. Even though
the Protocol contains a strong law enforcement provision and a first-ever
international definition of "trafficking in persons", it was viewed as a lost
opportunity to protect the rights of victims of trafficking. Shortly after the UN
Crime Commission finished negotiations on the Protocol, the Human Rights
Caucus, composed of twelve NGO's, announced that, the new Protocol was
inadequate as it did not in fact require governments to provide any services to
victims of trafficking and it provided no basis for insisting that governments
treat victims of trafficking different from undocumented migrants. They
challenged the effectiveness of the Protocol on the grounds that does not require
governments to provide emergency shelter, medical or psychological services
or legal counseling or to cease arresting, imprisoning and summarily deporting
victims. Further they argue that victims are not protected. For example, victims
are not notified when traffickers are released from prison. The Protocol fails to
protect the identity of victims or permit victims to remain in the country, even
temporarily if it is unsafe for them to return home.21
According to a Human Rights Caucus press release, "[t]his serious gap in
the Protocol is partly due to government reluctance to make any commitments
to provide services and protection to undocumented persons even if they are
victims of a horrific crime. 22 They note, "Governments were unwilling to
distinguish between trafficking victims and undocumented migrants. This
means local NGO's will encounter tremendous obstacles in advocating the
inclusion of mandatory protection in their domestic trafficking laws. 23
The Protocol will enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of
deposit of the fortieth instrument of ratification. Although the Protocol is a step
towards the eradication of human trafficking, several problems remain that have
yet to be addressed by any major international body. For example, there is a
lack of systematic research and reliable data on the trafficking of human beings
that would allow comparative analyses. The Global Program against Traffick-
ing in Human Beings (GPAT) designed by the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime has been developed to facilitate the gathering of data and the
21. Sutthida Malikaew, U.N. Human Trafficking Protocol Endorsed, PREDA Foundation, Inc., at
http://www.preda.org/research/linkl 100-0101 .html (last visited Feb. 22, 2004).
22. Id.
23. Id.
coordination of national efforts to curb trafficking. Further, the program is
designed to raise awareness of human trafficking at a grassroots level.24
There is a need to strengthen the criminal justice response to trafficking
through legislative reform, awareness raising and training, as well as through
national and international cooperation. Although many nations have adopted
legislation that address human trafficking, these laws often do not have the
beaurocratic support system to implement the laws.
Most importantly, the support and protection of victims who give evidence
is a key to successful prosecution. This support, although addressed in the
Protocol, is clearly inadequate.
Finally, the legal status of trafficked persons must be addressed. Often,
because of the stigma attached to serving as a prostitute, or because of the fear
of AIDS, many victims of trafficking cannot return or do not wish to return to
their native countries despite the fact that they were taken against their will.
Because the states parties could not agree, the Protocol only requires states "to
consider adopting legislative or other appropriate measures that permit victims
of trafficking to remain in its territory temporarily or permanently in appropriate
cases." 25 Clearly, requiring such legislation would provide added protection to
victims of trafficking.
While trafficking in persons has finally gained the attention of the world
community, adequate resources and political will are necessary if this scourge
is to be eradicated. While the Protocol is an important first step, its provisions
must be strengthened to address the needs of the victim as well as law
enforcement.
24. U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Outline of the Programme, at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/
en/traffickingprogramme-outline.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2004).
25. U.N. Office, supra note 12, at art. 4.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations (UN), in its life of forty-eight years, has faced several
challenges' as promoter of human rights in international arena. One such
challenge has been to ensure that even non-state actors such as transnational
corporations (TNCs) 2 respect human rights, at least within their respective
spheres of activity. The UN, in a way, was alive to this when it constituted a
Commission on Transnational Corporations in the mid-70s.3 Though the vision
of the Commission to draft an agreeable code for TNCs failed to materialize
due to various reasons,4 the UN continued to pursue the issue of social
responsibility of TNCs in different forms and forums.5 The approval of the
Norms on Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (UN Norms/Norms) by the Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights6 in August 2003
represents a new vigor on the part of the UN in regulating corporate human
rights abuses. This development, together with the launch of Global Compact,7
1. The challenges related not only to ascertaining the "content" of human rights, but also to their
effective "enforcement."
2. The United Nations preferred the usage of the terms TNCs to multinational corporations
(MNCs) or supranational entities. See generally CYNTHIA D. WALLACE, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 10-12 (Martinus Nijhoff 1983).
3. E.S.C. RES. 1913, U.N. ESCOR, 57TH Sess., Supp. No. 21, at IA, U.N. Doc. E/5570/Add 1
(1974).
4. See PETER MUCHLINSKI,, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAw 593-96 (Blackwell
Publishers 1995).
5. Since 1993, the issues related with TNCs are dealt with by the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The issue of TNCs' social responsibility, including the obligation to
observe human rights norms, is squarely dealt with in at least two of the papers issued by the UNCATD. See
generally Social Responsibility of Transnational Corporations, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development,
at 8 (1999), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//poiteiitm2l.en.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2003); see
Social Responsibility, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD _ITEI/22 (2001),
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//pstieiitd22.en.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2003). Presently, the
Sub-Commission of Human Rights deals with TNCs and the interactions of trade and human rights, which
in turn has constituted a working group on TNCs.
6. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises
with Regard to Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 55th
Sess., Agenda Item 4, 1, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/64155e7e814 lb38c 1256d63002c55e8?Opendocument (last visited Jan.
31, 2004) [hereinafter U.N. Norms].
7. The U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed the Global Compact, consisting of nine
principles in the areas of human rights, labor and environment, on January 31, 1999 at the World Economic
Forum in Davos. The Compact calls upon business enterprises to embrace, support, and enact a set of core
values in the above three areas. See Alexis M. Taylor, The UN and the Global Compact, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 975, 978-79 (2001).
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clearly reflects the necessity as well as urgency on part of the UN to revive its
relevance8 in a new world order in which states no longer enjoy the monopoly
as violators of human rights.9
The UN Norms, however, have not received the attention of academia they
deserved; the release/approval of the Norms is not followed by the searching
academic critiques.' Though the Norms undoubtedly represent an improve-
ment in terms of both formulation and implementation of human rights
standards over earlier such attempts at the international level, they still fall
short of what is required for evolving an effective international regulatory
regime of corporate human rights responsibility. In this article, I intend to
analyze the provisions as well as omissions of the UN Norms. The central
objective of the analysis is to highlight the operational shortcomings, and also
explore the possible approaches that could be taken to remedy them before the
Norms come up for consideration and further action before the UN Commission
on Human Rights in March 2004. By way of caveat, it should be noted that I
do not make any claim of offering final and/or detailed solutions to such
shortcomings, the primary idea being to put an academic debate into motion.
8. Global Compact: Report on Progress and Activities (Draft), at 3 (2002), available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/hometglobal-compact/ProgressReport%20July%203.pdf (last visited Jan. 31,2004)
[hereinafter Compact Progress Report]. Being alive to changing needs, the General Assembly of the UN has
now passed a resolution authorizing continued engagement of the UN with the private sector, including the
Global Compact initiative; Towards Global Partnerships, G.A. Res. 55/215, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., at 2,
U.N. Doc A155/228 (2000).
9. This is clear from two facts. First, since the early 90s there has been a spur in cases filed against
TNCs for human rights abuses all over the world generally and in the US, particularly under the Alien Tort
Claims Act. See Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights,
20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45, 51-53 (2002); Aaron X. Fellmeth, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: A New
Standard for the Enforcement of international Law in the U.S. Courts?, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 241,
244-45 (2002); Ariadne K. Sacharoff, Multinationals in Host Countries: Can They be Held Liable Under the
Alien Tort Claims Act for Human Rights Violations?, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 927, 958-64 (1998); John C.
Anderson, Respecting Human Rights: Multinational Corporations Strike Out, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 463,
464-65 (2000); Lena Ayoub, Nike Just Does It and Why the United States Shouldn't: The United States'
International Obligation to Hold MNCs Accountablefor Their Labor Rights Violations Abroad, 11 DEPAUL
Bus. L.J. 395,400-11 (1999); Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon- An
Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of Multinational Corporations, 20
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 91, 131-36 (2002); Mahmood Monshipouri et al., Multinational Corporations and the
Ethics of Global Responsibility: Problems and Possibilities, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 965, 973-77 (2003). Second,
of the largest 100 economies in the world, fifty-one are TNCs and only forty-nine are states. Nicola Jagers,
The Legal Status of the Multinational Corporation UnderlInternational Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS
AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 260 (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999). The 2003
survey shows that there are now seventy-two TNCs in the list of 100 largest economic entities. Paul Sheehan,
A Rising Force in Capital and Culture, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Jan. 3-4, 2004, at 21. See also Sarah
Anderson & John Cavanagh, Top 200: The Rise of Global Corporate Power, available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncs/top200.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
10. Infra note 15.
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I begin in Part HI by briefly explaining how the Norms make a departure
from the past, and could be characterized, in view of such departure, as an
improvement over their predecessor as well as other current regulatory regimes
of corporate human rights responsibility. Part III first reviews the human rights
obligations of TNCs as laid down in the Norms, and then highlights the two
operational difficulties that they might face: the one of which is the result of
(over)-reference to international human rights instruments whereas the other
relate to putting universal standards of human rights into practice. Regarding
the first issue, I will argue it is desirable that the human rights obligations of
TNCs are enumerated, as far as possible and in an inclusive manner, in a
schedule to the Norms. As far as the second difficulty is concerned, despite a
claim for universality of human rights and the common standards flowing from
such universality, it is necessary for the UN Norms to acknowledge a
distinction between, what I term, "aspirational" and "operational" standards of
human rights. The former signifies general objectives whereas the latter
translates those objectives into concrete measurable units. The Norms could
possibly lay down only the aspirational standards, the exact contours of which
are to be determined by making further rules at municipal levels.
The provisions of the Norms related to implementation of TNCs' human
rights obligations are dealt with in Part IV. Though the Norms make a
promising start by employing multiple monitoring techniques both at national
and international levels, they neither invoke multiple sanctions to enforce
obligations against TNCs nor go far enough in establishing a vigorous
enforcement mechanism. Moreover, it is equally vital that the Norms also
devote some attention to the procedural issues associated with implementation
of human rights standards. It is fundamental to the success of the UN Norms
that, at least, the rules regarding the application of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens and the liability of a parent corporation for human rights violations
by its subsidiaries are reexamined and agreed upon. Part V sums up the
analysis, including the arguments, and also throws some light on the future
treatment of the Norms.
II. NATURE OF UN NORMS: DEPARTURE FROM THE 'PAST'?
The starting point for an analysis of the provisions and omissions of the
UN Norms should be, in my view, the relevance of their place in an interna-
tional mechanism of TNCs' accountability for human rights violations. After
all, what was the need for these new (TNCs would also claim 'additional') 1
11. See e.g., Talking Points on the Draft "Nonns on Responsibilities of Transnational Corpora-
tions and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights," available at http://209.238.219.1 11/
USCIB-text-Talldng-Points.htm (last visited Feb. 3,2003); USCIB is also critical of the Norms on the ground
that, among others, they (i) blur the line between voluntary and legal actions; (ii) are "predicated on the belief
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norms when various international initiatives already exist? 2 The answer to this
question must be found with reference to the provisions of the Norms as
compared with the provisions of their predecessor13 and other current regulatory
regimes of corporate responsibility.14
The relevance of the UN Norms lies in the fact that they represent a shift
in the paradigms "that have to date dominated the discourse of corporate social
responsibility"' 5 and have been responsible for ineffective regulation of
corporate conduct impinging upon human rights. 6 I argue that the Norms
present the most promising human rights norms for TNCs to date because of at
least six factors. First, instead of being limited to labor and/or environmental
rights, 7 the UN Norms attempt to draw a comprehensive list of human rights
that human rights can best be advanced by circumventing national political and legal frameworks"; (iii)
extend far beyond issues of "basic" human rights; (iv) impose impractical obligations. Compare Sir Geoffrey
Chandler, Commentary on the United States Councilfor International Business 'Talking Points'on the Draft
Norms on Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights, available at http://209.238.219.11 l/Chandler-commentary-on-USCIB-Talling-Points.htm
(last visited Dec. 23, 2003) (considering USCIB's response to be "misleading and factually inaccurate").
12. See generally ILO's Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises
and Social Policy, 17 I.L.M. 422 (2002) [hereinafter Tripartite Declaration]; OECD Declaration and
Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 15 LL.M. 967 (1976), available at
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2000doc.nsf/c5ce8ffa4l835d64c 125685 d005300bO/c 125692700623b74c 12
56991003b5147/$FKLFJ00085743.PDF (last visited Aug. 30, 2003) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines]. Besides,
regulatory regimes/initiatives also exist at national and regional levels. See e.g., Alien Tort Claims Act 1789
(US); Commission on Industrial Relations and Industrial Change on Promoting a European Framework for
Corporate Social Responsibility (2001), available at http://www.ibeurope.comfDatabase/Factsheets/
F051csr.htm (ast visited Aug. 30, 2003).
13. A reference could be made to the final draft of the UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Cor-
porations proposed in 1990 by the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations. U.N.
ESCOR Commission on Transnational Corporations, Supp. 7, Annex I, at 12-27, U.N. Doc.
E/1983/17/Rev.1 (1983). The Code never came into force. See generally KWAMENA ACQUAAH,
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS: THE NEW REALITY 108-20 (1986);
MUCHLINSKI, supra note 4, at 592-97.
14. OECD Guidelines, supra note 12.
15. Carolin Hillemanns, U.N. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights, 4 GERMAN L.J. 1065, 1068 (2003).
16. See Surya Deva, Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations and International
Law: Where From Here?, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1-57 (2003). I have argued, in brief, that the existing inter-
national framework of corporate accountability "does not prescribe clear human rights standards, is based
upon flawed premises, relies excessively on states to enforce obligations and offers no sanctions in case of
non-compliance. In sum, the four-fold inadequacy of the system makes it ineffective." Id. at 56.
17. Though the Tripartite Declaration makes a reference that the multinational enterprises "should
respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the corresponding International Covenants adopted
by the General Assembly," the thrust of its provisions is undoubtedly on labor and employment rights. Tri-
partite Declaration, supra notel 2, 1 8. The same could be said about the OECD Guidelines despite the fact
that after the 2000 review a recommendation on human rights finds a place. OECD Guidelines, supra note
12, 111.2.
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obligations. Besides a general obligation "to respect, ensure respect for,
prevent abuse of, and promote human rights recognized in international as well
as national law,""8 the specific obligations relate to the right to equal opportu-
nity and non-discriminatory treatment; the right to security of person; the right
of workers; the respect for national sovereignty and human rights; and the
obligations with regard to consumer and environmental protection. The general
obligation to respect "international human rights" becomes a potent provision
in view of another provision in paragraph 23, which provides that a reference
to "international human rights" in the UN Norms includes all civil, cultural,
economic, political and social rights.
Second, the Preamble to the Norms makes a clear, specific and unequivo-
cal reference to the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) and other international treaties to deduce obligations for TNCs. 9 This
provides a stronger and more widely accepted basis of human rights responsi-
bility generally, and ajus cogens basis regarding some human rights.20 In view
of the UN Norms' reliance on the said international covenants, one commenta-
tor has concluded that the Norms "thus represent a restatement of existing inter-
national human rights law" which "already does or should apply to companies'
conduct."2 Though an academic argument could be made that the UDHR or
other international covenants apply to non-state actors including TNCs,2 one
should not, however, lose sight of the fact that those international covenants
were never drafted to directly23 apply to TNCs and therefore, nowhere provided
for any enforcement mechanism in case TNCs fail to observe the obligations.24
18. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1.
19. The reference to various international conventions, for the purpose ofreliance, is quite elaborate
and covers a wide range of civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights. Id., at the pmbl.
20. See generally B. Simma & P. Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens
and General Principles, 12 AusT. Y.B. INT'L L. 82 (1992).
21. Hillemanns, supra note 15, at 1070.
22. Louis Henkin argues with reference to the application of UDHR to corporations: 'Every
individual includes juridical persons. Every individual and every organ of society excludes no one, no com-
pany, no market, no cyberspace. The Universal Declaration applies to them all." Louis Henkin, The Univer-
sal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 17, 25 (1999). See also
ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 91- 101 (Oxford Univ. 1993) (arguing that the
European Convention of Human Rights and certain UN Conventions cover the protection of human rights
against the actions of private bodies and individuals).
23. However, an argument can be made that the courts have "indirectly" tried to make private actors
accountable, i.e., failure of state to prevent human rights violations by private persons, including corporations,
within its territory amounts to violation of a state's mandate under the international conventions. See e.g.,
Guerra v. Italy, 26 E.H.R.R. 357 (1998). See also David Kinley, Human Rights as Legally Binding orMerely
Relevant?, in COMMERCIAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 25, 40-41 (Stephen Bottomley & David Kinley eds.,
2002); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, Ill YALE L.J.
443, 470 (2001).
24. The International Council on Human Rights Policy report concludes that only the ILO and
Further, the very fact that there is a move towards framing human rights norms
"specifically" directed to TNCs also makes it clear there exist certain gaps in
the prevailing state-focal international regulatory regime.25 The UN Norms,
therefore, do more than merely state the existing; they not only formulate
obligations directed clearly and directly to TNCs but also lay down the
provisions for their implementation.
Third, in terms of the nature of obligations also, the Norms clearly make
an encouraging advancement vis-A-vis the prior or existing corresponding
instruments. As TNCs could violate human rights in several ways (including
by failing to act),26 it is insufficient to draft obligations in conventional "nega-
tive" terms, i.e., that TNCs should/shall not violate human rights. The UN
Norms try to overcome this problem by imposing "positive" obligations on
TNCs. 27 TNCs shall not only refrain from directly or indirectly contributing to,
and benefiting from, human rights violations but also "use their influence in
order to promote and ensure respect for human rights. 28
Fourth, the Norms substitute the conventional approach of "should" with
"shall" in terms of the compliance of the obligation.29 Although it may be
suggested that the change of terminology may not make much difference in
terms of the end result and that strictly speaking the Norms are still not binding,
it is still a positive and definite shift in approach, and should make a difference
when coupled with provisions for implementation of the norms.3" This shift is
OECD enforcement mechanism were designed with companies in mind. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON
HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF COMPANIES 117 (2002).
25. Steven Ratner argues that "a system in which state is the sole target of international legal
obligations may not be sufficient to protect human rights." Ratner, supra note 23, at 461.
26. Deva, supra note 16, at 8. See also Su-Ping Lu, infra note 138, at 605-06; Andrew Clapham
& Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 339, 348-49 (2001) (examining silent complicity as the basis of liability).
27. This is clear from the use of terms obligation to "promote" and "protect" human rights. U.N.
Norms, supra note 6, 1. Also, the obligation is constructed in terms of not only respecting but also
contributing to the realization of human rights. U.N. Norms, supra note 6,1 12. For an argument why TNCs
should be under positive obligations, see Surya Deva, Human Rights Standards and Multinational
Corporations: Dilemma Between "Home" and "Rome," 7 MEDITERRANEAN J. HUM. RTS. 69,87-89 (2003).
28. Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other
Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights, U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 4, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/293378ff2003ceb0c1256d7900310d90?Opend
ocument (last visited Oct. 27, 2003) [hereinafter Commentary on U.N. Norms]. See also Hillemanns, supra
note 15, at 1073.
29. A shift in approach is visible from the use of the term "shall" in paragraphs 2 through 17 and
19 as well as by the fact that the provisions for implementation are given due importance and place in the
U.N. Norms. U.N. Norms, supra note 6. See also Hillemanns, supra note 15, at 1068.
30. It is important to note that paragraph 14 of the final draft of the UN Code of Conduct on
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also a tacit acceptance of the fact that the prevailing "dialogue-cooperation"
based approach of voluntary compliance3 with human rights norms is not
proving to be adequate.32
Fifth, the UN Norms propose specific provisions for implementation of
human rights norms.33 In fact, this is a corollary to the Norms opting for an
obligatory approach to the compliancy of the obligations. Besides asking states
to "establish and reinforce the necessary legal and administrative framework for
ensuring that the Norms ... are implemented by transnational corporations",34
the Norms propose independent and transparent periodic monitoring as well as
verification by national and international (including the UN) mechanisms. 35
This again is a departure from the existing indirect mode of implementation in
which the responsibility of enforcement lies solely and exclusively with states.
A note must be taken of another significant provision of the UN Norms which
provides for prompt, adequate and effective reparation to persons and
communities adversely affected by failure to comply with responsibilities.
36
Sixth, the scope of the Norms is not limited just to TNCs, but also covers
"other business enterprises, 37 that is, any business entity, regardless of its legal
form and/or area of operation, including a partnership, contractor, subcontrac-
tor, supplier, licensee or distributor (hereinafter contractors-suppliers et al).3"
The Norms shall apply to such "other business enterprises" if they have any
relation with a TNC, the impact of its activities is not entirely local, or the
activities involve violations of the right to security outlined in paragraphs 3 and
4.39 Such a wide amplitude of the UN Norms should be seen as a response to
the problem associated in pinning the precise responsibility of a TNC. As in
many situations the apparent violator is not a TNC but its subsidiaries,
contractors or suppliers, should the concerned TNC be allowed to bypass the
Transnational Corporations has chosen "shall" in place of "should." It reads: "Transnational corporations
shall respect human rights and fundamental freedoms in the countries in which they operate." (Emphasis
added). See cases cited supra note 13.
31. See, e.g., Compact Progress Report, supra note 8, at 4. "It [the Global Compact] is a
cooperative framework based on internationally established rights and principles." It must also be noted that
engaging in "policy dialogues" with the business sector is one of the four main areas of activity of the
Compact. Id. See also OECD Guidelines, supra note 12, 1.1.
32. See Mahmood Monshipouri et al., supra note 9, at 979-82. See generally Erin Elizabeth
Macek, infra note 84.
33. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, U 15-19.
34. Id. 117.
35. Id. 16.
36. Id. 18. Compensation not as charity but for violation of a right due to omission of duty is
crucial. See Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, infra note 130.
37. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 1.
38. Id. 121.
39. Id.
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liability on technical grounds, e.g., the separation of personality or lack of
control? The Norms, thus, try to overcome this problem by directly and
squarely placing an obligation, that the contractors-suppliers et al4° of a TNC
respect human rights, on the concerned TNC.4 It must be noted that the
obligation of TNCs also extends to ensuring that their contractors-suppliers et
al actually implement the Norms in their respective operations.42 The Norms,
therefore, send a clear message to TNCs: either ensure that the entities with
whom you do business dealings respect human rights or do not deal with them,
for failure to act may attract liability. 3
The above analysis makes it manifest that the UN Norms represent a
progress (and that too in the right direction) over the prevailing regulatory
regimes. At the same time, one should not become unduly optimistic from this
progress. Despite the above vital improvements, as compared with previous
instruments, the Norms still suffer from serious theoretical and operational
shortcomings, both in terms of formulation and implementation of human rights
obligations. These shortcomings, together with the positives, are dealt with
below in the next two parts.
III. FORMULATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
In this section I first intend to briefly analyze the general as well as
specific human rights obligations of TNCs formulated under the UN Norms,
and then examine some of the operational difficulties which they might face.
I also explore the possible theoretical recourse that could help in overcoming
those difficulties. But before proceeding further, two clarifications. First, I
have invoked, wherever considered appropriate, the Commentary on UN Norms
to understand and state human rights obligations of TNCs because the Norms
40. Though the definition of TNC in paragraph twenty is wide enough to cover even the subsidiaries
of a TNC, "subsidiaries" as such are not specifically mentioned along with suppliers-contractors in paragraph
21. It seems, however, that the subsidiaries of a TNC could still be covered, being a "business enterprise"
having a "relation with a transnational corporation". This interpretation could also be supported from the
language used in paragraph 15. U.N. Norms, supra note 6.
41. Paragraph one provides: "... [Wlithin their respective spheres of activity and influence,
transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall have the obligation to promote, secure the
fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in international as well as
national law, ... "(emphasis added.) U.N. Norms, supra note 6. See also Hillemanns, supra note 15, at
1072-73.
42. This is clear from a provision regarding implementation, which lays down: "... [e]ach
transnational corporation or other business enterprise shall apply and incorporate these Norms in their
contracts or other arrangements and dealings with contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, licensees,
distributors, or natural or other legal persons that enter into any agreement with the transnational corporation
or business enterprise in order to ensure respect for and implementation of the Norms." (emphasis added.)
U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 15.
43. See Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 18.
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itself consider the Commentary to be "a useful interpretation and elaboration
of the standards contained" therein.' Second, as mentioned before, though the
Norms are directed towards TNCs and other business enterprises, for the sake
of convenience I have used TNCs to indicate both.
A. Human Rights Obligations
1. General Obligations
The UN Norms begin by laying down general obligations in paragraph 1.
The obligations are two-fold: primary45 responsibility of states and "within their
respective spheres of activity and influence" the obligation of TNCs to "pro-
mote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human
rights."46 The general obligations assume more significance because of two
reasons. First, all the Norms that follow are to be interpreted in the light of
these general obligations.47 This interpretational guideline becomes very potent
in view of a broader spectrum of duties conceived herein,' and should go a
long way in a (required) liberal construction of the human rights obligations.
Second, the appended commentary clarifies that the obligations apply to
corporations and other business enterprises irrespective of the fact where they
operate49-whether in home or at 'Rome', that is, the host country."0 This again
tries to address, at least at theoretical level, an issue which should have been the
starting point of any theory of corporate responsibility.
A difficulty may, however, arise in construing what is the "respective
spheres of activity and influence" of TNCs, especially when the Norms do not
prescribe any guidelines. For example, would it include the entire supply
chain, and all the subsidiaries as well as affiliate sister concerns of a TNC?
Moreover, whether the spheres of activity of a TNC engaged in, say, construc-
44. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, at pmbl., 9.
45. Qualifying states' responsibility by 'primary' may, though inadvertently, suggest that the
responsibility of TNCs is secondary. Such an implication is avoidable because in view of TNCs emerging
status, role and place, their responsibility to respect/promote human rights should also be primary in nature.
"Because MNCs have gained powers traditionally vested only in states, they should arguably be held to the
same standards that international law presently imposes upon states." Mahmood Monshipouri et al., supra
note 9, at 966.
46. UN Norms, supra note 6, 1.
47. Commentary on UN Norms, supra note 28.
48. See Deva, supra note 27; Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28.
49. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28.
50. Which standards of human rights corporations operating in many countries should follow has
been a critical issue of corporate responsibility debate. See Clare Duffield, Multinational Corporations and
Workers' Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, A DIALOGUE 193 (Stuart Rees &
Shelley Wright eds. 2000); JOHN R. BOATRIGHT, ETHICS AND THE CONDUCT OF BUSINESS 379 (3d ed., 2000).
See also Deva, supra note 27.
2004]
tion work would extend to promoting right to education or privacy generally,
i.e., outside its activity boundary? As TNCs and human rights activists are
likely to plead for opposing interpretations, this aspect requires clarification.
2. Right to Equal Opportunity and Non-Discriminatory Treatment
The UN Norms mandates TNCs to "ensure equality of opportunity and
treatment" in order to eliminate discrimination based on race, color, sex, langu-
age, religion, political opinion, national or social origin, social status, indigen-
ous status, disability or age.5 Besides, there is also a diluted52 obligation to
eliminate discrimination on the ground of health status (including HIV/AIDS),
marital status, capacity to bear children, pregnancy and sexual orientation.53
The measures that accord special protection to children, or are "designed to
overcome past discrimination against certain groups" are, however, considered
not a negation but promotion of equality.54 TNCs are expected to pay special
attention "to the consequences of business activities that may affect the rights
of women", especially regarding conditions of work.55
Though the list of discriminating factors is appreciably extensive, it is
difficult to understand why the obligation is made soft regarding some equally
important variables. For example, despite HIV/AIDS and pregnancy being very
potential reasons for discrimination practiced by corporations all over the
world,5 6 the Norms prescribe no mandatory obligation to desist from such
practices. In one respect however, the Norms deserve credit: an express provi-
sion for taking affirmative action measures to rectify past discrimination. Such
a provision becomes crucial at a time when a fear is expressed that the
assumption of public services by corporations, in view of states resorting to
privatization and disinvestments, will not be accompanied by adoption of
erstwhile states' policies of affirmative actions.5 But it should be noted that
51. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 2.
52. 'Diluted' because the obligation is drafted in terms of 'should' and moreover, laid down under
the commentary as distinguished from the main text of the relevant paragraph.
53. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28.
54. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 2.
55. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 5.
56. A recent survey of almost 8,000 high-level executives from firms in 103 countries revealed that
"fewer than 6 percent of businesses surveyed have an HIV/AIDS-specific written policy that has received
formal approval." David E. Bloom, ET AL., Business and HIV/Aids: Who Me?, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM,
(2003), available at http://www.weforum.orgpdf/Initiatives/GHLBusinessAIDSWhoMe-WAD.pdf (last
visited Dec. 18, 2003). See generally INT'L LAB. OFF., Time for Equality at Work (2003), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/decl/publ/reportsreport4.htrm (last visited Dec. 18, 2003);
Jayanth K Krishnan, The Rights of the New Untouchables: A Constitutional Analysis of HIV Jurisprudence
in India, 25 HuM. RTs. Q. 791-819 (2003).
57. For example, in thecontext ofIndia, wherearts. 15(4) and 16(4)/(4-A)/(4-B) oftheConstitution
provide for special affirmative action provisions for certain under privileged classes of citizens, an argument
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the UN Norms do not make it clear whether this is merely an enabling
provision, or an obligation requiring taking of positive steps.58 In the context
of corporations, a provision for affirmative action would prove more effective
only if it is of the latter category.
3. Right to Security of Person
Paragraph 3 of the UN Norms deals with crimes against the human beings
in violation of international human rights and humanitarian law. TNCs, for
example, shall neither engage nor benefit from war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide, torture, forced disappearance, forced or compulsory labor,
hostage-taking, and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions.5 9 In
addition, the appended commentary provides that besides not producing or
selling weapons declared illegal under international law, TNCs which produce
and/or supply military, security, or police products/services shall also "take
stringent measures to prevent those products and services from being used to
commit human rights or humanitarian law violations."60 These provisions are
a reflection of the lessons learnt from the trial of several corporations for their
direct or tacit involvement in the commission of above-mentioned heinous
crimes, since the Second World War to the present day.6'
The Norms also contain another provision directed at remedying the
fallouts of security arrangements made by TNCs on human rights.62 "Business
security arrangements shall be used only for preventive or defensive services,"
and the force applied by security personnel shall be proportional and only when
"strictly necessary. ,63 It must also be kept in mind that security personnel do
not violate important rights of workers/employees such as the rights to freedom
of association and peaceful assembly and to engage in collective bargaining.64
Moreover, TNCs shall establish policies to prohibit the hiring of private
is made that the government's policies of liberalization might result in undermining the scope of these
provisions.
58. In the context of provisions for affirmative action in the Indian Constitution, M.P. Singh argues
that those not merely enabling provisions and could be claimed by citizens against state like any other funda-
mental right. M.P. Singh, Are Articles 15(4) and 16(4) Fundamental Rights?, 3 J. SUP. CT. CASES 33 (1994).
Contra Pramanand Singh, 'Fundamental Right to Reservation: A Rejoinder,' 3 J. SUP. CT. CASES 6 (1995).
59. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 3.
60. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 5.
61. See Ratner, supra note 23, at 477-78; Hillemanns, supra note 15, at 1073-74; Beth Stephens,
supra note 9, at 49-50; Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations, 35 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'LL. 801,803-07(2002). See also Ramasastry, supra note 9; see generally EDWIN BLACK, IBM
AND THE HOLOCAUST: THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE BETWEEN NAZI GERMANY AND AMERICA'S MOST
POWERFUL CORPORATION (Three Rivers Press 2001).
62. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 3.
63. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 6.
64. Id.
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militias/paramilitary groups, or working with units of state security forces
known for human rights violations.65 Again, we can see clearly the influence
of the human rights violating activities of Enron and Unocal on the drafting of
these provisions.66
4. Rights of Workers
The UN Norms make elaborate provisions regarding workers' rights.
TNCs are supposed to provide a safe and healthy working environment,67 and
are mandated not to use forced or compulsory labor as forbidden by the relevant
international instruments, national legislations, and international human
rights/humanitarian law. 68 A special provision obligates TNCs to respect the
right of children to be protected from economic exploitation.69 TNCs shall not
only create and implement a plan to eliminate child labor7" but also not employ
any person under the age of 18 in any type of work that is hazardous, interferes
with child's education, or is likely to jeopardize the health, safety or moral of
young persons.7'
Besides the above rights, two more provisions deserve special mention.
First, TNCs shall provide workers with remuneration "that ensures an adequate
65. Id.
66. The report of Human Rights Watch on Enron documents detail how Enron/Dabhol Power
Corporation violated civil-political right with the help on Indian police. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE ENRON
CORPORATION: CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY INHUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (1999), available at http://www
.hrw.org/reports/1999/enron/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2003). It should further be noted that one of the charges
leveled against Unocal before the U.S. courts is that it aided/abetted the Burmese military force to carry out
forced dislocation, forced labor, rape, etc. See John Cheverie, United States Court Finds Unocal May be
Liable for Aiding and Abetting Human Rights Abuses in Burma, in 10 HuMAN RIGHTS BRiEF 6 (2002).
67. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 7. The relevant commentary further provides that TNCs "shall
make available information about the health and safety standards relevant to their local activities."
Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 9. Such a provision is very important because most of times
corporations do not disclose information about the possible negative effects of their activities on the
health/safety of employees, consumers and general public. For example, in Bhopal catastrophe the failure
of UCC/UCIL to provide prompt and adequate information about the negative effects of MIC and other gases
proved fatal as far as victims are concerned.
68. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 5. It is also provided that employers shall have resort to prison
labor only as a consequence of a conviction in a court of law, provided that the work/service is carried out
under the supervision and control of a public authority. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 7.
69. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 6. "Economic exploitation" is defined in an expansive manner to
include employment "in a manner that is harmful to their health or development" or in any occupation "before
a child completes compulsory schooling and, except for light work, before the child reaches 15 years of age."
Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 6.
70. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 8.
71. Id. at 7. TNC may, however, employ persons aged 13 to 15 years in light work in national laws
or regulations permit. Id. Such a provision though might be misused by TNCs in view of the fact that they
often enjoy more bargaining power than many developing countries.
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standard of living for them and their families."7" The remuneration should be
freely agreed upon or fixed by national laws/regulation, whichever is higher,
73
and keep in mind the principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value.74
Second, the TNCs shall ensure freedom of association and effective recognition
of the right to collective bargaining of their employees/workers, 75 especially in
those countries that do not fully implement international standards concerning
those rights.76 It should be noted that a sincere commitment on the part of
corporations to respect the rights to freedom of association and collective
bargaining could go a long way in protecting rest of the workers' rights.
It is clear from a brief review of workers' rights that the Norms seek to
achieve lofty goals and make extensive provisions to attain those goals. Critics,
however, argue that the intended results might not be achieved as ambiguity in
the provisions affords enough room for corporations not to follow the
provisions in spirit. For example, with the reference to the provision for fair
and reasonable remuneration 77 it is argued that the Norms "leave it open to
anyone to interpret what are an adequate standard of living and ajust wage" and
"continue to base their wage criteria on the notion of national conditions."78
Though the first point regarding ambiguity deserve consideration, a suggestion
for having equal global wages, both in North and South, is more difficult to
defend as well as pursue. Even if workers in North and South work for same
number of hours and under similar circumstances, it will be both unrealistic and
unreasonable to argue that they should be given same wages, for the wages
awarded to workers at any two given places would command different
purchasing power to satisfy basic needs. It is still necessary though to agree on
common variables with reference to which fair and reasonable wages could be
determined at national level. This is further explained below with reference to
a distinction which should be drawn between aspirational and operational
standards of human rights.
72. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 8.
73. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 10.
74. Id. at 10-11.
75. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 9. TNCs are also supposed to respect the right to workers to strike.
Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 11.
76. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 12.
77. On reading paragraph eight with Commentary (a), it seems that remuneration would be "fair
and reasonable" only if it ensures an adequate standard of living for workers and their families. U.N. Norms,
supra note 6, 8.
78. See e.g., THE JUS SEMPER GLOBAL ALLIANCE, LIVING WAGES NORTH AND SOUTH, Corporate
Social Responsibility and Human Rights 2 (2003), available at http://www.jussemper.org/Resources/
Corporate%20Activity/Resources/CSRandHRnorms.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2003).
5. Respect for National Sovereignty and Human Rights
Under the umbrella of "respect for national sovereignty and human rights",
the Norms stipulate obligations on a wide range of issues-from adherence to
rule of law to abstaining from corruption; from promoting right to development
to respect for national laws/regulation; from promoting social, economic and
cultural rights to positive contribution for human rights realization generally.79
The most striking feature of these provisions is their treatment of TNCs,
together with other state organs, as vehicle of developing a society wedded to
rule of law, transparency, accountability and sustainable development and in
which people's civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights are realized.
Despite the fact that TNCs' obligations are subject to the limitations of "their
resources and capabilities,"' it represents a departure from the traditional role
of TNCs in society in at least three respects. First, the human rights obligations
of TNCs instead of being limited to mere civil and political rights now also
encompass second and third generation human rights, that is, both individual
and collective social, economic and cultural rights. Second, the scope of
obligations is clearly broadened; TNCs shall be subject to both negative and
positive obligations. Third, TNCs are expected to respect/promote human
rights not only of those who are affected by their activities directly (workers/
consumers) but also of those affected indirectly, invisibly and/or in the longer
run (society as such).
It will be worthwhile to note some of the obligations which demonstrate
the above shift. TNCs are, for example, expected to enhance the transparency
of their activities in regard to payments made to government/public officials."1
They are also obligated to respect the rights of indigenous people, including "to
own, occupy, develop, control, protect and use their lands, other natural
resources, and other cultural and intellectual property." 2 Moreover, TNCs
shall contribute to the realization, in particular, of the rights to development,
adequate food and drinking water, the highest attainable standard of physi-
cal/mental health, adequate housing, privacy, education, freedom of thought,
conscience and religion, and freedom of opinion and expression. 3
The above provisions undoubtedly reflect a paradigmatic shift in terms of
the appropriate role and place of corporations in society generally and regarding
human rights in particular.8 4 But the Norms merely paint this picture with a
79. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, l 10-12.
80. See Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 12.
81. Id. at 13.
82. Id. at 12.
83. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 12.
84. See e.g., Erin Elizabeth Macek, Scratching the Corporate Back: Why Corporations have no
Incentive to Define Human Rights, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 101 (2002).
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broad brush; it is not clear how TNCs are expected to put these expectations
into practice. Various issues would require clarification or concretization
before TNCs actually deliver the desired goods. For example, whether only
those TNCs whose activities come in direct contact or conflict with certain
human rights are under a positive obligation, or all operating TNCs are under
a general obligation to promote all the human rights? It seems that the Norms
tend to adopt, in my view rightly, the second option, but in that case it will be
necessary that corporate law, which governs the establishment and working of
corporations, both at national and international level is amended to provide for
taking into account the impact of corporate decisions/activities on human rights
in society. The Norms are, however, silent on this issue. Unless it is precisely
clear what we want TNCs to do, any further talks about the efficacy of the
proposed regime will be premature as well as unsound.
6. Obligations with Regard to Consumer Protection
As the activities of corporations also come in conflict with consumers'
various (human) rights, 5 the Norms make specific provision to address this
issue. TNCs shall not only act in accordance with fair business, marketing and
advertising practices, including relating.to competition and anti-trust matters,
but also take all necessary steps to ensure safety/quality of the goods and
services provided.86 An important aspect is that TNCs are also expected to
observe the precautionary principle, 7 and also disclose, in cases where a
product is potentially harmful, all appropriate information on the contents and
possible hazardous effects of the products through proper labeling, informative
and accurate advertising and other appropriate methods.88 These provisions
85. Consumers' rights to information, health and safety, and clean environment are directly affected
by corporate decisions/activities. For example, a study conducted by Chapman & Carter demonstrates how
Australian tobacco industry strived hard to avoid, delay and dilute health warnings on cigarettes. S. Chapman
& S.M. Carter, Avoid Health Warnings on All Tobacco Products for Just as Long as We Can: A History of
Australian Tobacco Industry Efforts to Avoid, Delay and Dilute Health Warnings on Cigarettes, 12 (Suppl
IM) TOBACCO CONTROL J., iiil 3, iiil 3-22 (2003). Also, a recent investigation indicates that pharmaceutical
companies are investing millions of dollars into patient advocacy groups and medical organizations in order
to expand markets for their products. Gary Hughes & Liz Minchin, Drug Firms Fund Disease Awareness,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Dec. 13, 2003, at 5, available at http://www.smh.com.au/cgi-bin/common/
popupPrintArticle.plpath=/articles/2003/12/12/1 (last visited Mar. 20,2004); Gary Hughes & Liz Minchin,
Sugar-Coating the Message, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Dec. 13, 2003, at 30.
86. U.N. Norms, supra note 6,113. See also Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 15.
87. U.N. Norms, supra note 6,113. See also Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 15.
"Precautionary principle" means that lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a justification for
not taking or delaying a step which could have enhanced the safety/quality of the goods or services, especially
when doing so may result in irreversible harm.
88. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 15.
will become immensely relevant in the time to come, for example, in the
context of genetically modified products, or breast implants technology.
7. Obligations with Regard to Environmental Protection
The UN Norms also respond to the growing concern about corporations'
indifference to sustainable development while taking business decisions as well
as formulating short/long term policies. Accordingly, TNCs shall carry out
their activities in accordance with laws, practices and policies of the country of
operation as well as international agreements, principles and standards regard-
ing environmental perseverance in order to contribute to "the wider goal of
sustainable development."89  TNCs are required to assess periodically the
impact of their activities on environment and human health,9" especially of
certain groups such as children, older person, women and indigenous people.9'
Further, best management practices and technologies must be adopted to reduce
the risk of accidents and damage to the environment.
92
As TNCs operate in countries placed at different levels of development
and consequently having varying levels of environmental standards, it becomes
problematic and often full of business dilemmas as to which standards out of
three-home, host or international-should they follow. Though the Norms
mandate TNCs to observe both international and host standards, in many
situations the host standards are as good as non-existent or are not enforced.93
As far as the international standards are concerned, they are generally so vague
and general that it is quite easy to comply with their words without adhering to
their spirit.94 In such a scenario, it is worth exploring whether TNCs should not
follow the higher of home or host standards, irrespective of the fact where they
operate.95
89. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 14.
90. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 16.
91. Id. TNCs are also required to make the impact reports accessible, in a timely manner, to the
affected groups, concerned national/international institutions and to the general public. Id.
92. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 17.
93. For example, India had no "specific" law dealing with environmental pollution, hazardous
substances, or violations of human rights in 1984, at the time of the Bhopal accident. In fact, the Bhopal
catastrophe led to the enactment of the Environment Protection Act of 1986, the Public Liability Insurance
Act of 1991, and the National Environment Tribunal Act of 1995. Similarly, Myanmar had no law
specifically dealing with the environment, human rights, or forced labor in 1993 when Unocal entered into
a joint venture project in Myanmar. Later, Myanmar passed the Protection of Wild Life, Wild Plants and
Conservation of Natural Areas Law of 1994.
94. It will be overoptimistic to assume that precise environmental obligations for TNCs are
ascertainable. See e.g., Declaration of the United Nations on the Environment, June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1 (commonly referred to as the Stockholm Declaration); Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, Aug. 12, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/26 (Vol. I).
95. See generally Deva, supra note 27.
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B. Operational Difficulties: A Response
Despite making a commendable effort to formulate human rights
obligations for TNCs, the UN Norms, in my view, might face several opera-
tional shortcomings. Two of such possible difficulties are dealt with below.
1. (Over)-reference to International Human Rights Law/Instruments?
The Norms make frequent reference to numerous international treaties,
which are negotiated as well as signed by states and are directed primarily
towards states. This approach is problematic due to several reasons. At the
outset, the approach is circular. Instead of laying down ascertainable and guid-
able human rights standards, it leads the consumers of the Norms - from TNCs
to NGOs, states, and victims-to several national and international instruments.
In other words, the questions such as what are the obligations of TNCs in a
given case and whether they violated those obligations cannot be determined
with reference to the UN Norms. Though at places the appended commentary
try to give concrete shape to some of the obligations,96 on the whole that is
highly inadequate. A reference to state oriented international instruments to
deduce TNCs' human rights obligations might present another difficulty when
it comes to TNCs' positive obligations. 97 Whether the positive human rights
obligations of TNCs, especially regarding socio-economic and cultural rights,
are expected to be equivalent to that of states, which were conceived as original
and primary targets of such international instruments? 98 If TNCs' positive
obligations are not as extensive as that of states, which seems to be a more
probable as well as acceptable stand, 99 then it will be logical to stipulate their
obligations separately.
I argue, therefore, that though there is no need to redefine human rights
especially for corporations and it is perfectly legitimate to rely upon interna-
tional instruments 'negotiated-signed-applicable' to states to construct human
96. See e.g., Commentary to U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 7-9.
97. See e.g., Sarah Joseph, Pharmaceutical Corporations and Access to Drugs: The "Fourth
Wave" of Corporate Human Rights Scrutiny, 25 HuM. RTS. Q. 425,436-38 (2003) (examining the complex
question which arise regarding the human rights obligations of pharmaceutical companies).
98. For example, a pharmaceutical company should have positive obligations only regarding those
human rights which are directly related to its core business (e.g., right to health), or qua all human rights
generally (e.g., right to adequate housing or food/drinking water).
99. For obvious reasons, TNCs cannot be equated to states as far as the nature and extent of human
rights obligations are concerned. Donaldson argues that "corporation is an economic animal" and therefore,
"it would be unfair, not to mention unreasonable, to hold corporations to the same standards of charity and
love as human individuals." THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 84 (1989).
See also Deva, supra note 27, at 95-96.
rights obligations for TNCs,'00 it may still be necessary to deduce specific
obligations of TNCs with reference to the referred international instruments.
This is also required because TNCs could not possibly violate certain human
rights enumerated in state-focal international treaties."°1 Therefore, in my view,
subject to the limitation regarding putting universality in operation discussed
below, it is desirable that the human rights obligations of TNCs are enumerated,
as far as possible and in an inclusive manner, in a schedule to the Norms.
Doing so will not only bring certainty in terms of what is to be followed and
consequent higher rate of compliance, but will also be an economically efficient
way of regulation.
2. Human Rights Standards: Putting Universality in Operation?
The Norms acknowledge, among others, the universality of human
rights,1 12 which in the context of TNCs also mean that they should observe the
same standards of human rights whether operating in "home" or at "Rome".
Though this article is not the appropriate place to join an already intensive and
extensive debate over universality (or lack of it) of human rights generally, 0 3
I intend to explore this additional TNCs-related dimension of universality
100. Joseph Raz argues that "there is no closed list of duties which correspond to the right .... A
change of circumstances may lead to the creation of new duties based on old right."(emphasis added).
JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 171 (1986).
101. See e.g., Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(l1),
U.N.Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), and Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (N.O. 16), at 52 U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
(Mar. 23, 1976) [right to be presumed innocent when charged for a penal offence]; Article 12 of the ICCPR
[liberty to leave and enter his own country]. Steven Ratner, however, contemplates the situations in which
corporation could involve in violation of even such rights. Ratner, supra note 23, at 492-93.
102. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 3. Besides universality, "indivisibility, interdependence and
interrelatedness of human rights" are also acknowledged. Id.
103. Out ofa vast literature, one can refer to: HENRY J. STEINER &PHILIPALSTON, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, MORALS, POLITICS 192-255 (1996); Jack Donnelly, Human Rights and
Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights, 76 AM. POL. So. REV.
303 (1982); Yash Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: The Asian Debate, 15 AUSTRALIAN Y.B. INT'L L.
1 (1994); Michael Perry, Are Human Rights Universal? The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, 19
HUM. RTS. Q. 468 (1997); Abdullahi Ahmad An-Na'im, Human Rights in Muslim World: Socio-Political
Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13 (1990); ALISON DUNDES RENTELN,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM (Sage Pub. 1990); Rein Mulierson,
Universal Human Rights in the Multicultural World: Reasons and Excuses for, and Circumstances
Conducive to their Gross and Systemic Violation, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: ETHICS AND ECONOMICS OF THE
WORLD ORDER 133 (Meghnad Desai & Paul Redfern eds., 1995); Adamantia Pollis, Cultural Relativism
Revisited: Through a State Prism, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 316 (1996); UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 91-118 (2002); Fernando R. Teson, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, in HUM.
RTS. L. 117 (PHILIPS ALSTON ed., 1996); and Michael Goodhart, Origin and Universality in the Human
Rights Debate: Cultural Essentialism and the Challenge of Globalisation 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 935 (2003).
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which arise because of the fact that TNCs, unlike states, operate in more than
one country. Agreeing that TNCs shall pay fair and reasonable remuneration,
whether fair and reasonable would quantify into 'same' wages, say, at a factory
in India and in the US? Again agreeing that TNCs shall contribute to the
realization of, say, the right to drinking water (or access to highest attainable
standard of health, for that matter), what type of and level of contamination will
make the water not suitable for 'drinking' (or in case of right to health, by
which yardstick highest attainable standard will be judged)? Such examples,
which could be easily multiplied with reference to various provisions in the
Norms, demonstrate that there are operational difficulties associated with
universal human rights. How such difficulties could be overcome, to the
satisfaction of the affected parties having conflicting interests?
Even if we assume arguendo that human rights are universal, it seems that
in case of many human rights universality is only in terms of aspiration and not
regarding the content ofaspiration; in fact, a push for pressing universality also
regarding the content of rights might result in negation rather than promotion
of human rights. For example, there is a universal right to food but it is
doubtful whether there is a universal right to a particular type of food.
Similarly, the right to safe and healthy working environment or the right to fair
and reasonable subsistence wages is universal only in abstract terms and in each
case the quantification of what is safe and healthy or fair and reasonable is
bound to vary from place to place. Thus, in order to operationalize the abstract
universality and/or to ascertain the content of human rights, certain adjustments
to local social, political, economic and cultural conditions are to be made.1"4
A distinction, therefore, needs to be drawn between aspirational and operational
standards of human rights. A note of caution, however, is required in localizing
the universality in such a manner. As the objective of this exercise is to
promote human rights, it should be ensured that only those local differences are
given weight which help in fulfilling the intended objective; the differences
which do not respect human dignity should be treated as irrelevant.'05
In view of the above distinction proposed between aspirational and
operational standards of human rights, the Norms could only possibly lay down
aspirational standards of human rights. Such aspirational standards would
require to be translated into concrete measurable operational standards at
municipal level. Unfortunately, the Norms do not recognize this distinction and
consequently try to achieve an impossible balance between generality and
104. For example, Shelley Wright argues how local cultural differences might be used to promote
human rights, and a failure to recognize such differences might in fact result in subverting human rights.
SHELLEY WRIGHT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, DECOLONISATION AND GLOBALISATION: BECOMING
HUMAN 88-93, 111, 213-14 (2001).
105. See Deva, supra note 27, at 77-78.
specificity. In the absence of UN Norms not adopting the distinction between
aspirational and operational standards, they might prove ineffective not only in
guiding the conduct of TNCs but also working as touchstone with reference to
which violation of human rights could be measured. Recognition of such a
distinction, on the other hand, is likely to increase the efficacy of the UN
Norms.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
Lack of implementation strategy and effective sanctions have been the
most critical lacunae of the existing international regimes of corporate
responsibility for human rights violations.'0 6 Being conscious of this aspect, the
UN Norms, after some initial debate during drafting stage,' make a departure
from the past approach of merely voluntary implementation. Paragraphs 15 to
19 deal with "general provisions of implementation." Out of these, only the
first three paragraphs (15-17) relate to implementation procedures stricto sensu;
while paragraph 18 elaborates the obligation to provide for reparation to the
victims adversely affected by non-compliance with the Norms, paragraph 19
lays down the rule that the Norms shall not be "construed as diminishing,
restricting, or adversely affecting the human rights obligations" of states and/or
TNCs under national or international laws.'0° I begin below with an analysis
of the provisions related to multiple implementation techniques as well as
reparation and then move on to examine some of the lacunae which may
seriously hamper the efficacy of the prescribed implementation mechanism.
106. With reference to the Global Compact, Alston makes an apt remark, which holds true regarding
other regulatory instruments as well: "[T]he more puzzling nature of the proposal [i.e., Global Compact] is
that it reduces the focus to a very soft and dialogue-based effort to promote human rights." (emphasis
added). Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to
Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 815, 837 (2002). See also William H. Meyer & Boyka Stefanova, Human
Rights, the UN Global Compact, and Global Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 501,503-04 (2001); and
Letters from Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, to the Global Compact Office (Oct. 21, 2001, Nov. 2001,
Apr. 7, 2003), available at http://www.lchr.org/workers-rights/wr-other/LCHR to UN -Oct 01 .pdf,
http://www.lchr.org/workers.-rights/wr _ other/LCHR _ to _ UN _ Nov 01 .pdf,
http://www.lchr.org/workers-rights/wr-other/joint-ltr UN 040703.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2003).
107. See Hillemanns, supra note 15, at 1068-69.
108. In case of a choice between the Norms and "more protective interests", paragraph nineteen
confers priority on the latter. Commentary (a) to paragraph nineteen also makes it clear by providing that
"[i]f more protective standards are recognized or emerge in international or state law or in industry or
business practices, those more protective standards shall be pursued." Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra
note 28, at 20.
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A. Techniques and Modes of Implementation
The UN Norms try to combine multiple implementation techniques for
ensuring that TNCs comply with their human rights obligations. On a closer
scrutiny of the relevant provisions, one can also notice that these techniques
seek to implement two different types of obligations: direct and indirect. Para-
graphs 15 and 16 are aimed at implementing direct obligations of TNCs and I
will, therefore, call it the "direct mode." The mode is direct because it treats
TNCs under a direct obligation to respect/promote human rights and seeks to
enforce such obligation by invoking internal as well as external techniques.
Paragraph 17, on the other hand, is directed at implementing indirect obliga-
tions, i.e., the obligation of states to ensure that all entities, including TNCs,
within their jurisdiction respect human rights rather than implementing TNCs'
obligations to respect human rights.'0 9 This can, therefore, be termed as "in-
direct mode" to distinguish it from the first one." 0 I believe that the distinction
between the two modes is vital. To draw an analogy, it is the distinction
between saying that minor children shall not drive and that parents shall ensure
that their minor children do not drive. The distinction, in other words, is that
in the former case the proposed mechanism, whether national or international,
will be enforcing obligations imposed directly on TNCs whereas in the latter
what the mechanism will be enforcing is only an intermediary/indirect
obligation, i.e., states' obligation to ensure that TNCs within their territory
respect human rights."'
1. Direct Mode
The direct mode adopts a two-fold strategy of implementation. First,
TNCs "shall adopt, disseminate and implement internal rules of operation in
compliance with the Norms. ' "2 As here the emphasis is on TNCs adopting and
109. See Danwood M. Chirwa, Obligations of Non-State Actors in Relation to Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights Under the South African Constitution, 7 MEDITERRANEAN J. HUM. RTS. 29, 43-49 (2003)
(discussing the emerging jurisprudence of indirect obligations).
110. It appears the indirect mode is added in the last stage of the drafting, as a provision for this is
not found in the Draft Norms on Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises, U.N. Comm. on Hum. Rts., 54th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/WG.2/WP.1 (2002), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/
0/8af5cb0c00839902c 1256c010054b660/$FIIE/G0213899.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2003).
111. Such an obligation on states is discemable, among others, from paragraph I of the Norms:
"States have the primary responsibility to promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and
protect human rights recognized in international as well as national law, including ensuring that
transnational corporations and other business enterprises respect human rights." (emphasis added). See
generally U.N. Norms, supra note 6. See also Chirwa, supra note 109. See cases cited supra note 23.
112. See U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 15. TNCs are also obliged to "periodically report on and take
other measures fully to implement the Norms." Id. It is, however, not very clear to whom such reporting is
to be made.
applying the Norms themselves, I will call this the strategy of "internalization."
The strategy of internalization is directed towards developing a corporate
culture of respect to human rights. TNCs should give appropriate training to
their managers and workers as an initial step for building such a culture." 3
More importantly, such human rights culture is not to be confined to the narrow
legal structure of TNCs but has to extend to their contractors-suppliers et al, as
TNCs are obligated to apply and incorporate the Norms in the relevant
contracts/business arrangements. "4 TNCs shall either ensure that their business
partners comply with human rights obligations or cease to work with them." 5
Though TNCs might contend that this is an impractical expectation, the Norms
rightly place the obligation directly and squarely on TNCs because only TNCs
are in a position/power to achieve this result.
Second, TNCs "shall be subject to periodic monitoring and verifying by
United Nations, other international and national mechanisms already in
existence or yet to be created.""..6 It can be termed "external" strategy in view
of the focus being on external agencies keeping an eye on the conduct of TNCs.
Though the Norms have not elaborated upon the details of proposed monitor-
ing/verification, the appended commentary suggests that the UN human rights
treaty bodies should monitor implementation of these Norms, among others,
through the "creation of additional reporting requirements for states."" 7 A role
is also envisaged for other UN special agencies, including the Commission on
Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights." 8 But it is surprising that there is no specific mention of the
Global Compact despite the fact that it is a UN initiative especially directed
towards corporate social responsibility. Moreover, the reliance on state
reporting to ensure that TNCs comply with the Norms is too optimistic to be
realistic," 9 more so when states act in connivance with TNCs on many
occasions. "0
113. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 17.
114. U.N. Norms, supra note 6,115. See also Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 17-18.
115. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 18.
116. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 16.
117. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 18-19.
118. Id.
119. The mechanism is already under serious stress to prevent human rights abuses even by states.
See James Crawford, The UN Human Rights Treaty System: A System in Crisis?, in THE FUTURE OF UN
HUMAN RIGHTSTREATY MONITORING4-11 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000) (highlighting some
of the factors responsible for this stress). See also Final Report on Enhancing the Long-Term Effectiveness
of the UN Human Rights Treaty System, U.N. ESCOR, 53rd Sess., Agenda Item 15, 37-52, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1997/74; U.N. C.H.R., 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/75 (2000); UN Human Rights Treaties:
Facing the Implementation Crisis, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY
SYSTEM IN THE 21 ST CENTURY 682-90, (Anne F. Bayefsky ed., 2000).
120. Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi point out three types of corporate complicity: direct, indirect,
2004] Deva
516 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 10:493
It can be said that though the Norms rightly take cognizance of the
necessity of putting in place an external international regulatory regime to make
TNCs accountable for human rights violations, they fall short of moving in the
right direction. For example, it requires thorough investigation whether a new
international body is created for this purpose 2' or the existing institutions,
including the WTO, are molded to enforce human rights obligations against
TNCs. "'22 What is, however, appreciable that the commentary to paragraph 16
not only encourages trade unions and NGOs to invoke the Norms for their
actions/dealings with TNCs, but also hope that the Norms could be used as
benchmarks of ethical investing.2 3 Such a provision is important because the
success of any mechanism aimed at enforcing human rights obligations on
TNCs requires, in addition to traditional enforcement tools, evolution and
employment of new enforcement strategies.
2. Indirect Mode
Under the indirect mode, the Norms expects that "states should establish
and reinforce the necessary legal and administrative framework for ensuring
that the Norms" are implemented by the TNCs. 124 It is interesting to note that
this is the only provision that is drafted in terms of 'should', a deviation which
is difficult to explain especially when the obligation of states to respect and
promote human rights also includes the responsibility to ensure/secure respect
from other natural or legal persons operating within its territory. 25 The
and silent. Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 26, at 342-49. See also Ramasastry, supra note 9, at 100-04
(examining in detail the nature and level of corporate complicity with states that should give rise to civil and
criminal liability); Ratner, supra note 23, at 500-06.
121. See e.g., the proposals cited by William Meyer and Boyka Stefanova. Meyer & Stefanova,
supra note 106, at 520-21. See also Monshipouri et al., supra note 9, at 983-86.
122. I have elsewhere argued that the proposed international mechanism could be based upon a
partnership between the UN and the WTO. Deva, supra note 16. See generally Emst-Ulrich Petersmann,
Time for a United Nations 'Global Compact'for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide
Organizations: Lessons from European Integration, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 621 (2002). Contra Alston, supra
note 106; Robert Howse, Human Rights in the WTO: Whose Rights, What Humanity? Comment on
Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 651 (2002).
123. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 19. It could be said that by introducing the
notion of "ethical investment" the Norms are catching up with a global trend towards promoting ethical or
socially responsible investment. For example, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission is
currently in the process of finalizing guidelines regarding product disclosure statements (PDS). See AusTL.
SEC. & INV. COMM' N, DISCLOSURE ABOUT LABOUR STANDARDS AND ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND ETHICAL
CONSIDERATIONS IN PRODUCT DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS- DRAFT ASIC S 101 3DAGUIDELINES FOR PRODUCT
ISSUERS (2003), available at http://www.asic.gov.au (last visited Sept. 15, 2003); see generally AUSTRALIAN
GOVERNMENT'S DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND HERITAGE, CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY-AN
INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE: THE MAYS REPORT (2003).
124. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 17.
125. Id. 1 1. See also Chirwa, supra note109.
appended commentary elaborates further the above expectation of the UN
Norms: the governments should not only make these Norms widely known but
also use them as a model for initiating legislations or taking administrative
processes, including national human rights commissions. 126  Whether this
provision makes any difference or not, will depend to a large extent on how the
courts, both municipal and international, make use of this directory mandate. 27
In case TNCs fail to comply with the Norms, they shall provide reparation
to individuals, entities and communities adversely affected by such failure.2 8
The reparation, which may take the form of restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation for any damage done or property taken, must be prompt, effective
and adequate. 29 This provision is significant because of at least three reasons.
First, it implies that victims of corporate human rights abuses shall have a right
to claim compensation. Thus, TNCs should no longer be able to present
payment of monetary compensation as a sign of mercy shown to the victims. 3
Second, as the compensation could be claimed even by communities, presum-
ably for violation of collective rights, this will take care of those situations
when it is difficult to attribute harm to identifiable individuals. Third, the
provision expressly acknowledges that reparation, in order to serve any real
purpose, should be prompt, effective and adequate.
Despite the above positives, one difficult issue survives regarding the
adequacy of compensation. Courts, both at municipal and international levels,
face an obvious difficulty in quantifying damages for human rights violations,
especially when victims and TNCs belong to countries placed in vastly different
stages of economic development. It seems that the guidance offered by the
Norms-that courts, while determining damages, shall apply the Norms in
pursuance to national/international law' 3 -- does not reach to the root of the
problem. The quantification of damages invariably raises the question about
the value of life, say, of a worker in an Indian factory qua a worker employed
in a similar factory in the US or Europe. To put it differently, whether the loss
of life should have same monetary value everywhere or not? Another
ambiguity remains regarding the objectives sought to be achieved by the
provision for reparation; it is not clear whether deterrence is one of the
underlying themes. If deterrence is one of objectives behind reparation, which
126. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 20.
127. See sources cited supra note 23.
128. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 18.
129. Id.
130. For example, in the Bhopal case the settlement order of the Supreme Court read: "Tbe aforesaid
payments [of $470 million] shall be made to the Union of India as claimant andfor the benefit of all victims
of the Bhopal gas disaster ... and not as fines, penalties, or punitive damage." Union Carbide Corp. v.
Union of India A.I.R., 1990 S.C. 273, 275 (India) (emphasis added).
131. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 18.
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in my view should be, then there should be a specific provision for awarding
punitive damages. If so, what should be the test for determining punitive
damages-whether the proportionality of the harm caused or the economic
capacity of the concerned TNC should play any role in this regard?'32
B. What is still Lacking?
Effective and efficient implementation of the Norms holds the key to the
extent of their success in achieving the intended objective. Though the Norms
make a sincere attempt in formulating the provisions for implementation, in my
view they fall short of what is required. In my view, the UN Norms suffer from
at least following three glaring omissions which might seriously hamper the
prospect of their viable enforcement.
1. Multiple Sanctions
As explained above, the Norms stipulate implementation provisions. But
which coercive measures could follow if certain TNCs fail to implement the
mandate of the Norms? It seems that the response of the Norms to such a
situation is two-fold. First, the expectation is that states will establish the
necessary legal framework to ensure that TNCs comply with their human rights
standards under the Norms and also otherwise.13 3 It is logical to assume that
provisions related to sanctions could be part of such legal framework. It can,
however, be said that administering sanctions solely or even predominantly
through states might not fulfill the desired results. Past experiences show that
on many occasions, if not always, states either act in complicity with TNCs'
132. The Indian Supreme Court has laid down a principle of punitive damages that is worth
considering. Oleum Gas Leak Case (M.C. Mehta v. Union of India) A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1086. Justice Bhagwati
observed that "the measure of compensation in the kind of cases referred to in the preceding paragraphs [i.e.,
liability of an enterprise dealing with hazardous or inherently dangerous activity] must be correlated to the
magnitude and capacity of the enterprise because such compensation must have a deterrent effect. Id. The
larger and more prosperous the enterprise, greater must be the amount of compensation payable by it for the
harm caused on account of an accident in the carrying on of the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity
by the enterprise." Id. at 1099-1100.
133. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 117.
134. For an example, see the activities of Enron in India and Unocal in Myanmar.
or tacitly align with them.'35 This is besides the fact that any municipal system
will always find it difficult to impose sanctions on a transnational entity.'36
Second, TNCs which fail to implement the Norms are obligated to pay
reparation to those adversely affected.'37 Reparation is undoubtedly an
important, and from the perspective of victims also useful, remedy, but it is
doubtful whether reparation alone could coerce TNCs to respect the Norms.
Ideally, the UN Norms should employ three types of sanctions against TNCs:
civil, criminal and social. Reparation under the Norms seems to be used only
as a civil remedy as it is unclear whether it is also intended to be utilized as a
criminal sanction. It is important that the Norms not only resort to criminal
sanctions against TNCs (and their human hands) but also effectively invoke
social sanctions-by which I mean outcast of the concerned corporation from
the market through blacklisting/ban on commercial dealings, and also pressure
emanating from consumers, investors, media and NGOs' 38-to enforce the
human rights obligations against TNCs.'39 Further, it is equally vital that these
multiple sanctions flow, wherever possible, from international as well as non-
state sources, including market forces.
2. Enforcement Mechanism
A strong enforcement mechanism is sine qua non for effective implemen-
tation of the Norms. Being alive to this, the Norms conceive of multiple
monitoring and verification mechanisms, both at national and international
135. For an example see the response of the US government which is clear from the following two
facts. First, the U.S. Department of State, in a letter submitted to the District Court of Columbia, has taken
the stand that the adjudication of human rights violation case against ExxonMobil Corporation by the U.S.
courts might have "serious adverse impact on significant interests of the United States." Secondly, on May
8, 2003, the US Justice Department, in an amicus curie brief submitted in Unocal case before the Court of
Appeal for the Ninth Circuit, has questioned the very basis of judicial invocation of the ATCA against the
US based MNCs for redressing human rights violations abroad. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States of
America, John Does I, et al. v. Unocal Corp., et al., 2002 WL 31063976 (Nos. 00-55603,00-56628, available
at http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/05/dojO50803.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2003). See generally Elliot J
Schrage, Judging Corporate Accountability in the Global Economy, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 153
(2003).
136. For example, the UCC and its officials are successfully avoiding the pending criminal
proceedings in India. See also Deva, supra note 16, at 48-49 (explaining various substantive and procedural
difficulties associated with state-based regulation of TNCs).
137. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 18.
138. See Su-Ping Lu, Corporate Codes of Conduct and the FTC: Advancing Human Rights through
Deceptive Advertising Law 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 603,607, 613,624 (2000); Macek, supra note 84,
at 110-15; Monshipouri et al., supra note 9, at 986-87.
139. Though the Commentary to paragraphs 15 and 16 indicates that the U.N. Norms conceive a role
for civil society organs and stakeholders, generally that role still needs to be clearly demarcated and
institutionalized.
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levels. 4 ' But it seems that the idea is still undeveloped; no definite and/or
viable framework for such a mechanism is ascertainable from the Norms, and
the appended commentary invite the Sub-Commission on Human Rights and
other UN bodies "to develop additional techniques for implementing and
monitoring these Norms."'' If the Norms are adopted in its present form, that
is, without any concrete mechanism to supervise the implementation, it will
undoubtedly make a mockery of the Norms, framed admittedly in "non-
voluntary" terms and supported for the first time with implementation
provisions. Therefore, an enforcement mechanism should be put in place
before the Norms being adopted. It is equally critical that the mechanism is
both effective and efficient, that is, it could not only preempt human rights
violations but also offer speedily an adequate remedy to the victims in cases of
violation. For example, the suggestion of monitoring implementation by
existing human rights treaty bodies through additional state reporting
requirement'42 is likely to prove neither effective nor efficient.'43
3. Response to (Mis)use of Procedural Issues
At least two procedural issues-forum non conveniens'"and the liability
of a parent corporation for human rights violations by its subsidiaries'-have
140. U.N. Norms, supra note 6, 1 16.
141. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 18-19. Paragraph 16 contemplates monitoring
and verification also by national/international institutions "yet to be created." U.N. Norms, supra note 6,
16.
142. Commentary on U.N. Norms, supra note 28, at 18-19.
143. It is anybody's guess how an already burdened, and in need for reforms, mechanism would cope
up with more than 60,000 TNCs operating in the world. See Halina Ward, Securing Transnational
Corporate Accountability Through National Courts: Implications and Policy Options, 24 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REv. 451, 452 (2001) (citing UNCTAD's 1999 World Investment Report).
144. Jamie Cassels argues that the "doctrine [of forum non conveniens] shields multinationals from
liability for injuries abroad." JAMIE CASSELS, THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE OF LAW: LESSONS FROM BHOPAL
144 (1993). Similarly, Justice Doggett, while rejecting the plea of forum non conveniens in a case brought
by the farm workers of Costa Rica against Shell Oil and Dow Chemicals, observed that the doctrine is not
really about convenience but connivance to avoid corporate responsibility. Dow Chem. Co. v. Domingo
Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 680 (Tex. 1990). See generally D. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in
America and England: A Rather Fantastic Fiction, 103 L.Q. REv. 398 (1987); INCONVENIENT FORUM AND
CONVENIENT CATASTROPHE: THE BHOPALCASE 1-30 (Upendra Baxi ed., 1986); Jaqueline Duval Major, One
Way Ticket Home: The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and the International Plaintiff, 77
CORNELL L. REv. 650 (1992); Rogge, infra note 147.
145. A cocktail of two principles of corporate law - separate personality and limited liability -
achieve this effect, as demonstrated by many cases. In fact, the U.N. Center on Transnational Corporations
recognized this as early as in 1988.
A further complication arises from the concept of limited liability in corporate law,
This often precludes the extension of liability to the parent entity for the actions or
omissions of the affiliate, and also tends to limit the exercise of jurisdiction over the
2004]
often been (mis)used by TNCs to avoid or delay their responsibility for human
rights violations. 146 The judicial response to these two issues has also, by and
large, helped the cause of TNCs rather than the victims. 147 But the UN Norms
do not address these important procedural issues, in the absence of which any
implementation mechanism, even if equipped with multiple sanctions, can
hardly deliver justice to the victims.
The Norms should, therefore, respond to the above procedural challenges
by offering principled 148 guidelines to be followed by courts. For example, on
the issue of the liability of a parent corporation for human rights violations by
its subsidiaries, the Norms could adopt the enterprise theory rather than the
entity theory as the basis of liability. 149 This will ensure that the courts instead
of deciding the issue afresh in each and every case, which is not only time
consuming but also leads to inconsistent decisions, may determine the question
of liability swiftly and in accordance with a predictable principle rather than
wagering between various principles. 5 ° This will also send a signal to those
parent corporations which conduct more hazardous business through financially
weaker subsidiaries' 5' and then keep distance by design with them in order to
parent entity by either the home or host country in respect of the actions of the
affiliate.
U.N. CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS CODE OF CONDUCT ON
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 22 (1988).
146. Besides these two issues, conflict ofjurisdiction and choice of law are other problematic areas.
147. A more positive judicial attitude is though visible in some recent cases. See e.g., Connelly v.
RTZ Corp. plc, 4 All E.R. 335 (House of Lords 1997); Lubbe v. Cape, plc, 1. W.L.R. 1545 (House of Lords
2002). But it is still unclear whether this represents a uniform policy shift all over the world. See generally
Peter Prince, Bhopal, Bougainville and OK Tedi: Why Australian Forum non Conveniens Approach is
Better, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 573 (1998); Malcolm J. Rogge, Towards Transnational Corporate
Accountability in the Global Economy: Challenging the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in In Re: Union
Carbide, Alfaro, Sequihua and Aguinda 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 299 (2001); Winston Anderson, Forum non
Conveniens Checkmated? - The Emergence of Retaliatory Legislation 10 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 183
(2001).
148. Borrowing from Ronald Dworkin, I use "principle" in the sense of "a standard that is to be
observed ... because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality." RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22 (Harv. U. Press 1978).
149. See generally Philip I. Blumberg, Asserting Human Rights against Multinational Corporations
under the United States Law: Conceptual and Procedural Framework 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 493 (2002)
[hereinafter Blumberg, Conceptual and Procedural Framework]; Philip I. Blumberg, The Increasing
Recognition of Enterprise Principles in Determining Parent and Subsidiary Corporation Liabilities 28
CONN. L. REv. 295 (1996). See also D. Aronofsky, Piercing the Transnational Corporate Veil: Trends,
Developments and the Need for Widespread Adoption of Enterprise Analysis 10 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
31(1985).
150. Courts in different cases have invoked, or have been urged to invoke, the doctrine of agency,
attribution, alter ago, or piercing of corporate veil to mitigate the rigor of the principle of separate personality.
151. See Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corporate
Torts 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1203, 1205, 1246, n. 179-82 (2002). See also A. Ringleb & S. Wiggins, Liability
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exploit a principle of corporate law which is probably out of tune with the
present day reality of TNCs.'52
Similarly, the existing predominant judicial approach to the doctrine of
forum non conveniens also require adjustment, at least when cases are tried by
municipal courts, so as to prevent its abuse for evading liability for human
rights violations. The Norms should take a lead in this regard. Blumberg
suggests that presence of international human rights should be considered
among the public interest factors to be taken into consideration by courts while
hearing the plea of forum non conveniens. 53 It can further be argued that since
realization of human rights is no longer a matter internal to national boundaries,
in cases involving human rights violations the doctrine offorum non conveniens
should be invoked only when courts are of the view that a particular forum is
clearly and grossly inconvenient to the defendant.
5 4
V. CONCLUSION
Many actors-from states' 55 to international institutions,"16 academia,
media and civil society organs157-are engaged in a search for evolving an
effective as well as efficient regulatory framework of TNCs' accountability for
human rights violations. The UN initiatives hold a prominent, if not central,
place in such a quest; the Norms being the most recent, and also to date most
promising, effort on the part of the UN. The Norms seems to have benefited
from the exposure of the infirmities of its predecessor as well as other current
and Large Scale, Long-Term Hazards 98 J. POL. ECON. 574 (1990).
152. See PILIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW: THE
SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY 1-20 (1993).
153, Blumberg, Conceptual and Procedural Framework, supra note 149, at 526.
154. See generally Peter Prince, supra note 147 (arguing that the Australian approach of "clearly
inappropriate forum" is better than the approach of "most suitable forum" adopted by the courts in the United
States and United Kingdom).
155. See e.g., Corporate Code of Conduct Bill of 2000, H.R. 4596, 106th Cong., available at
http:llthomas.loc.gov/cgi-binlquery/z?c106:H.R.4596 (last visited Oct. 6, 2003); the Corporate Code of
Conduct Bill of 2000 (Austl.), available at http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/ Repository/Legis/Bills/
Linked/I 3020235.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2003). Both bills, however, could not be passed as law.
156. One can easily identify the initiatives on the part of the OECD, ILO, UN and the EU. See supra
notes 5, 6, 7, 12, and 13.
157. The efforts of the part of Human Rights Watch, Corporate Watch, Greenpeace, Business for
Social Responsibility, Corporate Social Responsibility Forum, etc., have been commendable, and have
contributed to putting the issue of corporate social responsibility on the center stage. See Anne-Marie
Slaughter, A Liberal Theory ofinternational Law, 94 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 240, 243 (2000). See also
Frieda De Koninck, How Can We Influence the Practices of Transnational Actors? The "Clean Clothes"
Campaign: How Can We Fight for Economic and Social Rights when Faced to Transnational Actors?, in
SOCIAL ALERT, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL Rights: A Challenge for Peace and Development in a
Global World 58-70 (2002), available at http://www.paxchristi.net/PDF/DEC06E02.pdf (last visited Dec.
15, 2003).
regulatory regimes of corporate human rights responsibility, as they apparently
seek to remedy some of those infirmities. However, certain lacunae still survive
which, in my view, might hamper the efficacy of the Norms and neutralize the
edge that they claim over their counterparts.
I have argued in this article that though the Norms revive the hope for
establishing a legally binding international regime of corporate responsibility
for human rights violations, they represent an imperfect step, albeit in the right
direction. It is critical for the efficacy of the Norms that imperfections related
to both formulation and implementation of TNCs' human rights obligations are
further deliberated upon thoroughly before any move towards the adoption of
the Norms. In sum, it is argued that the Norms should not only deduce human
rights obligations of TNCs from state-focal international treaties and maintain
a distinction between aspirational and operational standards of human rights,
but also establish a robust enforcement mechanism which invokes multiple
sanctions. Besides, the Norms should also take the lead in responding to
hindrances posed by the procedural issues related to forum non conveniens and
the liability of a parent corporation for human rights violations by its subsidiar-
ies.
Though at this stage it is difficult to predict with certainty whether the UN
Commission on Human Rights will adopt the Norms in March 2004, or whether
they will become legally binding stricto sensu in the near future, in my view it
might be more appropriate that some of the issues raised herein are deliberated
upon further before a formal adoption of the Norms. As far as the binding
nature of the Norms is concerned, it will be ideal if they take the shape of a
legally binding instrument; but this is not to suggest that the non-binding Norms
could not contribute, in some way, to rectify the current state of TNCs'
impunity for human rights violations. What is more important, however, that
a healthy debate amongst all the affected parties on an issue of vital signifi-
cance ensues, and if that happens, the present article would achieve its modest
objective of highlighting the positives and exposing some of the inadequacies
of the Norms.
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"The situs of intangible property is about as intangible a concept as
is known to the law."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent economic downturns in Argentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela, to
name a few Latin American states among others in various parts of the world,
have once again raised serious concerns regarding the ability of international
lenders or creditors to recover on the sovereign and private debt instruments
* Ariel Oscar Dfaz is an Associate Attorney at Leaf & Associates, LLC. in Miami, Florida. This
comment is based on a paper presented to Professor Tomas J. Skola and the International Credit Seminar
offered at the University of Miami, School of Law, Spring 2003.
1. Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 714 (5th Cir. 1968).
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that they hold.? With respect to sovereign debt, while the International
Monetary Fund, the Paris Club, and the London Club have provided institu-
tional mechanisms by which to conduct organized sovereign debt restructurings,
it nonetheless remains for lenders or creditors dissatisfied with the reorganiza-
tion process to look to the courts to enforce their contractual rights.' Signifi-
cantly, the predictability of debt restructuring regimes have been eroded by the
emergence of bondholders and secondary market debt purchasers as principal
creditors in place of traditional commercial bank lenders engaged in longstand-
ing relationships with debtor states Apart from the problems endemic in
transnational litigation, this new fixture of non-syndicate or "rogue" creditors
in international sovereign lending has engendered a whole set of legal and
public policy questions, the heart of which falls beyond the scope of this paper,
but which, nonetheless, have already left an indelible imprint on legal
commentary and United States decisional law concerning international public
or sovereign debt.'
In the instance of private debt, which is the realm of creditor-debtor law
this paper will focus on, the gamut of international lender or creditor concerns
similarly runs wide. However, in the international private debt market the
institutional mechanisms for re-negotiation available to sovereign lenders are
ordinarily not available to private creditor-obligees. As a result, these creditor-
obligees are limited principally to seeking judicial remedies for default or non-
2. See generally Lex Rieffel, Notion of Odious Debt is Impractical, FINANCIAL TIMES, May 26,
2003; Desmond Lachman, The False Optimists of the Emerging Markets, FINANCIAL TIMES, May 20, 2003;
World Business Briefing, Americas: Uruguay: Bond Exchange Sought, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2003, at W1;
Jonathan Fuerbringer, Mutual Funds Report; Bonds Eclipse Stocks in Emerging Markets, N.Y. TMES, Apr.
6, 2003, at sect. 3, at p. 15; Larry Rohter, International Business; Amid Financial Despair, Argentines See
a 'Little Summer', N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2002, at C13; Larry Rohter, Argentina Defaults on Big Payment to
WorldBank, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,2002, at WI; Juan Forero, Venezuela Economy Falters, Despite Abundant
Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2002, at WI; South America's Troubled Economies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2002,
at A14; Larry Rohter, World Business Briefing, Americas: Argentina: Telecom Default, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
3, 2002; Simon Romero, Defaults Seem Near for Latin Units of BellSouth and Verizon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
29,2002, at C4; Simon Romero, AT&Tand Others Bracefor Trouble From Argentina, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2002, at W1.
3. See Charles M. Schmerler, Litigating Defaults on Sovereign Debt Law: Policy Struggle to
Defer to Foreign States While Honoring Lender's Rights, N.Y.L.J. (Apr. 15, 2002), available at
http://www.arentfox.comquickGuidebusiness Lines/litig2/litigation-related/ra2002-04-25schmerler/ra2002-
04-25schmerler.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
4. See, e.g., Elliot Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Naci6n, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999); Pravin
Banker Assocs., LTD. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 895 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); CIBC Bank and Trust
Co. Ltd. v. Banco Central do Brasil, 886 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v.
People's Republic of Congo, 729 F. Supp. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
5. See, e.g., Jote Kassa, Note, A Safety Net for the Eurodollar Market?: Wells Fargo Asia Ltd.
v. Citibank, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 126 (1990); William W. Park, Legal Policy Conflicts in International
Banking, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1067 (1989).
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payment either, in their own national courts, or the national courts of the
debtor-obligor. Further complicating these creditor-debtor disputes is the
underlying cause for debtor default or non-payment. Increasingly, it has been
noted that the inability of debtors to perform their payment obligations is due,
at least in some part, to foreign government regulations to which the debtor is
subject. As will be discussed below, these regulations may be imposed in
several forms, the prevailing of which are: foreign exchange controls,
mandatory currency conversions, debt repayment moratoria, depositary
expropriations, and unilateral debt restructurings.
The economic distress that a number of Latin American, as well as other
debtor nations must confront, indeed, is likely to increase the resort to creditor-
debtor litigation, particularly in the United States. While it is true that
international private debt disputes may be litigated in either the home forum of
the creditor-obligee or the debtor-obligor, at least where United States debtors
or creditors are parties to the contracts in question, United States courts have
commonly served as the de facto decision-making forum. More importantly,
however, the prospect of international debt litigation in the United States
arising from these recent economic downturns is likely to revive some difficult
and legally complex issues that remained, arguably, unresolved throughout the
last period of debt crisis litigation in the 1980's.
One issue likely to evoke an extensive and contentious corpus of legal
literature and decisions concerns American notions on international comity and
application of the Act of State Doctrine.6 The Act of State Doctrine has indeed
been the focus of much scholarly debate over the last fifty years.7 While the
majority of commentators have been inclined to support the Doctrine, still a
6. Other significant issues that arise from the transnational nature of international debt litigation
involve, inter alia, the doctrine of forum non-conveniens, foreign sovereign immunity, jurisdiction to
prescribe, and jurisdiction to adjudicate. See generally ALAN C. SWAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 242-97 (2d ed.
1999) (providing a basic framework for understanding the impact of these areas of transnational litigation
on international business transactions); ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND
ARBITRATION 257-72, 608-97 (2d ed. 2002) (providing cases and discussion on the development of forum
non conveniens and the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976).
7. For an enlightening sampling of the theoretical and historical background of the Act of State
Doctrine and its relation with other principles of comity consult, see Ifeanyi Achebe, The Act of State
Doctrine and Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Can They Coexist?, 13 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE
247 (1989); Daniel C.K. Chow, Rethinking the Act of State Doctrine: An Analysis in Terms of Jurisdiction
to Prescribe, 62 WASH. L. REV. 397 (1987); Margaret A. Niles, Note, Judicial Balancing of Foreign Policy
Considerations: Comity and Errors Under the Act of State Doctrine, 35 STAN. L. REV. 327 (1983); Irene
Elizabeth Howie, Note, The Nonviable Act of State Doctrine: A Change in the Perception of the Foreign
Act of State, 38 U. Prrr. L. REV. 725 (1977); Louis Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility,
6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1967).
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number of others have called for its abandonment by the courts.' In the courts,
however, the Doctrine has generally enjoyed substantial normative stability
dating back to its earliest articulation in the landmark United States Supreme
Court decision Underhill v. Hernandez.9 The Court in Underhill considered an
action in tort for wrongful detention of a United States citizen against a military
government in Venezuela, later recognized as the legitimate governing authority
by the United States."° The Court held that the sovereign acts of a foreign
government done within its territory were unreviewable by United States
courts."
More than a century later, the Supreme Court invariably has continued to
look to Underhill as the classic statement of the Doctrine. 2 In fact, most if not
all decisions concerning acts of state have maintained a tradition of quoting
verbatim the words of Chief Justice Fuller in Underhill:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its
own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be
obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign
powers as between themselves. 3
In subsequent decisions the Supreme Court has adjoined to their classic
statement in Underhill more precise restatements of the Doctrine and its
theoretical predicate. 4 In what has been termed the "second classic statement
8. See, e.g., Donald W. Hoagland, The Act of State Doctrine: Abandon It, 14 DENV. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 317 (1986); Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325
(1986).
9. 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (providing a curt distinction between "sovereign risk" and "country
risk").
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,416 (1964); First Nat'l City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,763 (1972); Alfred Dunhillof London v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S.
682, 691 n.7 (1976); W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990).
13. Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252.
14. See Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918) ("The principle that the conduct
of one independent government cannot be successfully questioned in the courts of another [must] rest...
upon the highest considerations of international comity and expediency..."); Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co., 246
U.S. 304 (1918) ("the details of such [confiscatory] action or the merit of the result cannot be questioned but
must be accepted by our courts as a rule for their decision").
of the act of state doctrine,"' 5 the Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino6 announced:
[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of
property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government,
extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the
absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding
controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the
taking violates customary international law.'7
The Act of State Doctrine, thus, is squarely implicated by some of the potential
debt litigation that may ensue given the proclivity of debtor nations to intervene
the private banking sector to curb the devaluative effects of financial crises on
domestic currency. While this measure appears extreme, even mitigated
options such as exchange controls raise the same Act of State problems for
international creditors. Nonetheless, the dire economic conditions many debtor
nations must confront leave a dearth of alternatives for government
policymakers other than adoption of such stringent measures, which effectively,
and quite intentionally, disrupt the performance of payment obligations flowing
from local debtors to foreign creditors. As such it is of significant value that
the Doctrine be examined and its application better understood in anticipation
of what may, although hopefully not, turn out to be a reemergence of mass
international debt litigation in the United States.
This paper will attempt to address some of the salient issues in the
territoriality inquiry that the courts since Sabbatino have been concerned with.
Additionally, this paper will make an earnest attempt to examine key problems
in international debt (i.e., intangible property rights) cases. The following
section of this paper will deal directly, and at some length with notions of
territoriality as developed by the courts and commentators subsequent to
Sabbatino. Further, that section will treat the historical and modern functions
of the territorial limitations in the Act of State Doctrine. Section three will deal
in greater length with the major approaches to situs of debt rules relevant in the
Doctrine. That section will treat the underlying rationale for these rules, and
argue for an enhanced rule of reason in guiding judicial situation of
international debts. Section four will recapture some of these salient points and
provide some concluding remarks.
15. See Michael Gruson, The Act of State Doctrine in Contract Cases As a Conflict-of Laws Rule,
1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 519, 530 (1988).
16. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
17. Id. at 428.
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II. THE TERRITORIALITY INQUIRY
One important element the Court refined in Sabbatino was the proposition
that application of the Act of State Doctrine was not dependent upon the
inclusion of the acting state in the litigation.' 8 In Sabbatino the plaintiff, an
instrumentality of the Cuban government, brought an action in conversion
against a court appointed receiver in New York City to recover payment for a
shipment of sugar that had been previously confiscated by the government
within Cuban territory. 9 The Court, nonetheless, maintained that the Act of
State Doctrine could very well be raised even in the context of non-state party
disputes.2"
Another important element, perhaps the more crucial one to territoriality,
in the Sabbatino decision was the rehashing ofjudicial self-restraint principles,
particularly over foreign political matters. The newer modification of the Act
of State Doctrine in Sabbatino indeed appeared to reflect a judicial
preoccupation with the increased exercise of expropriatory and confiscatory
takings by sovereign states of foreign-owned property. Within a short time
period preceding Sabbatino, and shortly thereafter, numerous nation-states
underwent significant social and political changes, the most notable of which
was embodied in the Cuban revolution and the movements for de-colonization
in Africa and Asia. Understandably then, the Court in Sabbatino, following the
dictates of Underhill, deemed it necessary to clarify that even takings in
contravention of international customary law would be barred from examination
by American courts irrespective of whether it was American-owned or locally-
owned property that was taken abroad.2'
The Court, however, made its holding in Sabbatino clear that the Doctrine
would not apply where the acting sovereign had taken property not located
within its territory.22 While this proposition had been an implied part of the
holding in Underhill, Sabbatino strived to transform the territoriality inquiry
18. Id. at 417-18, 428; Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252 (While it is clear the Sabbatino opinion
established that the Act of State Doctrine was generally applicable independent of the acting state's
participation in litigation, the rudiments of this proposition were first borne out in the Oetjen and Ricaud
cases).
19. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 402-09. The previous owner of the Cuban sugar attempted to intervene
as party to the litigation but was unsuccessful.
20. Id. Unlike foreign sovereign immunity, which necessarily involves foreign governments or their
instrumentalities in litigation, the Act of State Doctrine operates more akin to an issue preclusion or a strict
choice of law rule. See, e.g., Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1113 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing to
Sabbatino for the proposition that the Act of State Doctrine does not require government defendants, or even
that the subject matter of the dispute, to be specifically based on a sovereign act).
21. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 422; see also Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S.
682, 716 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting the point supported by the plurality and concurrence opinions).
22. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
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into one of the only sharp points of distinction in the Doctrine. The Court, thus
raised a judicial wall of separation from reviewing acts undertaken by foreign
governments within their territory, while dismantling any opportunity to have
the Doctrine apply to cases where property rights in the United States were
affected by foreign government regulations. A handful of commentators have
questioned the development of this doctrinal threshold element as one not
entirely rooted in traditional notions of international comity and respect for
sovereign authority. 23 Notwithstanding criticism, the Sabbatino restatement
with its central concern for territoriality has become the guiding rule of law.
Until Sabbatino, although arguably thereafter as well, the Court had been
certain to indicate that the rule of decision contained in the Act of State
Doctrine was predicated upon notions of international comity. 24 Nonetheless,
beginning with the Sabbatino decision the Court began to elaborate a distinct
foundation for the Doctrine.25 Rather than resting on international comity, the
Court in Sabbatino and subsequent decisions has made it clear that the Act of
State Doctrine has "constitutional underpinnings" and rests upon separation of
powers concerns that generally preclude the judiciary from meddling in the
foreign affairs powers of the Executive Branch.26 Under this "judicial
institutional" explanation of the Doctrine, Sabbatino and its progeny have
essentially developed the rationale that where a foreign sovereign undertakes
governmental action that affects (expropriates, confiscates, modifies, etc.)
property not within its territory then the Act of State Doctrine will not apply
since the Executive Branch could not possibly be "embarrassed" from judicial
action before the other nations of the world, particularly the acting state. This
rationale, of course, presupposes that extraterritorial regulation of property
rights by foreign governments fails to raise political questions and that these
should not be accorded a high degree of comity and respect.
The new rationale for the Act of State Doctrine advanced in Sabbatino,
while argued to be logically flawed in some areas, 27 however, probably does
23. See, e.g., Bazyler, supra note 8; Henkin, supra note 7.
24. See Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 303; Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); but
cf. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421 (noting that the doctrine is not compelled by the inherent nature of sovereign
authority or by some principle of international law; historic notions of sovereign authority do not dictate the
doctrine's existence).
25. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423, 427-28. See also Stephen Zamora, Recognition of Foreign
Exchange Controls in International Creditor's Rights Cases: The State of the Art, 21 INT'L LAw. 1055,
1070 (1987) (noting three separate theoretical predicates employed by the Court in Act of State Doctrine
cases); Kenneth L. Miller, Note, Debt Situs and the Act of State Doctrine: A Proposal for a More Flexible
Standard, 49 ALB. L. REV. 647, 651 n.16 (1985).
26. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423; Louis Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts:
Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 805, 809-13, 820, 828 (1964).
27. See Bayzler, supra note 8, at 373; Robert S. Rendell, The Allied Bank Case and Its Aftermath,
20 INT'L LAw. 819, 826-27 (1986).
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appropriately limit the Doctrine's application to territorial state actions. It is
indisputable, at least as a matter of law, that when the "parties and the res are
outside the foreign government' s territorial boundaries, the foreign government
does not possess the ability to alter the legal status of the parties relative to the
res.' 28 The Court's rationale in Sabbatino indeed reflects reasonable notions
of territorial sovereignty and comity among independent states. It is not an
unsound proposition that "judicial re-examination of a foreign sovereign's act
will vex relations with foreign governments or hinder the executive in the
conduct of foreign policy only when courts act to frustrate the foreign
sovereign's reasonable expectations of dominion."29 It follows, then, that a
reasonable expectation of dominion would be fatally attenuated where a
sovereign state acts to regulate property not located within its territory. ° As a
matter of positivist logic, so much is generally conceded. The difficulty,
however, comes with the judiciary's determination of when and where
territorial state action has transpired. The questions to resolve, thus, seem
readily framed: what property exactly is the territorial action being asserted
over and when is its location ascertainable? Whereas, these queries have been
adequately treated in disputes arising from state actions that "take" tangible
property, the judiciary has struggled terribly to arrive at an equally expeditious
treatment where intangibles are concerned." Consider the following intangible
property dispute scenarios:32
Case 1-A United States bank makes a loan to a foreign borrower
(sovereign or private), and brings an action in the United States to
28. Miller, supra note 25; see also Alfred Dunhill of London, 425 U.S. at 686-87, 691 n.7; First
Nat'l City Bank, 406 U.S. at 768; id. at 787 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chem.
Bank of New York, 658 F.2d 903,908 (2d Cir. 1981); United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868,
874-75 (2d Cir. 1976); Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1972) (concluding that
a foreign sovereign is obviously unable to complete an expropriation of property beyond its borders); F.
Palicio y Compaftla, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481, 483-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
29. Margaret E. Tahyar, Note, The Act of State Doctrine: Resolving Debt Situs Confusion, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 594, 609 (1986).
30. See Callejo v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101, 1123 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that the theory
underlying the territorial limitation to the act of state doctrine is that a foreign state is less concerned about
effect of its acts on property outside of its territory than within); Maltina Corp., 462 F.2d at 1021. See also
22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (also termed the "second Hickenlooper amendment" presently bar application of the
Act of State Doctrine with respect to property located within the United States where the act of expropriation
contravenes international law).
31. See F. & H.R. Farman-Farmaian Consulting Eng'rs v. Harza Eng'g Co., 882 F.2d 281, 286 (7th
Cir. 1989) (Judge Parsons commenting that "a debt (like a word, a number, an idea) has no space-time
location; it is not a physical object, and efforts to treat it as such, like efforts in conflicts of law jurisprudence,
now largely abandoned.., to find the site of a contract, seem bound to fail").
32. The characterizations of these model cases are derived from Tahyar, supra note 29, at 614-16.
See also Zamora, supra note 25, at 1056-58.
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enforce the loan following the imposition of exchange controls that,
effectively, prevent the borrower from servicing the debt with the
contractually stipulated currency (United States dollars).
Case 2- A United States bank depositor deposits dollars in a foreign
bank (government-owned or private), and the implementation of
exchange controls by the foreign government prevents the depositor
from withdrawing dollars; the dollar deposit subsequently is
converted to local currency at the government-declared rate, hence
becoming greatly devalued. The depositor brings an action against
the foreign bank in the United States.
Case 3-A foreign depositor deposits funds in a United States bank;
the government of the foreign depositor brings an action against the
bank in the United States to collect the deposit following an
expropriatory or other regulatory act undertaken by the foreign
depositor's government asserting ownership over the account.
Case 4-A depositor (either from the United States or foreign)
deposits funds in a foreign branch office of a United States bank, and
brings an action against the bank's home office in the United States
to recover the deposit following the depositor government's seizure
of the branch's accounts or its prohibition of withdrawals pursuant
to exchange controls.
Case 5 -A foreign government expropriates property owned by one
of its subjects, and then sells the property for export to the United
States. The former owner of the expropriated property relocates to
the United States and brings an attachment action against the United
States buyer to recover proceeds or account receivables derived from
the sale of the expropriated property.
Case 6 -A United States seller exports goods to a foreign buyer, and
the foreign buyer's government imposes exchange controls thus
preventing the foreign buyer from making payment in the
contractually stipulated currency. The United States seller brings an
action in the United States to collect payment.
Clearly, these scenarios raise issues the nature of which vary substantially,
legally and practically, from the more basic tangible property cases which
plainly involve the "taking" of movable property or realty located within the
territory of the acting state. Still, however, courts continue to fit intangible
property into some conception of place and time. To better understand this core
convergence a historical perspective on the rules of territoriality might be
appropriate.
A. History and Development
The foundation of United States law and policy regarding the conduct of
foreign governments acting to regulate rights within and outside their territory
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can be traced back to the notions of sovereignty developed within the
Westphalian regime of international politics.3 3 Under this regime, the state's
authority to regulate affairs within the state was an inherent and unquestionable
exercise of sovereign power free from review or re-examination by other
states.34 "Thus, an act valid where done [could not] be called into question
anywhere" outside the jurisdiction sanctioning its validity.35 While this basic
tenet of vested rights theory developed in the 17th century continues to recede
from modem American jurisprudence,36  its underlying rationale has
occasionally maintained a significant degree of adherence among American
courts with respect to issues in conflicts of law, and prescriptive and personal
jurisdiction. 7 The courts, thus, have selectively opted against vested rights
theory in adjudicating some issues implicating more than one body of sovereign
law, while favoring the theory in other cases.38
The dichotomy engendered by the selective application of vested rights
theory has been explained as an implicit acknowledgement by the American
courts that giving effect to, or perhaps more accurately, exercising restraint
from deciding disputes based on foreign regulations requires a certain degree
33. See TORBJORN L. KNUTSEN, A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 84-86 (2d ed.
1997) (articulating the proposition that the power to exercise sole control over rights and duties within a
territory was a prerequisite to achieving sovereignty); see also SEYOM BROWN, THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION
OF WAR 104-05 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that 'Vestphalian norms give pride of place to national sovereignty
and the noninterference by countries in another's domestic affairs").
34. See Chow, supra note 7, at 405-06.
35. 3 J. BEALE, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 517 (1902); see Chow, supra
note 7, at 405-06 & n.47 (providing a brief account of the influence of legal positivism and vested rights
theory on notions of territoriality in the Act of State Doctrine).
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). See Thomas Byron Ia A
Conflict of Laws Model for Foreign Branch Deposit Cases, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 671, 690 (1991).
37. See Chow, supra note 7, at 406-09. See also McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1971)
(noting that the foundation ofjurisdiction is power); Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357
(1909) (noting that "[all legislation is prima facie territorial"). While the narrow holding in American
Banana has been overruled in subsequent years, the general thrust of the Court's opinion in that case remains
an influential guide through prescriptive jurisdiction cases.
38. See Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 357; Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918)
('The principle that the conduct of one independent government cannot be successfully questioned in the
courts of another [must] rest . . . upon the highest considerations of international comity and expe-
diency..."); Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918) ("the details of such [confiscatory] action
or the merit of the result cannot be questioned but must be accepted by our courts as a rule for their
decision"); These cases represent only a select instance where the courts strongly favored a vested rights
approach. Cf Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) (holding that the principle of comity is essentially
a voluntary recognition of foreign acts); Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435,
440 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding that "[clomity is a recognition that one nation extends to within its own territory
to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another. It is not a rule of law, but one of practice convenience,
and expediency") (emphasis added).
of relaxation of the forum's own sovereignty.39 As such, the fundamental
predicate of vested rights theory (sovereign power) appears irreconcilably at
odds with the natural consequences of requiring that vested rights be recognized
everywhere. The resulting effect of vested rights theory, thus, has served to
maximize the acting states territorial sovereignty while minimizing that of the
forum state.40  The reasoning is that where a foreign state acts to regulate
property rights squarely within its territory then it has sole territorial
sovereignty to do so. Under vested rights theory this means that the act of state
must be given strict effect anywhere outside the acting state's territory. This
strict effect mandate, of course, would also mean that the forum state would
have to relax its territorial sovereignty in order to give such effect to the
regulation of the acting state.4'
While there certainly appears to be an undercurrent of vested rights
rationale in the territorial limitation to the Act of State Doctrine, the Doctrine
does not entirely depend on that theory.42 Rather, the Doctrine more soundly
rests on the principles that attempt to detach the judiciary from balancing the
territorial sovereignty of two states, that is, the acting state and the forum
state.43 These principles are collected under the self-restraint penumbra of non-
justiciable political questions.' In essence, the Doctrine's territorial inquiry
has been designed to serve more as a determinant alerting the courts as to when
to avert the consequences of vested rights (minimization of forum sovereignty)
on non-justiciable grounds, or when to proceed safely to determine the extent
of international comity without the mandate of strict effect.45 The Doctrine,
39. See Chow, supra note 7, at 410-11.
40. Id.; but cf. Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 357 (Justice Holmes suggesting that the mere election of
a party subject to foreign sovereign law to litigate in the United States only requires the forum to consider and
apply foreign law without, at the same, relaxing notions of the forum's sovereignty).
41. See E. ScOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAws 13-15 (1982).
42. See Chow, supra note 7, at 408-09 (stating the proposition that Sabbatino fundamentally recast
the rationale for the Act of State Doctrine from one of external (strict effect to territorial sovereignty of acting
state) to internal deference (non-justiciablity for reasons of separation of powers and abstention from deciding
issues of sovereignty minimization and foreign policy); Cf. Charles Mac. Mathias, Jr., Restructuring the Act
of State Doctrine: A Blueprint for Legislative Reform, 12 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 369, 392 (1980).
43. See Chow, supra note 7, at 415-16.
44. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217 (1962) (providing the seminal statement on doctrinal tests
involved in determining non-justiciable political questions as
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind for non-
judicial discretion, or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decisions already made, or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question);
Swan, Act of State at Bay: A Plea on Behalf of the Elusive Doctrine, 1976 DUKE L.J. 807, 848-55 & n. 145.
45. See Chow, supra note 7, at 444 (providing an explanation of the courts' doctrinal management
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hence, allows a shift of decisional power on the former determination from the
judiciary to, presumably, the Executive branch. This shift is predicated on the
not unsound assumption that the Executive is better suited to seek appropriate
means of remedial redress on behalf of private actors from other sovereign
states in the international plane.
B. Modem Function
The historical effect of the territorial inquiry was to raise the question for
the judiciary of whether to apply the Act of State Doctrine, thereby eluding a
direct confrontation with the issue of forum sovereignty minimization, or to
employ notions of international comity to discretionarily enforce the acting
state's policies affecting property within the forum. This bifurcation,
nonetheless, accorded the party raising the Doctrine as a defense in litigation
an exception to the territorial limitation. While the rules of comity, of course,
depend on jurisprudential balancing of interests and public policy
considerations, the territoriality inquiry could be obviated if enforcing the
acting state's policy did not offend the forum's notions ofjustice and fairness.46
This interest and policy-balancing component to the territoriality inquiry was
firmly established in earlier jurisprudence dating back to the first half of last
century.
47
The modem effect of the inquiry, however, has proven that the judiciary
proposes a much sharper bifurcation of results under the Act of State Doctrine.
Since the Court's pronouncements in Oetjen, Ricaud, and Sabbatino, the
consequence of falling outside the purview of the Doctrine's territorial
limitation has meant, with a large measure of certainty, that the acting state's
policies will not be enforced or be given effect in the forum state.48 Hence, the
territoriality inquiry has, indeed, become one of burden shifting and risk
allocation in transnational property rights litigation.49 The practical effect of
following a determination that the acting state has undertaken to regulate property outside its territorial
sovereignty).
46. See Chow, supra note 7, at 410-11; Elliot E. Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws:
Their Role and Utility, 58 HARv. L. REV. 361, 367-68, 373 (1945).
47. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) (holding that the principle of comity is the
"recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive orjudicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or
of other persons who are under the protection of its laws"); See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
48. See Chow, supra note 7, at 444. See, e.g., Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 937-38
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862,864 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d
624, 629 (2d Cir. 1976); Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir.
1971).
49. See Jose Ibietatorremendia, Exchange Control Risk in Eurodollar Deposits: A Law and
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this burden and risk allocation function has meant the "[D]octrine does not
apply at all when the foreign sovereign attempts to take property located in the
United States."5 The reason for this sharp-edged rule seems explicable only
by the judiciary's reluctance, indeed refusal, to abstain from deciding against
issues of property takings by a foreign sovereign.5
Due to its modem function, the territoriality inquiry will rarely, if ever,
yield a result other thanjudicial abstention from examining another sovereign's
regulation of property rights within its territory, or judicial denunciation of
property takings outside the acting states territory. Applying this, seemingly
strict, territorial "win or lose" rule has traditionally led to some reasonable
outcomes in disputes regarding tangible property.52 However, as earlier stated,
the more difficult question remains: how to determine who wins and who loses
in disputes over property the physical nature of which is indefinable, to be sure,
intangible. Put simply, the question is: where is the intangible property. As
reasonable as may be the outcome in tangible property cases under the
territoriality inquiry, the judiciary's treatment of disputes over issues of debt
and other chooses in action leave much to be desired in the way of reason and
consistency.53
HI. THE SITUS OF DEBT RULES
Transnational intangible property disputes involving sovereign acts
affecting debt obligations have generally relied on three distinct theories for the
determination of the situs of debt, in other words, the place where the intangible
property is located.54 The first, and most traditionally rooted, traces the
positivist theories on the in personam jurisdictional power of sovereigns to
subject persons within the sovereign's territory to its regulations. This theory
has produced the "jurisdiction over debtor" rule. The second theory focuses on
a similar positivist concern. However, rather than looking solely to jurisdiction,
Economics Perspective, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 591,593. See also Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897)
(providing a curt distinction between "sovereign risk" and "country risk").
50. Chow, supra note 7, at 444.
51. See Tahyar, supra note 29, at 595-96.
52. See Joseph B. Frumkin, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Sovereign Defaults on United
States Bank Loans: A New Focus for a Muddled Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 488 (1985).
53. See Byron, supra note 36, at 680; Peter S. Smedresman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Eurodollars,
Multinational Banks, and National Laws, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 735 (1989); Joseph H. Sommer, Where
is a Bank Account?, 57 MD. L. REV. 1, 86 (1998); Ibietatorremendia, supra note 49, at 601; P.J. Rogerson,
The Situs ofDebts in the Conflicts ofLaws-Illogical, Unnecessary, and Misleading, 49 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 441,
441-44, 453-60 (1990); L. Goldwaithe, Comment, Recent Approaches to Situs of Debt in Act of State
Decisions, 1 CONN. J. INT'L L. 151, 182-83 (1986).
54. See generally Courtade, Annotation, Situs of Debt or Property for Purposes of Act of State
Doctrine, 77 A.L.R. FED. 293 (1986).
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this second theory, more importantly, looks at the sovereign's power to
complete the alteration in property rights within its territory. This theory has
produced the "fait accompli" or "complete fruition" rule. While these two
theories have been stringently criticized for producing mechanical rules without
demonstrating due respect for the underlying rationale of the Act of State
Doctrine, most courts have not entirely, or even partly, abandoned them. Yet,
a handful of courts and commentators have developed a third rule that seeks to
avoid rigid, litmus-like situs tests in favor of a rule of reason and
circumstance." This latter attempt has produced the "incident of the debt" rule,
the analysis of which "considers whether judicial inquiry will frustrate the
foreign sovereign's reasonable expectations of dominion over the debt.
56
A. Pointing to Jurisdiction Over Debtor
In the seminal case of Harris v. Balk,57 the United States Supreme Court
held that "the obligation of the debtor to pay his debt clings to and accompanies
him wherever he goes. ' 58 The Court in Harris went on to state the debtor "is
as much bound to pay his debt in a foreign state when therein sued upon his
obligation by his creditor, as he was in the state where the debt was
contracted. '59 Essentially, then, under this reasoning a debt is located within
the territory, even if foreign, to whose jurisdiction the debtor is subject.
While the Court in Harris employed the term "foreign" to characterize a
debt incurred in North Carolina but litigated in Maryland, the holding has been
applied beyond interstate debt disputes to those involving cross-border
transactions. In Menendez v. Saks & Co.,' the Second Circuit applied the
Harris situs test to a factual scenario upon which the above model Case five is
based. In Menendez, the dispute arose from the Cuban government's
confiscatory taking of a Cuban-owned cigar exporting business.61 The original
Cuban owners instituted an action against a cigar importer in the United States
alleging that pre-confiscation debts owed to them by the importer were not
located in Cuba, hence not subject to the Act of State Doctrine.62 The circuit
court agreed, holding that since the cigar importers were subject to the court's
55. See Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870, 881-84
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Callejo v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101, 1123 (5th Cir. 1985); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443 comment a (1987).
56. See Chow, supra note 7, at 439.
57. 198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 223.
60. 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'don othergrounds sub nom.; Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc.
v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
61. Menendez, 485 F.2d at 1365-66.
62. Id.
inpersonamjurisdiction, the debts owed to foreign creditors were located in the
United States, thus the Doctrine was inapplicable.63
In a few intangibles cases preceding Menendez, the Second Circuit had
already evinced an inclination toward considering the "jurisdiction over debtor"
rule.' 4 In Republic of Iraq, the court held that a bank deposit account carried
in New York was a debt owed by a debtor over whom the court had in
personam jurisdiction.65 As a result, the Act of State Doctrine was inapplicable
and the newly formed Iraqi government, claiming to have confiscated all of the
depositor's (King Faisal) assets, was unable to also affect the bank's debt to the
accountholder' s estate.
In light of these Second Circuit cases, the "jurisdiction over debtor" rule,
indeed, became a mainstay in the territoriality inquiry. 66 However, within only
a few years following Menendez the rule's inherent problems would gradually
become apparent. For one, the courts had not articulated an alternative
rationale to the obvious problem of shared jurisdiction, where both the acting
state and the forum state exercised in personam jurisdiction. Secondly, the
courts seemed content in continuing to apply this rule ignoring the even greater
problem of foreign sovereign intangible takings based on the simple assertion
of jurisdiction over a debtor, particularly United States banks operating foreign
branches or multinational entities. 67 Theoretically, a strict and mechanical
application of the "jurisdiction over debtor" rule would render a creditor
powerless to enforce a debt whose obligor (domestic or foreign) was even
tenuously subject to the jurisdiction of another sovereign having attempted to
"take" that intangible.
B. Pointing to "Fait Accompli" or "Complete Fruition"
Shortly following the decision in Menendez, the Second Circuit again had
opportunity to treat the "jurisdiction over debtor" rule of Harris in United Bank
Ltd. v. Cosmic International, Inc.68 The facts in Cosmic present a scenario
fundamentally similar to Menendez, where a pre-confiscation owner and the
63. Id.
64. See Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892,910-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l. City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965).
65. See Republic ofIraq, 353 F.2d at 51.
66. Other court opinions adopting the Harris approach included: Rupali Bank v. Provident Nat'l.
Bank, 403 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Fed. Republic of Germany v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 813
(E.D.N.Y. 1978); Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981).
67. See Richard Herring & Friedrich K. Degreesubler, Allocation of Risk in Cross-border Deposit
Transactions, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 942,989-90 (arguing that a "government should not be allowed to interfere
with a deposit made in another country if its only justification is that it can put its hands on property owned
by the depositary bank").
68. 542 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1976).
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newly formed government of Bangladesh claimed pre-confiscation accounts
receivables owed by a United States creditor. Whereas in Menendez and
Republic of Iraq the court avoided addressing the issue of shared jurisdiction
over the debtor,69 in Cosmic, the Second Circuit dealt squarely with the
problem.70 The court there recognized, at least impliedly, that in personam
jurisdiction alone could not afford the sole basis upon which to determine the
situs of intangible property under the Act of State Doctrine.71 More
importantly, the court's reasoning in declining to follow the Harris and
Menendez analysis touched upon the basic problems with the "jurisdiction over
debtor" rule mentioned above.
First, the court declined to determine whether the acting state had any
jurisdiction over the debtor.72 To this extent, the court stated: "jurisdictional
determinations would inevitably require American courts to engage in complex
interpretations of foreign statutory and case law pertaining to jurisdiction,
resolving situs questions on such a basis would deprive the act of state doctrine
of certainty and predictability."73 Short of entirely rejecting the "jurisdiction
over debtor" rule, the court nonetheless denied having previously adopted the
strict jurisdictional approach and determined that following such a rule would
give the Act of State Doctrine "needless scope."74 As a result, the court
implicitly recognized that it was required to apply a rule that would obviate the
need for a potentially complex shared jurisdiction analysis.
Second, in looking for an alternative to jurisdictional analysis, the court
elected to employ and base its decision on the "fait accompli" rule, which had
been previously adopted by the Fifth Circuit in a factual pattern virtually
indistinguishable from Menendez and Cosmic, Tabacalera Severiano Jorge,
S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co.75  While the Menendez opinion provided a
69. See Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1365 (2d Cir. 1973) (providing that the result
might differ were the importer-debtor "present in Cuba or subject to the jurisdiction of Cuban courts" at the
time of the confiscation); Republic ofIraq, 353 F.2d at 51 (recognizing that its conclusion might differ if the
foreign sovereign could also assert jurisdiction over the debtor).
70. Cosmic Int'l, 542 F.2d at 874.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 392 F.2d 706, 714-15 (5th Cir. 1968). Tabacalera was, perhaps, the first true intangibles case
arising from the long series of Cuban confiscations revisited in United States courts. In establishing the
"complete fruition" test the court in Tabacalera held:
When a foreign government performs an act which is an accomplished fact, that is
when it has the parties and the res before it and acts in such a manner as to change the
relation-ship of the parties touching the res, it would be an affront to such foreign
government for courts of the United States to hold that such an act was a nullity.
Furthermore, it is plain that the [previous] decisions [have taken] into consideration
rudimentary statement of the "fait accompli" rule,76 the more developed rule
and rationale in Tabacalera was applied in Cosmic. This alternative rule
appeared to address the secondary "jurisdiction over debtor" flaw of ignoring
intangibles "takings" exercised by foreign sovereigns solely and tenuously
asserting in personam jurisdiction over the debtor, thus leaving a creditor
powerless before an Act of State defense. The court in Cosmic, thus,
determined that the situs of a debt was within the acting state's territory if the
state had the power to enforce or collect the debt, leaving the forum court no
means by which to rectify the alteration in property rights."
The "fait accompli" debt situs rule established in Tabacalera has been
hailed as a "common sense" one because it is predicated on the foreign
sovereign's ability to extinguish the debt obligation through its collection power
over funds carried locally and/or payments to be made by the debtor.7" Quite
obviously, jurisdiction over the debtor is a prerequisite to the power to collect
the debt. Thus, in this sense the "fait accompli" rule is a more comprehensive
situs determinant. However, this rule too has intrinsic flaws.79 For one, the rule
assumes that forum courts will always be powerless to rectify a foreign
sovereign's alteration of intangible property rights. Secondly, the rule, in some
ways, replicates the jurisdictional simplicity of the "jurisdiction over debtor"
rule in requiring that the debtor and the creditor be subject to the acting state's
in personam jurisdiction. These flaws have generated mounting criticism
against continuing application of this similarly mechanical situs rule. 0 The
former assumption has increasingly proven untrue, particularly, in international
private debt cases where the debtor's obligation, although leviable by the acting
sovereign, is also enforceable and collectable in the forum state through
attachment and execution of debtor's assets outside the acting state. The ability
of the forum to enforce and collect the debt, thus should serve to negate the
genuine motivation for the territoriality inquiry: respect for the acting
the realization that in most cases there was nothing the United States courts could do
about it in any event.
Tabacalera, 392 F.2d at 715.
76. See Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1364 (2d Cir. 1973).
77. See Cosmic Int'l, 542 F.2d at 874.
78. See Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Crddito Agrfcola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516,521 (2d Cir. 1985);
Herring & Degreesubler, supra note 67, at 990-91 (arguing that in the case of depositary accounts held by
banks the situs of the obligation is where the bank "books" the liability, in other words, where the bank
carries, maintains, and makes accounting entries regarding the debt); Chow, supra note 7, at 441.
79. See Chow, supra note 7, at 441-42; Tahyar, supra note 29, at 597-98; Ibietatorremendia, supra
note 49, at 604-05.
80. See generally Zamora, supra note 25, at 1079-80 (citing to Calejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d
1101, 1123 (5th Cir. 1985) for the proposition that the "complete fruition" test, based on power to enforce
or collect a debt is not an adequate test of determining situs of debts for act of state purposes because the
analysis ignore the quantity and quality of contacts the debt has to the forum state).
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sovereign's reasonable expectation of dominion over property sought to be
regulated." As is argued, where the debtor has assets in the forum against
which the creditor may execute, the acting state attempting to alter the
obligation of the debtor cannot expect to have the forum enforce the alteration.
The result is the acting state will not have a reasonable expectation of dominion
over the debt.
C. On Incidents Of Debt And Reasonable Expectation Of Dominion
Despite the commonsense approach of the "fait accompli" for determining
debt situs, the rule's shortcomings have encouraged the development of an
alternative rule of reason that looks to the "incidents of the debt." Perhaps the
first decision to enunciate this alternative rule was Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco
Nacional de Costa Rica.2 In Libra, the court dealt with one of the first debt
crisis cases of the 1980's.83 There a Costa Rican bank was prevented from
servicing its debt to foreign creditor banks due to strict exchange control
measures imposed by the Costa Rican government, and thus was sued in the
United States by its creditor.8 4 The Costa Rican bank raised the Act of State
defense to excuse its non-performance, however, the court held the Doctrine
inapplicable having found the situs of the foreign bank's debt to be in New
York, rather than Costa Rica. 5 The rationale for its holding expressly indicated
the court's pursuit of a more flexible, multifaceted rule: "although a debtor
may in theory be sued at the creditor's choice in either of two jurisdictions, the
legal incidents of the debt may nevertheless place it, for the purposes of the act
of state doctrine, in this nation rather than in a foreign nation" (emphasis
added).86
81. See Zamora, supra note 25, at 1079-80; see also Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1123 (holding the fact
that a "debt can be enforced by the creditor in one forum should not be the basis of depriving him of his
ability to enforce the debt in a different forum").
82. 570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
83. The factual scenario of Libra Bank provided the basis upon which the above model Case 1 is
composed. In the ensuing years following Libra Bank, the majority of exchange control cases implicating
the Act of State Doctrine came under the basic pattern of model Case 1; see, e.g., Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco
Credito Agrfcola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985); Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., 495 U.S.
660(1990). During the same time, however, other banking cases raising the Act of State increasingly fit the
mold of model Cases 2,4, and 5. See, e.g., Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1988); Riedel
v. Bancam, S.A., 792 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1986); Callejo v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985); Braka
v. Bancomer, S.A., 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985); Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. Galadari, 610 F.
Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 463 N.E.2d 5 (N.Y. 1984); Garcia v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984); Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,
660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981).
84. See Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 874.
85. Id. at 881-82.
86. Id.
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Some of the factors or "legal incidents" the Libra court emphasized
included the terms of the loan agreement respecting forum selection, choice of
law, and place of payment. Additionally, and perhaps, more importantly, the
court stressed the significance of the debtor bank's assets in the United States
and the attendant ability of the courts to enforce collection of the debt. The
court stated: "[s]ince Banco Nacional was found here and had considerable
assets here, 'the Act of State itself remain[ed] incomplete in the absence of
acquiescence by the forum state,' and in such a case as this, 'the obvious
inability of a foreign state to complete an expropriation of property beyond its
borders reduces the foreign state's expectations of dominion over that
property.'87 Clearly, Libra sought to meld the "fait accompli" rule with another,
more flexible fact-specific approach. In so doing, it set situs analysis on a
course substantially in tune with the territorial underpinnings of the Act of State
Doctrine."8
Only a few years later the Second and Fifth Circuits, again, made
significant strides in the adoption and further development of the "incidents of
the debt" rule. In Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 89 the Fifth Circuit expressly
adopted the "incidents of debt" rule. There the court dealt with a factual
scenario upon which model Case two is based: the Mexican government
imposed exchange control restrictions that directly prevented the debtor
Mexican bank from performing its certificate of deposit obligations to a United
States creditor. The creditor sued in the United States and the Mexican bank
raised the Act of State defense. The Fifth Circuit accepted the defense holding
that the situs of the certificate of deposit right was within the territory of
Mexico and thus subject to Mexican regulations.9" The rationale employed by
the court clearly evinced an attempt to ascertain whether Mexico had a
reasonable expectation of dominion over the debt. The court, in this respect,
focused on where the deposit was carried, the contractual choice of law and
forum, and collectability. 9" Since the parties had agreed to have the deposit
carried and payable in Mexico, and the creditor could only collect from the
debtor in Mexico, the court determined that the debt was properly sitused in
87. Id. at 884 (quoting Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1972)).
88. Id. (holding that where a foreign government contracts to repay a debt in the United States,
consents to jurisdiction, waives sovereign immunity, and continues to maintain substantial assets in the
United States, "it can hardly be said that this court's judgment shall frustrate the foreign state's reasonable
expectations of dominion over the legal rights involved therein so as to vex our amicable relations with that
foreign nation."); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,428 (1964) (declining to lay
down or reaffirm inflexible and all-encompassing rules).
89. 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985)
(indistinguishable factual pattern and legal outcome).
90. Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1124.
91. Id. at 1123-24.
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Mexico. The court, additionally, raised another seemingly significant factor for
situating the debt in Mexico stating: "[g]iven Mexico's interest in these
certificates of deposit, which were issued by a Mexican bank and payable in
Mexico, disregarding Mexico's exchange regulations would be a serious
affront."92 It appears from this statement that the court also considered the
sovereign's interest in the underlying private credit transaction.
1. The Factors
In recent time, the courts have increasingly stressed the importance of the
contractual terms of payment and choice of law and forum in determining debt
situs.93 In Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 94 the Second Circuit
expressly indicated that the intangible property right there, a certificate of
deposit allegedly confiscated by the Cuban government, was situated outside
Cuba due to a contractual stipulation in the debt instrument ensuring the safety
of the deposit against government acts. While this stipulation certainly would
have governed the legal rights as among the debtor and creditor, for the purpose
of locating the debt the court's reasoning was arguably flawed. First, the
deposit in Garcia was issued, carried, and maintained in Cuba, not in the United
States.95 Secondly, the creditor was not contractually deprived from collecting
the deposit in Cuba.' Thus, the debt situs for the purpose of Cuba's
confiscatory act was reasonably expected to be within the territory of Cuba.
Notwithstanding this considerable flaw, the courts, over the years, have
continued using contractual provisions as a weightier factor than the others.
Reflecting the traditional debt situs analyses, inpersonamjurisdiction over
the debtor and enforcement/collection power are, quite obviously, another set
of factors in the "incidents of debt" rule. Whereas as every court following an
"incidents of debt" analysis has considered these essential factors, the courts
following more traditional approaches to locating a debt have too, necessarily,
looked to the proper exercise of personal jurisdiction and, both, the ability to
enforce and collect debts to determine situs.97 The one point concerning this set
92. Id. at 1125.
93. See Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645,649 (2d Cir. 1984); Drexel Burnham
Lambert Group, Inc. v. Galadari, 610 F. Supp. 114, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Weston Banking Corp. v. Turkiye
Garanti Bankasi, A.S., 57 N.Y.2d 315 (1982).
94. 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984).
95. Id. at 647-50.
96. Id. at 647-50,652 (Kearse, J. dissenting) (stating that in the "present case, when Garcia and her
husband (collectively "Garcia") made their deposits and acquired their certificates, they agreed with Chase
that the debts could be collected on presentation of the certificates anywhere that Chase has a branch...
Cuba was not excluded") (emphasis added).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 56 through 80; see, e.g. F. & H.R. Farman-Farmaian Con-
sulting Eng'rs v. Harza Eng'g Co., 882 F.2d 281, 286 (7th Cir. 1989); Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164
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of factors that, to an extent, remains unsettled concerns shared collectability.
Similar to the problem confronted by the courts in applying the "jurisdiction
over debtor" rule where the forum and the acting state could validly exercise
jurisdiction, the incidence with which each state can now also exercise
enforcement and collection powers presents an area requiring clarification by
the courts.98 Essentially, where both, the acting and the forum state share
enforcement and collection powers over the intangible (derived from the same
power exercisable over the debtor), all else being equal, the court must consider
yet another factor to determine whether the foreign sovereign has retains a
reasonable expectation of dominion over that intangible.99
In Callejo, the Fifth Circuit, indeed, provided an additional factor on
which to potentially find the foreign sovereign's continued reasonable
expectation of dominion over a debt."° This factor, as mentioned above, would
allow the courts to consider the foreign sovereign's interests in the underlying
private credit transaction. In this respect, some of the interests the courts have
directly or indirectly recognized have been connected to the denomination of
the debt obligation in the foreign sovereign's currency.'"
2. Ordinary or Special Debt Situs Rules
The same year the Fifth Circuit decided Callejo, the Second Circuit had
chance to treat anew another debt crisis matter in the companion case for Libra.
In Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Cr~dito Agricola de Cartago,0 2 the court, once
more, considered the case of a Costa Rican bank's non-performance arising
from the same exchange control restrictions dealt with in Libra. The court in
Allied held, like Libra, that the debt situs was in the United States and not in
Costa Rica. Thus, the intangible property right held by the creditor was not and
could not be affected by the Costa Rican regulations, and was, as a result,
(6th Cir. 1988); Bandes v. Harlow & Jones, Inc., 852 F.2d 661,667 (2d Cir. 1988); Vishipco Line v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981); Tchacosh Co. v. Roskwell Int'l Corp., 766 F.2d 1333
(9th Cir. 1985); United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868, 874-75 (2d Cir. 1976); Republic of
Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 78 through 80.
99. See Frumkin, supra note 52, at 491-93 (arguing that an additional factor to consider in shared
collectability is whether the forum court can fully or substantially satisfy the debt obligation owed to the
creditor by execution of the debtor assets within the forum). This argument is a persuasive one, particularly,
as the lack of obtaining adequate collection relief in the forum may reasonably indicate to the acting state that
it has dominion over the regulated intangible.
100. See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1125 (5th Cir. 1985); Braka v. Bancomer, S.A.,
762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985). See also Frumkin, supra note 52, at 491-92.
101. Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1124; Tahyar, supra note 29, at 613.
102. 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985).
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enforceable in the United States. °3 The court's rationale, more than simply
apply the traditional mechanical rules, intimated that flexibility was an
important concern under the Doctrine's territoriality inquiry. °4
The result in Allied yielded yet another development in debt sits analysis.
Rather, than conform to the generally accepted "fait accompli" rules, the Allied
court made a distinction between "act of state sits analysis" and "ordinary
situs of debt analysis.""1 5 Judging from the court's opinion the reasonable
inference is that the court was no longer satisfied with the "fait accompli" rules
and instead was searching for a rule of reason, which it termed "ordinary situs
of debt analysis." On closer inspection, however, this "ordinary" analysis
considers similar, if not identical, factors as those in Libra: jurisdiction, place
of payment, and collectability.10 6 Interestingly, rather than characterizing the
analysis as one looking to the "incidents of debt", the court utilized the more
confusing term "ordinary situs analysis" as if to suggest the use of conflict of
laws rules to determine debt situs. °7
In contrast to the Allied court's leaning toward an "ordinary" conflict of
laws analysis, it has been suggested that the appropriate debt sits analysis
under the territoriality inquiry requires a unilateral focus on the expectations of
the foreign sovereign and not a balancing approach weighing the interests of theforum against those of the foreign sovereign." 8 This unilateral focus is,
arguably, implied in the Libra analysis as the court there elected not to directly
consider the potential interests of the forum in determining debt sits. The
Libra opinion consciously considered the factors outlined above (jurisdiction,
place of payment, collectability, etc.) as they related to the acting state's
reasonable expectation of dominion.
D. Devising a Continuum of Reasonableness
In determining an acting state's expectation of dominion over intangibles
the foregoing sits factors may combine to more accurately reflect the
103. Id. at 521.
104. Id. at 521-22.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 522.
107. Tahyar, supra note 29, at 611 n. 106 (noting the similarity between the debt analysis and conflict
of laws rule).
108. Id.; Miller, supra note 25, at 673; Chow, supra note 7, at 443; Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICr OF LAWS § 6 (1971); Michael Gruson, The Act of State Doctrine in Contract Cases As a Conflict-
of Laws Rule, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 519, 520 (1988); Paul N. Filzer, The Continued Viability of the Act of
State Doctrine in Foreign Branch Bank Expropriation Cases, 3 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 99, 124-25
(1988); Edmund W. Sim, Throwing A Monkey Wrench Into the Wheels of International Finance: Wells
FargoAsia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 11 MICH. J. INT'LL. 1039, 1058-59 (1990); Miller, supra note 25, at 683.
reasonableness of that expectation.' °9 The ability to enforce and collect is
essential elements in determining reasonableness. So too is the power to assert
in personam jurisdiction over the debtor. Consideration of contractual
stipulations (place of payment, choice of law and forum, country risk insurance,
etc.) between the underlying private parties is an important element, but is
likely not one of fundamental value for a state's reasonable expectation of
dominion.
1. Strongest Expectation of Dominion
An acting state's regulations, when viewed through the unilateral situs
analysis, are seized with the strongest possible expectation of dominion where
the state has jurisdiction over the debtor, power to enforce and collect, and is,
either, by default or design of the underlying private parties the place of
payment. The exemplary cases on this point are Callejo and Braka. These
cases provide the factual scenario upon which model Case two is based.
2. Strong Expectation of Dominion
Following the strongest case for the acting sovereign is the fact pattern
where the state, again, has the sole power to enforce and collect the intangible
and jurisdiction over the debtor. Unlike the case above, reasonableness here
may require that the acting state have exclusive power to levy against the
debtor's assets within its sovereign territory. There have been a number of
decisions indicating that this would likely be the accepted result on this point:
Bandes v. Harlow & Jones,"0 Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank,"'
Tchacosh Co. v. Roskwell Int'l Corp.,"2 and F. & H.R. Fannan-Farmaian
Consulting Eng'rs v. Harza Eng'g Co."3 These cases provide the factual
scenarios upon which model Cases three and five.
3. Substantial Expectation of Dominion
On the fringes of reasonableness, a state may still retain sufficient
dominion over a debt so as to come expect judicial abstention from the forum
109. See Miller, supra note 25, at 675-79.
110. 852 F.2d 661,667 (2d Cir. 1988).
111. 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965).
112. 766 F.2d 1333 (9th Cir. 1985). The facts in Tchacosh clearly also evokes the strongest
expectation of dominion for the acting sovereign. The Ninth Circuit held there that the acting state was the
place where the service contract between the parties was to be performed and where payment was impliedly
to be made.
113. 882 F.2d 281,286 (7thCir. 1989). Similar to Tchacosh, the Seventh Circuit in Farmaian, also
determined that shared enforcement and collection power did not lower the acting state's expectation of
dominion where the contractual and implied obligations were performable within the acting state.
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state where jurisdiction over the debtor can be asserted, but the power to
enforce and collect is shared with the forum state, and no other contractual
factor serves to further connect the acting sovereign with the intangible. In this
case, the acting sovereign may validly be held to retain dominion if it has a
legitimate interest in the underlying private credit transaction between the
parties. Under the additional "tie-breaking" factor in Callejo and Braka, this
interest is implicated by the acting sovereign's inherent right to regulate its
national currency and payment obligations denominated in such currency.' 4
IV. CONCLUSION
The financial obligations of developing and debtor nations, as well as the
obligations of private debtors within these debtor nations is, once more,
becoming a mounting concern for private international creditors. The fact that
these nations have in the past resorted, and may again look to drastic policy
measures to contain economic downturns should alert international and
domestic creditors to the attendant legal implications of such purely sovereign
maneuvers. The Act of State Doctrine is just one of the several jurisprudential
concerns in international credit disputes; however, to a greater degree than the
other concerns, it evokes profound considerations of sovereignty and
international comity. Moreover, the Doctrine's territoriality inquiry,
particularly with respect to disputes over intangibles, has for many years mired
the judiciary in a morass of, on one-hand rigid standards, and on the other,
unconvincing rationale on the situs of indefinable cross-border property rights.
If any one notion on debt situs persists, it should fundamentally necessitate
legal and analytical flexibility, and must consider the reasonable expectation of
a sovereign to regulate property rights within its territory.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 97 through 100.
